



Part I

Multilateralism as a Guiding Principle for the Future of Global Order





Multilateralism and Unilateralism: The Way Forward

Makmur Widodo

“Might is Right” or “Right is Might”?

The topic for this paper is one of the contemporary international issues under debate and is indeed complex. This paper concerns multilateralism and unilateralism, with a view to achieving a better understanding for the future. As I often encounter, many have questioned the importance, as well as relevance, of multilateralism in dealing with global problems. Why do states choose to act alone? Has the world become a more dangerous place and reverted to the dark ages where “might is right”, or could “right is might” prevail?

Let me begin the discussion by presenting several principles associated with the topic. First of all, multilateralism champions the United Nations (UN) as having the central role in dealing with international problems as well as in finding solutions. Multilateralism means international affairs *à la charte*, centre-piecing the UN Charter, based on its principles and purposes.

Secondly, multilateralism empowers international law, legality, legitimacy and authority, as well as the primacy of compliance and facts, as its instruments of choice when dealing with global issues. Actors in international affairs utilise *adroit* diplomacy, dialogue, cooperation and partnership, within the spirit of shared responsibility, in efforts to maintain international peace and security.

The United States, through its initiatives and inspirational leaders, gave the world the League of Nations and the United Nations respectively following the end of the two devastating world wars of the past century. Under President Roosevelt's leadership, a network of institutions, with the United Nations at its centre, was founded in which the people of the world could work together for the common good. President Harry Truman further enunciated the fundamental premise in 1945:

We all have to recognize that no matter how great our strength, we must deny ourselves the license to do always as we please. No one nation ... can or should expect any special privilege which harms any other nation. ... Unless we are willing to pay that price, no organisation for world peace can accomplish its purpose. And what a reasonable price that is!

In September 2000, Heads of States and their representatives from 191 countries gathered in New York and agreed upon a monumental UN Millennium Declaration. This historic document reflects the commitment of world leaders to addressing various challenges facing mankind in the new millennium.

In contrast, principles of unilateralism have negated the UN as the pre-eminent institution of multilateralism. Unilateralism views multilateralism *a la carte* (instead of *a la charte*). When interests collide, actors discard multilateral efforts and instead embark on efforts that are in their own national interest.

Many analysts have attributed acts of unilateralism to the current US foreign policy, e.g. the Bush Doctrine of Stra-

tegic Pre-emptive Strike (September 2002). This strategy favours the traditional doctrine of *jus ad bellum* (the right to attack) and *jus in bello* (how armed force is applied). It reflects might is right, survival of the fittest, and Pax Americana.

The US has asserted that it will use force, where necessary, to defend its interests with or without UN Security Council (UNSC) approval, and has rejected agreements that could be interpreted as contrary to key aspects of the US military doctrine. The US has never had any interest except not to be threatened, and when threatened, to remove that threat.

The Need to “Return to the UN”

Using the words of UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Kofi Annan, the UN is now at a crossroad (or fork in the road), with two contradictory paths to choose from, as it is facing such enormous global threats. Several critics have even questioned the relevance of the UN, especially in the aftermath of the horrendous September 11 terror attacks.

Current developments in Iraq are even more discouraging. The United States has opted to take military action against Iraq without the UN Security Council’s authorisation. In September 2002, President Bush notified the UN Organisation to “...act against Iraq—that was considered violating the Council’s Resolution—or be irrelevant”. In March 2003, the US unilaterally launched its military against Iraq. UNSG Kofi Annan called on the US-led Coalition in Iraq to respect the Geneva Convention, but US officials sidelined diplomacy in favour of military force. Against these unilateralist actions, the international community (UN Security Council) has failed to rubberstamp the American military action against Iraq.

During the 58th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2003 in New York, member states once again voiced the need to “return to the United Na-

tions”, by recognising multilateralism as the key to resolving global issues and at the same time rebuffing unilateralism.

President Megawati Soekarnoputri during her speech in the General Debate said to the UNGA Session:

...It must be admitted that the United Nations has displayed its merits and contributions. ...The United Nations has developed and strived to implement international laws. ...it has also instituted... an array of legal instruments very useful in preventing and settling conflicts among states as well as in promoting a framework of cooperation among nations.

At the same time, French President Jacques Chirac further declared in the UNGA General Debate that “Multilateralism is the key, for it ensures the participation of all in the management of world affairs. It is a guarantee of legitimacy and democracy in matters regarding the use of force.”

Denouncing the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive war for rocking the foundations of UN collective security, UNSG Kofi Annan told the Session:

This logic represents a fundamental challenge to the principles on which, however imperfectly, world peace and stability have rested for the last fifty-eight years. My concern is that, if it were to be adopted, it could set precedents that resulted in a proliferation of the unilateral and lawless use of force, with or without justification.

Yet Mr. Annan acknowledged that denunciation would lead to nowhere. So he further said:

But it is not enough to denounce unilateralism, unless we also face up squarely to the concerns that make some States feel uniquely vulnerable, since it is those concerns that drive them to take unilateral actions. We must show that those concerns can, and will, be addressed effectively through collective action.

Acknowledging that some Member States opposed his decision to go to war in Iraq, President Bush told the same UNGA Session:



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Yet there was, and there remains, unity among us on the fundamental principles and objectives of the United Nations. We are dedicated to the defense of our collective security and to the advance of human rights. These permanent commitments call us great work in the world, work we must do together. So let us move forward.

On Iraq, he further said:

America is working with friends and allies on a new Security Council resolution, which will expand the UN's role in Iraq.

On the work of the UN, President Bush stated:

As an original signer of the UN Charter, the USA is committed to the UN. And we show that commitment by working to fulfill the UN's stated purposes, and give meaning to its ideals...

But it is not only world leaders who have denounced a foreign policy of unilateralism. Even the American public has voiced their support for multilateralism. A poll released just hours after Bush's speech to the UN on September 23, 2003 found a solid majority of the US public favours giving the UN a greater role in guiding the political future and reconstruction of Iraq. Seventy per cent of respondents say that they support a "significant role" for the UN, while a majority of fifty-one per cent say the US should be prepared to give up some military control to the world body in order to get other countries to deploy troops to Iraq, according to a survey of 1,500 people by the Pew Research Centre for People and Press.

Now we ask ourselves, what is the way forward for the UN and multilateralism? My argument is that the UN is not irrelevant. The challenge that it faces is to reaffirm its relevance so that "the law of the jungle" cannot prevail. To reach this end, the international community must agree to fundamentally overhaul the UN.

Again let me remind you of Mr. Annan's powerful statement to the UNGA Session: "We have come to a fork in the road". To this end, Mr. Annan expressed his intention to

establish a High-Level Panel of Eminent Personalities, entrusted with four tasks: first, to examine current challenges to peace and security; second, to consider the contribution that collective action can make in addressing these challenges; third, to review the functioning of the major organs of the UN and the relationships between them; fourth, to recommend ways of strengthening the UN through the reform of its institutions and processes.

The panel is requested to report back to the UNSG before the beginning of the 59th UNGA session next year, so that the UNSG can make recommendations to the Assembly. Only then can all member countries, including the US, make the firm and clear decisions needed.

In final analysis, the UN cannot be preserved and reformed without cooperation and commitment from the US, however distressing this may be. For the US, working within the UN will allow it to maximise what Joseph Nye calls “soft power”—the ability to attract and persuade others to adopt the American agenda, rather than relying solely on the dissuasive or coercive “hard power” of military force. US credibility is indeed at stake.

It is worth reminding the US of the leadership and inspiration of President Theodore Roosevelt as well as the fundamental premise pronounced by President Harry Truman in 1945, about the need for all nations to fully observe a foreign policy based on enlightened national interest.

Finally, I would like to quote parts of a letter written by Ustadz Abdullah Gymnastiar to President Bush:

Mr Bush. Understand that we live on this earth one time. And in a moment, history notes in gold ink those people who honestly develop and protect weak countries, intensify friendships, and develop an ethical and moral civilisation. And history writes in blood of people who carry out tyranny, murder and slaughter because of personal desire. Supposing the moment of death arrives, with which ink will your name be written?



US Foreign Policy: Our Place in the Community of Nations

Ralph L. Boyce

Over the past months, there has been a lot of talk in Indonesia and elsewhere in the world about the goals of US foreign policy, and much of this talk has revealed some fundamental misunderstandings and false perceptions about the way we Americans see our place in the world and how we define our foreign policy objectives. This article will clarify these sorts of misunderstandings and misperceptions by explaining our foreign policy vision in general terms.

The overall aim of United States foreign policy is to make the world not just safer but better by enhancing political and economic freedom, fostering peaceful relations with other nations, and encouraging respect for human dignity. We hope that our efforts will lead to decades of peace, prosperity, and liberty. To help build this safer and better world, the United States is concentrating on five major

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foreign policy themes: Defusing Regional Conflicts; Defeating Global Terrorism; Promoting Human Dignity; Preventing Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; and Promoting Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade.

Before I address the substance of these five major foreign policy themes, let me first deal with a false perception that I have heard in Indonesia and elsewhere in the world, and that is the sense that the United States is intent on going it alone and is no longer interested in working together with other nations or international organisations in dealing with the world's most serious problems. I suspect that this perception is reflected in the title of our dialogue session: "Unilateralism versus Multilateralism: The Future of Global Order". Frankly, this perception is not accurate. As I discuss our five major foreign policy themes, I will point out specific examples of how the United States has worked and continues to work within the community of nations to build a safer and better world—whether through partnerships with like-minded countries or through multilateral organisations such as the United Nations. I will also briefly discuss the role of the US Embassy in Jakarta in implementing our five major foreign policy themes in the Indonesian context.

Defusing Regional Conflicts

The first theme of American foreign policy is working with other nations and international institutions to defuse regional conflicts.

Concerned nations must remain actively engaged in critical regional disputes to avoid explosive escalation and to minimise human suffering. In an increasingly interconnected world, regional crises can strain alliances, rekindle rivalries among nations, and create horrifying affronts to human dignity. When violence erupts and states falter, the United States will work with friends and partners to allevi-

ate suffering and restore stability.

No doctrine can anticipate every circumstance in which US action—direct or indirect—is warranted. We have finite political, economic, and military resources to meet our global priorities. The United States will approach each case with these strategic principles in mind: First, The United States will invest time and resources into building international relationships and institutions that can help manage local crises when they emerge. Second, The United States will be realistic about our ability to help those who are unwilling or unready to help themselves. Where and when people are ready to do their part, we will be willing to move decisively.

Let's look at some fairly recent examples in which the US acted in concert with the international community to end bloody regional conflict and rescue millions of people, mostly Muslims, in the Balkans. As we saw during the debate on the Iraq issue, some people simply assume that the United Nations is the only multilateral entity capable of effectively resolving complex international problems. While it is true that UN Peacekeeping Operations have often done excellent work in many places throughout the world, the UN Peacekeeping Operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s clearly demonstrated the limits of United Nations effectiveness. The operation was plagued from the outset by indecisiveness and bickering within the UN Security Council and UN Headquarters: meanwhile, hundreds of thousands if not millions of people were forcibly expelled from their homes and subjected to horrific acts of savagery. If the Bosnia experience displayed the limits of UN peacekeeping, it also showed the indispensable nature of strong US leadership to fill a leadership vacuum. I am proud to say that, when it became obvious that the United Nations could not meet the challenges posed in Bosnia, the US stepped forward to lead NATO efforts to put an end to the chaos and carnage of ethnic cleansing and to broker a negotiated settle-

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ment to the conflict. The US remains a leader in international efforts to maintain stability in that region.

During the Kosovo crisis in 1999, when it became apparent that a deadlocked United Nations Security Council was unable or unwilling to prevent in a timely manner the forcible expulsion, rape, and murder of hundreds of thousands of Muslim Kosovars, it was American leadership of NATO military efforts that prevented a repeat of the Bosnia catastrophe. Thanks to US-led efforts, the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo was halted early in the process and hundreds of thousands of Muslim Kosovars were able to return to their homes and their land. Thanks to US-led efforts, Slobodan Milosovic—the man who introduced the hateful expression “ethnic cleansing” into the world’s vocabulary—sleeps in a prison cell and stands before an international tribunal to face charges of crimes against humanity.

It is interesting to compare Indonesian and world reaction to US-led military intervention in Kosovo and reaction to US-led military intervention in Iraq. Even though the Kosovo conflict was resolved outside of a United Nations mandate, I do not recall criticism from Indonesians or, for that matter anyone else besides a few Serbs who were vested in the Milosevic regime, that the US had “violated the sanctity of the United Nations” or had turned away from a multilateral approach to conflict resolution. There were no demonstrations in front of our Embassy, no mass marches down Thamrin street in Jakarta demanding an end to US-led intervention, no angry editorials in the Indonesian press. On the contrary, there were some expressions of appreciation for US-led efforts to rescue innocent civilians, mostly Muslim civilians, from acts of unspeakable barbarism. But mostly there was silence. Let’s compare this reaction to the reaction surrounding the recent US-led intervention in Iraq. There are numerous striking similarities between the Kosovo and Iraq efforts. Both were conducted without a United Nations mandate. Both involved military intervention by a



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coalition of like-minded nations under United States leadership. Both led to the ouster of cruel dictators who had brutalised their own people and threatened their neighbours. Both resulted in the liberation of people—mostly Muslim, in both cases—who had suffered greatly. Two very similar situations, yet two very different reactions. In the Kosovo effort we were hailed as heroes, rescuers of the innocent. In the Iraq effort we were criticised as selfish unilateralists with a hidden oil agenda. I ask you to ask yourselves about this difference and why it exists.

Let's turn to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, perhaps the most difficult and deeply-rooted regional conflict in the world today. It is of great importance to the United States because of its toll of human suffering, because of America's close relationship with key Arab states and the state of Israel, and because of the region's importance to our other global priorities. There can be no peace for either side without freedom for both sides. America stands committed to an independent and democratic Palestine, living beside Israel in peace and security. Like all other people, Palestinians deserve a government that serves their interests and listens to their voices. The United States is working directly with the parties and the other so-called Quartet members—Russia, the European Union, and the UN—to implement a “road map” to peace, and we continue to encourage the parties to step up to their responsibilities as we seek a just and comprehensive settlement to the conflict. We are fully aware that this process is extremely difficult and that there will be many “one step forward one step backwards” moments such as we have seen over the past months. Despite the difficulty, we believe that a peaceful resolution is possible and we are committed to working with the parties and the international community to achieve it.

Indonesia also understands the importance of defusing regional conflicts, as we saw in your government's important role in helping to end conflict in Cambodia a number

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of years ago. With regard to the past crisis in East Timor, we are pleased that Indonesia appears intent on developing cordial relations with the government in Dili, although we would like to see a greater degree of accountability imposed upon Indonesians who participated in past atrocities in East Timor. We worked hard together with Japan, other nations, and NGOs to support a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Aceh within the framework of a united Indonesia. We stand ready to resume these efforts in the future. As we have said many times, the United States Government fully supports the territorial integrity of Indonesia. We do not and will not support separatist movements in Aceh, Maluku, Papua, or elsewhere within Indonesia.

Defeating Global Terrorism

The second theme of our foreign policy is working together with other nations and with multilateral organisations to defeat global terrorism with the aim of preventing attacks against the US or our friends.

In today's world, the enemy of peace-loving people is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. Our common enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocent people. Both the US and Indonesia have experienced the pain and horror of terrorism deep within our respective homelands—for Americans, we were struck on September 11, 2001 in cowardly attacks that killed over 3,000 innocent people, Americans and nationals of 80 nations including Indonesia. Indonesians were awakened to the brutal reality of terrorism on a quiet Saturday night in Bali, when another cowardly attack killed over 200 innocent Indonesians, Americans, Australians, and others. Indonesia felt the pain of terrorism again on August 5, 2003, when terrorists attacked the J.W. Marriott Hotel here in Jakarta, killing 12 people—mostly Indonesian taxi drivers who were struggling to make a living and support their families—and injuring 147 others.

Every year, the US State Department produces a report on international terrorism entitled “Patterns of Global Terrorism”, which can be downloaded from the State Department website at *www.state.gov*. In this report, the US Government defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience”. I mention the report and the definition of terrorism as a lead-in to an important point: The global campaign against terrorism is not a campaign against any particular religion or ethnic group or ideology. It is a campaign against criminals who employ terror and kill innocent peoples for a political cause. If you read the “Patterns of Global Terrorism” report, you will see that terrorist acts are perpetrated by a wide variety of groups and individuals of many nationalities, races, ethnic groups, and self-professed religious affiliations in many different parts of the world, from Peru and Colombia to Sri Lanka, from Greece and Northern Ireland to Central Asia. Though they may hail from different backgrounds and different ethnic and religious groups, terrorists generally exhibit several common characteristics: cowardice; a callous disregard for human life; and a desire to use violence against the innocent as a substitute for peaceful participation in a political process. Think for a moment about the many people whose lives were ruined two months ago outside the Marriott Hotel—people you might have seen on the street or in a shop only the day before they were killed or disfigured for life—and you will understand the reality of terrorism and why we must work hard together to fight back against it.

The terrorist threat is global in scope, and it has many dimensions. The United States has joined together with many countries—including Indonesia—in a broad international coalition with an aim to combat terrorism. This is another example not of American unilateralism, but rather of US attempts to build the broadest possible multilateral alliance against terror. We base our cooperation with our

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international partners on four basic principles: First, we make no concessions to terrorists and we refuse to strike deals with them. Second, we aim to bring terrorists to justice for their crimes. Third, we strive to isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior. Fourth, we stand ready to strengthen the counter-terrorist capabilities of those countries that work with us and require assistance.

The efforts of the US and our international partners have already met with important successes. The people of Afghanistan have been liberated from tyranny and oppression under the brutal Taliban regime and their Al-Qaeda henchmen. The Taliban regime was ousted not by unilateral action by the United States, but by a coalition of like-minded nations. With the help of the international community, the long-suffering Afghan people for the first time in a generation have an opportunity to develop their country peacefully and democratically. Law enforcement agencies in the US and in many other countries—including Indonesia—have broken up terrorist cells, arrested hundreds of Al-Qaeda members and operatives from related terror rings, frozen terrorist assets and disrupted their sources of funding, and greatly degraded the operational capacity of Al-Qaeda and similar radical networks.

The global campaign against terror is not over. As we experienced with the Marriott Hotel bombing, the threat of terrorism has not passed. It is clear that terror cells continue to plot further death and destruction, not just against Americans but against all people who value freedom and decency. Like the innocent taxi drivers who happened to be parked outside the Marriott Hotel in the early afternoon of August 5 or the Marriott Hotel employees who worked long hours with the hope that they could give their children a better life. We must come together to ensure that the terrorists do not succeed in their evil designs. We must not get bogged down in semantic arguments over the meaning or symbolic

significance of the names terror groups choose for themselves, because that might cause us to lose sight of our mutual goal of stopping attacks before they happen. The governments of the world's nations have a major role to play in this campaign, a campaign that is waged on many fronts—on diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, financial and yes, sometimes even military fronts. Just as governments have an important role to play in this endeavor, the ordinary citizens of the world's nations also have a vital role. By promoting peace, tolerance, mutual respect and mutual understanding among the people of this increasingly small planet, ordinary people can help create an atmosphere in which terror cannot thrive.

In the sad aftermath of the Bali and Marriott bombings, we see that both the Indonesian Government and the Indonesian people now have a more realistic understanding of the global terror threat, just as my government and my people were forced to have a more realistic understanding of terrorism by the attacks of September 11, 2001. The US and Indonesia are committed to assisting each other to accomplish our mutual goal of eradicating terrorism. We are pleased with the steps Indonesia has already taken in this regard, such as a thorough and professional investigation of the Bali and Marriott bombings, the arrest of suspected perpetrators of terrorist acts here and abroad, and the prosecution of suspected perpetrators. In order to assist Indonesia, we are undertaking a long-term security and counter-terrorism program with the Indonesian Government valued at over \$50 million. Secretary of State Powell signaled our appreciation for Indonesia's cooperation in the campaign against terror when he asked the US Congress for a total of \$136 million in economic, law enforcement and democracy assistance for Indonesia in this year's budget. We look forward to continue working closely with our Indonesian partners as we pursue our mutual goal of suppressing and preventing terrorism.

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Promoting Human Dignity

The third foreign policy theme is the promotion of aspirations for human dignity. The United States stands for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property.

To promote these values we are committed to five agenda. First, speaking out honestly about violations of human dignity using our voice. Second, voting international institutions to advance freedom. Third, using our foreign aid to promote freedom and support those who struggle non-violently for it, ensuring that nations moving toward democracy are rewarded for the steps they take. Fourth, making freedom and the development of democratic institutions key themes in our bilateral relations, seeking solidarity and cooperation from other democracies while we press governments that deny human rights to move toward a better future. Fifth, making special efforts to promote freedom of religion and conscience and defend it from encroachment by repressive governments.

In the Indonesian context, we have been very active in working with the Government of Indonesia, non-governmental organisations, and other elements of civil society to help Indonesia emerge from decades of authoritarian rule and develop a vibrant, functioning democracy. Our assistance in this area ranges from electoral aid to promotion of greater respect for human rights and judicial reform. We are also working with Indonesian Government and concerned NGOs to stop the trafficking and exploitation of women and children.

Preventing Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The fourth general theme of US foreign policy is focused on preventing our enemies from threatening the United

States, our allies, or our friends, with weapons of mass destruction.

In the 1990s we witnessed the emergence of a small number of rogue states that, while different in important ways, share a number of attributes. These states first, brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal gain and ambitions of the rulers; second, display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party; third, are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes; fourth, sponsor terrorism around the globe; and fifth, reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.

It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat, and only after September 11, 2001 did we fully comprehend the danger posed by the union of rogue states and terrorist organisations, particularly regarding the very real possibility that a rogue state might supply a weapon of mass destruction for use by terrorists. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they will rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning. As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, causing mass civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists and these losses would be many times more severe if terrorists acquired and used weapons of mass destruction.

I have already discussed the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as an example of a rogue state which allowed its territory to be used by a terrorist organisation—Al-Qaeda—to train for, plan and launch terror attacks. Since the Taliban were unable to provide Al-Qaeda with real weapons of mass

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destruction, Al-Qaeda turned commercial airliners into weapons of mass destruction.

Saddam Hussein's Iraq was an example of a rogue state which, like the Taliban regime, had connections with international terror groups and a motive for using such groups to strike at the United States. Like the Taliban regime, Saddam Hussein was ousted not by unilateral action by the United States, but by a coalition of like-minded nations. Now that Saddam Hussein has joined other infamous dictators and tyrants in the *tempat sampah* (rubbish bin) of history, the United States is committed to helping the people of Iraq build a nation that is whole, free, and at peace with itself and its neighbors. We support the aspirations of Iraq's people for a united, representative government that upholds human rights and the rule of law as cornerstones of democracy.

The world's media are focused almost exclusively on attacks by Saddam regime remnants and their terrorist allies that are mostly taking place in a relatively small area of a large country. However, the media are not telling us about many of the good things that have happened and are happening today in Iraq. The Iraqi people have formed a Governing Council, a broadly representative administrative body that will oversee the transition to democratic rule by drafting a new constitution and then conducting national elections. The Governing Council has appointed a cabinet whose members represented their nation recently at the United Nations General Assembly and OPEC meetings. All major Iraqi cities and most towns have municipal councils. An independent Iraqi Central Bank has been established. A new Iraqi police force conducts joint patrols with coalition forces. We are training a new Iraqi army—today some 56,000 Iraqis are participating in the defense of their country. Hospitals and schools have been renovated and reopened. Iraq's long-neglected infrastructure is being repaired and made operational. Our objective is not to create dependency but to encourage Iraqi independence, by giving Iraqis increas-

ing responsibility for the security and governance of their country. Long-term stability comes not from the presence of coalition forces but from the development of functioning local institutions. The sooner Iraqis can take responsibility for their own affairs, the sooner coalition forces will return home.

We know that Iraq's transition will be neither quick nor easy. But we, the international community, and the Iraqi people will not be deterred by the murderous acts of a handful of former Saddam Hussein regime desperados and imported terrorists who seek to slow Iraq's irreversible progress toward freedom and democracy. We urge the Government of Indonesia and all other members of the international community to support the Iraqi people in their efforts to build a just and pluralistic society.

Promoting Global Economic Growth through Free Market and Free Trade

The fifth and final theme of our foreign policy is our determination to promote a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade.

A strong world economy enhances world security by advancing prosperity and freedom. Economic growth supported by free trade and free markets creates new jobs and higher incomes. It allows people to lift their lives out of poverty, spurs economic and legal reform, furthers the fight against corruption, and reinforces the values of liberty.

We are promoting economic growth and economic freedom beyond America's shores, and engaging with Indonesia and other countries to underscore the benefits of policies that generate higher productivity and sustained economic growth, including: first, pro-growth legal and regulatory policies to encourage business investment, innovation, and entrepreneurial activity; second, rule of law and intolerance of corruption so that people are confident that they will be able to enjoy the fruits of their economic endeavors; third, strong

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financial systems that allow capital to be put to its most efficient use; fourth, sound fiscal policies to support business activity; fifth, investment in health and education that improve the well-being and skills of the labor force and population as a whole; and sixth, free trade that provides new avenues for growth and fosters the diffusion of technologies and ideas that increase productivity and opportunity.

The lessons of history are clear: market economies, not command-and-control economies with the heavy hand of government, are the best way to promote prosperity and reduce poverty. Policies that further strengthen market incentives and market institutions are relevant for all economies—industrialised countries, emerging markets, and the developing world.

We have worked with Indonesia in all these areas for many years. We welcome the progress made in restoring macro economic stability in Indonesia as a result of sound fiscal and monetary policies. We continue to work with Indonesia to attract greater flows of foreign investment that would boost growth, create jobs, and reduce poverty. This of course will require continued reforms, particularly in the areas of greater transparency and legal reform to strengthen the rule of law and reduce corruption, and structural reforms to create the institutions for long-term growth. Indonesia is only one of many nations—China, Vietnam, Thailand, India and others—competing for investment capital in the trillions of dollars (far surpassing aid flows). Potential investors look closely at areas such as corruption, legal transparency, and tax policy before making investment decisions. Not only do we work closely with Indonesia bilaterally, but also multilaterally through organisations such as APEC and the WTO, to create an environment that fosters free trade within the Asia Pacific region and throughout the world.

I hope that I have provided some clarity regarding the “unilateralism versus multilateralism” question by explaining with examples of how the United States performs its



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role within the community of the world's nations. The US is engaged in many different issues with many different international partners: with the Quartet to bring about peace in the Middle East, with a broad coalition of at least 34 nations to assist in Iraq's security and reconstruction efforts, with NATO and other countries to help the people of Afghanistan overcome a legacy of pain and violence, and with Indonesia and scores of other nations to rid the world of the scourge of terrorism. There is one initiative where I must confess that some might conclude the United States is acting more or less unilaterally, and that is President Bush's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. This project goes beyond all current international efforts to help the people in the most AIDS-ravaged nations of Africa and the Caribbean. The United States has committed to spend \$15 billion on this project over the next five years. Even this initiative, however, has a multilateral element, as we will work with UNICEF and the WHO to administer relief.

As I have already noted throughout my remarks, US and Indonesia are actively engaged on a wide variety of important issues, and we are doing so in a cordial, cooperative, and mutually respectful manner. President Bush and President Megawati Soekarnoputri enjoy an excellent working rapport, and they periodically discuss important world issues by telephone. Senior US Government officials also have warm working relations with their Indonesian counterparts. My government understands and respects the complexity, diversity, and regional importance of Indonesia. The true test of the strength of a bilateral relationship is the way that two countries deal with issues over which they have a fundamental difference of opinion. Our two governments have had a few of these kinds of differences of opinion in the past, and we will probably experience a few more in the years to come. But these differences of opinion have not damaged our bilateral relationship—instead, we have always exchanged views in a calm and rational manner and, when



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necessary, agreed to disagree, which is a true sign of a stable and mature friendship. We hope that this friendship will be further strengthened as our two countries continue to work together toward shared goals in a spirit of mutual respect and appreciation.





Third World Countries in the Global Order

Makmur Keliat

In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union there have been conflicting opinions on the position of Third World countries in the global order. In general there have been two opposing views. On one hand some have opined that Third World countries in the global order have become increasingly marginalised. The dissolution is said to have shifted the world from being bipolar to unipolar, primarily led and directed by the United States. The space and options for Third World countries to formulate national policy independent of major powers are, accordingly, believed to have become more limited.

On the other hand, some have argued that the dissolution of the Soviet Union has provided all countries, including the Third World, with an opportunity to resolve ideological conflicts and evolve a kind of peace unprecedented in modern history, particularly since the end of the Second

World War in 1945. This optimism has been based on the view that the end of the Cold War would encourage decision makers all over the world to end their ideological confrontation. The first priority and top agenda for all decision makers would be how to intensify cooperation in order to eradicate poverty and reduce economic disparity between countries. As the end of Cold War was meant to be the end of the arms race, the proponents of this view have projected that resources previously allocated to the military sector can be transferred to social and economic developments. In short, arguments to build up military forces will find no political legitimacy either at an international or domestic level.

In essence, the first view points out that in the post-Cold War era Third World countries are under the menace of US unilateralism. In contrast, the second view puts forward a rosy scenario for multilateralism. The following paper, with the different arguments, attempts to show the reliability of the first view. By taking into account the war launched by the US against Iraq the paper seeks to argue that the idea of multilateralism is still a long way from being realised. However, this is not to say that there are not limits to the US exercising its political zeal for unilateralism.

For this purpose, the paper will be divided into three main parts. The first part will highlight the position of Third World countries in the global order. It will begin with the definition what we mean by Third World countries and global order. The second part will attempt to explain why the US attacks against Iraq did not have widespread support even from people in developed countries. By taking into account the limits of military power and the rise of the constructivist perspective in the discipline of international relations there is still a lot of room to restrain acts of unilateralism. The third part will offer plausible reasons behind the American unilateralism and its consequences for Third World countries' relations with the US.

Marginalised Countries

The term “Third World countries” was fashionable during the era of the Cold War when the Soviet Union still existed. It mainly refers to countries that were neither part of the Western bloc nor part of the Socialist-Communist bloc. While members of the Western bloc were all called developed countries, the Communist bloc was known as the second world. Since it had been greatly imbued with ideological connotations, and because of the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself, the term “developing countries” instead of the Third World seems to have become more familiar to the academic community in the recent past. For practical reasons, however, both terms will be used interchangeably in this paper. If considered from a geographical perspective, countries situated in Africa, Latin America, and Asia except Japan are commonly considered to be the Third World or developing countries.

There are at least three main reasons why the distinction between the terms Third World and developed countries has been made and why the terms have become significant. The first is to differentiate the levels of welfare. It has become a factual reality that there is remarkable inequality between people who live in developing and those who live in developed countries. The striking contrast between the two entities, both in economic and social terms, can easily be found. This, for instance, can be seen from “The World Development Report” 2003 just released by the World Bank. It shows that currently 2.8 billion people in developing countries live on less than \$2 a day. Meanwhile, the average income in the richest 20 countries is 37 times that in the poorest 20. In fact that ratio is said to have doubled in the past 40 years.¹

Similarly when considering the rate of infant mortality and life expectancy, the difference between developed and developing countries has also become obvious. The World Fact Book 2002 shows that the infant mortality rate in de-

veloped countries is always far lower than that of developing countries. Similarly, based on the WHO report, the developed countries are ranked far higher in terms of life expectancy than developing countries. It is also worth mentioning that if we refer to the study conducted by Ankie Hoogvelt, not much significant change has taken place for the last 200 years in the share owned by Third World countries in world trade. Hoogvelt's study shows that the contribution of the regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America to world trade from 1800 to 1990 was a fairly constant 20 per cent.²

The second reason is to unite political aspiration at an international level. Leaders of Third World countries have made collective efforts to reduce inequality through international and regional forums. The establishment of non-aligned movements and G-7, including the attempts to strengthen the South-South cooperation, are cases in point. The forums convey the message that there has been a political presumption among the leaders of developing countries that part of the problem of inequality has its roots in asymmetric relations between developed and developing countries. They seem to have also been aware that developing countries are weak in terms of both soft and hard power, and therefore it is impossible to change the asymmetric relations unless they build a united position on a number of issues *vis-à-vis* developed countries.

In other words, one could say that the term Third World or developing countries has become instrumental for leaders of developing countries in building and strengthening a collective identity *vis-à-vis* developed countries. However, such efforts, as stated earlier, have not gained significant results in terms of collectively improving the level of welfare in developing countries. Moreover, the success story of some developing countries, shown in their impressive economic growth, especially in some countries in the South East and East Asian regions, have reduced the significance

and weakened the importance of collective efforts.

The success stories have encouraged a number of academics to go back to conventional explanations for the poor records of economic development in most developing countries. Instead of placing the blame on structural constraints at an international level, they have relied on cultural factors at a national level. This, for instance, was clearly indicated by Samuel P. Huntington when he explained the reasons behind the failure of Ghana and the success of South Korea. Despite the fact that the two countries had almost the same level per capita GNP in the 1960s, by the 1990s the per capita GNP in Ghana was only one-fifteenth of South Korea's.³ Regardless of this academic debate, the terms "developing" or "Third World" countries are still useful and relevant when showing that there have been serious problems in the eradication of poverty.

The third reason is to draw a map of the distinctive conflict landscape. The term "Third World countries" also connotes vulnerability to armed conflict. It has become an historical fact that despite political tension between East and West, most of the interstate conflict during the Cold War occurred in developing countries. Though the Cold War has ended, a large number of conflicts in the form of civil war, mainly because of the painstaking nation building process, have continued unabated and have become the main characteristic of developing countries. It is not an exaggeration to say, therefore, that developing countries were the main victims of the Cold War and that they have not found peace from the end of the Cold War.

Now let us talk about global order. The question here is "what does it mean?" From the discipline of international relations, there are two possible ways to understand the term. First is by equating it with the term international order. According to Hedley Bull in his classical book *The Anarchical Society*,⁴ international order is a pattern of international activity that sustains the goals of the state alliances.

With regard to the definition, Bull points out that there are four main goals that always exist in state alliances namely: the preservation of the alliance itself, maintaining the independence or sovereignty of individual states, the maintenance of peace, and the limitation of violence.

The second way to understand global order is to link the term with the concept of world order. Again, in the words of Hedley Bull, world order is a pattern of human activity that sustains the elementary goals of social life among humanity as a whole. Through this definition, Bull intends to argue that world order is different from international order. While international order is defined as order among states, world order is conceived to be wider and more fundamental than order among states. It is broader and more fundamental because the main emphasis is not on state but on individual human beings. Therefore, the primary goal behind the transfer of resources from rich countries to poor is to achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth among all individual members, regardless of existing differences in race, culture and religion. It is based on this idea that world order has been conceptualised as morally higher than international order. As stated eloquently by Bull “if international order does have value, this can only be because it is instrumental to the goal of order in human society as a whole”.⁵

Hedley Bull’s conceptualisation of international order and world order inspires us to understand the marginalised position of developing countries in the global order. First, if global order is understood as international order, then the privilege of Third World countries as part of the society of states has not been fully preserved and respected. A number of developing countries, mainly in Africa and Asia, still remain plagued by war and violence. The recent war against Iraq has conveyed a clear message that maintaining independence or sovereignty, as one of the goals of the society of states, only applies to developed countries.

Second, if global order is understood as world order, then so-called world justice remains an illusion for most people in developing countries. Transfer of resources to developing countries in the name of solidarity amongst human beings is a dream rather than a reality. Serious poverty still afflicts large numbers of people in developing countries, to the point that they live a day to day struggle for survival. In addition, transfer of resources from developed countries has been channeled mainly in the form of debt, distributed because of political and security considerations, and not because of moral solidarity between humans.

Transnational Coalitions

If in reality the notion of sovereignty and of global justice remain a luxury for Third World countries, as shown in the case of the US military attack against Iraq, is it right to say that the United Nations (UN), symbolising a multilateral institution, is no longer relevant to developing countries? For those who rely on a Marxist perspective, the answer to this question is obvious: the UN is incapable of protecting the interests of developing countries. The attack can be seen as a symbol of the weakness of developing countries *vis-à-vis* developed countries, represented by the United States and the United Kingdom.

Similarly, for those who put their faith in the realist perspective, the US attack might not be seen as a great surprise. From this perspective it can be seen as a natural consequence of the new balance of power since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, shifting from a bi-polar to a unipolar world, dominated and led by the US. They do not deny the fact that the UN is a multilateral forum for political cooperation. However, the multilateral institution works only if there are two competing super powers, and only if the interests of the major powers in the Security Council are protected. If these requirements cannot be fulfilled, then the important role of the UN as a multilateral forum for coop-

eration will cease to exist.

It is based on this line of thinking that speculation has emerged that the US attack on Iraq is a victory for realists and a defeat for liberal-internationalists. It is considered to be a defeat because liberal internationalists always advocate multilateral mechanisms like the UN in order to resolve conflicting interest between countries. As a result of the unilateral act of the US military attack against Iraq, therefore, the idea of multilateralism and interdependency promoted by liberal internationalist is seen as nonsense, primarily aired in various international workshops and seminars, but a long way from reality. Is this the explanation one could offer to explain the US war against Iraq? Is it right to say that the war confirms the hypothesis of leftists groups, a victory for realists and a defeat for liberal-internationalists? Why did a series of protests against the war by a number of groups immediately arise in big cities around the world in both developed and developing countries? How can we explain this phenomenon in the context of the US military attack against Iraq and the role of the United Nations?

Indeed the protests convey two messages. First, since the protests were transnational in nature, the existing dominant perspectives in the discipline of international relations do not have sufficient capacity to explain them. The protests were held not only in Dhaka, New Deli and Jakarta but also in Washington, London and Canberra. Second, despite the fact that they did not have material power, be it in military or economic terms, those who organized the protests seem to have built virtual networks and common positions in their criticism of the war. In the words of Kubolkova, Vendulka and Onuf (1998), the protesters tried to challenge conventional “lenses” offered by dominant perspectives, whether from realists, liberal internationalists or Marxist-leftist viewpoints. In academic debates, those who embark on such attempts are known as constructivists.⁶

It remains a big question whether such efforts will be successful in their challenge of dominant perspectives. How-

ever, playing down their influence seems improper, due to the impressive progress of communication technology in the last two decades. In years to come the main problem faced by the US and other supporting countries in the war against Iraq will not merely be the question of how to win the war or how to make the war an effective instrument to destroy the system built by Saddam Hussein. Of great importance is the question of how to make the war legitimate in the eyes of the international community. Seen from this perspective, the role of protesting groups should not be underestimated.

Moreover, criticism against unilateral tendencies took root in the US in the 1970s. For instance, in 1972 Richard Falk clearly stated that American foreign policy had nothing to do with the question of whether the liberal-internationalists exist or not.⁷ The views of liberal-internationalists do exist in the US and have gained strong support within the academic community. The problem basically lies at the level of policy making, because decision makers almost never rely on views promoted by liberal-internationalists when implementing policy. The views have been mainly used for rhetorical purposes, if at all.

Another critical view has also been eloquently aired by Philip C. Jessup. The refusal of the US to obey the multilateral mechanism of the UN is a violation of the US constitution. This argument is put forward on the basis of article VI, paragraph 2 of the US constitution. It states, "this constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made or shall be made under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land". Since the US is one of the signing countries to the UN charter, violation of the UN charter means violation of the US constitution. Jessup also bluntly pointed out that "the world of sovereign nations is not a lawless world. It is a lawless world because the law is often violated".⁸

Two main points emerging from this critical view deserve special attention. First, a number of protests voiced

against the war policy launched by George W. Bush are morally understandable and justifiable. But the opposition to US war policy does not need to be an opposition to American citizens, because criticism of the unilateral policy has also been raised by a number of groups within the United States. Second, there is still the opportunity to empower the UN as a multilateral institution, but it requires a deconstruction of what we mean by international relations.

If we agree with the constructivists, what should be done is to deconstruct the idea that the primary actor in international relations is nation-state. It should be replaced by the idea that the substance of the relations indeed lies in the people. Formulated in different words, a moral imperative in international relations indeed lies in a spirit to build solidarity and friendship among the people. In this context it is worth mentioning that the moral setting of the UN itself when it was established indicates the importance of the people to build peace. The charter of the UN itself among others cites, “we the people of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”.

The emphasis on the protection of people has become the main reason why war is always considered to be an awful act in relation to human survival. If the ultimate objective of war is to disseminate and advocate the idea of freedom of expression, there are many other more intelligent ways to achieve it. Attempts to advance civilisation through war result merely in the devastation of property and the loss of human lives. From this point of view there remains a question of justification for the US in their war against Iraq. It is difficult to accept the view that the war was a necessary initial step to build a democratic political system, even though under Saddam Hussein Iraq was ruled through an authoritarian political system.

Consequences

In light of the power the US has, the doubts about Bush's real motive for launching the war are not without foundation. Indeed, as argued by Zbigniew Brezinski,⁹ the US is a comprehensive global super power, unprecedented in world history. The US has been endowed with the capacity to control all four different types of global power: military, economic, technological and cultural. Iraq, by contrast, is a weak country and geographically does not pose a direct or immediate threat to American territory. In this context, there are four hypotheses we could propose to explain the motive for the war.

The first hypothesis is that the war is a natural consequence of the increased use of hard power in US foreign policy. The tendency to rely more on hard power and less on soft power emerged in the 1970s and has continued since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. As pointed out by Joseph S. Nye Jr (2001), one of the clear signals of the shift is the difference in budget allocations for defense and for foreign ministries. Whilst the budget for defense is around 16% of the US state budget, the foreign ministry has only received 1%. It is worth mentioning that in 1970 the budget for the foreign ministry was 4% of the US national budget.¹⁰

The second hypothesis is that the war is a symbol of the US increasingly abandoning thoughts pioneered by Theodore Roosevelt, and now relies more on Wilsonian views. As stated by Henry Kissinger, if the country relies on Roosevelt's view then US foreign policy will exercise the art of the balance of power and take geopolitical and historical factors into consideration. On the other hand, if a Wilsonian view is used, then US foreign policy will be implemented in terms of American "moral" standards.¹¹ The stronger tendency to take sides with the Wilsonian view has been indicated by the increasing use of the word "evil" by the US policy makers to criticise the foreign policy of other coun-

tries that are perceived to be enemies of the US. Indeed, if the US had not relied on Wilsonian moral terms, the Bush government would have implemented a different strategy, such as strengthening Iran, a traditional enemy of Iraq, or by launching a kind of proxy war.

The third hypothesis is that the war signals that the US government prefers the massive war school of thought to the limited war school. The limited school, as pointed out by Alexander R. George, was exercised in the case of Korea in the 1950s and Vietnam War in the 1970s and also in the Gulf War in 1991.¹² The presumption of this school is that fire power is used only to complement, and not as a substitute for, diplomatic and political processes. On the other hand, the massive school advocates that if the policy of military intervention is adopted, such a policy should be carried out decisively in order to gain a total victory. If this objective is not an integral part of the strategy, then the school suggests that military intervention should not be launched. In other words, the proponents of the massive school would not agree to launch a war if the movement of soldiers were constrained by political and diplomatic considerations.

The fourth hypothesis is that the war could be motivated by economic interest, in particular by a desire to secure the supply of energy. By overthrowing Saddam Hussein, it is expected that there will be an increasing stability in energy supplies on the international market, which is of great importance to the business interests of oil and industrial companies in the US and other developed countries. Related to this motive is the possibility that the US has been increasingly aware of the ineffectiveness of petroleum as a commodity power in international politics. The Gulf War in 1991 in fact was a watershed as it showed the importance of oil as a commodity power to exert pressures over developed countries, because there were divergent responses from the member countries of OPEC. This was in a stark contrast to the political reaction of the Arab-Israel war in 1973.

If we use these four hypotheses as points of reference, there are four consequences for US-Third World relations in the future. The first consequence concerns the importance of a people-to-people approach in diplomacy. The continued reduction of the US state budget allocation to the Foreign Ministry indicates that Washington is no longer concerned with, and will become ignorant of, the cultural differences between countries. The second implication is for the decreasing importance of geo-strategic dimensions. As the US government relies more on the Wilsonian view, there is a stronger impetus for the US to fight at any cost, threats perceived to be against American moral standards, such as terrorism. Under these circumstances the geo-strategic considerations would be put aside in the formulation of American foreign policy when dealing with developing countries will no longer and be important.

The third implication concerns the style of US diplomacy in resolving bilateral issues. It is likely that the decreasing role of the limited war school will encourage the American government to exercise diplomacy by force. In other words, the US government foreign policy will likely be shaped by a realist perspective in a very orthodox form. Accordingly, it is almost out of the question to expect that the American government will prioritise ideas of multilateralism, as promoted by liberals. The last implication concerns oil-exporting countries. The reconstruction of Iraq after the war will have long-term impacts on the larger supply of energy, and this in turn will reduce the price of energy in the international market.

Notes

¹ World Development report 2003, *Sustainable Development in a Dynamic World, Transforming Institution, Growth and Quality of Life* (Washington: World Bank, 2003).

² Ankie Hoogvelt, *Globalization and the Post Colonial World, The New Political Economy of Development* (Baltimore Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp. 69-73.

³ Samuel P. Huntington, "Foreword Culture Counts" in Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (eds.), *Culture Matters How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 2000) pp. xiii-xiv.

⁴ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society, A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: MacMillan, 1997), second edition with a new foreword by Stanley Hoffman, pp. 8-21.

⁵ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*.

⁶ For further discussion, see Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf and Paul Kowert, "Constructing Constructivism" in Vendulka Kubalkova et. al. (eds.), *International Relations in Constructed World* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 3-24.

⁷ Richard Falk, "Transnational Institutions: More or Less, Faster or Slower" in Fred Warner Neal and Marey Kersey Harvey (eds.), *American Foreign Policy in the Age of Interdependence, Pacem in Terris III* (Santa Barbara: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1974), pp. 197-199.

⁸ Philip C. Jessup, "The Imperative of Institution-Building", in Fred Warner Neal and Marey Kersey Harvey (eds.), *American Foreign Policy in the Age of Interdependence, Pacem in Terris III* (Santa Barbara : Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1974), p. 165.

⁹ For an interesting discussion, see Zbigniew Brezneski, *The Grand Chess Board, American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), pp. 3-24.

¹⁰ Josph S. Nye Jr., *The Paradox of American Power, Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go it Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

¹¹ Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy, Toward Diplomacy for the 21st Century* (New York: Simon&Schuster,

2001), pp. 237-250.

¹² Alexander R. George, "The Role of Force in Diplomacy: A Continuing Dilemma for U.S. Foreign Policy" in Chester A. Crocker et.al., *Managing Global Chaos, Sources of and Responses to International Conflict* (Washington DC: Institute of Free Press, 1996), pp. 209-215.

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Cultural and Inter-cultural Multilateralism: What Muslims Can Contribute to Create a New Global Order

Hassan Hanafi

Introduction: Object and Method

The multilateralism-unilateralism dichotomy is a permanent tension in every culture, in all historical periods. The tension between the two sides is a sign of vivacity and a basis for survival. No cultural tradition is entirely monolithic. All great cultural traditions have generated competing, often conflicting worldviews. Indeed, the tension within a particular cultural tradition may be regarded as a source of creativity and adaptability to the changing constellation of problems confronting it.¹ When multilateralism prevails, then liberalism, freedom of thought, dialogue and mutual respect also prevail. If unilateralism overwhelms, then conservatism, censorship and orthodoxy also over-

whelm. However, absolute multilateralism leads to scepticism, relativism and agnosticism, because of the lack of norms and criteria of right and wrong, true and false, good and bad, while absolute unilateralism leads to dogmatism, fanaticism and violence. Unilateralism is an independent subject, a *problematique per se*. It appears in and out of the UN system. It is only a point of application, the subjection of multiple nations to one hegemonic power, the double standard in the application of the UN charter. This dichotomy is a metaphysical one, the problem of unity and multiplicity, of the one and the many. It has other synonyms such as monolithism and pluralism. Multilateralism in social science appears first in thought, before being in action. It is a worldview before being a system, it is related to values and cultures before being implemented in laws and institutions.

Multilateralism is indeed related to the problem of cultural and social change. Without falling into an idealist assumption, nothing occurs in action if it does not occur first in perception, based in values and norms embedded in worldviews. Superpower hegemony is not only related to power struggles but may be essentially based on and motivated by ego-centrism and racism.

In developing countries, religion plays the role that social science plays in developed societies. Religious sciences: theology, philosophy, mysticism, and jurisprudence are traditional forms of social science. Theology is political theory, philosophy is cultural anthropology, jurisprudence is economic theory, and mysticism is behavioural science. Therefore, intellectual perspectives in the social and human sciences, bearing on multilateralism, find their roots in religious sciences.²

The multilateralism-unilateralism dichotomy already implies a value judgment. Unilateralism is a minus and multilateralism is a plus. This may already be a cultural bias in Western-oriented worldviews. In contrast, in Asia, maybe in Africa, and especially in China and Japan, cultural

unilateralism may be a plus, while multilateralism is a minus. Multilateralism in the West is based on the concept of a singularity in Being and human individuality, while unilateralism in Asia and Africa is based on the concept of the whole or totality in Being and in human groups.

In order to study images of world order deriving from the different traditions of civilisations and the problems of negotiation with different value-systems,³ a conceptual analysis of world order is first required. In the case of Islam, the concept of world order is a new concept that requires reading back into an old tradition, that of Islam as a projection of the present into the past. As Bergson says, *Le mirage du présent au passé* (an interpretation of the past according to the present), or as Bergson also expressed it, *Le mouvement rétrograde du vrai*. The concept of world order is still unclear. What is the difference between world order and worldview? Is not world order one of the manifestations of worldview in international relations? Is world order old or new? Is it the same world in a new form? Has world order changed in modern times since the emergence of Eurocentrism?

The question in Islam is also what data to describe Islam *per se*, or Islam as a historical development? The word “tradition” is ambiguous. Does it mean Islam as described in the textual sources of the Qur’an and the Hadith? An ideal Islam is always referred to as subject to different textual hermeneutics, according to the socio-political position of the interpreter. History is already inherent in Ideal Islam. The Qur’an has been revealed in history in socio-political circumstances. The Hadith, sayings of the Prophet, were uttered in his time, in Arabia, a spatio-temporal limitation. An historical Islam is indeed historical, being revealed in space. Moreover, Islam is a step in the historical development of revelations, added to the two previous steps, Judaism and Christianity.

Any documentary or preconceived method, based on secondary literature revealing the state of the art, has its limitations. First, it is not first hand research. It depends on multiple and sometimes conflicting theories in social science. The possibility of error is double, error in the theory and in its application. Second, it presents external evidence, using arguments of authority, not arguments of reason. Its veracity is due to the conformity of the result to the theory, not to the external world. Third, the choice of theory is motivated by ideological bias, without self-verification of the premises. Conflicting results are due to conflicting theories and may not be due to conflicting realities. Some theories are self-contradictory, for example, liberalism as the foundation of multilateralism leads to the hegemony of superpowers.

Since most theories originated in Western social science, they have their limitations once applied in other cultures. With the application of multilateralism in non-Western cultures, Western theories on multilateralism would be incompatible with non-Western cultures. Theories introduced from certain societies may be not applicable to other societies without theoretical modifications. It would be a contradiction in terms, or unconformity in science, to take an Islamic approach to cultural and inter-cultural multilateralism, using Western literature stemming from different intellectual traditions, such as classical realism, liberal institutionalism, world system structuralism, and historical dialects. These may be relevant to the socio-political history of the West, but look alien as tools of analysis for other traditions, namely Islam.⁴

Rather, phenomenology is chosen as the most suitable method to study such subjects. The reflexive method, depending on internal coherence and self-evidence, is more persuasive than the documentary method, depending on external references, even related to the state of the art. Reflection is not mere subjective and void meditation, but reflection on something. In reflection, both subject and object are

two aspects of the same reality.

Objectivity is guaranteed by the awakened consciousness, exempt from passion and inclination. It is also guaranteed by the existence of a world of meanings and essences, a real world, a regional ontology, or ontological regions. The intuition of essences, the direct relation between the subject and object as two subjects, prevents all kinds of mystification and intercessions of alien concepts or strange objects.

The level of analysis will not be cultural values *per se*, as independent essences, nor world orders stemming out of them, nor national and international organisations' most recent embodiment of both cultural values and world order, rather, the three levels together, intertwined in living individual and historical experience. Neither the purely formal level of cultural values, nor the purely material level of socio-political organisations, but something linked together in the living experience, away from a double reduction to a formal world system theory and a material reduction to economics. Lived Islam may be a combination of the ideal textual Islam and the real historical Islam, since both lie in the unity of living experience.

A comparison between different cultures gives different instances of analysis to substantiate essences. Structures are inherent in history. Scholars from different cultures can arrive at the same description of essences. It is already a manifestation of unity and multiplicity, unity of essence, and multiplicity of historical instances. Meaningful comparison helps in widening the scope of Western social science, object wise and method wise. Islam is the national culture in Africa and may be becoming so in Europe and America. The Gulf War was one incentive to the question of the new world order.

Multilateralism as the Built-in Structure in Islam

The multilateralism-unilateralism dichotomy is one of the major aspects of Islam. God is one, creation is many.

The unity-multiplicity problematic is essential in Islam. God is one, since *solvitur in excelsis*, the *vinculum substantiale* proposed by Leibniz. Unity is at the origin of the world. The world came out of one source. Unity is also at the end of the world, unity of destiny, death and resurrection. Unity is always in the passage between the beginning and the end, the unity of truth or life. All human beings are rational, facing one objective truth, and are capable of communing with each other, recognising their divergences and realising their convergences. Therefore, unity is the income, multiplicity is the outcome. Unity is the input, multiplicity is the output. Between the beginning and the end, the dialectics of unity and multiplicity occur.

The Unity of God is not silent but active. It manifests itself also in multiple attributes: science, power, life, hearing, sight, speech, and will. The Unity of God is the carrier of a universal code of ethics for all mankind. That is why multiplicity in life is not agnosticism, scepticism or relativism, but realism, since human beings are different in frames of reference, in ways of understanding, in depth of knowledge, in methods of reasoning, in languages, customs, manners and habits. As it is impossible to consider the origin of the world multiple, it is also impossible to consider ways of the life one. If unity comes from God, multiplicity comes from man. Unity is Divine, while multiplicity is human. Multiplicity expresses the spirit of Islam. It is proved by arguments of reason, of nature and of revelation. Reason proves that human beings and peoples are different. They are different in temperament and in choices. Each nation has a national character.⁵

Divergences are manifestations of it. Generations are different. A permanent quarrel between the old and the new, between the ancients and the moderns, occurs in every culture. Historical periods are different. Each period expresses the spirit of the time. Nature, including minerals, plants and animals, proves also that human beings, peoples, cultures,

manners, customs and habits are different. They are different in their passions, motivations and perceptions. Their differences are due to human freedom and free choice. Nature stems from one origin and reunifies spontaneously, one trunk and many branches and leaves. Individuality is a human principle that requires multiplicity. Otherwise, human beings will be copies of each other, mere repetitions and formal substitutions.⁶

Revelation is a reconfirmation of what reason and nature pose. Seven times the Qur'an stresses this natural multiplicity, the difference between night and day (five times), of tongues and colours (once). One time the word "difference" is used negatively, once difference is in rational evidence and a priori truth.⁷

The adjective different is mentioned ten times, seven times it has the same meaning. Different natural phenomena, different colours of drinks such as honey, different colours of mountains, different animals and human beings, different plants and fruits, different things. Opinions are also different. Difference is a sign of Divine Mercy.⁸ Divergences exist as real in order to discover their convergences as ideal.

Only two times does the adjective have a negative meaning, when knowledge goes beyond the senses and makes judgement on matters beyond experience, such as eschatologies.

The verb "to differentiate" is mentioned thirty times, referring to previous experiences of revelation, as divergences without convergences. Jews and Christians differed in scriptures regarding historical authenticity, literal or metaphorical understanding and practicing the law.⁹ They differed in principle not only in modes of application, in dogma not only in law, in theory not only in practice.¹⁰

Differences here reach the extreme and become heresies.¹¹ They come from human passions and conflicting interests, not from revelation.¹² Each step in revelation corrects and verifies previous steps.¹³ It reveals certainty amidst

conjectures.¹⁴ God alone knows certainty while human beings conjecture.¹⁵ The ideal is convergence, the real is divergence.¹⁶ Returning to God is discovering the original unity. Differences are related to time, circumstances, interests and understanding, a positive sign. Differences may reach the extreme and become divergences and conflicts leading to war, while differences of views can be solved peacefully. Differences in life are the cause of survival.¹⁷

This metaphysical principle of unity and diversity, of one and many, which is the basis of multilateralism, appeared in the history of Islamic culture in all formative sciences. In theology, two major schools of thought, Shi'ism and Sunnism. In Sunnism, there are two other schools of thought, Ash'arism and Mu'tazilism, Transcendence and anthropomorphism, Predestination and Free Will, Scriptures and Reason, Faith and Work, Theocracy and Democracy. In philosophy different trends also existed in theosophy (Al-Farabi, Avicenna) and scientific Rationalism (Al-Kindi, Averroes). In mysticism different currents also existed: ethical (Rabi'a, Al-Basri), psychological (Thu Al-Nun, Al-Hallaj), and metaphysical (Ibn Arabi, Ibn Sabi'in). In jurisprudence there are four schools of law; first, pragmatic realistic (Malikite), giving priority to the common welfare; second, theoretical prevailing reasoning and inferences from premises (Hanafite); third, syncretic and intermediate, combining principles and realities, theoretical premises with mass interests and common welfare (Shafi'te); fourth, textual and literal, shying away from all forms of theoretical reasoning, the opinion being hypothetical, and from pragmatic and mass interests, always linked to human passions (Hanbalite). An individual effort at understanding is a source of law irrespective of its results. A right reasoning has two points, while a wrong reasoning has one point due to the effort spent. This multilateralism ended in history because of external threats (Crusades) and internal despotism. In fact, the Crusades began at the end of the fifth century Hijra. In the face of the

external threat the state strengthened its threshold. Differences lead to divergences and the dissipation of energy. Everyone took up arms for the defence of the state. Orthodoxy was the best custodian versus liberalism, outward openness and esoterism, inward openness. All are internal threats, while conservatism and liberalism are the guarantees for victory. Closing outside requires closing inside. The defence of external and geographical frontiers begins with the defence of internal and intellectual frontiers. The strength of the state outside, against foreign domination, also demands the strength of the state inside, against internal opposition.

Al-Ghazali is the theologian, the philosopher, the mystic and jurist, who made this historical and cultural conversion from multilateralism to unilateralism. He chose orthodoxy (Ash'arism) as the official state doctrine of God or the Sultan as Absolute, an ideology of power. He chose for the masses mysticism, namely resignation, patience, reliance, acceptance, asceticism, renunciation. This is an ideology of obedience. He also discredited theological, philosophical and mystical opposition that challenged the authority of the Ruler and directed itself to mass mobilization, overground or underground. Al-Ghazali legitimised taking power by *coup d'etat*. The legitimate rule was that of whoever had power and controlled the state. The previous situation of free election as the source of sovereignty was tarnished. Since then, modern military *coups d'etat* have been deeply rooted in culture. As a result, for the last millennium, unilateralism has been the main stream in Islamic national culture, used politically and institutionally as the unconscious basis of dictatorship. The Attributes of God are: Knowledge, Power, Life, Hearing, Sight, Speech and Will. These are the same attributes of the Sultan, knowledgeable about everything through his secret services, powerful over everything through his forces of security, even having eternal life through his nomination for life. He also hears, sees, speaks and wills. His political speeches are almost holy Scriptures. He is

always right and the opposition is always wrong. He is the Saviour, the redeemer. This is the theological root of political dictatorship. The Imam is almost nominated, not elected. Sunni political theory of free election yielded to the Shi'i one based on textual nomination. In human action, unilateralism gave priority to predestination over free will, to faith over works, to scripture over reason. It monopolised the interpretation of the scriptures in order to monopolise political power, since legitimisation of power comes from scriptures. Thus age, earnings, prices of goods in the markets, sickness and health all come from the superpower, God or the Sultan.

The Pyramidal Worldview is also an inherent part of Islamic national culture. The world is a pyramid, a summit and a base. The relation between them is the relation between one and many, good and evil, high and low, virtue and vice, perfection and imperfection, pure and impure. This vertical dualism impacts on the social structure and forms class society, divided into rich and poor, male and female in the patriarchal family, father and sons in patriarchal societies. These images of world order form the mental structure underlying such perspectives.¹⁸

Multilateralism as a Built-Out Structure in Islam

While built-in structure means cultural multilateralism, built-out structure means inter-cultural multilateralism, as a result of the openness of Islamic culture to other cultures for interaction and mutual interchange, diachronically with previous religions and cultures and synchronically with neighbouring cultures. Islam is the last in a series of Abrahamic religions, stressing the unity of God, social solidarity and the dignity of man. The essence of the religion is the same. Changes are only in terms of expression, due to development in human consciousness and cognitive powers, as Lessing described them in his "Education of the Human Race". When humanity was in the childlike age, means

of expression were sensual, based on punishment and reward. When humanity reached the adolescent age, spiritual and moral means of expression were used to satisfy the dreams and utopias of the youth. When humanity reached maturity, realistic and pragmatic means of expression were used in order to build and to transform revelation as an ideal structure of the world, through human action. Regarding social solidarity, the first stage was a material social group, chosen as a field of experience in which to educate people and to crystallise independent individual human consciousness. The experience ended with the establishment of a Kingdom on Earth (Judaism), disobedient to the Kingdom of God. The second stage was a utopian society, a reaction to the first, a Kingdom of Heavens which is near in time and nowhere in space. The only hope for salvation was in the heart. It ended in monasticism (Christianity). The third stage, Islam, accumulating the two previous experiences, is the implementation of the kingdom of heaven on earth, the realisation of the ideal as real. Regarding the dignity of man, in the first stage man's worth was his belonging to the chosen people. He was saved through the remnant. In the second, man's glory was his belief in the saviour. In the third, man's dignity is his individual moral responsibility, manifesting itself in good deeds.

Islam is not only the last in the series of Abrahamic religions, but is also the inheritance of ancient Asian, Mesopotamian and Egyptian religions. Revealed religions capitalised on historical religions. Revelation does not only descend from the heavens, but also ascends from earth. Logically speaking, truth can be known by deduction or by induction. Buddhism is a moral development of Hinduism, stressing internal enlightenment, like Christianity. Confucianism is a socio-political development of the I-Ching, ancient Chinese religion. Ancient Mesopotamian religions linked Marduk to man and cosmos. Hamuraby laws are an origin of Islamic law. Ancient Egyptian religions reached

monotheism: Power behind the Sun and immortality of the soul, punishment and reward. Through the whole ancient Near East, religions are linked in time and space between Asia, Africa and Europe. A model of cultural interaction may be found in the unity of ancient cultures, an Ur-Religion, an Ur-Kultur.

Synchronically, Islam was also open to neighbouring cultures, Persian and Hindu from the East, Greek and Roman from the West. Islam was victorious on the ground and inherited vast territories. However, it showed full respect to previous religions and cultures, sharing the same beliefs and values of God and moral action. New converts, as well as those who kept their religions, showed loyalty to the new religion and culture, using their previous intellectual and cultural background to understand it. Islam became philosophy after the translation of Greek philosophy, became jurisprudence after the translation of Persian political thought, and became mathematics after the translation of Indian arithmetic. The Christian Arabs of Syria, keeping their own religion according to Islamic law, also showed loyalty to the new society and culture. They translated Greek philosophy, already translated into Syriac, the language of liturgy, into Arabic, to be used by Muslim Arabs, seen as brothers and cousins. The translation was done first through the mediation of Syriac and secondly, directly from Greek to Arabic.

After these two types of translation another stage of cultural interaction began, that of commentary. A commentary is an exercise to understand the original text. It can be prolix, to analyse the text piece by piece, or concise, to concentrate on the meaning. A commentary is a certain kind of analysis of the translated text, going beyond the language to the structure of thought itself, to complete what is lacking, to eliminate what is excessive, and to restructure the essence in a more balanced middle way. It is a reproduction of the original text in a new cultural milieu, after dropping the cultural circumstances of the milieu in which the original

text was composed.

Cultural exchange occurs on three levels: Language, Thought and Reality, according to the three meanings of logos suggested by Husserl: Term, Meaning, and Thing. A cultural exchange occurs on the linguistic level when the language of the new neighbouring and translated culture is substituted for the language of the old Islamic one. The new language is rational, open, and human, compared to the old legal, closed meaning. The old meaning is re-expressed by the newly translated term. New dimensions of meaning are revealed, which were hidden in the old term. The thing meant and expressed becomes more authentic, more visible and more lived. This pseudo-morphology, a pure linguistic phenomenon, “explains one mode of thought in terms of another, without threatening the destruction of either”.¹⁹ The whole tripartite philosophy was reconstructed, with logic, as a normative science which protects thinking from errors; physics, which leads to metaphysics, and metaphysics, where human intellect enters into direct relations with Divine Intellect. The whole society is governed by the intellect and ruled by the king-philosopher, or the philosopher-king. A new ideal emerged in Islamic culture, which the European Enlightenment reached one millennium later. Revelation, Reason and Nature are from the same order. Revelation was the subject of rational criticism in terms of historical texts, belief-systems and ethical codes. Reason was the origin of mathematical sciences. Nature was discovered as the object of natural sciences. The virtuous city was not only utopian, but real, preserving the unity of mankind, social solidarity, and the dignity of man.

Cultures are the expression of different national characters. Greek philosophy expressed Greek Logos. Roman Scepticism expressed Roman sensuality. Arab-Islamic culture unified the Greek ideal and the Roman real. It rejected logical Formalism as well as sceptical Nihilism. After seven centuries, when Islamic culture began to decline, the same pro-

cess of cultural interaction occurred with African and Euro-American cultures. Islam expanded downward to Africa and northward to Europe and America. New cultural interactions occurred. Afro-Islamic culture addressed itself against apartheid, tribalism and fetishism. It contributed by directing African societies towards cleanliness and covering, as well as limiting polygamy and unethical behaviour. A new Euro-American Islamic culture was manifested in the Muslim Council of Europe, in Islam as human rights, and in the Nation of Islam as an egalitarian community in the USA. When these intercultural relations occurred with Western cultures during the last two centuries, power relations between Islam and the West changed in favour of the West. Modern Christian Syrian translators were more loyal to Western culture and languages than to local cultures and languages. Their purpose was to propagate Western culture amidst local cultures. Within Islam, transliteration dominated over translation, due to the complex of inferiority *vis-à-vis* Western culture.

The new meaning was superimposed on the old meaning, causing a kind of dualism in the culture between the old and the new, between the in and the out. Two worlds opposed each other, the self and the other, the self receiving the shock of modernity, and eager for development and freedom, the other hegemonising and eager to dominate. The endogenous addressed itself against the exogenous, in the name of authenticity and against alienation. Fundamentalism was the natural reaction to Westernisation, the defence of the spiritual patrimony against the invading Western culture. For fundamentalism, "Darkness comes from the West", whereas for Westernisation, "Sunrise comes from the West". This divergence of culture generated a political power struggle between fundamentalism and secularism. Each one introduced itself as the legitimate inheritor of political power, the first in the name of legacy, the second in the name of modernity. A war is still going on between the two brother-

enemies (Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Sudan), the first calling for a theocratic state applying Islamic law, whilst the second defends a free democratic and secular state. Actual political regimes are neither the first nor the second, being neither military nor royal. Both regimes lack legitimacy. Militarism and kingdoms are not legal Islamic regimes. That is why they are always challenged by theocracy hailed by fundamentalism, and by democracy defended by secularism.

However, an Islamic image of world order is derived from Islamic tradition and culture, one universal community, including several equal communities, sharing one universal code of ethics, an expression of the unity of God. Racialism, ethnicities, and sectarianism are completely alien to the Islamic worldview. “Therefore, cultural traditions also involve a reaction to challenges from other cultures. They react partly by internalising aspects of alien culture, partly by redefining the authenticity of their own tradition to meet new circumstances”.²⁰

Inter-cultural Multilateralism and New World Order

In theory, the very essence of Western culture is Multilateralism. Its sources oscillated between Plato, Aristotle and Socrates; between Idealism, Realism and Humanism, between Rationalism, Empiricism and Existentialism; between philosophy of Mind, philosophy of Nature and philosophy of Existence. This “triple Multilateralism” continued on through the middle ages between Augustinianism, Thomism and Mysticism. However, this “multilateralism of the surface” was carried out in a certain “unilateralism of depth”, worked out in the tension of “Aristotle and Church”. The Reformation in the 15th century was the rejection of the authority of the Church, while the Renaissance in the sixteenth century was the rejection of the authority of Aristotle.

In modern times, unilateralism in depth was destroyed. “Aristotle’s dixit” ended with the destruction of argument

of authority. The world became epistemologically naked without any theoretical cover. Reason gave only viewpoints on reality, depending on human options motivated by human passions and interests. Different philosophical systems were constructed to interpret the world. Three were proposed: two opposing and one in the middle, Plato, Aristotle and Socrates: Rationalism, Empiricism and Humanism; Idealism, Realism and Existentialism. Almost every century offered these three alternatives, according to the dialectic law of action, reaction and mediation, thesis, antithesis and synthesis. In the 17th century there was Rationalism (Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranch, Leibnitz); Empiricism (Bacon, Locke, Hobbes); and Humanism (Pascal). In the 18th century the same three alternatives continued: Transcendentalism (Kant), Sensualism (Hume), and Mysticism (Hamann). They also continued in the 19th century: Idealism (Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer), Realism (Darwin, Haeckel, A. Comte, J.S. Mill), and Existentialism (Kierkegaard, Nietzsche). In the 20th century the three lines continued: Conceptualism (New-Hegelianism and L. Brunschwig), Psycho-Physical Parallelism (Wundt, Charcot, Fechner), Phenomenology (Husserl, Heidegger, Jaspers, G. Marcel, M. Marleau-Ponty, JP. Sartre, A. Camus). Thus the world was at one time a concept, an idea or a subject; at another time experience, sense-data or object; a third time existence, passion or anguish.

However, in practice, the very essence of Western culture in modern times, behind this multilateralism of surface, is unilateralism of depth. In spite of these alternatives, the three centres of thought, Reason, Reality and Human Existence, are all functioning for a deeper motivation in European consciousness: Hegemony, Supremacy and Expansion outside its natural borders, Euro-centrism, new forms of old Jewish election and racialism based on colour. Here Reason rationalises Western Universals. Experience gathers data about non-Western peoples and cultures. Humanism ex-

pands, overwhelming other humanisms in the name of acculturation. This deep restriction was crystallised in the so-called geographic discoveries of Africa and Asia in the 15th century, which lead to the discovery of America, as if Africa, Asia and the New World had not existed before the knowledge of the white man. The other exists only insofar as the self knows it. Geographic discoveries continued under Western hegemony, which reached its peak in 19th century Imperialism. In spite of decolonisation in the 20th century, the decolonised countries became more dependent on their colonizers. Western hegemony continued in different forms: economic, political military, scientific, cultural and information hegemonies, an almost total monopoly of modern means of communication. Military, economic and cultural power were transformed into scientific, technological and information power. “Temporary and declared colonialism” was transformed into “permanent and undeclared colonialism”.

Multilateralism on the surface, accompanied by unilateralism in depth, was manifested in a certain kind of dualism in practice, between the centre and the periphery. The West is the centre, and the whole non-West is the periphery. The centre creates, the periphery consumes. The centre is the eternal master, the periphery is the eternal disciple. It is a proto-type for the one way relationship of inter-cultural unilateralism, the centre gives, the periphery takes, or so it seems to the centre.

The motivation of this model is the myth of Western culture as an unprecedented proto-type of Universal Culture for all peoples, Culture per se, Culture with a capital C, while all other cultures are repetitions, cultures with small c. The truth is Western. Philosophy, science and art are Western. Worldview and lifestyle are also Western, with logical mentality versus *mentalité primitive* and *pensée sauvage*. Acculturation means the substitution of Western culture for local cultures, in the name of modernisation. Cultural Euro-

centrism is the expression of a deep Euro-ethnicity and Euro-racialism, which find their roots in the innate feeling of supremacy, a secular transformation of the Jewish doctrine of election, and the continuation of imperial Rome. Neither the Greek Logos nor the Christian dictum, “love thy neighbour”, were deep motivations in Western consciousness. The Western image of the world was derived from Western tradition and heritage, or so it seems to the West.

On the contrary, genuine inter-cultural multilateralism requires that all cultures, including that at the centre, are equal in value. It requires a two-way relationship, give and take, create and consume. It happened that Western culture came at the end of time, after the beginning of culture in the East, in China, Persia, Mesopotamia, Canaan and Ancient Egypt, several thousands of years before modern times. The West, in order to diffuse the myth of a singular model, made a conspiracy of silence on the Oriental sources. Five centuries, Western modern times, took over the whole of history of twenty centuries, and even of the whole history of the world. The delicious taste of the fruit left the leaves, the branches, the trunk and the roots aside. The accumulation of the history of human creativity in Western modern times does not mean the reduction of human history to Western modern history. Inter-cultural multilateralism requires re-writing the story of mankind in a more equitable way, in which every culture can have its own share.

Inter-cultural multilateralism combines unity and diversity, unity of a universal code of ethics and diversity of philosophical worldviews. A universal code of ethics does not change from one place to another, from one case to another. It is not a double standard code, applied once in the Gulf in defence of Kuwait but silent another time in Palestine and South Africa, applied once to protect the Kurds and the Shi'ites in Northern and Southern Iraq, but silent another time in the genocide of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ideals of Western enlightenment were limited to the

geographical border of Europe. The declaration of universal human rights is to be completed by another declaration of the Universal Declaration of People's Rights for self-determination. Since rights are not only a declaration of intent but a real practice, an equal share of wealth between rich North and poor South must be a part of people's rights in world wealth, to prevent thousands of deaths, as in Somalia for example. The minerals, markets and manpower of the South are historically the source of the wealth of the North. Oil wealth, water resources and manpower have to be equally distributed in the Arab World. These are "the intersubjective meanings that constitute reality for different human groups".²¹ Meanings and realities are the same, cultures and interests are two sides of the same coin. "Therefore, a balance is to be struck between the distinctiveness of different traditions, cultures or civilisations, and values that can become the common basis for coexistence and mutual enrichment of these traditions".²² That requires a non-hegemonic world order, first on the intercultural level, going beyond the centre and the periphery dichotomy. "A non-hegemonic world order would have to be based on reciprocal recognition of the validity of different civilisations and a research for common ground as a basis for coexistence among them".²³

Since the downfall of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, accompanied by the rebirth of local cultures as carriers of nationalities, ethnicities and sectarianisms, the world order appears as if it is going to be reshaped into a uni-polar world instead of a bi-polar world with nationalities instead of totalities, balance of interest instead balance of power, bread and butter instead of nuclear weapons and even conventional arms, peaceful coexistence instead of Cold War. Euro-centrism did not change. Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia belong geographically and culturally to Europe. Europe is rearranging itself, reconciling with its socialist rival of the last century, coming back to the

big brother, with liberalism as ideology, capitalism as political system. The Third World has lost its traditional ally from the period of Liberation struggle in the 1950s and in the 1960s. However, even before the downfall of the faithful ally, the Third World itself had already suffered from counter-revolutions, setbacks, dependence on Western powers, drought and hunger, desertification and civil wars. It had already begun, in many of its parts, the open-door policy, privatisation of the public sector, and the abolishment of socialist laws, agrarian reform, industrialisation, self-reliance, development, planning, free education, and workers rights. Non-alignment yielded to alignment, except in rare cases (Cuba and China). “Previous hegemonies have derived their universals from the dominant society. A post-hegemonic order will have to derive its universals in a research for common ground among constituent traditions of civilisations”.²⁴ This is the challenge to the World Order based on equal and inter-cultural multilateralism.

Notes

¹ Letter from Robert W. Cox to Hassan Hanafi (February 13, 1992).

² Programme on Multilateralism and the United Nations System, 1990-1995 (MUNS), UN (April 1991), pp. 8-9.

³ Programme on Multilateralism and the United Nations System, p. 13.

⁴ Robert W. Cox, *Perspectives on Multilateralism* (UNU, April 1991), p. 16-44.

⁵ “O Mankind, we created you of Male and a Female, and we made you into nations and tribes, that you may know each other” (49: 13) *The Holy Qur’an. Text, Translation and Commentary by Yusuf Ali* (Beirut: Dar al-‘Arabia, 1968).

⁶ “And every one of them will come to Him singly on the day of judgement”, *The Holy Qur’an* (19: 95).

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⁷ “Had it been from other than God, they would surely have found therein much discrepancy”, The Holy Qur’an (4: 82).

⁸ “If thy Lord had so willed, he could have made mankind one people, but they will not cease to dispute.”, The Holy Qur’an (11: 118).

⁹ “Because God sent down the book in truth. But those who seek causes of dispute in the book are in a schism”, The Holy Qur’an (2:176).

¹⁰ “We certainly gave Moses the book aforetime, but disputes arose therein”, The Holy Qur’an (41:45).

¹¹ “If God had so willed, succeeding generations, would not have fought among each other after clear signs had come to them, but they chose to wrangle, some believing and others rejecting”, The Holy Qur’an (2:253).

¹² “It was only after Knowledge had been granted to them that they fell into schisms, through insolent envy.”, The Holy Qur’an (45:17).

¹³ “Mankind was one single nation, and God sent messengers with glad tidings and warnings. And God with them He sent the book in truth to judge between people of the book, after the clear signs came, who did not differ among themselves except through selfish contumacy”, The Holy Qur’an (2: 213); also “and We sent down the book to thee for the express purpose, that thou shouldest make clear to them those things in which they differ, and that it should be a guide and a mercy to those who believe”, The Holy Qur’an (16: 64).

¹⁴ “Verily this Qur’an doth explain to the children of Israel most of the matters in which they disagree”, The Holy Qur’an (27:76).

¹⁵ “Then shall ye all return unto me, and I will judge between you of the matters where you dispute.”, The Holy Qur’an (3:55).

¹⁶ “Mankind was but one nation, but differed. Had it not been for a word that went forth before from thy Lord, their differences would have been settled between them”, The Holy Qur’an (10:19).

¹⁷ “And did not God check one set of people by means of another, He would indeed be full of mischief”, The Holy Qur’an (2:251); “Did not God check one set of people by means of another, there would surely have been pulled down monasteries, churches,

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synagogues and mosques in which the name of God is commemorated.”, The Holy Qur’an (22:40).

¹⁸ Programme on Multilateralism and the United Nations System, p. 14.

¹⁹ Programme on Multilateralism and the United Nations System, p. 13-14.

²⁰ Letter from Robert W. Cox to Hanafi.

²¹ Programme on Multilateralism and the United Nations System, p. 13.

²² Letter from Robert W. Cox to Hanafi.

²³ Programme on Multilateralism and the United Nations System, p. 13.

²⁴ Programme on Multilateralism and the United Nations System, p. 3.

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Beyond the Dialogue of Civilisations;
The Sense and Nonsense of
Inter-cultural Exchange:
A Perspective from Europe

Andreas Jacobs

Dialogue with Islam is a difficult business. Everybody calls for it, but nobody really knows what it should look like. It is politically and socially desired and promoted, but in practice it usually remains without influence or an outline. Dialogue with Islam shares the fate of many trends, that is to say, it is poorly conceived, without substance, and hardly goal oriented. This invites criticism: it is waste of money it is said, and, even, that by attempting dialogue one is dangerously ingratiating oneself with the enemies of the West. But even a serious look at the issue clearly shows that dialogue with Islam in Europe, despite many good attempts, idea-rich meetings, and engaged projects, has an ambivalent character. Even to those who engage in the dialogue it

is often unclear who should be speaking with whom about what and with what goal in mind. In no other cultural or security policy area (yes—what else?) is the discrepancy between reality and perception so large. This is regrettable because the dialogue is important and good. The wrong signal is sent though when European governments, after much herald to the contrary, actually cut funding for dialogue with Muslim countries and societies. This does offer the chance, however, of freeing the dialogue from the ballast of hectic campaigning and to allow it to become what it ought to be anyway: a well-conceived project with long-term objectives and clear goals. This is urgently needed, because a look at past dialogue attempts shows a lot of peculiarities and some nonsense.

The Dialectic of the Dialogue

A criticism of this dialogue is that it often ends up above all as a ritualised exchange of harmless words. Declarations of tolerance and openness are necessary if this dialogue is going to lead to rapprochement and to a definition of common positions, in short, to results. But public-pleasing declarations of belief in the same God avoid the real problems. Islam is not a green hued Christianity, and the cross is not easily shaped into a crescent moon. It does not much help either to constantly quote the ring parable from *Nathan the Wise*. With this parable the great German poet Gotthold Ephraim Lessing dramatised the imperative Enlightenment ideas of the equality of religions over 200 years ago.¹ The solution for concrete political and social problems does not consist in forging the three rings (i.e. the three world religions, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam) into one synchronised world religion. Belief is not the problem; rather, the problem is what the believers make of it.

The basis for every constructive meeting with Islam has to be the recognition of freedom of religion as a fundamental principle. This is also necessary because Islam has long

been a part of the reality of European life.² While it is still debated whether this is enriching or threatening, the discussion about the positive impulse of Islam for European societies has made much too sluggish progress. Muslims also bear some of the guilt for this. The Muslim contribution to dialogue wavers between self-pity and accusation. Self-critical reflection is the exception. Instead one hears from the Muslim side the same (true) things: *jihad* does not mean “holy war”, but rather “struggle for God”, Jews and Christians are accepted minorities in Islam with special protection rights (which alienates the non-Muslim observer rather than pleases him), and in Islam there is no compulsion (to believe). This is all true and must be said. But what role does this play in the reality of Muslim life? Iranians or Algerians in Germany shrug their shoulders when one wants to debate reconciling the concepts of the House of Peace (*dar al-Islam*) and the House of War (*dar al-harb*) with them. Many of them have found peace in Europe, which their old (Islamic) home would not give them. All of this has little to do though, in the opinion of many Muslims, with true Islam, because Islam is, by definition, a peaceful religion. A rogue, crook, or terrorist can therefore not be a Muslim. It is that simple.

In Europe dialogue with Islam always follows one and the same pattern. At the beginning, the non-Muslims listeners are told from the Muslim side that first, they know too little and second, they only receive misrepresentations about Islam. Next they learn that these un- and half-truths have led to discrimination and exploitation and that Islam does not deserve such treatment. Finally the guilt-ridden listeners are enlightened about the fact that Islam means “peace” and is inseparably linked to such terms such as tolerance, justice, and democracy. The end consists of a reminder of the commonalities of all religions and a glowing call for dialogue between them. The dialogue with Islam repeats this pattern again and again. It begins with the necessity of the dialogue and ends with a call to continue the same.

Islam as Other

An essential element of the dialogue schema that was sketched above is the thesis of the picture of Islam as the enemy, as the “other”. The fundamental element of this thesis is that opposition to Islam has been raised to a structural characteristic in Western culture. September 11 and its consequences become an act in a larger drama that has been staged in the form of the Crusades, the Inquisition, colonialism, fascism, communism, neo-imperial exploitation, and so on. In this drama the West needs the Orient to define itself culturally, right after the communist enemy has been lost.

Naturally it has been known at least since the philosophical thoughts of Johann Gottfried Herder that cultures define themselves against the outside, and the West has probably become a bit more “Western” because of September 11. But there are more important characteristics of identity for western culture than not being Islamic. What is especially problematic in the Islam as other thesis is that it requires precisely those mechanisms that the dialogue with Islam should actually criticise. He who speaks of Islam as other digs moats instead of building bridges; he finds that which divides instead of that which binds. He plays into the hands of those who only see Islamic culture in the role of the victim and those who would explain a complex reality with anti-Western prejudices and conspiracy theories. In order not to be misunderstood: of course there are prejudices in Europe, as well as intolerance, hate for Muslims, and a new picture of Islam as the embodiment of the enemy.³ But it is the task of all Europeans, whether Christian, Muslim, or Atheist to work against this. After all, Islam has, as previously stated, long been a European religion.

It is annoying that against exactly this background some European Islam experts gladly succumb to the temptation to support their Muslim dialogue partners in this Islam as other thesis. From the perspective of European Islamic schol-

ars the picture of Islam in Europe is almost always false, distorted, and hostile, and generally simply dominated by mediocre ignorance. The widespread criticism of media coverage is only partially supported by the facts. Actually media commentary on Islam tends to be, at least in Germany, dominated by those who criticise it. Since the nineties, at the latest, the subject of Islam has been covered in the bigger national newspapers by noted academics and journalists who are experts on Islam and who are often Muslims themselves. The serious print media's coverage of Islam is thus of a high level. There are exceptions of course, especially with the choice of pictures and television. Here especially we overwhelmingly see pictures of violence and terror, which sell better, but that have little to do with actual Muslims' lives from Morocco to Indonesia.

It is no wonder that the so-called "Islamic experts," as possessors of the power to interpret culture, propagate the idea of cultural difference as the central variable to explain all sorts of things. Because, after all, those who can explain Islam are sought after these days. The revival of allegedly historically rooted conceptions of Islam as the enemy, or as the other, achieves the opposite of what it claims to intend. It all becomes potential empirical evidence for Samuel P. Huntington's simple interpretive model for a highly complex reality. He who speaks of Islam as the other throws Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" out the front door, and publicly so that the neighbours see, in order to surreptitiously invite it in through back door. The representatives of the thesis of Islam as other become through this exactly what they claim to fight, ideologues of cultural difference. It is part of the dialectic of dialogue that he who denies something often needs precisely that to justify himself.

It was therefore impressive how right after September 11 dialogue with Islam was sought right through all societal strata and political camps. In Germany, anyway, there was

hardly any persecution of Muslims. There was at least not persecution to the extent that was predicted by many. Seldom was there such extensive coverage of Islam, seldom was there so much curiosity and honest interest, and seldom has there been so much academic work on Islam as there is today. At the same time, those who are anxious to take introduction courses in Arabic or seminars on Islamic law are not Orientalists in the same way that Edward Said uses the term.⁴ It is not neo-colonial ambitions that bring the crowds to academic subjects on the Orient, but rather sincere interest in an old and rich cultural and religious tradition and the understanding of its political and societal topicality.

The Enlightened Muslim

A further peculiarity of the dialogue with Islam is in, and here the author is only referring to the situation in Germany, the selection of the Muslim dialogue partners. Approximately three-quarters to two-thirds of the more than 3 million Muslims who live in Germany consider themselves religious. Only a small portion of practicing Muslims, however, is organized. Theoretically this small portion seems to contain the most interesting dialogue partners. If one looks for dialogue partners in the field of organised Islam in Germany, however, as a rule the only ones one finds are those with links to Turkish or Saudi Arabia dominated institutions who are obviously close to Islamic movements.⁵ Neither trend represents the majority of Muslims in Germany.

It is not only appropriate to suspect Islamic associations' claim to represent Muslim opinion in Germany, but their motives are suspect as well. The goal of dialogue must be getting to know each other, dismantling fear and prejudices, and defining common principles of living together. The past behaviour of the Islamic associations' representatives at dialogue events instead begs for the opposite intentions to be assumed. Stressing Islam as an enemy other here serves to accentuate cultural differences. These differences, it is

claimed, need to be acknowledged and respected by the German state. The motives are obvious: instead of integration, what they call for is the creation of legal and political manoeuvring room—differentiation that is. The dialogue runs into the danger here of becoming a forum in which civil liberties and individual rights, in the sense of a false understanding of tolerance, are put into question. The subject of these attempts at creating manoeuvring room are often the same: slaughtering unanaesthetised animals, freeing girls from gym classes, Mosque architecture, the wearing of the headscarf, and the call to prayer. A lot of what is discussed under the label of religious freedom is less harmless than it appears. The so-called headscarf debate (*Kopftuchstreit*) in Germany is met with incomprehension by many Muslim friends in other countries and raises doubt as to the religious tolerance of the German State. But what they often ignore is that this specific case is more about than just the individual right of freedom to practice religion, but rather it is also about a legal precedent.

That fact that dialogue meetings are not seldom misused for recruiting purposes for the specific understanding of Islam held by the central Islamic association in Germany is not only embarrassing for the dialogue partners. Significantly more problematic is that it puts the majority of Muslims who do not feel a great need for privileging their Islamic existence in European societies under pressure. Many Muslims see themselves to a certain extent polarised in an Islamic direction because of the current societal debate, which is actually alienating rather than pleasing to them. This dialogue does not prevent the development of parallel societies; instead it gives a forum to those who would build such societies. Here again the clash of civilisations comes in through the back door.

If one wants to avoid the central Islamic associations when searching for dialogue partners it becomes difficult. Many Muslim intellectuals shy away from establishing them-

selves as representatives of Islam and prefer to think of themselves as what they are: writers, academics, students, artists, entrepreneurs, or civil servants. Hardly any of them want to present themselves as model enlightened Muslims. This is also true of guests from Muslim countries. One always hears from Egyptian, Iranian, or Indonesian friends that they feel downright Islamised in Europe and are more and more often urged by European dialogue partners to explain Islam here. This all shows the deficit in Muslim self-promotion in Europe. What is missing is that spirit and finesse that Islam has shown for centuries. There is no trace of the “public convert intellectuals” who have appeared as a new phenomenon in the United States and who have shown the Americans a loose modern Islam through an effective medium. In Germany in particular one looks in vain for that type of young, smart Muslim, who is well versed in the language and appearance of western societies and who can become the speaker for new generations of young Muslims. Instead the Muslim self-image is stamped by platitudes, moaning, and victimhood.

Thus it should not surprise anyone that contradictions arise. In Germany, but also in other European countries, the first books are appearing that denounce dialogue with Muslim countries and societies as selling out the Christian West and which warn of an Islamisation of the (Christian) revelation.⁶ This makes it clear that fundamentalism has a home in every religion and culture. He who presently warns of the spectre of the loss of Christian Western cultural identity is not only doing injustice to Islam, but also to that Christian-Western culture. Curiosity, openness, and interest in others are the strengths and not the weaknesses of that culture. The critics of dialogue with Islam have one point, however, (but only one) and that is: Islam should only be met self-assuredly and on the firm foundation of strong conviction. Only he who represents his own position clearly and confidently can receive recognition and respect from his dialogue partner.

Dialogue with Modernity

So what is needed to actually allow a good idea to work in practice? First, above all, clarity must be achieved regarding the goals and subjects of dialogue. Roman Herzog, the former German President and one of the strongest supporters of a dialogue with Islam, always brought attention to the fact that in order for this dialogue to succeed, coalitions of pragmatists need to be created against dogmatists—even within the respective cultures.⁷ Here indeed is where the substance lies: the strengthening of the moderniser, the *philosophe*, and the reformer. Often it seems that the problem is not the dialogue of religions with one another, but rather of the religions with modernity. This is above all true of Islam.⁸

The demand for dialogue is for the most part a Christian/Western one, with which the Muslim side often must be brought to comply. New approaches in Islamic thinking have to come from within and can only, perhaps, be supported from the outside. It is hardly helpful only to understand Islam as a problem. Everywhere in the Islamic world, and also in Europe, there are critical thinkers who dig deep down and think about the relationship between Islam and modern thought.⁹ The attempts of Islamic intellectuals to find an authentic path to modernity should be taken seriously. It has to be the task of this dialogue to offer these intellectuals a forum and to strengthen them in the internal Islamic debate. This can lead down several different paths. What is important, however, is that Islam succeeds in overcoming its rather negative image in Europe. This can only succeed if the Muslim world can unleash its own creative powers and accomplish aesthetic achievements that can truly fertilise Europe. This does not mean rugs, culinary arts, or well-intentioned folklore contributions; instead what is needed is art and culture in an entirely elitist sense.

The dialogue cannot only be about people: above all, concrete subjects must be sought out and discussed. Mosque

visits and Christian-Islamic discussion roundtables can be important and promote understanding, if they are carefully prepared. Many churches, social institutions, and engaged individuals carry out outstanding, original work here. Fundamentally, however, dialogue with Islam must move away from dialogue about dialogue. He who discusses the subject ought not be perplexed that he is not getting anywhere in questions of substance. That does not have to automatically lead to “dialogue mainstreaming”. But what would be wrong with including European Muslims in certain debates about political and social challenges that are of interest to all sides? Only in this way can sensitive topics be addressed, such as: understandings of democracy, human rights, education, globalisation, jurisdiction, hostility to strangers, anti-semitism, and, not least, religious tolerance. Muslims may react with annoyance to questions about Islam’s ban on changing one’s religion or the acceptance of Christianity in Islamic countries, but these questions are necessary. It is simply part of plural, multireligious societies that one can choose a religion and be allowed to leave or change it.

Adherence to realism has meanwhile become common in dialogue with Islam. It remains correct nevertheless. Dialogue with Islam, however it is framed, cannot have as a requirement diminishing potential or current tensions between states and societies of different cultures in the short and medium term. Through a fair exchange of views it can, however, increase mutual understanding and contribute to learning, which can on a long-term basis act in the intercultural conflict management sense. Realism also requires having no illusions regarding the role and weight of the participants. Power and interest asymmetries in terms of politics cannot be waived aside simply with declarations of the dialogue partners’ equality. These asymmetries are structurally dependant and can only be overcome, if necessary, on a long-term basis. In order not to let these asymmetries preclude or load a debate from the start, the inequality between the dia-

logue partners must be reflected upon in the process of dialogue. Even with this background the dialogue should be led by civil society, above all, as an exchange between concrete individuals. To have dialogue between abstract collectives of two religions or cultures is just as abstract as it is impossible. All this shows that dialogue with Islam still has a long way to go before it is not just simply a fad but a form of permanent practice. It is not a format that was brought into being and since that time has existed as a constant unchanging component of political and social life. It must be developed, arranged, changed, rejected and reinvented.

Notes

¹ Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Nathan the Wise* (Paperback) (New York: Hauppauge, 1972).

² Jan Rath/Rinus Penninx/Kees Groenendijk and Astrid Meyer, *Western Europe and its Islam. The Social Reaction to the Institutionalization of a 'New' Religion in the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom* (Leiden/Boston/Tokyo, 2001); Frank J. Buijs/Jan Rath, *Muslims in Europe. The State of Research* (New York, 2002); Shireen T. Hunter, *Islam in Europe and the United States. A Comparative Perspective* (Washington D.C., 2002); John L. Esposito, *Islam as a Western Phenomenon: Islam in Europe and the United States* (Washington D.C., 2002).

³ Christopher Allen/Jorgen S. Nielsen, *Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001 on behalf of the EUMC* (Vienna: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2002).

⁴ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York, 1979).

⁵ David Crawford/Ian Johnson, "German Muslim's Radical Path Was Paved by Saudi Contacts", *Wall Street Journal* (February 21, 2003).

⁶ In Germany, it is, above all, Hans-Peter Raddatz, who attracted public attention due to his criticism of the dialogue with Islam.

⁷ Bernhard J. Trautner, *The Clash Within Civilisations: Islam and the Accomodation of Plurality*, InIIS-Working Paper, No. 13, 99 (University of Bremen, 1999).

⁸ A. Salvatore, *Islam and the Political Discourse of Modernity* (Reading, 1997).

⁹ Nezar Alsayyad/Manuel Castells (eds.), *Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization (Transnational Perspectives)* (2002).

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Part II

Cultural Globalism versus Local
Identity: The Creation of Terrorism?





Are the Roots of Global Terrorism Cultural?

Randolph Mank

The idea of cultural roots of global terrorism immediately brings to mind the theories of scholars such as Samuel Huntington and the “clash of civilisations”. These theories postulate that global communities—or civilisations, which Huntington argues may be delineated along religious lines—are destined to come to a clash of civilisations, arguing that the cultural or religious divide is too great a rift to breach. While clash theories have an enormous and growing audience, it is my view that they are inherently flawed.

While these theories imply that the roots of terrorism are cultural, I think no one has yet been able to reveal the roots of terrorism in any convincing way. The important thing, however, is to avoid oversimplification.

Attempting to “unveil the roots of global terrorism” seems to lead us into the tricky debate over root causes, an important topic but one that always runs the danger of sug-

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gesting that there might be some justification for terrorism. Of course, there is no such justification.

Having said all of that, it is important to have this discussion, and we, as members of a global community, need to try to understand the problem of terrorism and think about what we can do about it.

The Roots of Terrorism are not Cultural

The obvious reason of this proposition is that terrorism has occurred so often in so many very different places and cultures that it would seem obvious that cultural factors are very poor predictors of the phenomenon. Worse, the cultural argument reminds us of Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilisations" thesis. His theory is that global communities as being defined along cultural and religious lines are destined to clash because of it. While clash theories are very popular today, as I noted earlier, it is my view that they contain fundamental weaknesses.

Arguments such as these, which present global conflicts and instability that have so shaken the world as the results of two cultures set in opposition, rely on over-simplifications, which feed into the prevailing misconceptions of the day. Theories that pit the "West" against the "East", "good" versus "evil", or Christianity versus Islam, foster dangerous stereotypes and run the risk of fuelling the very conflicts these theories purport to expose and explain. Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen argues that:

The foundations of the clash thesis involve a program of categorising people of the world according to one allegedly commanding system of classification. To see any person wholly, or even primarily as a member of a so-called civilisation—the "Western world", the "Islamic world", is already to reduce people into this one dimension.

Unfortunately these caricatures of nations, cultures, faiths and people have a certain utility and appeal to both the few who resort to terrorism, and those working to fight

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it: it is always easier to fight against an enemy you know, even if you have to create it first. But is a battle—an important, even essential battle—that is waged on a constructed and flawed premise bound to succeed in the long run?

Any divisive vision of the world is dangerous and feeds into the agendas of terrorists. For example, why is it that when terrorism is debated today, it is often, especially in the West, linked to Islam? Why is it that an expression of faith is portrayed as equivalent to an expression of violence? Terrorism is not exclusive to Islam, or any other religion for that matter. This, of course, is the kind of misleading caricature that comes from the cultural—or perhaps more precisely the religious—argument. Terrorism spans religions, cultures, ethnicities, social and economic strata, educational barriers and political affiliations. Terrorism seems to be more an expression of rage and hate, which, of course, is the opposite of the peace and love common to all religions.

It is a common assumption that cultures or countries are not homogeneous. Countries are reflections of the people of which they are comprised and are as unique and diverse as the citizens who inhabit them. “No one today”, as the late Edward Said stated, “is purely one thing. Labels like Indian, or woman, or Muslim, or American are no more than starting points, which if followed into actual experience for one moment are quickly left behind”. This vision of a neatly categorised world does not fit with the vision of plurality and cooperative diversity that a state such as Canada strongly hold. Hence, there is no solid ground to suggest that cultural or religious roots provide a very satisfactory explanation of this problem.

The Complex Explanation of World Terrorism

The problem of world terrorism is so complex that it defies easy explanations. It is not simply the problem of poverty nor it is that of ideology. The terrorists behind recent attacks have not been particularly poor. On the con-

trary some have been very wealthy, which explains why they can acquire weapons and followers. Sometimes the followers, of course, are poor, which is another problem. If it were that of ideology we would have been able to see a clearer logic to the attacks. Why attack the United Nations? What possible ideology does that serve? It is not either the problem of failed states like Afghanistan. This state was indeed an example of how such a state can be exploited by terrorists. But terrorism has come from stable states as well.

Could it, in fact, be attributable to dementia? This is an explanation that is rarely explored. And yet we have seen many examples throughout history of how charismatic zealots, who turn out to be quite deranged, manage to convince otherwise normal people to follow them and perform unspeakable acts. We could go on and on thinking of possible explanatory factors. Of course, not one of them taken alone can explain the phenomenon. Nor is there some mathematical formula combining them that can provide a clear explanation. Rather, it seems that some confused jumble of these and other factors turn out to offer an unsatisfactory explanation for terrorist acts. The fact is that terrorism has been around for a long time and has touched every corner of the globe. It takes many forms. What we are seeing in the world today is its intensification, as terrorists exploit technologies in ever more destructive ways. Rather than being limited to specific conflict areas, terrorism is being globalised, which makes it difficult both to understand and to combat.

We are all guilty of these simplifications as we, members of the global community, scramble to understand and fight what Bali and the Marriott have shown to be a global epidemic. In this new paradigm of global insecurity it is surprising how quickly we revert to our ideological roots - pitting black versus white, good versus evil, East versus West. There is a retrenchment of nationhood, unilateralism and patriotism. The world is not that simple and as wilful or innocent our ignorance may be, it risks perpetuating this

war that we all wish to fight and it widens the gulfs between nations, cultures and people rather than bridging them.

**Against the Potential Environment of World
Terrorism: Canadian Case**

It is probably worth drawing our attention to a recent address by Canada's former Prime Minister, Jean Chrétien, to the Conference on "Fighting Terrorism for Humanity" held in New York on September 22, 2003. During his address, the former Prime Minister articulated Canada's position on the global roots of terrorism. He said that there is a critical link—that we must never take for granted—between democracy, good governance, and the ability of people to live free from threats to their personal security. He further stated that in the absence of inclusive and responsive political institutions, discontent, destabilisation and violence find room to grow. In contrast, when all members of a society can freely participate in political life; when the government is accountable both to the law and to the people; when there is a free and independent media and a vibrant civil society; when human rights are respected; and when there is a functioning and unconstrained judiciary, then it is possible to express dissent in legitimate, non-violent ways. Then we give a voice to the voiceless. Finally, he noted that when we all have a voice, conflict can be channelled into the political arena in the form of dialogue and debate, which, as we know, are essential components to democratic nation-building.

One can argue that it is in the absence of stable governance, a strong judiciary, and the provision of basic needs that terrorism can find a welcoming environment. There are no quick fixes to these problems. But Prime Minister Chrétien also argued that we must do more to expand opportunities and share prosperity—to reduce the growing disparity between rich and poor. Global security and stability today depend on greater equity—they are interdependent. The more we promote and encourage education and eco-

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conomic security, the more we promote global security. Inclusiveness, democracy, openness, and shared opportunities for prosperity are important weapons in the medium and long-term battle against terrorism.

As a Canadian, when I look to my country's experience, it is obvious that the simplifications simply do not hold. How can I juxtapose the West (Canada) with the East, or Islam? The Canadian experience resists this simplification: we pride ourselves on our cultural diversity and pluralism. Canada is, as I have said many times, a "Muslim country". We are a country made up of Indonesians, Malaysians, Philippines, Palestinians, not to mention Europeans, Africans, Israelis, and Irish.

In Canada, we pride ourselves on our cultural diversity and pluralism. We are far from perfect, but I think our diversity enriches us. Canadians are many things. We come from many ethnic and religious backgrounds. We are a coming together of disparate groups and communities from the entire world. And somehow this pluralism, through tolerance, works. We feel that our commitment to our diverse national community and the wider global community makes us stronger, not weaker.

Muslims now make up the second largest religious group in Canada. These Canadians contribute to Canada's society in every sense and at every level. We have about 700,000 Muslim Canadians who come from South and Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America, Europe and the Middle East. Canadian Muslims hold seats in the Canadian House of Commons and the Senate, are business executives, university professors, storeowners, doctors, teachers and police officers.

The multiculturalism policy in Canada provides equal opportunities in employment, provision of services and in representation, as well as equal rights and protection under the law. Muslim Canadians have thrived in this pluralist environment, and while challenges do exist, the Muslim com-

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munities and their neighbours have worked together to break down stereotypes and provide a concrete alternative to the divide espoused by proponents of “the clash of civilisations”.

The first mosque in North America was established in Edmonton, Alberta. This mosque regularly opens its doors to other members of the Canadian community, so that its leaders can educate and share part of this unique Canadian experience. Canadian Muslims participate at every level of Canadian society. These Canadians embody the diversity within Islam itself and are helping us disprove the clash of civilisations thesis.

We long ago rejected the model of a traditional nation state, choosing not to define ourselves through one common ethnicity, religion or language, but rather through diversity itself: Unity in diversity. Indonesia, of course, has the same founding principle. With the world’s largest Muslim population, I think Indonesia can serve as a model for the rest of the world. Pluralism does seem to work here and tolerance is evident everywhere. It is important to nurture this.

Canada hopes to learn from the Indonesian experience and share whatever we can in return. We do this through dialogues and debates such as the one for which this paper was written, or the recent conference at McGill University in Canada. Recently a group of Canadian parliamentarians visited Jakarta to learn more about Islam here. I am sure they returned home with a much deeper understanding of the Indonesian way.

These are small steps when you look at the big picture, but important ones. They are steps taken in the right direction: toward one another rather than away. I would like to conclude with six quick points: first, the way forward must be inclusive and engage the entire global community; second, there is a need for a global dialogue to address the misconceptions of Islam and to strike a clear delineation between Islam and terrorism. Misconceptions about “the



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West” also persist and must be addressed; third, we must understand terrorism in all its complexity and devise our strategies to fight it accordingly; fourth, we must take concerted action on the political, financial, legal and military fronts. We also need to establish common standards on such issues as transportation, security and terrorism financing; fifth, we must ensure that appropriate resources are available for implementation; and sixth, we should remain committed to multilateralism as the international mechanism for fostering increased global and human security.

Through our commitment to global co-operation, dialogue and good governance I am sure that we, as members of a global civilisation, while revelling in our diversity, can work together to fight terrorism.



Globalisation, Local Identity, and Terrorism in Global Cultural Pluralism

K.S. Nathan

The September 11, 2001 episode, marked by terrorist attacks on the icons of the American superstate, with nearly 3,000 casualties alongside huge financial, economic and other collateral losses, is but the most forthright indication that political and ideological globalisation has preceded the values associated with cultural globalisation. In an economic sense, globalisation refers to economic interdependence and the unparalleled movement of capital, goods, services, and skilled manpower—a process driven by interrelated factors such as the advent of the Information Age, new technologies of production and transportation, the demise of international communism, the opening up of socialist and third world markets, and export-oriented national economic strategies. The process is also accompanied by significant reductions in government control of the national economy,

the rise of civil society, and the growing power of multinational corporations and international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.¹ The pressure exerted by the IMF on the Soeharto regime in Indonesia in the immediate aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis is a well-documented fact. The IMF rescue package was humiliating to Indonesian national pride and might have been a contributing factor in the collapse of the Soeharto regime in 1998.

Globalisation is a fairly recent phenomenon in terms of its totalising economic, political, social, and cultural impacts on human civilisation, commencing with the advance of Western imperialism and territorial conquest in the latter half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. The non-Western world was arguably globalised by the imperial activities of the Western powers and also Japan, whose emergence as a military-industrial power under the Meiji Restoration gave the “Land of the Rising Sun” the same imperial energy and drive that characterised the Western powers. International relations scholars have debated, and continue to debate, the various impacts of globalisation. However, there is little doubt that globalisation has enabled especially the Western nation-states from the late 19th century onwards to mobilise a number of assets of which at least three were crucial: First, the ability and willingness to use large-scale violence, often based on technological supremacy; second, an assumed cultural supremacy that was often translated into political and social institutions; and third, the availability of maritime power and organisation, which complemented their military and technological power. It is these assets that translated their potential advantage into actual domination.² Indeed, the situation today is not very different—hence the resentment of the politically, economically, and culturally disempowered states, groups and individuals in the current global order—which explains to some extent the rise of Islamic radicalism in the world today.

On the interface between culture, religion and morality in the context of globalisation, Beyer maintains that “the globalising tendencies of society have radically altered the conditions under which the moralising solution is possible on the level of society as a whole, because the group now includes everyone”.³ Beyer further argues that the outside or inside distinction readily at hand for reinforcing the internal moral codes of communal, and hence, territorial societies become difficult to maintain over the long run in a world of virtually instant global communication, itself a consequence of institutional specialisation.⁴ Beyer’s thesis helps explain the political dimension of the concept of Muslim *umma* (Islamic community) as the pursuit of this goal transcends local and national identities, with the aim of creating and establishing a universal identity for adherents of the faith—the desire to establish an Islamic state and an Islamic world order.

In any event, in the aftermath of the two world wars (WW I and WW II), the world community essentially accepted the Nation-State process of globalisation, and symbolised the post-Second World War status quo by establishing the United Nations in 1945. Henceforth, unilateral ambitions were to be moderated by multilateral impulses through the machinery of international organisation, and pacific settlement of disputes achieved through the medium of international law. Multilateralism in trade and economic matters was also endorsed under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system, whilst the 1944 Bretton-Woods system attempted to stabilise the international monetary system in the post-Second World War era. Despite all human efforts to create a more humane international order, the struggle for political dominance and the search for security through “realist” rather than “institutionalist” approaches still remains largely embedded in the foreign policies of states. The faith in multilateralism and the United Nations was dealt a heavy blow in the crisis over

Iraq and the subsequent invasion (March 19–April 9, 2003) and occupation of that country by the United States and Britain. The United Nations could only be a mere observer in that brief conflict—and even the 5 custodians of international security (Britain, France, United States, Russia, and China) failed to avert the crisis and war over Iraq’s presumed possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

Cultural globalism, local identity, and differences in national and regional approaches to conflict-resolution were sidelined in favour of unilateralism as manifested by the behaviour of the singular superpower in the post-Cold War era—the United States. In this regard, what strategies and policies are available, or should be pursued in the post-September 11 and post-Iraq contexts to increase awareness of the enormous cultural pluralism that the 191 nation-states of the world today represent, with a view to limiting national or unilateral impulses that can tend towards aggression based on power rather than peace based on inter-cultural understanding and dialogue? The following issues are examined to facilitate a better appreciation of the linkage, if any, between terrorism and globalisation.

Globalisation, Local Identity, and Terrorism

Globalisation—as a universal, integrative process in terms of the pace and volume of political, economic, military, social, intellectual, technological and cultural transactions and exchanges—invariably produces an uneven impact on the global community as this very society, divided politically into 191 Nation-States, is extremely heterogeneous, with tremendous diversity in all the indices stated above. Cultural globalism is necessarily modified by local conditions that in turn stem from geography, history, ideology, and the capability of humans to transact their needs and address challenges at various levels. As Tomlinson notes, “culture matters for globalisation in the obvious sense that it is an intrinsic aspect of the whole process of complex

connectivity”.⁵ Just as globalisation impacts on culture, the reverse process is equally true—hence we get the term “glocalisation”, i.e. how cultures respond to, adapt, and initiate their own approaches to culture in a local context. One could even evaluate this phenomenon in terms of the “subjects” or initiators and “objects” or recipients of global processes. Individuals, communities and states that are more adept at coping with, and benefiting from globalisation would welcome it as a factor conducive to raising their material conditions, while those that lack these skills would not only fear its impact, but also react negatively to its manifestations. An NGO activist from Thailand has even claimed that “globalisation is endangering every part of society, and perhaps economic globalisation is the most powerful cause of many social illnesses...”⁶ The recent spate of violence in the Muslim-dominated parts of southern Thailand raises questions about the effectiveness of the Thai State’s policies towards minorities who have certainly become more aware of their rights and status through globalisation. It has brought into sharper focus the nexus between “cultural globalism” (which the Thai State promotes through assimilation and integration)⁷ and “local identity” (which the Muslim south prefers to assert through their Islamic faith, partly, if not largely, because of the neglect of their socio-economic welfare by the central authorities)—a situation not too different from the Muslims in the southern Philippines. Is terrorism therefore an inevitable albeit negative response to globalisation or cultural globalism? In the post-September 11 context, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad captured the nexus between the global and the local when he referred to Osama bin Laden’s popularity:

Any number of people can use (Islam) for their own objectives. The main thing for them is to gain power. We are going to be faced with this problem for a long time. We know that we in Malaysia are vulnerable to such forms of extremism, like every other country in the world. Everyone of us is vulnerable.⁸

The type of terrorism unleashed in Southeast Asia, and more specifically, on the Indonesian island of Bali on October 12, 2002 and on the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta on August 5, 2003 needs further study and analysis in regards to why a generally peace-loving and tolerant people, with a rich tradition of cultural pluralism, would allow a few misguided individuals to unleash terror on innocent people. Nevertheless, there are some answers to the question of how cultural globalism impacts upon local (individual or group) or even national identity.

The Political or Ideological Dimension of Globalisation

Muslim identities are either being engulfed or threatened by global processes that are viewed or interpreted by Muslims as un-Islamic or contrary to the teachings of the Qur'an. They would like to see the emergence of a truly Islamic local, national, regional, and if possible, global world order based on Islamic principles. At the present time, the implementation of an Islamic legal, political, economic and social system has been at best incomplete, and therefore, ineffective in promoting or achieving justice, development, and prosperity. The more assertive or radical Muslims are frustrated by the powerlessness of the Muslim world *vis-à-vis* the Western industrialised, capitalist, and secular world. Professor Azyumardi Azra, a well-known Indonesian expert on political Islam, noted that while Islamic revivalism is continually gaining momentum, there are signs that many secular nation-states in the Muslim world have failed to deliver their promises, with the result that the centre-stage is being hijacked by Islamic movements and leaders offering more radical solutions to empower Muslims, such as the establishment of an "Islamic state" (*al-khilaḥa*).⁹ Being unable to change the power equation through pre-existing channels and structures that they would claim to be stacked against Islam, certain ideologues like Osama bin Laden and

his disciples around the world have decided that the only weapon available to effect change is “terror”. Osama and his disciples are fully convinced that Muslim identities can never flourish in the Western-dominated international system—hence the alternative is to wreck it as far as possible in the rather distant hope that change can be brought about in favour of the Islamic world. Indeed, it is arguable that the rise of Islamic extremism is a product of cultural and religious globalisation. As Zachary Abuza argues, the growth of Islamic extremism worldwide since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 “has less to do with theology and more to do with the failure of the domestic political economies of respective Muslim countries. Increasing gaps between the rich and poor, inequitable distribution of wealth, poverty, a lack of economic diversity, unemployment, corruption, and the lack of a viable political alternative have all given rise to Islamic extremism”.¹⁰

The existing Nation-State system in the non-Western world, which Muslim discontents would argue is the product of Western imperialism and colonialism, is the cause of the disproportional balance of power between Islam and the West. Yet, it must be noted, Islamists are actually attempting to craft the “Islamic State” onto an originally secular political entity whose attributes are fairly finite: territoriality, sovereignty, municipal government and legal system, and the capacity to transact business with other nation-states with similar politico-legal attributes. There is thus a conflation of “Islamic identity” with “national identity”—resulting in a confused state of affairs in terms of the pursuit of what is desirable versus what is possible. As Azra himself notes, the caliphate of yester year was itself an undemocratic concept, and any attempt to reconstruct an Islamic national identity through the model of an “Islamic State” within Indonesia’s present national borders would be both problematic and unrealisable. Since the 1990s, Islamic organisations that entertain such dreams, for example Hizb

al-Tahrir and Jamaah Tarbiyah, which were suppressed during the Soeharto era, are now using their new-found freedom under democratisation to rekindle their hopes.¹¹

For most Muslims, rightly or wrongly, power differentials effecting identity are manifested by several national, regional, and global issues, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in which the Palestinian right to self-determination is being systematically crushed by Israeli military might, augmented by American power and military-economic assistance to the Jewish state. More recently, the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq to presumably remove the threat of WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction)—without the authorisation of the international community acting through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations—is further proof of Muslim disenchantment and a sense of alienation under the unipolar world order. Loss of Muslim “face”, erosion of identity, and a sense of powerlessness, backed up possibly by the call for *jihad* by Muslim radicals in order to redress injustice, have all contributed to September 11 and the ensuing episodes of global and regional terror unleashed by Islamic militants.

The difficulties encountered by the American military occupation post-Iraq War provides adequate proof of the clash between cultural globalism and local identity. It is becoming increasingly evident that the US authorities in Iraq have very little understanding of the local culture, ethnic and religious dynamics, nor of the historical and socio-political conditions that lay at the root of the anti-US insurgency. While it cannot be denied that Iraqis have for the first time, after 30 years of Saddam Hussein’s autocratic repression, an opportunity to engage in democratic discourse and to determine their own future political destiny, they are generally resentful of the occupying forces regardless of America’s good intentions. The problematic here obviously is the clash and tension arising from *globalisation* American-style and *glocalisation* Iraqi-style. Neither force is strong

enough to adapt cultural globalism to the requirements of local identity. Iraqi nationalism i.e. resistance to foreign aggression and rule is being conflated with anti-Americanism—with neither side being capable of making sense of the long-term implications and consequences, both negative and positive, of the regime change brought about by US unilateralism. Even the oppressed Shia majority in Iraq, although welcoming in some ways the downfall of the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein, are wary about their own political future, as a proper and consensus-based power-sharing formula cannot be worked out in the context of ever-increasing violence. Developments such as these in the Middle East are bound to produce implications and lessons for other states and regions of the world that face increasing challenges from globalisation in managing highly pluralistic societies in terms of culture, politics, economy, and society.

**Cultural Globalism and the Challenge of Identity:
Co-opting or Containing Political Islam?**

It is often said that terrorism is the weapon of the weak. As such, as long as the pervasive feeling exists among Muslims, whether rightly or wrongly, that they are being disenfranchised by the essentially secular domestic and international political systems, discontented individuals and groups in the Muslim world will continue to challenge the credentials of their secular leaders, through violence if necessary. The March 11, 2004 Madrid bombings of a commuter train causing over 200 deaths is indicative of how irrationality can dominate the minds of disgruntled individuals and groups who choose terrorism to vent their anger at their lack of empowerment in the current international socio-political and economic order. However, it needs also to be asked why the ordinary masses who are not Muslim do not adopt the same path of violence—why only Muslims should choose terror as their most effective weapon? Is it because the so-called “Islamic states” themselves unleash oppression on

their Muslim subjects—contrary to all the noble ideals and best practices in Islam? Where does the answer lie in re-shaping an Islamic identity that can emerge and flourish within the confines of existing political, ideological, economic, social, and cultural realities? Should Islamic practice itself be re-examined and reformed to absorb features of globalisation so that Muslims can seek security, progress, spirituality and prosperity within a re-defined Islamic identity that can avert a clash of civilisations?

States that have consciously or inadvertently condoned international terrorism in pursuing their dreams of creating a new Islamic world order need to seriously rethink their strategies and policies. As these states themselves begin to take stern police and military measures to stamp out terrorism within their borders, their hitherto sympathisers have now turned their guns on the leaderships of these states. The best examples are Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, where Al-Qaeda elements are now determined to use whatever terrorist means possible to dismantle the leadership of both these governments. Thus, September 11 has impacted significantly upon state policies *vis-à-vis* terrorism with the realisation that in the long term, the wiser approach is based on the adoption of more constructive ways to strengthen and empower themselves in the existing international order, rooted in the Nation-State. The alternatives, such as establishing an “Islamic State”, holds promise only for those fundamentalist and extremist ideologues who seek self-empowerment more than the empowerment of the entire Muslim *umma*.

Lack of Muslim empowerment in the current international order is beyond doubt. Nevertheless, strategies must be formulated to provide realistic approaches and answers to Muslim weakness in the present global system. Terrorism is clearly not the answer. Besides creating a very negative image of Muslim competence in facing economic, political and cultural globalisation, it also reduces the window

for inter-cultural dialogue to explore pluralist and multilateral strategies to close the Muslim or non-Muslim divide. At the nation-state level, education, including religious education, needs to be examined very closely to ensure that no fault lines appear at the initial stages of schooling, i.e. at the *pesantren* and *madrasa*—as it is there that individual and groups, as well as national identities and loyalties, are shaped.

The Indonesian cultural milieu—as a reflection of the plurality of Southeast Asian cultures—projects national confidence in dealing with diversity. As Sharon Siddique observes, the indigenous population of Southeast Asia has historically maintained its distinctiveness despite the “globalising” pressures and influences from three great civilisations: Indian, Chinese, and European, while religion itself was rarely brought to Southeast Asia with the sword.¹² If Muslims did not lose their identity then why is there this sudden fear among them of being swept into oblivion by other civilisational impulses? Could it be that Islamic doctrine and practices are remaining static while other cultural or civilisational forces are evidencing a capacity for resilience, flexibility, modernisation and reform in a manner that is required by the dictates of survival and progress in the 21st century? Muslim scholars and policy makers of a modernist, progressive orientation probably have the answers, but whether the conservative or reactionary forces are stronger in resisting change is a matter for open debate. In any event, religious values and practices considered normal and acceptable in a Middle Eastern or Arabic context might well be unsuitable for the culturally pluralistic and accommodative milieu of Southeast Asia—hence the existence of some tension between religious identity and national identity, local identity versus global identity. These tensions invariably need to be addressed and resolved to ensure that religious and cultural globalism does not clash with local identities and national loyalties.

Nevertheless, as McDonald and Lemco aptly note, “there is a danger, however, in lumping Southeast Asia’s Islamic

tradition with Middle Eastern radicalism. Significant differences exist between the Islamic revivalist movements looking to cultural and spiritual renewal that have swept Southeast Asia in recent years and transnational terrorist networks".¹³ In Indonesia, obviously one should not mistake the wood for the trees. With the breakdown of central authority following the collapse of the 32-year old Soeharto regime, long-simmering ethno-religious tensions aggravated by the 1997 Asian financial crisis and economic downturn erupted into open conflict.

In Malaysia, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), following significant electoral victories *vis-à-vis* the ruling UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) in the 1999 General Elections, felt emboldened to pursue even more vigorously the establishment of an Islamic State—a project that has suffered a severe setback since September 11. PAS's open identification with Osama bin Laden also raised questions relating to local identity versus global identity in Islam. September 11 has thrown a challenge to PAS to demonstrate its capability and commitment to a Malaysian national Islamic identity that is not in conflict with its political commitment to a higher, transnational loyalty called *umma* (Islamic brotherhood/community). If the recent General Elections in Malaysia, held on March 21, 2004, have any message for the success and prospects of moderate Islam, the electoral disaster suffered by PAS is highly instructive. The fundamentalist Islamic party earlier failed to make a clear distinction between "Islam" and "terrorism", and was veering in the direction of support and empathy for Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. The lesson for Muslims emerging from the Malaysian political experience is that the more effective strategy in defeating Islamic radicalism is by ballots, not bullets. The ruling *Barisan Nasional* (National Front) Coalition Government led by Abdullah Badawi, a moderate and progressive Muslim, scored a 90 per cent victory, taking 198 of the 219 parliamentary seats. The BN electoral

landslide suggests that Malaysian voters, including Muslims, are not only quite sophisticated, they also reject simplistic as well archaic solutions to the problems and challenges of modern governance. Malaysia's fifth prime Minister, who succeeded Dr. Mahathir Mohammad on October 31, 2003, is advocating a modernist, progressive, inclusivist and pluralist version known as *Islam Hadhari*, suitable for Malaysia's multi-cultural and multi-religious society. His approach is geared towards the convergence and fusion of diverse elements and forces into a Malaysian national identity, consistent with positively addressing the demands and challenges of globalisation in the 21st century.¹⁴

Malaysian and Indonesian Muslim leaders of a moderate persuasion are well aware of treading the treacherous path of converting the present fairly open, democratic, secular and pluralistic political system into an "Islamic State". Hussin Mutalib makes a very important observation for multi-racial, multi-religious, and multi-cultural Malaysia in this context: "what is bound to exacerbate the difficulty in transforming Malaysia into an Islamic State is the almost virtual absence of such a state in the world today for Malaysia, and others, to follow or emulate".¹⁵ Additionally, M.H. Syed, in his work on "Islamic Terrorism: Myth or Reality", expounds his thesis on the concept of an Islamic State by pointing out the difficulties and complexities involved, which actually negate its creation. He argues that if sovereignty in Islam lies with God alone, the state has no power in and of itself. Therefore, there is no point in actually defining political institutions, when in any case, the executive, legislative, and judicial powers have very little room for maneuver—as their powers are limited and circumscribed by a supreme law which human agency can neither alter nor interfere with. Furthermore, Islamists quickly turn a discussion about institutions into one about determining the virtues and personal traits of those qualified to fulfill the various functions of state power. He concludes that "the priority

accorded to personal attributes over the definition of duties prevents the emergence of any thought on the subject of institutions".¹⁶

Abdullah Badawi's strategy of "progressive Islam" is arguably an attempt by the state to address the problems of globalisation in a pragmatic and constructive manner—and not an endorsement for the creation of the "imperfect" Islamic State. As Farish Noor aptly remarks that the problem that Malaysia faces today is trying to preserve its current system of values (and trying to project its system of values as well) against an overwhelming tide of different ideas and values in an increasingly integrated global environment.¹⁷

Indonesia also faces similar problems in harmonising values related to state or nation, religion, culture, and society, while its version of modernist and progressive Islam has arguably long been advocated, and continues to be practiced by the two mainstream Islamic parties, Nahdhatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. The strength of moderation in Indonesia's political culture is reflected by the very low level of support for militant Islam, as seen in the rise and demise of Laskar Jihad between 2000 and 2002. As Michael Davis observes, this militant brand of conservative Islam did not go beyond spawning Muslim-Christian clashes in Ambon, Sulawesi and Maluku in the aftermath of September 11. It was disbanded immediately after the October 12, 2002 Bali blasts. Political parties and groups advocating religious pluralism continue to maintain the upper hand.¹⁸

Nevertheless, the growing role of religion in the domestic politics of Malaysia and Indonesia should not be easily discounted. Religious politics are as much products of modernity—of mass society and mass politics. As Shanti Nair observes, "although often represented in political definition and language as static, Islamist politics and discourse should therefore not be treated as *sui generis*."¹⁹ In the context of globalisation, it impacts upon Malay nationalism, Malay or Islamic identity, and Malaysia's multi-ethnic and multi-cul-

tural society as a whole.

Indeed, globalisation imposes upon states and governments the imperative of designing “inclusive” rather than exclusive strategies and policies in managing pluralism and diversity, as this is the time-tested method of reducing the gap and tensions that always exist between “state” and “society”, between the “rulers” and their “subjects”. The democratic process, although cumbersome, ensures in the long-term a government that is open and responsive to local identities and regional or provincial dynamics, besides being more capable of marshalling the sentiments of the people towards a sense of national identity, belonging, and commitment to the Nation-State. Oppressive and high-handed approaches can only fracture the Nation-State and possibly encourage loyalties that transcend the nation-state structure—loyalties and identities that can threaten the very foundations of the state’s political order.

At the global level, identity formation is also influenced by the politico-military-diplomatic strategies pursued by states and international organisations. In the post-Iraq war era, it is patently clear that multilateralist solutions are preferable to unilateralist approaches to world order, and national and regional security based on the values of equity and justice. Indeed, justice and equity must be globalised as much as economic and technological exchanges are globalised. Inequities are bound to develop when globalisation produces a very narrow range of benefits and choices for a very disparate and pluralistic world community. Nationalism itself can be utilised as a strategy to strengthen local identities that are incrementally being eroded by transnational and impersonalised forces, thus causing in some individuals, communities and states a sense of despair that urges the use of violence and terror to restore identities threatened by cultural homogenisation.

Political Islam is here to stay with us for an undetermined period. The issue is not whether political Islam is or

is not a threat to the political and territorial status quo, because in Islam politics, religion, culture, economics and society are an integral part of the Muslim way of life. The real challenge for Muslim leaderships is to ensure that Muslims practice moderation in politics and avoid militancy as an option to achieve political goals. Pursuing the goal of being a good Muslim can be quite different from the political goal of desiring to establish an Islamic State. Indeed, it is arguable that both these goals are mutually exclusive as the former seeks spiritual empowerment while the latter seeks political glory. It is in the interests of Muslims to view globalisation not purely as a Western-initiated process or preserve, but as a process depicting cross-cultural fertilisation and mutual learning, and as “a multi-source, multi-recipe global scene in the new millennium”.²⁰

Bridging the Gap Through Multilateralism

In sum, globalisation itself cannot be singled out as the root cause of terrorism. Terrorism existed from the time humans began to live in communities, societies, and later nation-states. The technological and communications revolution has globalised the means by which we comprehend and respond to terror. Control of the mass media has highlighted the immediacy and veracity of the impact of global terror. Additionally, the unipolar world order under American dominance invariably assigns priorities to American perceptions of world order—perceptions that are seen to be insensitive to the Muslim, and even the developing world. Yet, it would be incorrect for the non-Western world to perceive and respond to globalisation, which is a consequence of modernity, as a Western Project. In the view of Anthony Giddens, globalisation is more than a diffusion of Western institutions across the world, in which other cultures are crushed. He argues that Globalisation—which is a process of uneven development that fragments as it coordinates—introduces new forms of world interdependence, in which, once again,

there are no “others”. These create novel forms of risk and danger at the same time as they promote far-reaching possibilities of global security”.²¹

Thus, cultural globalism is best viewed in positive terms as a project and phenomenon arising from global interdependence, in which the character and identity of social order at all levels can be shaped collectively by all cultures, religions, and socio-political groups. This approach encourages the scope for multilateral approaches to shape local national, regional, and global identities, thereby reducing threats to security at all levels.

In the context of the prevailing *Pax Americana*, international perceptions of rising American unilateralism under the Bush Administration have invariably questioned the legitimacy of US global leadership in view of “a general depreciation of international rules, treaties, and security partnerships”.²² The answer obviously lies in constructing shared perceptions and expectations of a world order in which cultural pluralism encourages multilateralist approaches, which emphasize not only the military component in combating global terror, but also the political, social, economic and diplomatic strategies required to promote cooperative security and enhance human security. At the regional level, the promotion and development of the ASEAN Security, Economic, and Socio-Cultural Community, in line with Bali Concord II (October 2003) is arguably a step in the right direction of multilateralism.²³ The latest initiative in regional cooperation by the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations takes into consideration the post-September 11, 2001 context in Southeast Asia, especially the need to strengthen cooperation against global terror. Such efforts in genuine multi-dimensional regional cooperation facilitate the harmonisation of local, national, regional and global identities in the search for peace, equity and justice for all.

Notes

¹ Brahma Chellaney, "Globalisation and Asian Security". Unpublished Paper presented at the Defence Services Asia (DSA 2000) Conference on War, Peace, Globalisation and Asian Security, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 12-13 April, 2000, p. 11.

² Michael Smith, "Modernization Globalization and the Nation-State", in Anthony G. McGrew & Paul G. Lewis et al., *Global Politics: Globalization and the Nation-State* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 254-255.

³ Peter F. Beyer, "Privatization and the Public Influence of Religion in Global Society", in Mike Featherstone (ed.), *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity* (London: Sage Publications, 1990), p. 384.

⁴ Peter F. Beyer, "Privatization and the Public".

⁵ John Tomlinson, *Globalization and Culture* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1999), p. 22.

⁶ Pipob Udomittipong, "Rethinking Education on the Verge of Globalization", in N.N. Vohra and J.N. Dixit (eds), *Religion, Politics and Society in South and Southeast Asia* (Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1998), p. 178.

⁷ See Marwaan Macan-Markar, "Thailand: Violence Mars Ethnic Harmony", *The Manila Times* (14 January 2004).

⁸ Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's keynote speech delivered at the Conference on Terrorism organised by the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 17 November 2001. Cited in Andrew Tan & Kumar Ramakrishna (eds.), *The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends and Counter-Strategies* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2002), p. 162.

⁹ Azyumardi Azra, "The Challenge of Political Islam", *PANORAMA: Insights into Southeast Asian and European Affairs*, No. 1 (2002), p. 25.

¹⁰ Zachary Abuza, "Al Qaeda's Southeast Asian Network", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (December 2002), p. 433.

¹¹ Azyumardi Azra, "The Challenge of Political Islam", p. 26.

¹² Sharon Siddique, "Religion and Realpolitik in Muslim Southeast Asia", *PANAROMA*, No. 1 (2002), p. 11.

¹³ Scott B. MacDonald and Jonathan Lemco, "Political Islam in Southeast Asia", *Current History*, Vol. 101, No. 658 (November 2002), p. 388.

¹⁴ K.S. Nathan, "Abdullah's Burdens of Victory", *The Straits Times* (March 29, 2004), p. 12.

¹⁵ Hussin Mutalib, *Islam in Malaysia: From Revivalism to Islamic State* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1993), pp. 129-130.

¹⁶ M.H. Syed, *Islamic Terrorism: Myth or Reality* (Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, 2002), vol. 1, pp. 224-225.

¹⁷ Farish A. Noor, "Values in the Dynamics of Malaysia's Internal and External Political Relations", in Hang Sung-Joo (ed.), *Changing Values in Asia: Their Impact on Governance and Development* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Tokyo & New York: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1999), p. 167.

¹⁸ For details, see Michael Davis, "Laskar Jihad and the Political Position of Conservative Islam in Indonesia", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 24, No. 1, (April 2002), pp. 12-32.

¹⁹ Shanti Nair, *Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy* (London & New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 120.

²⁰ Anthony B.L. Cheung, "Globalization versus Asian Values: Alternative Paradigms in Understanding Governance and Administration", *Asian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (December 2000), p. 13.

²¹ Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1990), p. 175.

²² G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "America's Imperial Ambition", *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2002), p. 53.

²³ See Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) (October 7, 2003) <<http://www.aseansec.org/15160.htm>>

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Political Fairness: An Approach to the Genuine Issue of Local Identity

Richard Gozney

The contrast between Cultural Globalism and Local Identity has been clear since the telegraph and radio were invented. This gave popular access almost immediately to events far away, across many cultural divides. Television, and now satellite television, has increased the contrast. They have increased popular access and the vivid impressions left by that access. Fashion TV is just one recent example. A rather light channel with eclectic, often skimpy Western clothes and enough bare flesh to delight even the naturist painters of Bali. Shocking, the conservative Muslims will say. But look at which channel is watched by young Indonesian men on their treadmills at the gym and you will see its popularity. That is globalisation for you. Personally, I think the contrast between cultural globalism and local identity will grow further as more and more people in, say, Asian or Muslim cultures have access to the internet as well as cable

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or satellite TV, and more money to buy the magazines that on one page discuss the latest *busana* Muslim and the next page debate the fitness of David Beckham's right foot. Globalism at the popular level is here to stay.

It gives rise to issues. But, at least in a democracy, it should not give rise to terrorism. We face some of those issues in Europe—the preservation of Welsh or Gaelic in remote mountain communities in Wales or Scotland where life used to centre on the church, and the pub or bar, but now is more strongly influenced by TV and videos.

You may face the same with some languages or dialects spoken by relatively few people in, say, North Sulawesi or East Kalimantan, now that the Minahasas, Kutai and Dayaks are increasingly wired up to satellite TV. But I am not sure that those worried about preserving local identity will need, in a properly functioning democracy, to resort to violence. We had little in Wales against English weekenders. But now those weekenders are busy learning Welsh, which has shot up in popularity, and thinking of attending the Eisteddfod, the great Welsh Cultural Festival, each year. I suspect that *Bupati* Syaikhani in Kutai Kertanegara will get the Bugis and Banjar to support his annual Erau Festival of Kutai Culture in much the same way.

Where wider ethical or moral values are at stake it is up to the defenders of local identity to convince enough people to preserve those values. In the Highlands of Scotland the followers of the Wee Free Church do no work of any sort on a Sunday. So a small hotel owned and run by a Wee Free Family will close on Saturday night, to stop them having to serve breakfast and make the beds of their guest on Sunday morning. If a consensus exists they will succeed in maintaining their religious custom. If it does not, even among themselves, then picking up a gun or a bomb is not going to help them.

Similarly if Western diplomats in Jakarta are foolish enough to invite Indonesians to lunch at 12.00 or 12.30 on

Friday, they will find few Muslim guests willing to forego *Sholat Jum'at* (Friday Prayer) and perhaps even willing to show to non-Muslims that they have foregone *Sholat Jum'at*. The consensus of Muslims in Jakarta in favour of spending an hour at prayer from noon on Friday is strong. It does not need force or violence to sustain it. And if most television stations broadcast the Friday noon call to prayer, it is not because they fear the gun or a bomb for failing to broadcast the call to prayer. Instead they recognise that many of their viewers are happy to be reminded of the noontime summons to the mosque. Nevertheless, there are people who favour radical support for what they see as local identity, who have strayed across the line, from persuasion and other legal activity, into illegal acts of violence. We call them extremists.

Again we have had them in the West. People of my age remember the *Bader Meinhof Gang* in Germany and the Red Army in Japan of the 1960s and 1970s. They held extreme political views, which I remember as very left wing with a flavour of anarchy. They tried to force their views on the people of Germany or Japan through violence. In no way could they hope to persuade people by legal means of argument, or by standing as political party candidates. They were tracked energetically and successfully by the police, the prosecutors and the courts of Germany and Japan. They went to prison. In a democracy, that is the way to curb extremists who know they can not win popular support by talking and campaigning. Their intellectual conceit, at thinking that they know better than everybody else, is breathtaking.

I will finish with some words on a very different sort of local identity—that linked to political equality or to territory. When frustration at the erosion of local identity is based on a sense of unfairness, that means that democracy is not seen and believed that the political structure of Northern Ireland gave them a fair deal and fair share of local power to help them maintain their identity as Northern Irish Catho-

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lics. They were right. They sympathised with the PIRA terrorists. Most of us would say that was wrong. But we had an obvious solution available to us and them—changes to the political structure and fairer sharing of political power. That was done, after much anguish and difficulty. So the Northern Irish Catholics no longer feel, I think, persecuted and unrepresented. The terrorism from PIRA has stopped for the last 6 years.

The sense of persecution is all the stronger when applied to a question of territory. In the 1970s and 1980s the Acehnese felt that their special identity was not recognised or respected by Jakarta. We all know that some of them took to violence from 1976. We can also see the solution—special respect for the distinctive nature of the Acehnese through special autonomy. The law providing for Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (literally the Islamic State of Aceh, a powerful title) confirms the Acehnese people's very special identity. We hope that those using violence, that is GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Aceh Independence Movement), will see this and return to the negotiating table to discuss the future of Aceh based on special autonomy, not independence, and that they will do so very soon, before many more Acehnese and TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Army) lives are lost.

Internationally, the danger to a people's local identity because territory has been taken away from them is seen most sharply among the Palestinians. Of course the Palestinians need their own State, in the West Bank and Gaza. Of course the Israelis should pull back their settlements and troops to allow the State to be declared. Of course the Israelis need reassurance that a small Israel, without the occupied territories of Palestine, will be safe. But the solution is also clear—a negotiated agreement along those lines was nearly reached under PM Rabin, and was even more nearly reached by PM Barak in the 1990s, under which the Golan Heights would be returned to Syria, Gaza and the West Bank

would form the State of Palestine, and the special status of Jerusalem for Christians, Jews, and Muslims is recognised.

This sort of local identity issue, which gives rise to terrorism in Palestine, or Northern Ireland, can be solved by negotiated compromise, by sharing territory and mutual respect. Then the terrorism stops. The sort of local identity issue seen in special ethnic groups, whether the Gaelic speaking highlander of Scotland or the Badui of Banten here in Java, can also be solved if the ethnic group maintains its values and coherence and insists on respect of its values by outsiders. Terrorism is not needed. Nor does it help.

The false issue of local identity is different. Where a tiny minority claim a distinctive identity and insist on imposing that identity upon those around them, that is not, in my view, a genuine issue of local identity. It is an issue of a minority group's arrogance. We need to support and keep strong the alternatives for impressionable young people who, in frustration at the slow speed of political change, what is called *reformasi* in Indonesia, may be tempted by the tiny minority. In Java that means strong support for the moderate view. We outsiders can support a little, on request (Nahdhatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah). Support for the minority extremists of *Bader Meinhof Gang* in Germany and Red Army in Japan fell away sharply 20 and 25 years ago because the alternatives offered to young people were more attractive.



Part III

New Consolidated Democracy:
In Search of Pluralism,
Clean Governance and
Non-Violent Cultures





New Consolidating Democratic Countries towards Global Challenges: The Case of Southeast Asia

Jörn Dosch

Introduction

An academic paper that is supposed to deal with two of the most contested contemporary concepts at the same time, democracy and globalisation, is almost doomed to failure right from the start. To make things worse, even if we arrived at a more or less accepted definition of these broad ideas, the related questions are even more challenging: Do democracies face any other global challenges than non-democratic polities? Have the former adopted any other strategies to deal with the manifold impact of globalisation than the latter? And last but not least, is Southeast Asia's situation in any way different from the global challenges faced by other world regions? This chapter will discuss the cases of Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. The three young Southeast Asian democracies still face immense shortcom-

ings and hurdles in the process of democratic consolidation but have already come a long way since the days of authoritarian rule. Cambodia would be another example but will not be analysed here because behind the democratic façade, major parts of the country's political system are still dominated by prevalent autocratic power structures.

What is the link between democracy and globalisation? Following Anthony Giddens' definition; globalisation is the intensification of world-wide social relationships, which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by distant events and, in turn, distant events are shaped by local happenings. It is a process that has led to the reduction of geographical, spatial, and temporal factors as constraints to the development of society. It has resulted in an increased perception of the world as a whole, and a readjustment of societal thought and action away from national, and towards international and global spheres.¹

Based on this understanding, recent world-wide processes of democratisation can be considered an expression of globalisation. Kim Kihwan even views democratisation as the immediate "result" of globalisation:

Globalisation will lead to greater democratisation... With easier and greater access to information, constituents will want to participate more actively in the decision-making process. The upshot will be not only more democratic decision making in all organisations but also change the nature of democracy itself, from a representative to a participatory one.²

The expansion of democracy around the globe began with the demise of dictatorships in Portugal, Spain, and Greece in the mid 1970s. This process has been most prominently described as the "third wave of democratisation".³ It has extensively reshaped the modern world. After reaching Latin America the "wave" crossed the Pacific, reaching the shores of Asia: The so-called People Power Revolution of 1986 in the Philippines was followed shortly after by demo-

cratic transitions in South Korea and Taiwan. Thailand and Indonesia are undergoing (re-)democratisation processes since 1991 and 1998 respectively. According to the NGO Freedom House, less than 30 per cent of the world's countries were democratic in 1974. The most recent survey "Freedom in the World 2004" shows that currently 88 countries are consolidated democracies, representing 44 per cent of the world's population. 55 countries are considered "partly free", representing 21 per cent. Political rights and civil liberties are more limited in these countries, in which corruption, dominant ruling parties, or, in some cases, ethnic or religious strife are often the norm.⁴ Although it is questionable whether democracies can be clearly and easily identified and counted, as especially American analysts are trying to make us believe, democratisation is nonetheless a significant phenomenon, which cannot be ignored as a decisive factor in the post Cold-War era.

As readers will recall, in the lively debate on Western versus Asian values in the early 1990s, democracy was sometimes used by Asian contributors as a synonym for "Western culture" in general and therefore rejected as not suitable for their own societies. Some East and Southeast Asian governments had accused the "West" of trying to impose on them alien concepts derived from post-Renaissance liberal Western traditions. However, the idea that cultural differences make the "Western concept" of democracy inapplicable to East and Southeast Asia has never been commonly shared. For example, Kim Dae Jung, who has always been one of the major opponents of Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir Mohammad in the debate, has argued that Asia was rich with democratic ideals and institutions and still is.⁵

At any rate the problem of dealing with democracy is the normative character of the concept. Democracy is rooted deeply in specific cultural and historical experiences. In the mainstream European view, democratic political rule is prominently associated with the welfare state ideal, whereas

in the United States pluralism of decision making processes and power structures is at the fore. In Latin America the concept of civil society became a core element of the young democratic order. In East- and even more in Southeast Asia the notion of democracy had long been based on the principal of harmony and consensus-building, which materialised for example in Indonesia's so-called *Pancasila Democracy* under the rule of Soeharto. However, there is one common experience that all young democracies share regardless of the respective cultural background in which they are embedded. The wave of democratisation that has washed over the globe for three decades has principally opened international relations and foreign policy making to a larger number of actors compared with authoritarian regimes. The greater openness and complexity of foreign policy making is due to electoral competition, a prominent role played by parliaments, greater transparency and, not least, broad access to independent sources of information. In many cases a stronger participation of non-state actors, such as NGOs and other organisations of civil society in foreign policy making is not only a quasi inevitable consequence of democratisation but also a development actively supported by governments. As Gary Rawnsley observes for Taiwan:

Democratisation has significantly affected Taiwan's conduct of foreign relations... The government believes that everyone in Taiwan is responsible for, and can make a positive contribution to, Taiwan's diplomacy, in the hope of reducing elitism and nurturing a more inclusive foreign policy.⁶

Hence, I will argue that the processes of democratisation in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines have not only resulted in new domestic political orders but also have had an impact on foreign policy making and, more specifically, changed the way the respective governments perceive global challenges and react to them. The first part of this chapter will focus on this national-global nexus by elaborating

on the issue of terrorism and the emergence of soft or non-traditional security as a new key agenda in a globalising world. The second part will try to shed some light on regional responses to global challenges. It will discuss whether multilateralism has succeeded as a strategy to, first, soften the pre-eminent if not outright hegemonic position of the United States in the Asia-Pacific and, second, bring peace and stability to the region.

The National Level: Consequences of and Responses to the Global Challenge to Security

One of the most influential contributions to foreign policy analysis has been the metaphor of the two-level game as introduced by Putnam⁷ and developed further by many others since.⁸ The two level game framework is the “central analytical device ... to span the domestic-international divide”⁹ and “remains the standard for analysing such interaction”¹⁰. It follows the idea that “the relationship of states to the domestic and transnational social context in which they are embedded—have a fundamental impact on state behavior in world politics”.¹¹ The two level game links the national and international context of decision-making. At the national level, domestic actors pressure the government to adopt policies they favor. At the same time governmental actors seek power by building coalitions among these constituencies. At the international level, governmental actors seek to satisfy domestic pressures while limiting the harmful impact on foreign relations. Thus, political leaders must simultaneously play both the international and domestic games.

The requirement that decision-makers satisfy both domestic constituencies and international opponents is the component in this conceptual approach that produces constraints on international behaviour. In short, while the two-level approach as conceived by Putnam emphasises negotiating behaviour, it also serves as a metaphor for understanding

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the impact of domestic influences on the broad spectrum of foreign policy decisions.¹²

The Declining Role of the Armed Forces in Foreign Affairs

Regime changes in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines have resulted in new formal and/or informal structures, which influence, channel or even determine foreign policy decision-making. Although the respective heads of governments, the Presidents in Indonesia and the Philippines, and the Prime Minister in Thailand, continue to play the main part, the process of democratisation has opened the two level game in all three cases. Furthermore, the less clear and straightforward international structures of the early 21st century require more complex processes of foreign policy-making and the evaluation of a larger set of alternative options than in the case of the previous—relatively simply structured—bipolar world. One of the most visible results of regime change has been the decline of the Armed Forces as a major foreign policy actor and the revival of foreign affairs as a civilian domain. Although the *dwi fungsi* doctrine is still alive in post-Soeharto Indonesia and the Armed Forces of Indonesia (*TNI* or *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*) has not yet surrendered its self-proclaimed traditional role as a domestic stabiliser of last resort, the *TNI*'s impact on foreign affairs is diminishing.

A major factor in foreign policy formation has been the revitalisation of a professional diplomatic corps since the fall of Soeharto. In the New Order, the Department of Foreign Affairs (*Departemen Luar Negeri* or *Deplu*) was in effect subordinated by the military ... and the most-well known case of a difference between the *TNI* and *Deplu* was over the status of East Timor. *Deplu* had for years urged for a settlement on the issue, not least of all because East Timor has been the major impediment of Indonesia's aspiration on the global stage. However, the military took the final decision on this matter. Senior ambassadorial appointments went to generals rather than career diplomats.¹³

The first President of the democratic era, Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), opened up the foreign service to civilians. But *Deplu*, like most actors in post-Soeharto Indonesia, has yet to firmly establish its proper role within the political system and adapt to the new structures of decision-making and changing political culture. *Deplu*, like the Civil Service as a whole, "is now a multi-party environment where it must be neutral and learn to serve changing administrations."¹⁴ Overall the civilisation of foreign affairs in general and re-structuring *Deplu* in particular have not yet resulted in a more effective conduct of foreign policy. All three Presidents of the post-Soeharto era, B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and currently Megawati Soekarnoputri, took wide-ranging initiatives to re-establish Indonesia as a respected and influential actor on the global stage after the country's international bargaining power as the informal leader of ASEAN and high-ranking member of the Non-Aligned Movement had significantly declined in the wake of the Asian Crisis and human rights abuses in East Timor. However, neither Habibie's strategy of close cooperation with Germany and the European Union, nor Wahid's concept of forming a strategic alliance between Indonesia, China and India and the idea of establishing a West Pacific Forum, nor Megawati's attempt to play the role of a mediator for the reunification of North and South Korea produced tangible results. These and other initiatives lacked coordination and coherent strategic planning and have indicated that the Indonesian government has not yet found a suitable foreign policy concept in dealing with the rapid changes in its external and internal environment.¹⁵ At least for a few years Thailand took advantage of Indonesia's weakness and established itself as ASEAN's new power center.

Similar to Indonesia, the involvement of the Armed Forces in Thai politics goes back a long way. Thailand's democracy is the result of a long-term transitional process characterised by frequent alternations of authoritarian

regimes since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1933. The periods of authoritarian rule and semi-democracy were also shaped by the dominant position of the military in foreign policy decision-making. Under the administration of Chuan Leekpai (1997-2001),

The withdrawal of the military from politics was to have a meaningful effect on foreign policy formulation as civilian control of foreign affairs came into effect. For the first time since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932 Thailand had a civilian Minister of Defence, when Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai decided to hold the Defence portfolio himself.¹⁶

The fading military role in politics as a result of the democratisation process has contributed to a rising profile for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Under Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan (1997-2001), the MFA emerged as the undisputed lead actor in foreign policy. Surin's charisma, his outspokenness and revolutionary ideas about a reform of ASEAN, materialising in a lively debate about the organisation's sacrosanct principle of non-interference and the establishment of the ASEAN Troika,¹⁷ contributed to the Ministry's finest hour in recent years. As a result, Thailand emerged as a new unofficial leader of ASEAN in the wake of the Asian Crisis, which abruptly ended 30 years of Indonesian guidance. Due to the economic disaster and political crisis, the massively weakened Indonesian State was no longer in the position to maintain its role as the organisation's *primus inter pares*. Indonesian President Megawati, however, has tried to put Jakarta back in the driver's seat. Soon after taking office, she visited all ASEAN capitals as a reaffirmation of her pledge to make ASEAN once again the cornerstone of Indonesia's foreign policy and Jakarta the organisation's leader. Megawati sees "a consensus within ASEAN that Indonesia takes most of the initiatives and leadership in the organisation simply because it is the largest member."¹⁸ Even though this statement seemed

to reflect wishful thinking rather than a realistic assessment of the region, Indonesia earned back leadership credentials by hosting the 2003 ASEAN summit (see under 3 for more details), one of the organisation's most successful and important events ever.

Military-Civilian relations were different in the Philippines compared with Indonesia and Thailand, at least until martial law was imposed in 1972, ending an unbroken tradition of civilian control of the military. According to Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution, civilian authority is again, "at all times, supreme over the military." Generally, most military leaders found this more difficult to accept with respect to the domestic order than in the case of foreign relations. Since the beginning of re-democratisation, foreign policy decision-making has been dominated by the president, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Senate. Shortly after taking office, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, the fourth President since 1986, indicated that foreign affairs will be given priority during her administration. This could further strengthen the position of the DAF as "the premier department of the Philippine government".¹⁹ While the fading role of the armed forces in foreign affairs has had a less visible impact than in Indonesia and Thailand, the Philippines is a prime example of a second common feature that clearly differentiates autocratic and democratic regimes: policymakers in democracies do not decide against public consensus. As Risse-Kappen argues, "in most cases, mass public opinion set[s] broad and unspecific limits to the foreign policy choices".²⁰

The Growing Impact of Civil Society Organisations and Public Opinion

In 1996 the administration of then President Fidel Ramos wanted to pass an anti-terrorism law, citing the threat of international Islamic groups, which it says are linked to a continuing insurgency in Mindanao. It would have allowed tele-

phones to be tapped, bank accounts to be inspected, and arrests to be carried out without warrants. The proposal was already as good as dead before Congress had even seriously considered it. For many in the Philippines the plan evoked memories of martial law. Ramos was accused of harbouring similar dictatorial ambitions. Hostility to the bill was voiced in the streets as well as in the Senate.²¹ There is little doubt that increasing openness and transparency in foreign policy decision-making has contributed to a stronger societal input in Indonesia and Thailand too. Smith observes that “Post-Soeharto Indonesia is more politicised than it has been in decades. The growth of civil society means that foreign policy can no longer be made in isolation by a small number of insulated political elites.”²² Kusuma confirms the same for Thailand:

Prior to the decades of the 1980s and 1990s, Thai foreign policy had been formulated independent of the public domain to the extent that the Foreign Ministry was dubbed “the twilight zone”. Pressures, both external and internal, have opened up foreign policy decision-making to greater public scrutiny, to the extent that one can say that the ‘twilight zone’ no longer exists.²³

The democratic environment has primarily resulted in the stronger influence of business-related interest groups on foreign relations. At the same time, the activities of pro-democracy and human rights NGOs and movements, which have emerged in large numbers since the late 1980s, have clearly contributed to the shaping of foreign policy. The Chuan administration’s foreign policy pronouncement to Parliament in November 1997 outlined an almost Wilsonian vision of foreign policy by announcing Thailand’s participation “on the international stage in the protection and promotion of democratic values and human rights.”²⁴ Six years on, in September 2003, under the succeeding government of Thaksin Shinawatra, the vision materialised when Thailand sent 420 soldiers to Iraq in an effort to rebuild the war-ravaged country. Unlike most other countries that have sent

troops to Iraq, the military mission has never been controversial in Thai public opinion and is widely accepted and supported as the inevitable international duty of a country that wants to play a prominent and useful role in international affairs. Even the killings of two Thai soldiers in their camp in Karbala—the first Thai soldiers to be killed on an overseas battlefield since the Vietnam War—has not changed the overly positive attitude towards the mission.²⁵

In all three states the de-militarisation of foreign policy on the one hand and the increasing influence of business groups and NGOs in the arena of policy-making on the other have resulted in a shift from a realist to a more liberal perspective. In Thailand and the Philippines, security understood as the defence of the state's integrity, which was the overriding strategic aim of previous authoritarian regimes, seems to have given way to the primacy of trade diplomacy. In Indonesia, where national cohesion is still the overriding policy priority, a new focus on trade promotion did not emerge under Wahid and is only gradually gaining importance under Megawati's presidency. In all three cases the Asian Crisis of 1997-98 accelerated the process of re-defining foreign policy objectives. Perhaps the most decisive and visible result of the interaction between structural changes since the end of the Cold War, such as the diminishing importance of ideology—the communism-liberalism divide of the old bipolar world order—in international relations and the emergence of new actors who have successfully managed to put their mark on foreign affairs, is a new concept of security.

The Emergence of Non-Traditional Security

The end of the Cold War “generated a major re-evaluation of normative and policy assumptions as these apply to International Relations (IR). In particular, new attempts were undertaken to explain what made people ‘secure’.”²⁶ In the early 1990s, the two core elements of foreign policy, eco-

conomic development and military security, became intertwined in a way never seen before. At the same time, the post-Cold War period in International Relations has been characterised by the recognition of highly uneven patterns of change in different components of development, and the technological and political changes often labelled as globalisation. One consequence has been the emergence of the concept of human security. As fostered by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), this term usually means “freedom from fear and want”.²⁷ The UNDP Human Development Report of 1994 stressed:

The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust. It has been related to nation-states more than people... Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. For many of them, security symbolised protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards.²⁸

The idea of human security has rapidly moved to occupy centre stage in discussions of foreign policy and made its way onto the agendas of the EU, the United Nations and Group of Eight (G8). However, human security has not emerged as the only alternative security concept. According to the new understanding, security covers societal and even individual dimensions, economic, environmental, criminal, humanitarian and human rights issues, as well as those of the illegitimate use of violence. In Southeast Asia:

The shift in the discourse of security was visible at the fifth meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum held in Manila in July 1998, where ministers discussed the economic crisis at length and warned that poorly designed reforms could negatively affect “less privileged sectors of society” and “impact on the peace and security of the region”.²⁹

Akaha³⁰ identifies six non-traditional security complexes in East and Southeast Asia that have already appeared on the radar screen of policy makers in the region:

First, environmental deterioration and its deleterious effects on human health and trans-boundary pollution problems; second, growing pressures on natural resources due to expanding market demand, particularly with respect to forestry and fishery resources; third, legal and illegal migration and resulting ethnic tensions; fourth, increasing gaps in wealth and income within and between neighbouring regions in part as a result of international and transnational economic exchanges; fifth, drug trafficking; and sixth, mismanagement of national economies and their vulnerability to the intensifying forces of globalisation, resulting in major economic and social dislocations among the local populations.

As anywhere in the world, events since September 11 have had a further significant impact on security perceptions in Southeast Asia. In a few short lines the introduction to the most recent 'Regional Outlook' by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) show the manifold and devastating impact of terrorism as one of the most decisive non-traditional security challenges:

The escalation of terrorist activities threatens to dampen investor's interest in the region. It also scares away tourists. These economic repercussions add to the domestic problems of many regional countries. In those countries that are Muslim-dominated or have sizable Muslim minority, the terrorist-linked security poses a host of political challenges. The response to the U.S.-led campaign against international terrorism becomes a sensitive issue. Ongoing domestic debates over the interpretation and practice of Islam become more fraught with sensitivities.³¹

The Dilemma of Fighting Terrorism

No other nation in Southeast Asia has recently been affected by terrorism as badly as Indonesia. Most decisively,

the Indonesian government's reaction to the "war on terror" has provided an excellent example of the executive's dilemma created by the two level game in a democracy. Apart from re-focusing Indonesian foreign policy on ASEAN, the further improvement of relations with the United States has been Megawati's main foreign policy concern, not least for economic reasons. The President managed to secure US\$ 530 million in new financial aid, promised when she visited Washington soon after the September 11 events. To avoid any damages to Indonesia-US relations, it was in the interest of the Megawati government to support the Washington-led campaign in Afghanistan. However, pressured by anti-American demonstrations in the streets of Jakarta and elsewhere, the administration could not go beyond vague political rhetoric without risking the escalation of public unrest. According to Banyu Perwita:

Massive reactions of some elements of Indonesian Muslim society towards the war in Afghanistan and the wave of anti-Western (the US) mass demonstrations were clear examples of people's strong willingness to participate in Indonesia's foreign policy.³²

Despite Megawati's initial intention to support a proposed declaration of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) condemning international terrorism, the declaration did not materialise, particularly because domestic constraints prevented the Indonesian (and Malaysian) government from officially sponsoring and signing such a document. Instead, the APEC summit in Shanghai in October 2001 produced only a very general statement on terrorism. At the same time the Indonesian government was concerned that the war in Afghanistan could increase domestic support for radical Islamic groups, such as the Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front) and Laskar Jihad (Jihad Troops).³³ While a combination of national pride, lax law enforcement, and a dependency on the Islamic vote initially hindered the government from confronting the small minority of radical groups among the predominantly moderate

Islamic community, the Bali bomb attack of October 12, 2002 and the Marriot bombing in Jakarta some ten months later dramatically changed the scenario. The events forced Megawati to rush through emergency presidential decrees, giving state authorities a strong mandate to crack down on Islamic radicalism. Then again, in order to get re-elected in the 2004 Presidential vote, Megawati cannot afford to close her eyes to the interests of core Muslim players. Given her strong secular-nationalist background, the President needs to play the Muslim card to secure the Islamic vote. In addition, to vast parts of the population and not a few key-players among the political elite, Washington's foreign policy is unpopular and so is any external advice from the US or neighbouring countries on any matter, including the issue of how to handle terrorism. Recommendations from external actors are usually perceived as a most unwelcome interference in Indonesia's internal affairs. For all its history as a modern nation state Indonesia has proudly clung to its self-declared "active and independent" role in international affairs and seen itself as a principal actor and not a plaything of others.

However, no matter how the Indonesian government perceives the problem, there can be little doubt that the spectre of international terrorism is casting a shadow over South East Asia. Some links between Al-Qaeda and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Indonesia, respectively, seem to exist. Furthermore, members of JI have allegedly been training in the Philippines since 1998. There is a strong indication that the distinction between JI, as an international organisation, and local Islamic groups such as Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) are increasingly blurred in the southern provinces of the Philippines (US Department of the Treasury 2003). The sophisticated nature of the January 2004 attacks in Southern Thailand could also indicate international involvement.

At the same time, we should not blind ourselves to the fact that the origins of and reasons for armed conflict within many Southeast Asian States are of a domestic rather than international nature. Some radical groups in Indonesia might have found it useful to ride the global *jihad* bandwagon. On balance, however, their agendas tend to be local rather than international. Domestic factors have been far more important in explaining the recent re-emergence of militant Islam in Indonesia. With the notable exception of Jemaah Islamiyah, which first appeared on the scene in the late 1970s, most of the radical groups that make today's headlines emerged only after the ousting of Soeharto in May 1998. The end to authoritarian rule was followed by a new political pluralism not known in Indonesia for more than four decades. Hardline organisations could organise themselves and operate freely without much restriction. Equally, if not more important was the impact of the 1997-1998 Asian crisis from which Indonesia has yet to fully recover. The severe economic decline prepared the ground for a successful recruiting campaign. An increasing number of poor, unemployed young men have willingly followed the new movements. Even more importantly, although governments might find it convenient to stress the international dimension of domestic conflicts in order to attract US support and assistance—with the Arroyo administration in Manila certainly being the most prominent example—separatist and insurgency movements are primarily rooted in religious or ethnic cleavages which are often the result of failed policies of first colonial regimes and later independent national administrations.

The history of insurgent movements in the Southern Philippines, for example, dates back to Spanish rule. Resistance to colonisation was especially strong among the Muslim population of southwestern Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago when Moros—the Spanish name for the Filipino Muslims, which is still in use—fought Christians and

foreign domination in a battle for independence. Spanish control over the Moros was never complete, and the Muslim struggle continued during American colonial rule. Following independence, Filipino Muslims continued to resist political domination by Manila, leading to widespread conflict in the 1970s. The 12,000-strong MILF is the country's main Muslim separatist force. It has been fighting for an independent Islamic state in the southern Philippines since the group's establishment in 1978. Various governments have tried but eventually failed to end decades of separatist fighting and rebellion in the Philippines. In a similar vein, the Muslim-majority provinces of Southern Thailand, Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat, and Satun look back on a long history of insurgent activities. Although the conflict ground to a halt in the late 1980s and only a few small splinter groups continued to put up a fight into the 1990s, bomb explosions in Pattani, the burning down of more than a dozen schools in the region and other acts of terror may have marked the beginning of a new era of violence.

In brief summary, violence in Southeast Asia is not primarily the result of global terrorism in the wake of September 11 but predominantly related to failed or incomplete nation-building processes; half-heartedly implemented approaches to the decentralisation of central power structures; and the prominent involvement of the military in domestic affairs and, related, the temptation of governments to rely on "military repression in an effort to maintain national integration",³⁴ even in democratising polities.

Whether or not Megawati or any succeeding government will be able to defeat Islamic militarism in Indonesia, for example, does not only depend on the enforcement of tough anti-terror laws and US military assistance. The ongoing economic crisis, staggering corruption and lawlessness are the real challenges. This unhealthy mix of vital domestic problems would be more likely to provoke a radicalisation of moderate Islamic organisations than any

sympathy with the idea of a global *jihad*. The Chairman of Muhammadiyah, Ahmad Syafi'i Ma'arif, made this point very clear:

It is our duty to jointly stage *jihad* against corruption ... There is no other way to ensure a good and respectable future of the nation except to fully eradicate corruption. As a Muslim who lives in a predominantly Muslim country, I can no longer bear the shame of seeing my country labeled the most corrupt nation in Asia.³⁵

Muhammadiyah, the largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia, claims some 40 million members. It has never departed from its traditional course of promoting a tolerant 'cultural and social' Islam and being committed to the secular state. The Philippines and Thailand face a similar situation of a 'terrorist problem' deeply rooted in their national histories and failed policies of the past. As Surin Pitsuwan argues in the case of Thailand:

Without sensitivity to Muslim culture, heavy-handed tactics may lead to further tension and more serious conflicts. Buddhist Bangkok still fails to understand the reason for southern discontent. People in the south don't object to the government or its administrative and security representatives, they object to the oppressive and exploitative nature of these entities' presence. What most people want is not a separate state. They want a state that can guarantee equal opportunity and equal justice.³⁶

Southeast Asian governments are not blind to these issues and most have embarked on new policies to deal with these pressing issues without, however, having found any sustainable solutions yet. At the same time they have adopted a parallel strategy of dealing with the challenge of terror on a regional level, within the structural framework of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

**Regional Responses to Global Challenges:
Multilateralism and the Role of the US**

Recently ASEAN has increasingly looked at the experiences of Europe where centuries-lasting painful experiences with unilateralism, often in combination with nationalism and fascism, have shaped a structure that de facto prescribes multilateralism as the only possible answer to the challenge of managing regional order. In a similar vein, Southeast Asia used to be one of the hotspots, both in geopolitical and geostrategic terms, during the Cold War. Post-Cold War challenges such as the search for appropriate responses to economic globalisation, the Asian Crisis of 1997-1998, and more recently the SARS outbreak and bird flu epidemic, have highlighted the need to find regional solutions to regional problems. Furthermore, since its foundation in 1967, ASEAN has always followed the maxim that multilateral cooperation is best suited to foster regional peace and stability.

In October 2003 during their summit meeting in Bali, the ten leaders of the ASEAN signed the Declaration ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), which envisions a long-term integrative process with the ultimate aim of creating an ASEAN Community modeled on the European Union. More specifically, they agreed to create an integrated economic, security, and socio-cultural community by the year 2020 (ASEAN 2003). Although the Southeast Asian media and most observers have praised the outcomes of the Bali Summit as ASEAN's most significant achievement ever, the various agreements are less groundbreaking than they seem to be at first glance. A deeper look reveals a widening gap between vision and reality.

While ASEAN has been at the centre of many successful diplomatic activities that have undoubtedly contributed to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific by facilitating channels of communication among former adversaries and increasing trust and transparency, one should be realistic about

the achievements and value of the recent summit meetings and international agreements. Understandably Megawati, the host of the Bali Summit, was full of praise:

We have just witnessed a watershed in the history of ASEAN. This is the document that will establish an ASEAN community. That will make it possible for our children and their children to live in a state of enduring peace, stability and shared prosperity.³⁷

Whether this time the dream can be fulfilled remains to be seen. The fact of the matter is that ASEAN's history is not short on summits and treaties, which all seemed to have far-reaching international implications and were all applauded for being historical watersheds, for example:

- *Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration* (1971): envision the creation of a Southeast Asia “free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers”; the treaty has never gained any political significance and the meaning of “neutrality” in the ASEAN context is still subject to interpretation.
- *Declaration of ASEAN Concord* (1976): already formulated the vision of creating a “strong ASEAN community”;
- *Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia/TAC* (1976): establishes a regional mechanism for regional conflict resolution. However, the “High Council”, as the court-like institution is called, has never been deployed and ASEAN members have preferred to resort to international institutions such as the International Court of Justice in The Hague to deal with disputes;
- *Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone* (1995): a very detailed document without any political value because none of the ASEAN members possess nuclear weapons and the US and other nuclear powers have never officially recognised the treaty;
- *ASEAN Vision 2020* (1997): already outlines many of the ideas for an integrated Southeast Asia that can be found

in the recent Bali Concord II, including paragraphs such as “we envision the entire Southeast Asia to be, by 2020, an ASEAN community”. However, over the past six years ASEAN has failed to name any concrete steps concerning how to reach this ambitious goal.

- *Declaration of the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (2002)*: Although the agreement may pave the way for a peaceful solution to the dispute over conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea (the area of the Spratly Islands in particular), it lacks any specific provisions on how to resolve the conflict.³⁸

As anywhere else in the world, visions are an important contribution to the cohesion and prosperity of a region. Europe would never have reached its current level of economic and political integration without the great visions that sounded utopian to many in the 1950s or 1960s. At the end of the day, however, any scenario for the future has to pass a reality check. If visions are simply repeated and do not result in any specific steps towards their implementation, the whole process and the actors behind it will lose credibility. The Bali Concord II seems to be a confirmation of the rule rather than an exception to it.

Although the recent summit and other high-level meetings in Southeast Asia have generated a lot of international publicity for the region, enhanced ASEAN’s status, have particularly strengthened Indonesia’s position in the region in the wake of hosting the Bali summit, and have come to benefit China’s position in the Asia-Pacific at the expense of Japan (which is a different story that cannot be told here in detail), there is a real danger that well-sounding visions have created long-term expectations that the region’s governments will find it difficult if not impossible to fulfill due to the high degree of political, economic and cultural diversity that still characterises Southeast Asia.

The fight against terrorism is a case in point. For example, the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to

Counter Terrorism commits the member states “to counter, prevent and suppress all forms of terrorist acts in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and other international law, especially taking into account the importance of all relevant UN resolutions”³⁹ without prescribing a specific institutionalised pattern of dealing with the problem. Although ASEAN has established a regional framework for fighting transnational crime and adopted a Plan of Action outlining a regional strategy to prevent, control and neutralise transnational crime, the organisation’s overall response to the threat and realities of terrorism clearly mirrors its traditional policy for not committing its members to any specific responsibilities. The Plan of Action is based on the principle of voluntary contribution. The cautious approach of some ASEAN states to anti-terror co-operation is also prominently reflected by the US-ASEAN Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism. The document, which was signed in August 2002, includes a paragraph the US side was initially unwilling to accept: “Recognising the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states.”⁴⁰ The paragraph was added in the declaration at the request of Indonesia and Vietnam, which feared such an anti-terror accord with the US could lead to the basing of US troops in Southeast Asia. In brief summary, both documents reflect the lowest common denominator and do not create any binding obligations for ASEAN members because of a missing consensus on an exact definition of terrorism and, equally important, because the issue touches upon the sensitive field of national sovereignty. ASEAN members are not yet prepared to allow any substantial outside interference with national policies or even to partly surrender their national sovereignty.⁴¹

The Role of the United States

The US-ASEAN Joint Declaration brings another decisive challenge for the young Southeast Asian democracies into focus: How to do deal with the superpower? The eminent Indonesian scholar Arifin Bey reminds us of the long-standing missionary character of US foreign policy that, it seems at first glance, is anything but welcomed in South-east Asia:

The self-image of “America Über Alles” as drawn by scholars, such as Huntington and Fukuyama has reached its highest stage in the so-called era of globalisation. This is just old wine in a new bottle which reminds one of “Manifest Destiny”, Reagan’s claims that Americans are “God’s chosen people”, commissioned as the “Savior of the Western Civilisation” to destroy “evil empires” and “rogue nations”. The latest American slogan is “new crusade”.⁴²

Consequently, particularly since the end of the Cold War, it has been a hidden goal of ASEAN multilateralism to ease the impact of American pre-eminence in the region by strengthening the opportunity and international status of the medium and small powers. However, beyond political rhetoric and the occasional carefully dosed portion of anti-Americanism for the consumption of domestic audiences, there can be little doubt that the continuous presence of the United States is actually seen as a beneficial feature.

Although the term “hegemony” seems to be outdated in the globalised world of the post-bipolar era, most states in the Asia-Pacific, with the prominent exception of China, still consider and favour the United States as the prime stabiliser, broker and balancer within the area. Approximately 90.000 to 100.000 troops are currently forward-deployed in the Asia-Pacific. However, the acceptance of a pre-eminent position of the United States in the Asia-Pacific has never been based on the sheer seize of its military presence alone. The export of American culture and technology has played an equally important part. This is what

Joseph Nye has called *soft power*.

If [a state's] culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow. If it can establish international norms that are consistent with its society, it will less likely have to change. If it can help support institutions that make states wish to channel or limit their activities in ways the dominant state prefers, it may not need costly exercises of coercive or hard power in bargaining situations.⁴³

Or more to the point: "Soft power is your ability to attract others to get the outcomes you want. Hard power is when I coerce you".⁴⁴ While hard power materialises in military force or economic sanctions, soft power is based on values, ideology and cultural features. The sources of American soft power are liberalism and democracy and—maybe to an even greater extent—specific consumer patterns, pop culture and films. According to a popular cliché, McDonalds, Starbucks, MTV and Hollywood are the faces of globalisation. This is, of course, a simplifying metaphor but a very powerful one and not very far from reality. Until very recently in Bangkok a cup of coffee would cost the equivalent of about 10 cents. Today it is fashionable to buy the same black brew for ten times its former price. Today it is called *latte* and it is from one of the uncounted Starbucks outlets that are spread over town. Last but not least, American universities are an important source of soft power as they attract more than 500,000 foreign students each year who get in touch with—and not seldom absorb—American values and ideas before they return home. In his most recent book Nye argues that while the US as a leading world actor needs to exert both hard and soft power, the information revolution and the phenomenon of globalisation call for the exercise of soft more than hard power.⁴⁵

Conclusion

In the introduction I asked the following question: Do democracies face any other global challenges than non-democratic polities?; Have the former adopted any more

strategies to deal with the manifold impact of globalisation than the latter?; and last but not least, is Southeast Asia's situation in any way different from the global challenges faced by other world regions?

The answer to all three questions is clearly yes. Even though the process of consolidation is far from being completed, democratisation in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines has changed the so-called two-level game in foreign policy making. Democratisation has altered the way the respective governments perceive global challenges and react to them. However, as this chapter has at least implicitly shown, in analytical terms any discussion of the relationship between democratisation and globalisation is a tricky one as it is next to impossible to clearly identify the independent and dependent variables. Both variables are rather inter-related in a never-ending circular process. The democratic decision-making within a state constantly modifies national responses to global challenges. At the same time, rapidly emerging new global challenges have the potential to change the state and nature of the political system in a given country. Terrorism is a prime example. The US-led global war on terror has posed a major challenge to the government of a young and fragile democracy like Indonesia. The administration of President Megawati Soekarnoputri has been facing the dilemma of satisfying the United States, as one the country's most important trade partners, while at the same time trying to play to the anti-American factions of the electorate in an attempt to secure the vote of the Muslim constituency. In more general terms, the interplay between democratisation and global challenges has resulted in alterations to the definition and perception of security all over Southeast Asia, and has simultaneously had a significant impact on the dynamics of the respective political systems. In brief summary, the broadening of the concept from a statist realist definition of security as hard or military security to a liberal understanding that covers the whole spec-

trum of human, economic and environmental security, is obvious in the whole region.

While most, if not all, young democracies face the challenge of new dynamics in foreign policy with the result of the emergence of new actors, such as NGOs and other organisations of civil society, Southeast Asian governments have greatly benefited from the existence of a multilateral cooperation scheme in the region, which has enabled individual states to deal more effectively than others with the whole spectrum of global challenges. Unlike most other regions outside Europe, Southeast Asia has successfully managed to often speak with one voice in international affairs as the result of successful regional cooperation centred on ASEAN. In the 1990s many Southeast Asian governments and individual politicians had great hopes that a network of emerging multilateral fora and organisations in the Asia Pacific, modeled on the Southeast Asian experience and, equally important, with ASEAN in the driver's seat, would gradually replace the often unilateral structure of international relations of the Cold War days. However, despite some significant achievements of multilateral cooperation, ASEAN and other organisations have fallen short of expectations and generally put more emphasis on formulating new grand visions of community-building instead of seriously working towards the implementation of existing projects. At the same time, although the US is often perceived as a bully in international affairs, Washington's continuous presence as the region's balancer and policeman is actually welcomed in most parts of Southeast Asia due to the unique combination of American hard and soft power.

Notes

¹ Anthony Giddens, *How Do You Define Globalisation?* (1999), <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Giddens/FAQs.htm#GQ1>.

² Kim Kihwan, "Globalization and Its Limits" in Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), *The Indonesian Nationhood and Challenges of Globalization* (Jakarta: CSIS, 2001), p. 26.

³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, London : University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

⁴ Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2004*, 2004, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/survey2004.htm>

⁵ Kim Dae Jung, "Is Culture Destiny?" *Foreign Affairs* 73, 6, (1994).

⁶ Gary Rawnsley, "Taiwan's Foreign Policy and Democratisation", *BISA News*, No. 74 (July 2002), p. 9.

⁷ Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games", *International Organization* 42, 3 (1988), pp. 427-460.

⁸ Peter Evans, et. al. (eds.), *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

⁹ James A. Caporaso, *Across the Great Divide: Integrating Comparative and International Politics* (Florence: European University Institute, 1997), p. 567.

¹⁰ Andrew Mertha, *Deterring the Trade Warriors: US-China Trade Policy and Two-Level Games*, paper presented at the 43rd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA) (New Orleans, March 2002).

¹¹ Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics", *International Organization* 51, 4 (1997), p. 513.

¹² Peter F. Trumbore, and Mark A. Boyer, "International Crisis Decisionmaking as a Two-Level Process", *Journal of Peace Research* 37, 6 (2000), p. 680.

¹³ Anthony L. Smith, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Abdurrahman Wahid: Radical or Status Quo State?", *Contempo-*

rary Southeast Asia 3, 22 (2000), p. 500.

¹⁴Smith, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Abdurrahman Wahid".

¹⁵Alexsius Jemadu, *Democratisation and the Dilemma of Nation-building in the Post-Soeharto Indonesia: The Case of Aceh*, paper presented at the ICAS III conference (Singapore, August.2003), p. 20.

¹⁶Kusuma Snitwongse, "Thai Foreign Policy in the Global Age: Principle or Profit?", *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 2, 23 (2001), p. 191.

¹⁷In 1998, when Thailand's Foreign Surin Pitsuwan proposed replacing the group's non-interference policy with "flexible engagement," most of his ASEAN colleagues demurred. But the idea gained ground. In 2000 ASEAN's foreign ministers formally approved Thailand's proposal for the ASEAN Troika, a new mechanism to enable the sitting chair to formally consult with his immediate predecessor and successor to tackle specific problems with regional implications.

¹⁸*Jakarta Post* (August 30, 2001).

¹⁹*Manila Standard* (January 27, 2001).

²⁰Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structures, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies", *World Politics* 43, 4 (1991), p. 510.

²¹*The Economist* (February 17, 1996), p. 33.

²²Smith, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Abdurrahman Wahid".

²³Kusuma, "Thai Foreign Policy in the Global Age", p. 189.

²⁴Quoted from Kusuma, "Thai Foreign Policy in the Global Age".

²⁵This assessment is based on research carried out by the author in Thailand in December 2003 and January 2004.

²⁶Nicholas Thomas and William T. Tow, "The Utility of Human Security: Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention", *Security Dialogue* 33, 2 (2002), pp. 177-178.

²⁷Gary King and Christopher L. Murray, "Rethinking Human Security", *Political Science Quarterly* 116, 4 (2002), p. 585.

²⁸UNDP, *UN Human Development Report* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 22-23.

²⁹Anthony Burke, "Caught between National and Human Security:

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³⁰ Tsuneo Akaha, 2002. “Non-Traditional Security: Issues in Northeast Asia and Prospects for International Cooperation”, paper prepared for presentation at Thinking Outside the Security Box: Non-traditional Security in Asia: Governance, Globalization, and the Environment, United Nations University Seminar, United Nations (New York, March 15), p. 3.

³¹ Russel Heng Hiang Khng and Denis Haw, “Introduction”, in *ISEAS: Regional Outlook Southeast Asia 2003-2004* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003).

³² Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, “Political Islam and the Use of Societal Approach in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy”, *Indonesian Quarterly* 29, 4 (2001), p. 377.

³³ Perwita, “Political Islam”.

³⁴ Alexsius Jemadu, *Democratisation and the Dilemma of Nation-building*, p. 1.

³⁵ Quoted in *Jakarta Post* (May 23, 2002).

³⁶ Surin Pitsuwan, “Developing Thailand’s South”, *Far Eastern Economic Review* (12 February), p. 22.

³⁷ Quoted in *The Nation* (October 3, 2003).

³⁸ These and other declarations and agreements can be found on the official ASEAN website: www.aseansec.org.

³⁹ ASEAN, *ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism*, 2001, www.aseansec.org/5620.htm.

⁴⁰ US Embassy in Thailand, *US-ASEAN Joint Declaration for Cooperation To Combat International Terrorism*, 2002, <http://www.usa.or.th/news/press/2002/nrot084.htm>.

⁴¹ Jörn Dosch, *The New Global Politics of the Asia Pacific* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), with Michael K. Connors and Remy Davison.

⁴² H. Arifin Bey, *Beyond Civilizational Dialogue: A Multicultural Symbiosis in the Service of World Politics* (Jakarta: The Japan Foundation, 2003), p. 165.

⁴³ Joseph Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), p. 46.

⁴⁴ Transcript of an interview with Joseph Nye given to Harvard University radio station, 4 April 2002, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/nye_softpower_wbur_040402.htm.

⁴⁵ Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

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Muslim Countries and the Struggle for Pluralism, Clean Governance and Non-Violent Cultures

Shaban Shahidi Moaddab

The fantasy of pure community or pure race is at the root of all genocidal madness in recent decades. And the desire for purity is the matrix of all terrorism.

The principle that people of different races, religions, and political beliefs can live together peacefully in the same society is called pluralism. Diversity and tolerance are the two main components of a pluralistic society. If our world has become dramatically less secure it is simply because tolerance and diversity do not exist in certain societies.

Pluralism is a multi-faceted issue, which must be considered in relation to historical realities on the one hand, and the psychological conditions to be created for the cohesion of a multi-faith, multi-colour society on the other.

Prior to the colonial era and the creation of state nations, the world was a composition of multi-cultural theater

in which the current geographical demarcations did not exist. Lines of separation had a more natural significance than the existing colonially fabricated frontiers. This does not mean that people did not fight each other to change what could be called the common geographical borders before the appearance of colonialism, but if we take ignorance and lack of mutual understanding as a main cause in regional conflicts, we could have expected that modern man would not have been killed by the millions under the pretext of fascism or racism.

Diversity is an undeniable fact in creation. Mother nature herself is a perfect mirror of plurality. Plants, animals, trees, birds, fish of different size, colour, weight, and songs are the existing realities. And if we take it for granted that man is the ultimate end of creation, such a masterpiece should have been bestowed with perfect vision, taste and hearing to grasp everything the Almighty has provided him with.

Diversity is not an artificial additive, devoid of meaning, in creation. It is rather an imposing fact of recognition. In the Holy Qur'an chapter 49 of Al-Hujurat, verse 13, we read:

O, mankind, verily, we created you all from a male and female and appointed for you tribes and nations to be known to each other. Verily, in Allah's sight the most honorable of you is the most pious of you; and Allah is the informed owner of knowledge.

Diversity is also a sign of the Almighty's power, as well as a reminder to the men of knowledge. In chapter 21, Ar-Rum, verse 22 we read:

And of Allah's sign of power is the creation of the heavens and the earth and also variation of the languages and the color of you. People; verily in all of these are the signs of the men of knowledge.

Tolerance is the second primordial component of a pluralistic society. The great Persian Poet Hafiz says:

Do not pay any attention to the clashes of 72 nations.

Muslim Countries and the Struggle for Pluralism

Because they did not see the truth, they paved the road to futility.

Imam Khomeiny once said “If all divine prophets gather together they will have no differences”. Another great Persian poet, Jalaludin Mohammad Balkhi Mawlawi, who is also known as Rumi, tells us a story in his celebrated poetry book *Matsnawi*. He says a passer-by gave a golden coin to four men who spoke four different languages. The Iranian said “I want to buy *Angoor*”. The Turk said “I want to buy *Ouzum*”. The Arab said “I want to buy *Enab*” and the Roman wanted to buy *Estafil*. The problem was that they did not understand each other’s language. Although all four wanted to buy grapes.

Mawlawi criticizes them for such ignorance but says “if the one who knows the secret of signs were here, he would have told them that they wanted the same thing”. Who is the one who knows the secret of signs? Whoever he is, his main attribute is his multilinguality; he can translate. Therefore, translation is the knowledge of signs; and the secret is that behind and beyond words lies a common notion. A translator is a bridge builder and what lies beneath his bridge of words is the flowing idea. In the process of dialogue, translation plays a very vital role. Historically, Muslims are the pioneers of the translation movement. In the golden ages of Islam, Bait al-Hikmah was founded to translate Greek science and philosophy into Arabic.

Dialogue is the art of collecting different pieces of truth. One of the great Iranian Sufis has said “truth is a mirror fallen from God’s hand on the earth and has broken into pieces. Any one may find a piece and claim that he has found the truth. But this is only a part of the whole truth”.

Let us go back to the Holy Qur’an, chapter 23, Az-Zumar, verse 17-18:

O, messenger! Give the good news to my obedient worshippers! Those who listen to the different speeches and preaching and follow the best amongst the variety, those

are the ones whom Allah has guided and they are indeed men of wisdom.

This is the logic of the Qur'an and this is the order of Allah. Not only to Muslims but to all believers.

Let us take another example, chapter 16 An-Nahl, verse 125:

O, messenger! Invite mankind to the way of your creator and nurturer with divine reasoning and fair preaching. And argue with them in the best manner. Truly your creator and nurturer is in the supreme position to know who has gone astray from his faith and who are the guided ones.

Here again God is inviting us towards logic and good behavior in our dialogue. The Muslim holy book is laden with similar types of emphasise on, and invitations to engage in dialogue. Islam means submission to truth. A Muslim should always have an open mind in order to evaluate the solidity of his logic when engaging in dialogue.

Islam recommends its believers accept the force of logic and not the logic of force. In our contemporary world, humanity has become vulnerable, simply because the logic in international relations is misguided, the logic of the dialogue is that of "wolf and the lamb" dialogue, and the diplomacy of the super-powers is "we talk and you listen". One is acting in everybody else name.

Terms are losing their original meaning, and as a Chinese philosopher once said, "when words lose their meaning the kingdom will become ungovernable."

Never in the history of mankind has humanity faced so many monumental difficulties. Problems are becoming universal, and our collective security is at risk. International mafia is threatening our youths. Pornography is violating our common values. Corruption is being globalised. International terrorism is taking its toll all over the world. Consumerism is putting our environment at danger. AIDS is massacring man pitilessly. Unemployment is frustrating our young men and women. Thousands of men and women are

losing their jobs, families are breaking apart and the number of divorces and suicides is rising rapidly.

What should we do? This is a question millions of men and women are asking. Can a single man, a single country or a single continent bring a solution to our problems or remedy our universal open wounds? The answer is certainly negative. Mountains of difficulties standing in the way of our future cannot be lifted by one country, no matter how big or wealthy it may be.

We need collective decisions, and in this collectivity we need to have the courage and tolerance to consult each other, listen to each perspective, and accept that it is from discussion that light will glow.

Unilateralism is lethal to world peace and security. Look at Iraq, a country in blood and fire. More and more young American men are being killed. Iraqis are losing their loved ones every day, due to the unrealistic and individual arrogance of a super power. Intolerance is in its apogee. Students will be expelled from the USA because they belong to countries that refuse one man's rule and the gun boat diplomacy.

Religious prejudice is coming back and faith discrimination is taking more victims. The sacred image of Islam and Christianity is being tarnished by ignorant fanatics who have nothing to do either with the Prophet Muhammad or with Jesus Christ.

Why have we fallen in to such a trap? Is this what Western liberalism had promised to humanity, is this what the new world order means? We can easily blame each other. We can say that all these vices have been perpetrated by so and so. We can say that rampant capitalism is at the origin of all these mishaps.

One thing is clear; we cannot let the world continue in this mode of self created tragedy. What we need is a collective effort, a global will and a universal determination to put an end to this engulfing flame, which, if not extinguished,

will sooner or later turn our civilisation into ashes.

President Khatami from Iran has taken the initiative to call for intercivilisational dialogue. This universal talking does not only mean discussion between Eastern and Western philosophers to find the relation of Western thought to Greek Philosophy nor does it only mean the liaison between the teachings of Iranian philosopher Suhrawardi and Neoplatonic philosophy concerning the profoundness of human existence.

This dialogue is not confined to talks among theologians of Abrahamic religions, nor to the dialogue for finding the common ground among the traditional pentagonal civilisations.

It will be through this dialogue that we will have a common concept of humanity. Via this dialogue we will know each other better. We will learn to respect each other more and we will make collective efforts for the betterment of humanity as a whole.

Not everybody agrees with this dialogue among civilisations. Some critics say civilisations do not talk to each other, but people belonging to the civilisations should talk. They also say that in the present situation efforts are being made to impose the will of one country on the whole world. Islam and Muslims are under attack, under the watchful eyes of big powers Muslims are brutally persecuted. Baseless allegations are made against Islam in Western media and rarely is an opportunity given to its followers to reject these accusations. Even the UN is disregarded when making a decision to attack and occupy a Muslim country. In such circumstances, what does dialogue among civilisations mean?

Muslim countries are making efforts to respect multiculturalism. In the Islamic Republic of Iran we have three hundred parliamentary deputies for 64 million people. This means that for roughly every two hundred thousand citizens, we have one deputy. Nevertheless, the less than

twenty thousand Iranian Jews have one deputy in our parliament, and the less than fifty thousand Iranian Christians have two deputies. We do not consider Iranian Jews and Christians non-represented minorities. But look at the West, look at Europe and look at the USA to see what is the official representation for the millions of Muslims living there.

Concerning clean governance in Muslim countries, even though Islam emphasises the qualifications and conditions one should possess to govern an Islamic nation, and notwithstanding the permanent observatory and supervisory rights that Islam awards to the Muslims under the governance of the ruling authorities, in many of the Muslim states, Islamic norms are not observed in this respect.

The model of government in Islam is the manner in which the Prophet Muhammad behaved in Medina. The Prophet himself, although he was guided by divine revelation, consulted with Muslims on the daily affairs in his leadership. Muslims could freely express their opinions and the Prophet not only did not prevent them from freedom of expression but very often he accepted their views. An example is the trench war (*Ghazwa Ahzab*) in the 5th year of Hijriya in which the infidels of Mecca attacked Medina. In consultation with his disciples to find a better way to protect the city, the Prophet accepted the proposal of his famous disciple, Salman al-Farisi, who recalled the experiences he had in Persian Empires. He suggested that a trench should be dug around the city.

The Prophet lived in a very simple way and the share of material facilities at his disposal, if not less, was not more than what other Muslims could have. The Prophet Mohammad's way of appointing people to state responsibility was piety as well as their qualifications and not family relationship or kinship.

Imam Ali, the Prophet's son in law, in his almost five years of leadership of the Islamic Umma, behaved like the Prophet. In his appointment of governor for Egypt, Persia

and other countries and cities he appointed men who were well known for their fidelity in Islam and the simplicity in their private lives. Nevertheless, the Imam, who was a powerful *Khalif*, supervised the manner in which his appointees were ruling and living. He himself strictly controlled his children and never allowed any of his sons and daughters to have access to state funds or facilities. He reprimanded his treasurer when he heard that the treasurer had allowed one of Imam Ali's daughters to borrow a necklace from him.

Muslim leaders should observe the criteria of good governance, not only because this is a condition of good statesmanship but also because they have a historical model of leadership of the Prophet of Islam. Islamic leaders cannot take power by force. They have to be appointed by people and once they are in power their behavior must be supervised by the people who have voted for them.

Islam has clearly defined the mutual rights of an Islamic leader and the people under his leadership. Islam even has its own rules not only for the Islamic society but has clearly defined the rights of husband and wife, children and parents.

The story of governance in Islamic countries is a very unhappy one and Muslim leaders, mostly, still have a long way to go to claim that what they are doing could be considered Islamic.

To have clean governance we must have clean men and women in the government in Islamic countries. Unfortunately human rights are violated in many of the Islamic countries. Qualified men and women are barred from assuming high level of responsibilities. Public funds and natural resources in many Muslim countries are used by a tiny minority to the detriment of a vast majority of deprived people. Millions of Muslim men and women live in extreme poverty without having access to a minimum level of health care and literacy. Muslims, mostly, live on very rich lands, and if their leaders decided, they could have a high standard

of living. But because of the unclean governance, hundreds of millions of Muslims live a miserable life.

The last issue we should talk about is terrorism. The world community is facing different sorts of terrorism. And through terroristic acts many people are killed or injured and many more lose properties each year.

Our world has become very unsafe as a result of terrorism. Terrorism is becoming a nightmare for all of us. To curb such a threat we have no alternative but to collectivise and exchange information, and have cooperation in intelligence. We should unanimously reject all types of terrorism.

But what is more important in this campaign is to attack the roots of terrorism. Unfortunately we are accustomed to the “fait accompli” attitude. We are used to taking certain international injustices for granted and we look at problems from the middle.

We Muslims are proud to announce that terrorism is neither born in Islam nor in other divine religions. Islamic teachings prevent Muslims from perpetrating terrorist acts or supporting terrorism.

In our international war against terrorism we should first decide upon a common definition of terrorism, and once we reach a conclusion, then we should attack the terrorists. We have to look at what causes terrorism. Hopelessness, frustration, social discrimination and double tiered systems of values are among the causes of terrorism. Fanaticism, isolation and injustice are also causes that can lead to terrorism.

We Muslims have difficulty in understanding the Western logic in confronting terrorism. We believe that a distinction must be made between legitimate defense and terrorism. When you occupy another’s land you cannot expect to be welcomed by the people under occupation. When you destroy the houses of defenseless people you will not receive roses from those who have lost everything they had. When you fabricate historical lies and massacre women and children and send millions to exile as refugees you cannot

expect no reaction. We Muslims reject all types of terrorism but we cannot approve of injustices either. Did any Western countries ever disapprove of French resistance during the Nazi occupation of the Second World War? Our logic in condemning terrorism is simply “What is good for the goose is good for the gander”.

The German philosopher Heidegger says “in the era of technical domination art and poetry can be the reminder of our existence.” To end this debate, I will quote two Iranian poets. The Great Iranian poet Sa’adi says in his famous masterpiece *Golestan*:

All human beings are akin
All in creation share one origin
When fate allots a member pangs and pains
No ease for other members remains
Ignorant if you are, to others pain
How can then you be called a human.

One radical way to confront terrorism is not to give in to the terrorists. We should never lose hope. Losing hope is surrendering to those who wish to rule our world by intimidation. Violence has never been a good solution. The Prophet Muhammad and Jesus Christ have proven to us that to break the cycle of violence from within we must not lose hope. A nice poem of Hafiz reads:

Come to throw flowers for each other
Come to fill our cups with wine
Let us go beyond heaven and put forward new design
If sorrow mobilises an army to shed the blood of lovers
I and the wine distributor will compromise
And break down this army from within.



Islamic Civilisation and the Quest for Democratic Pluralism: Good Governance and the Political Culture of Non-violence

Bassam Tibi

Democracy and pluralism are a basket.¹ Is this basket universal? What is the view of Islam on this issue? In the world at large, as well as within each civilisation, there is a conflict between those who have one vision to be imposed on the entire humanity and others, who subscribe along the lines of pluralism to diversity.

Islamic civilisation is no exception. Regardless of these different views, the Qur'an teaches us diversity.

“... and we have created you ... and divided you into peoples and tribes that you might get to know (interact with) one another.” al-Hujrat (49:13)

In addition, we read in the Hadith the saying of the Prophet:

“*al-ikhtilāfu fi-ummati-rahma*/difference in my *umma* is a sign of mercy”.

This is the normative approach of this paper, which—nevertheless—is not scriptural, but rather based on *ijtihad*, i.e. free reasoning on the subject matter under issue.

Introductory Remarks

In a free society diversity and difference are accepted as values and safeguarded through the institutions of a civil society. An open-minded interpretation of Islamic sources lays the grounds for an Islam that embraces this pattern of political as well as cultural and religious pluralism. At present, diversity means in politics the admission of a multiparty system and definitely not the dominance of a party labelled as “Islamic”, as in the case of Iran, which presents itself as a model. Today we see not only in Islam itself, but also in the West, efforts aimed at mapping the globe along the lines of one model. For instance, there are Jihadist Muslims abusing the concept of *jihad* in a new ill-minded interpretation for legitimating their resorting to violence in the pursuit of imposing what they call the “Islamic State” to be the nucleus of a new Islamic world order. Well educated Muslims will find neither in the Qur’an nor in the Hadith the term order (*nizam*) or such a concept. If we talk about Islamic governance, then it can only be a matter of which ethics are followed and cannot be any particular system of government. There is no such thing in the Qur’an.

Pluralism within the societies of Islamic civilisation, as well as in the relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims in an international environment, needs to be accepted. The ethical norm upon which the Islamic Quranic precept is based reads: *Lakum dinukum wa liya din* (you have your religion and I have mine). This ethical norm should design Muslim behaviour, politics and society. This insight should be the point of departure for dialogue, first among Muslims themselves, and then between Islam and the West. Therefore, neither the American model, nor the Iranian one are appropriate for Indonesia or for any other Islamic country. All of these countries must be allowed to have their own models. However, civil Islam, as in Indonesia, should be the source of inspiration. To be sure, pluralism has two meanings that cannot be separated from one another: *diversity*

and *consent* to basic values and rules at the same time.² There can be no true democracy without real pluralism, and vice versa. At this juncture, I state my assumption that pluralist democracy and civil society are compatible with Islam. A cross-cultural meaning, underlying a state-society model based on a democratic political culture and on civil society, could provide the proper grounds for pluralism and a good governance based on freedom and conflict resolution committed to non-violence. There are Muslims who think otherwise. The Turkish scholar Serif Mardin argues “Civil society is a Western model ... a part of the social history of Western Europe ... civil society ... does not translate into Islamic terms.”³

As a Muslim, I promptly contradict this view and argue that Islam prescribes *shura* and is thus compatible with civil society and democracy. The Islamic concept of *shura* if interpreted appropriately, could smooth the way to accommodating the idea of civil society. However, such a political democracy did not find its way to most countries of the Islamic civilisation, be it in the past or in our present. Why? Some positively say that a deviation from Islam has been at work, others negatively say that *shura* is not democracy, and no more than a point of consultation; in short a democratic civil society does not translate to Islam. I flatly reject both positions.

Liberal Islamic authors concede that historical Islam did not provide a space for individual freedom, but insisted that the idea of freedom lies at the core of Islamic morality and spiritual Islam; their formula is “Islam of freedom, not Islam of Despotism”.⁴ In responding to the critique that such ideas were never practiced in Islamic history, only a few of these authors such as Hanafi concede that the lack of institutions failed to bolster the Quranic idea of freedom.⁵ Elsewhere, in an overall intellectual history of Islam, I dealt with this issue and brought evidence to support the contention that in Islamic history the right order was considered to only

be guaranteed by an *Imam 'Adil* (just Imam), in contrast to an *Imam ja'ir* (unjust Imam).⁶ Throughout their history Muslims were directed by their yearning for an *Imam 'Adil* who followed in the footsteps of the Prophet, and left aside the need for institutions that safeguard freedom. However, the Islamic ideal of a just Imam never materialised in the societies of Islam. The first four caliphs in Islam were revered as “*rashidun*/righteous”, but nevertheless three of them were assassinated by Muslims themselves. The first war in Islam was a *fitna* war amongst Muslims.⁷ This is a burdening legacy that was rendered topical after the war in Iraq. Neither the Bush administration, nor its French foe Chirac were able to grasp that democracy cannot be introduced per order into another culture, be it from Washington, Paris or even the UN itself. In addition, elections are only one aspect of democracy, no more than a procedure and not an indication of democracy itself. Elections can only be reasonable and credible if they are underpinned by a political culture of democracy, individual freedom institutionally practiced in a civil society, and, of course, by pluralism. How can Muslims of the 21st century cope with the need for a secular democracy as the substance of cultural modernity? Could they adopt this political culture on Islamic grounds? These questions demand an inquiry into venues of democracy and pluralism as the proper foundation for good governance, as seen from an Islamic perspective.

Rethinking Islam and Pluralist Democracy in a Global Context

Coping with Islam's predicament with incorporating democracy into its own legacy requires rethinking Islam and a willingness to do so whole-heartedly. There are many ways to deal with the question concerning the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Is the conflict a “clash of civilisations”?⁸ On what grounds could Islam and the West meet?⁹

The influential Islamist Yusuf al-Qardhawi flatly rejects any learning from other civilisations, in particular the West,

using the term “imported solutions”.¹⁰ He also states that democracy has Greek origins because it refers to the Hellenistic culture of polity, and thus prematurely concludes that it is alien to Islam. The argument that Islam and democracy are at odds is, however, wrong. In referring to the non-Islamic sources of democratic thought, people like al-Qardhawi believe that democracy is an import to Islam from the West, to be rejected. At first glance we may assume that this view reflects an anti-Islamic prejudice that supports the accusation of Islam being an anti-democratic religion. In return, the accusation of Islamophobia is on the agenda and it serves to suppress any inquiry. Surprisingly, the statement of incompatibility comes from some pivotal exponents of political Islam, not from prejudiced Western observers. Are Islamists themselves Islamophobic? Ironically, one could ask that question. The Islamic reformer al-Ashmawi was not being ironic when he argued: “Islamism is directed against Islam”.¹¹

In the spirit of open and civil Islam one can reverse the Islamist argument presented by al-Qardhawi. Truly, the rejection of democracy with reference to its classical Greek origins is not only based on ignorance, but certainly amazes well informed students of Islamic heritage and history. The reason is simple: These students are familiar with the extremely positive attitudes of Muslim philosophers in the classical age of Islam vis-à-vis the Greek legacy.¹² Aristotle was named by these open-minded and rational philosophers the *al-Mu'allim al-Awwal* (The First Master), whereas the most significant Muslim philosopher, al-Farabi, was ranked as *al-Mu'allim al-Thani*, second only to Aristotle.¹³ In giving the top ranking in intellectual history to a non-Muslim thinker, Islamic rationalists proved a high quality of open-mindedness and how flexible Islam could be. As much as the Hellenisation of Islam, being an Islamic accommodation of Greek legacy, was feasible in the past, I believe the democratisation of Islam in our present is possible too. The

Prophet once said: *Utjubu al-'Ilm wa lau bi al-Sjn* (seek knowledge even in China), knowing that China is not a Muslim country. Learning from others is allowed in the spirit of an open Islam. In other words, there exists an Islamic legitimisation for viewing knowledge as universal, regardless of religion. The conclusion being that the Islamist call for the Islamisation of knowledge is not only misleading, but also detrimental to Islamic civilisation.¹⁴

Democracy is based on modern knowledge and on cultural modernity and can be adopted by Muslims. Democratic Islam is civil Islam.¹⁵ In view of this it is strange to read the following contention in the very influential writing by one of the most prominent ideologues in political Islam, the late Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi. In his book *Islam and Modern Civilisation*, Mawdudi expresses his firm conviction in these phrases:

I tell you, my fellow Muslims, frankly: Democracy is in contradiction with your belief ... Islam, in which you believe, ... is utterly different from this dreadful system ... There can be no reconciliation between Islam and democracy, not even in minor issues, because they contradict one another in all terms. Where this system (of democracy) exists we consider Islam to be absent. When Islam comes to power there is no place for this system.¹⁶

Is this contended incompatibility of Islam and democracy correct? If this were to be answered positively, then Muslims would stay out of the global third wave of democratisation and also outside the project of democratic peace for the 21st century. In my view, Islam does not stand at odds with democracy.¹⁷ In recalling the intellectual open-mindedness *vis-à-vis* other civilisations in medieval Islamic history, the sharp rebuff of democracy by Islamists is not only disturbing, but also creates great concerns. Unlike the Americans John L. Esposito and John O. Voll,¹⁸ I am not confusing Islam and Islamism and see that Islam can accommodate democracy, while Islamism cannot. Islamism is a threat to Islamic and international security.¹⁹ It creates dis-

order in world politics.²⁰

It is true, in terms of *Iman* (belief) there exists only one Islam. In Islamic history there have been, however, many different approaches to understanding Islam, and thus various schools of thought. In recalling the quotes from the Qur'an and the Hadith, at the outset it is correct to go for diversity and difference. So why does the school of thought in contemporary political Islam, as reflected in the quoted adverse statement by Mawdudi, create these tensions? The answer is that this is clearly political Islam looking for trouble. By the term political Islam I address the Islamic variety of religious fundamentalism being a contemporary global phenomenon, based on the politicisation of religion.²¹ Islam's predicament with democracy can be solved, but there can be no "democratic Islamism". This is a contradiction in terms. Therefore, at the very outset of this paper it is pivotal to make clear the distinction between the interpretation of Islam as a religious-ethical belief and political Islam as a concept of order for a political system. This is an "invention of tradition" and also an unwelcome novelty in Islamic civilisation.

To be sure, Islam is also a basis for local cultures and the all encompassing civilisation²² around which these cultures rally in terms of worldviews. Now, the contention adverse to democracy, namely that Islam is a specific system of government, is questionable. The term *Nizam Islami* (Islamic system) neither occurs in the Qur'an nor can it be found in the legacy of the Prophet, the Hadith. It is rather a misconception of Islam that can be identified as political Islam based on the politicisation of religion. It is most important to draw a clear distinction between these two totally different understandings of Islam in order to further advance the argument that Islam and democracy need not be at odds, but Mawdudi states the contrary. Why? The reference to compatibility or incompatibility is in each case related to their respective approaches towards Islam. The argument

that classical Islam was able to embrace Greek philosophy with very few problems smoothes the way for a favourable debate on Islam and democracy. This approach also leads to a contradiction of Serif Mardin who believes that democratic civil society does not translate into Islamic terms (see note 3). This interpretation is not acceptable. In the history of Islam in its glorious times Hellenised Islamic rationalism proved that an open Islam is much more inspiring than the current closed-minded and defensive cultural mindset of political Islam. This is the key for understanding the difference between embracing democratic pluralism and civil society, and rejecting them. Now we should move towards viewing the realities of the world of Islam based on a great variety of local cultures. In so doing, I maintain that there are uniting ethical standards related to similar norms and values shared by all Muslims, as much as a corresponding worldview. The Islamic unity in terms of *Weltanschauung* and the Islamic diversity in terms of local cultures exist simultaneously and can be addressed as an Islamic civilisation. Differences in the worldview create dividing lines between the world's civilisations. Due to their universalisms, the West and the world of Islam move to center stage and could come into conflict with one another for the very simple reason that both claim the universality of their worldviews and the related concepts of order (see note 8). There are, however, ways to prevent this clash: cross-cultural bridging for an international morality.²³ People who belong to divergent civilisations could share the very essence of belonging to one humanity and on these grounds could agree on a cross-cultural consensus as a common core of ethical values. This consensus can unite humanity for the sake of a democratic peace. In my view, democracy and human rights are the core issues in this international morality for bridging on cross-cultural grounds. If we succeed in this accomplishment, there would be no clash of civilisations. Among the commonalities there needs to be consensus about shared rules for peace-

ful conflict resolution in order to have mechanisms for dealing with discord, which is a natural occurrence.

After the end of the Cold War the promised peace did not occur. Instead, our present world is characterised by the rise of ethnic nationalisms and religious fundamentalisms. They regrettably advance the dividing lines within humanity and are adversarial to the promotion of democracy. In contrast to these obstacles, a vision of a world in dignity and peace facilitates an acceptance of the universality of pluralism and democracy, for the simple reason that democracies do not wage war against one another. Democratic states acknowledge difference and recognise pluralism; therefore, they are able to resolve their conflicts peacefully through negotiations along the accepted rules underlined earlier in the pursuit of democratic peace. In light of this argument, world peace among divergent civilisations requires the establishment of these ethical standards of convergence, which is not tantamount to an overall sweeping universalism, let alone of a silly world ethics. There is no such thing, because each civilisation has its own ethics. However, to question a sweeping universalism and to honour instead a cross-cultural pluralism is not equal to endorsing cultural relativism. There are limits to pluralism due to the fact that neo-absolutisms and relativism cannot accommodate one another²⁴ and thus endanger world peace. Conversely, a cross-cultural, i.e. universal, agreement among cultures on democracy provides the grounds for world peace. European cultural relativism and fundamentalist neo-absolutisms must clash, whereas enlightened open Islam and European modernity, I believe, could come to terms with one another. Jihadism in the mindset of political Islam—the call of Sayyid Qutb²⁵—does not move in this direction and is a disservice to Islam and Muslims themselves.

In concluding this section I want to express my reservations about assertions by postmodernists who subscribe to cultural relativism while asking us to indiscriminately ac-

cept this approach, which undermines the required cross-cultural bridging between competing world civilisations. The notion of a united humanity goes beyond cultural relativism in furthering this shared international morality. This notion essentially requires a cross-cultural underpinning of an ethical core of values, such as human rights and democracy. The Indonesian scholar Masykuri Abdillah²⁶ contradicts cultural relativism in showing that Indonesian intellectuals embrace the values of democracy. These values are not relative and they need to be institutionally upheld by all the participating civilisations. Lip-service and ministries for human rights are one way first class tickets to nowhere.

To avert the clash of civilisations one needs to clearly distinguish between Islam as a tolerant religion, and religious fundamentalism as an ideology of order. This distinction facilitates the search for a place for Islam in a universal culture of democracy and pluralism. To engage in an Islamic promotion of democratic peace while denouncing Islamism as the “new totalitarianism”²⁷ is no contradiction.

**The Cultural Underpinning of Democracy:
Islam’s Predicament - Between Authenticity and
Learning from Other Civilisations**

In order to establish democratic peace in the 21st century,²⁸ an acceptance of democracy and pluralism based in each case on a local cultural underpinning is needed. However, pluralism can be undermined, as is the case in Iran. The contemporary rejection by Islamists of a true pluralist culture because of its Western origins and because learning from other cultures is not allowed stands in contrast to the open-mindedness of Muslims vis-à-vis other cultures at the height of Islamic civilisation. Why cannot this spirit be revived in our age of cultural modernity? Can democracy be introduced to the world of Islam and be put in harmony with Islamic views? Iran is not a case for democracy because democratic freedom and pluralism are not part of the Ira-

nian model. It is more a Mullahcracy than a true democracy. Unlike Iran, in South and South-Eastern Asia questions related to this issue are freely asked and answers are sought, with attitudes which are only slightly, if at all, anti-Western. I shall refer to the model of India as a secular state with the largest Islamic minority (130 million) in the world as it provides a model for the peaceful coexistence of people belonging to diverse religions, under democracy as a common umbrella. But it is a flawed democracy for one reason: India could also become a model for the “coming anarchy”,²⁹ if this secular multi-religious set-up were to break down. In contrast to India, the Islamic model of Pakistan is not in a position to absorb and integrate the minority of Mauhajirs, i.e. Indian Muslims who migrated after 1947 to Southern Pakistan. Muslim migrants in the Christian countries of Europe, like Germany, are treated much better than Muslim migrants to Islamic Pakistan.

In Southeast Asia, Indonesia is a much better case in point of a more tolerant Asian country where a relatively enlightened and tolerant Islam is embracing democracy, as an institutional guarantee of inter-ethnic and religious peace. Due to a kind of civil Islam combined with secularism, Indonesia, with a population of 230 million, not only constitutes the largest Islamic nation in the entire world, but also a better place for both Muslims and non-Muslims to live with one another in peace than in Iran. Does the Indonesian model (see note 15) provide a significant favorable model for democratisation in other countries in the world of Islam? Could it generate demonstrative effects throughout the Islamic civilisation, i.e. also for West Asia, being the centre of the Islamic civilisation? An expert on Indonesia, von der Mehden, subjected the interaction between Southeast Asia and the Arab Middle East, i.e. West Asia, to closer scrutiny. In the results he states the following telling facts:

Middle Eastern religious ideas still dominate the exchange between the two regions. There is relatively little influence

by Southeast Asian Muslim intellectuals on the rest of the Muslim world ... Religious education in the Middle East, and in Cairo in particular, remains a major source of Muslim thought in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia...³⁰

It follows that Indonesia³¹ has little impact on the rest of the world of Islam. This conclusion is saddening and leads to the necessity of setting the focus of this study on West Asia (i.e. the Middle East), which continues to be the cultural core of the Islamic civilisation. In the Arab Middle East the most important concern is the question of *ashlah* (authenticity)—much more than in Indonesia. Therefore, the cultural underpinning for the adoption of democracy is highly pertinent. Many Arab and Iranian Muslims believe they need no Western model of democracy because they have the Islamic *shura* (consultation), as provided in the Qur'an. Others are more open-minded in arguing that the reference to the *shura* could serve as a formula for providing legitimacy to the cultural adoption of democracy, i.e. for establishing an accepted frame of reference compatible with Islamic views. In this debate, there is a need to reiterate the fact—like it or not—that democracy has neither Islamic nor Christian nor any other religious roots. It is a secular concept and an addition to the political concepts of Islam, as the late Muslim-Iranian Oxford scholar Hamid Enayat rightly argues.³² The Islamic awareness of this continues to be weak and blurred, so that in Iran one can sell a Mullahcracy as a democracy.

Muslims first encountered the new concept of democratic rule in the context of globalisation and through exposure of their own civilisation to “cultural modernity”. The first encounter was in the early liberal age of the Middle East, when embracing democracy and reconciling it with Islam was a concern. The first Muslim Imam to go to Europe, Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi, who became a student there, expressed his deep admiration of the French culture of democracy. He was witness to the July revolution in Paris in

1830 and was impressed to see the representatives of the toppled regime being granted basic human rights. For Imam Tahtawi this was an evidence—as he says—“for how civilised the French are and how their state is bound to justice”.³³ Eschewing the work of Tahtawi, early Muslim modernists and reformists were more critical of Europe due to the colonial incursion into the abode of Islam. But there were Muslim liberals who continued efforts for a reconciliation between Islam and cultural modernity. In the Islamic liberalism³⁴ of the early twentieth century, democracy was at the top of the agendas of Muslim thinkers such as ‘Abbas Mahmud al-‘Aqqad³⁵. This liberalism waned in the wake of the emergence of the radical-secular praetorianism (e.g. Nasserism) of the military seizing power in the state, which also failed. The ensuing crisis of the secular nation-state has contributed to the de-legitimisation of these praetorian regimes and paved the way for the emergence of political Islam (*al-Islām al-siyasi*) presenting itself as the solution (*al-Islām huwa al-hill*),³⁶ as an exit from the crisis. What the world of Islam needs as a solution is not political Islam, but an Islamic cultural underpinning for adopting democracy.

As the historical record of learning from other civilisations in Medieval Islamic history shows, Muslims were highly developed when they had an open Islam. Islamic rationalism in the historical period was in fact a synthesis of Greek legacy and Islamic civilisation.³⁷ One has to bear in mind that this Islamic rationalism was one of the major sources of inspiration for the European Renaissance. In his philosophical discourse, Jürgen Habermas confirms that the legacy of the Renaissance has been one of the basic pillars of cultural modernity. It can further be argued that this very modernity is the major source of democracy. We should remind ourselves of the historical fact that the Renaissance is a part of the very same legacy that grew from the interaction between Islam and Europe. Leslie Lipson notes the European awareness of Hellenism via Islam:

Aristotle crept back into Europe by the side door. His return was due to the Arabs, who had become acquainted with Greek thinkers ... The main source of Europe's inspiration shifted from Christianity back to Greece, from Jerusalem to Athens.³⁸

This historical reference not only shows civilisational encounter and interaction, but also reminds us that the Hellenisation of medieval Islam³⁹ makes Hellenism a legacy shared by Islam and the West. This very Greek legacy is the major source of democracy. Currently, we need to build similar bridges and therefore we have to draw lessons from the past when Islamic medieval philosophers were willing to learn from others. A revival of this rationalist legacy would help to promote a cultural underpinning for adopting pluralism and democracy. It is unfortunate that the Greek legacy, transmitted to Europe by Muslim philosophers, vanished in the world of Islam itself. The rival Islamic orthodoxy gathered force around the *fiqh* (Islamic sacred jurisprudence) and contributed to the banning of rationalism from institutions of learning.⁴⁰ On these grounds the Islamic *fiqh*-orthodoxy took over and superseded Islamic rationalism, the *falsafa*.⁴¹ Efforts in contemporary Islamic history at reviving the tradition of Enlightenment and rationalism have not been very successful.⁴² The Egyptian philosopher Murad Wahba speaks of a *Mufarraqa Ibn al-Rushd*/paradox of Averroes,⁴³ by which he refers to the high respect this Muslim philosopher enjoys in the West while his books are burned in the world of Islam.

My subject in this paper is democracy and pluralism from an Islamic perspective and with a focus on the present. So why this dealing with Islamic rationalism in the past? This is more than an exercise in intellectual history. Early Muslim liberals⁴⁴ were at pains to revive this legacy of coming to terms with democracy and facilitating the adoption of its norms and values in an Islamic environment. As the already quoted late Oxford Muslim scholar Hamid Enayat puts

it, their failure was caused not so much “by conceptual incoherence as by absence of specific social and economic formations”. In continuing this line of reasoning, Enayat argues that on domestic grounds the constraints were “educational backwardness, widespread illiteracy, and the prevalence of servile habits of thinking and blind submission to authority”. In addition to these major obstacles, there were others on external grounds. These are related to “the reluctance of the United States and some West European powers to adjust themselves to the realities of the post-colonial era”.⁴⁵ Enayat emphasised these facts without becoming anti-Western; he acknowledged that the West, despite all its lip service, has not been favourable to the process of democratisation in the world of Islam while at the same time he made it clear that democracy has Western origins and any effort at introducing democracy to the world of Islam cannot succeed without drawing on these roots in the context of learning from others.

There are many Islamic countries with a record of democratisation in the early postcolonial period when democracy was still on the agenda in West Asia. As already stated, the rise of praetorian one-party authoritarian regimes and the ideology of Arab nationalism⁴⁶ marked the end of that democratisation. Ever since, the levers of power have been residing in the hands of life-time presidents and other tyrants of all shapes.⁴⁷ The de-legitimisation of these authoritarian regimes, in particular since the shattering defeat in the Six-Day-War,⁴⁸ has given rise to political Islam being presented—as already shown—as the alternative. Parallel to these developments there were some signs of electoral democratisation in Algeria, Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco; they failed as much as the attempted external introduction of democracy in Iraq after the toppling of Saddam Hussein seems to have failed.

In this paper, I argue for a cultural underpinning of democracy, because any effort at democratisation must be in

line with Islam in order to gain legitimacy. However, this search for a cultural underpinning is not an alleged Islamisation of democracy via political Islam. This term is an expression of the politics of Islamic fundamentalism. Political Islam is definitely not a new open avenue for democratisation. I fail to see the required democracy in Iran or similar states designed by political Islam. In the actions and pronouncements of Islamic fundamentalists there is no trace of democracy.

I agree with the findings of the research group from the “Democratic Movements in the Middle East”-Project, including the statement that the Islamists are “committed to using the fragile reemergence of democratic processes to destroy any decisive move in this direction of liberal democracy itself”.⁴⁹ My own observations in the field in Algiers during the failed democratisation process in 1991/1992 in Algeria support these conclusions. In articles published in the *Encyclopedia of Democracy* (The Congressional Quarterly) and in the *Encyclopedia of Government* I elaborate on the thesis that religious fundamentalism and democracy are at odds.⁵⁰ I reiterate my earlier expressed view that Islam and Islamism are two different issues. In rethinking Islam one can reach positive conclusions about the compatibility of democracy and Islam, but Islamism is a totalitarian ideology which stands in contrast to a civil Islam. Without the needed rethinking of Islam (e.g. in the area of war and peace)⁵¹ there can be no accommodation of pluralism and democratic peace. Political Islam fails to meet this challenge. When Islamists use the language of democracy—as in Egypt⁵²—it is merely for instrumental reasons.

The reference to cross-cultural morality is aimed at establishing a cultural underpinning as a legitimacy for embracing democracy. This reference could result in a synthesis of Islam and democracy in a tradition of enlightenment. The major authorities of contemporary political Islam—from Qutb through Qardhawi—argue against democracy as be-

ing alien to Islam. Next to Qutb as the major ideological source of political Islam is the already cited late Pakistani Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi. The Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (executed in 1966) believed that Islam will replace the West in the leadership of the world. He is also the precursor of the idea of a clash of civilisations on the Islamic front. Qutb supports the claim of the quoted contradiction and views the contended conflict on a global scale:

After the end of democracy to the extent of bankruptcy the West has nothing to give to humanity ... The leadership of the Western man has vanished ... It is the time for Islam to take over and lead...⁵³

The intellectual-religious tradition of Qutb and the legacy left by Mawdudi are kept alive in the work of Yusuf al-Qardhawi, the most influential Islamic writer of our time. He invented the formula *al-Hull al-Islami* (The Islamic Solution) versus *al-Hull al-Mustaurada* (The Imported Solutions) to which—as he believes—democracy belongs. He therefore firmly rejects democratic solutions as “un-Islamic”. We are familiar with this discourse in the Iran of the Mullahs. On the list of “imported solutions” we find the political system of “democratic liberalism”. Al-Qardhawi tells his readers: “Democracy is a Greek term which means the government of the people” and then continues that “democratic liberalism came into the life of Muslims through the impact of colonialism. It has been the foremost dangerous result in the colonial legacy”.⁵⁴ As the reader notices, al-Qardhawi’s dismissal of the Greek legacy deliberately withholds the positive record of Hellenism in classical Islam. My consent to a synthesis of Islam and democracy is based on this very record of Islamic rationalism and Hellenism. If this is dismissed then cultural bridging is dismissed, too. Without a democratic liberalism there can be no political, religious and cultural pluralism.

The rejection of democracy by political Islamists is basically directed towards the idea of popular sovereignty. In

their view God's sovereignty applies to politics. The model they present as an alternative to democracy is *Hākimiyyat Allah* (God's rule) as a legitimisation for their call for a *shariʿa* based "Islamic state".⁵⁵ Our topic in this section is authenticity and democracy. The questions are: Do Islamist views on democracy really reflect authentic Islamic political views? Is it true that Islam and democracy are "in contradiction in all terms" as Mawdudi contends? And last but not least: Why cannot contemporary Muslims emulate their ancestors of classical Islam in learning from others?

In dealing with these questions, it is argued here that there is no contradiction between authenticity and learning from others in the search for cultural patterns in our age of globalisation. There is one humanity subdivided into civilisations characterised by inner cultural diversity. Globalisation could result in an anarchy of terrorism and disorder if not accompanied by realities and worldviews of democratic peace. Seen from this perspective, therefore, efforts are needed for putting Islam and democracy in harmony. The positive history of Islam and Europe was one of cultural exchange and borrowing on both sides. The negative side of this history was the one of crusade and *jihad* when both civilisations tried to impose themselves on the other. Pluralism means in contrast: respect, not imposition.

The Quest for Pluralism in a Synthesis of Islam and Democracy

There is no system of governance prescribed in the Qur'an,⁵⁶ but there definitely are Islamic political ethics.⁵⁷ The Quranic idea of *shura* is an essential part of these ethics. On this ethical level one can argue for commonalities between Islam, pluralism and democracy. This ethical approach is authentic, though neither imposed nor scriptural. The spirit of Islamic ethics is in line with the pursuit of the needed international morality. From this point of view, I fully share the enlightened position of the late Muslim Oxford

scholar Hamid Enayat that it is “neither ... inordinately difficult nor illegitimate to derive a list of democratic rights and liberties”⁵⁸ from Islamic sources, if one reads them with the spirit of an open Islam. Thus the contention of the Islamist Mawdudi that Islam, pluralism and democracy are at odds does not hold as a firm argument. In addition, we have to consider the fact that the fundamentalist notion of *Hakimiyya Allah* is definitely not an authentic Islamic concept, it is not only an imposed interpretation, but a constructed one. One finds it neither in the Qur’an nor in the Hadith, i.e. the tradition of the Prophet. On the grounds of the Qur’an and Hadith, the only two authoritative sources in Islamic faith, one can dismiss the ideology of political Islam on all counts. However, Islam’s predicament with modernity cannot be fully pursued and fulfilled on scriptural grounds. Embracing democracy requires going beyond the scripture and beyond arguments based only on it. In Islam, *ijtihad* is an allowed path to knowledge. Earlier (see note 51), I mentioned the issue area of war and peace as an example for the need to go beyond the scriptural approach.

If Islamic governance is equated with the Islamist call for an “Islamic state”, presented as an alternative to the democratic state, we would then end up at an impasse. The call for *tatbiq al-shari’a* (Implementation of Islamic Law) (see note 55) results from a related misleading interpretation of *shari’a* law as advanced in the Islamist ideology to make it a state law. The criterion for determining the character of a *dawla islamiyya* (Islamic State) is based on this “state law”. Students of Islam who are familiar with Islamic *shari’a* law⁵⁹ will recognise the need to make some major corrections to these fundamentalists’ claims. These scholars know that the legal norms of *shari’a* have never been codified. The simple reason for this is that codification runs counter to the nature of *shari’a* as an interpretative divine law primarily based on the ethics of *al-amr bi al-ma’ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar*. In addition, there are four Islamic legal schools,

each of which has its own tradition of law-making as civil not as state law. Thus, Islamic law has primarily been the civil law for the divergent Hanafi, Shafi'i, Hanbali and Maliki religious communities. In Islamic history, *shari'a* was never directly attached to *siyasa* as the politics of the state. In the authoritative study of Islamic law by Joseph Schacht we read that *shari'a* and *siyasa* were separate realms.⁶⁰ As Hamid Enayat puts it, *shari'a* "was never implemented as an integral system, and the bulk of its provisions remained as legal fictions".⁶¹ In other words, the *Tatbiq al-Shari'a* (see note 55), aspired for by the exponents of political Islam, is also based on fiction.

In the pursuit of democratic pluralism as a framework for good governance and a political culture of an open society, an effort is made to establish harmony between Islam, pluralism and democracy. As a Muslim scholar, I acknowledge the real tensions burdening this pursuit and I state this for the sake of honesty and integrity. The search for a synthesis between Islam and democracy needs to grapple with these tensions. The spirit of an open and civil Islam facilitates this endeavour. In this regard, I am in agreement with my fellow Muslim Hamid Enayat when he states:

If Islam comes into conflict with certain postulates of democracy it is because of its general character as a religion... An intrinsic concomitant of democracy... involves a challenge to many a sacred axiom.⁶²

Proponents of an open Islam should not evade this predicament, which all religions face. One should not repeat the mistakes of early Muslim reformers. They, in their search for synthesis, clearly evaded addressing heated issues. Egypt is a case in point for this issue.⁶³ Obviously, these reformers were concerned that such an endeavour could jeopardise their plea for pluralism and democracy. An adaptation of religious doctrines to changed historical realities requires what the contemporary Algerian Muslim thinker Mohammed Arkoun called "Rethinking Islam".⁶⁴ This needed rethinking of Islam (of course *not* of Islamic tenets) involves, as I

argue in an earlier book, not simply indulging oneself in a kind of conformism in a pragmatic manner, but rather a substantial cultural accommodation of changed social conditions.⁶⁵ This point was also clearly addressed by Hamid Enayat:

What is blatantly missing ... is an adaptation of either the ethical and legal precepts of Islam, or the attitudes and institutions of traditional society, to democracy. This is obviously a much more complex and challenging task than the mere reformulation of democratic principles in Islamic idioms. It is because of this neglect that the hopes of evolving a coherent theory of democracy appropriate to an Islamic context have remained largely unfulfilled.⁶⁶

These unfortunately unavoidable shortcomings of Islamic liberals can also be found in the writing of Indonesian intellectuals on democracy (see note 26). Many modernists denounce the misunderstanding of the true religious doctrines. To introduce democracy into Islamic civilisation means to engage oneself in cultural change and is not a removal of an assumed misunderstanding. At issue is an interplay between cultural, political and social change.

The tenets of Islam are accepted as *thabit* (unchangeable). But there are others, many constructed, or simply historically emerged doctrines that can be subjected to new reasoning being *mutaghayyir* (changeable). I agree with Enayat that:

Efforts to synthesize Islam and democracy are bound to founder on the bedrock of that body of eternal and unchangeable doctrines which form the quintessence of every religion. Those Muslim thinkers who face this issue boldly, and free of any compulsion to keep their faith abreast of ephemeral political fashions, normally come up with the open admission that Islam and democracy are irreconcilable.⁶⁷

The search by open-minded Muslims for democratic pluralism and good governance is burdened with the predicament facing Islam concerning democracy and pluralism—

as best phrased in this statement by Enayat. It addresses the limits of a morality based on religion for non-religious ends, such as democracy and good governance. In other words, any purely religious underpinning for democracy and pluralism expressed in dogmatic-scriptural Islamic terms would fail, because although the Qur'an provides the spirit for an ethical embracing of democracy, it does not provide the rules for the related governance. Most approaches have been hitherto both selective and limited in their scope. The secularisation of politics⁶⁸ is, therefore, a requirement for overcoming the conflict between Islam and democracy in the states of Islamic civilisation. To avoid a well-known misunderstanding, I clearly state that by secular democracy I mean a system of governance separated from religion, but not from religious ethics. Islamic ethics could help to underpin democracy, but this is not an "Islamic democracy", because democracy is based on popular sovereignty, not on religious precepts. The democratisation of Islam is a better formula, which facilitates cultural change and does not view everything religious as *thabit* (essential). There is a distinction between normative and historical Islam. To be sure, the secularisation of politics is misunderstood if viewed as a religious approach. I reiterate: in secular politics, a morality based on religious ethics is needed, but one should not equate democracy with a Mullahcracy.

The Requirements for Democratisation and Pluralism

Freedom loving Muslims must get angry when Muslim scripturalists keep repeating their claim that Islamic *shura* is the foremost democracy on earth. The fact that in Islamic history *shura* as provisioned by the holy Qur'an, was never practiced is regularly played down or dismissed by alleging that a deviation from Islam was at work; this is presented as the explanation for the lack of democracy. Carried through to its logical conclusion this argument implies that the entire history of Islam has been a deviation from Islamic pre-

cepts by Muslims. In my plea for real democratic freedom I find myself in conflict not only with orthodox-scriptural Salafi Muslims and Islamists, but also with Western cultural relativists who contend that democracy, due to its being a Western political model, is only of limited interest to non-Western cultures. Among those is Samuel P. Huntington who first proclaimed a “Third Wave of Democratisation” in his “clash of civilizations” in arguing democracy was uniquely Western. There are also Muslim scholars, like Serif Mardin (see note 3), who argue in this questionable manner.

In the fall 2003 I was teaching a graduate class on “Islam in the 21st century” at Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta and therefore this paper has an Islamic background. I was fortunate to present the major ideas in this paper to my graduate students at the UIN of Jakarta. In this context, I referred to the experience of Robert W. Hefner, who discovered in Indonesia the seeds of a “civil Islam” as contrasted to a “scriptural Islam” based on a “totalising understanding of Islamic law”.⁶⁹ At the normative level, it is possible to establish harmony between an enlightened Islam and democratic-pluralist ideas. But Hefner also notes that the flourishing of a civil Islam requires a civilianised state and its related institutions. Therefore, there is a need for institutions that safeguard the fulfillment of the standards of the pluralist ideas of a democratic culture in Islam. I agree with Hefner who states that “democracy ultimately requires a public culture ... to promote universal habits of participation and tolerance. This civic culture ... the culture of civility remains vulnerable and incomplete, if not accompanied by a transformation of state.”⁷⁰

In considering these thoughts, the lack of a democratic culture of *shura* as prescribed by the Qur’an and *ikhtilaf* (difference) (the Prophet) in Islamic history cannot be related to “deviations of Muslims”, but to the lack of institutions needed as a safeguard. There are other explanations at

present, like the cultural-relativist reservations expressed by the Turkish-American Serif Mardin, vis-à-vis the universal validity of civil society in the world of Islam, as quoted earlier. Mardin, who repeats the cultural-relativist tale that pluralist and democratic civil society “does not translate into Islamic terms” and stretches the argument to the point of absurdity in accusing critics of “Orientalist disparagement of Muslim culture”.⁷¹ In Istanbul, I argued that civil society does translate into Islamic terms, despite all the obstacles⁷² that Muslims need to work hard to overcome.

My approach is based first on a cross-cultural underpinning of democracy and second on institutional democratisation in a civilianised state. In the pursuit of a world peace based on introducing democracy and pluralism into the Islamic civilisation we need civil Islam and a civilianised state. With this international morality in mind, current affairs in the world of Islam can be addressed and dealt with properly. The questions asked are related to how to reach out for a commitment to democracy based both on an ethical basis and on institutional democratisation. The major argument is that civil society and democracy are not fond “Western dreams” (Mardin), but a necessity that can only be pursued on realistic grounds. To be sure, reaching this end must not only be ethical but needs also to be supplemented by structural foundations. We see this in Iraq after its liberation from the Saddamian Baath despotism, where these requirements, such as institution building, economic solid grounds for democracy, public security and a supportive social system are a concern, but are missing. Without establishing democracy as a political culture a democratic state cannot flourish, for the system would be lacking the required cultural underpinning. The recent flawed elections in Iran (February 2004) are among the reasons for rejecting this Islamic state of Iran as a model for Iraq. Democratisation in the world of Islam requires a commitment to change in two major fields:

First, changing political culture in most Islamic societies requires the development of favourable pluralist attitudes towards democracy as a political culture of its own. This culture of a “civil Islam” runs counter to the politically quasi-tribal mindset of collectivism. Citizenship as the bedrock of a democratic polity is something other than loyalty to a clan or a sectarian or ethnic group. A democratic polity cannot be based on a tribe⁷³ nor on loyalty to a sectarian or ethnic community.

Second, political development, in the sense of institution-building, has to take place in Islamic societies now characterised by varying degrees of low institutionalisation and a high degree of personalisation of power.⁷⁴ The legacy burdening this issue has deep roots in Islam. The Prophet, not the required institution, has been viewed as the model to emulate. The search was always for an *Imam Sahih* being the just Imam aspired for, not for a proper institution for good governance (see note 6). In the UN-Development Program Report of 2002 and 2003 we are informed that these requirements, needed to promote democratisation, are still virtually absent from the entire Arab world. Is this characteristic of Islamic societies? I am an Arab-Muslim, but definitely not an Arab-centric, scholar who sees the Arab core of Islamic civilisation setting the standards. I wish to see the Indonesian civil Islam leading Islamic civilisation, but as a scholar cannot escape seeing Wahhabi and Islamist-Qutb Islam, originating in the Arab world, as setting the standards. This is a social-scientific observation.

The promise for democratisation in the Middle East did not start with the Iraq War in 2003. It goes back to the Gulf War⁷⁵ of 1991. A decade earlier, in November 1983, a group of seventy Arab scholars, journalists, and former politicians, myself included, addressed this issue as the *Azmat al-Demoqratiyya* (Crisis of Democracy)⁷⁶ in the Arab world. This assembly had to take place in Limassol, Cyprus, which is neither an Arab nor a Muslim territory. There were rea-

sons: we were denied permission to meet in Cairo or in any other Arab city, presumably under Saudi Arabia pressure. The proceedings were published in Arabic in Beirut in an authoritative 927-page volume which has enjoyed broad dissemination in the Arab World. Over the ensuing two decades, the concern for democracy/democratisation has become more urgent, not only in the Arab world, but also in the Islamic world at large. Again, Iran is not a model. The attempted export into the neighboring Arab states failed.⁷⁷ These states are not democratic either.

In the aftermath of the Gulf War of 1991, the West was blamed for not having resorted to political pressures in order to compel Middle Eastern states to accept a process of democratisation. A decade later the democratisation of the Middle East served as a legitimisation for the war against Iraq in 2003. The listing of democratisation among the goals of the war overlooked the fact that democracy cannot be imposed, and it cannot thrive if the local cultural and institutional underpinning is lacking. To argue this is not to contradict the presented plea for the promotion of democratisation by the Western policies vis-à-vis the world of Islam. To promote democratisation is not tantamount to imposing it, even though in some cases limited external intervention is needed for instance in the Middle East, or as was the case in Bosnia and Kosovo to protect Muslims from genocidal assaults.

Conclusions

The quest for democratic pluralism, for a political culture and for institutions of good governance in the world of Islam requires an introduction of a new system into mostly multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies ruled by mostly nominal nation-states.⁷⁸ The major problem is the lack of the basic elements needed to establish a democratically designed political community. The case of Iraq is clearly a pertinent case for illustrating the issue. All political groups

in Iraq are divided along ethnic and sectarian lines related to the artificial emergence of the Iraqi state in 1921. Iraq is composed of three main rival ethnic or religious groups and of their corresponding territories: the former Ottoman province of Mossoul inhabited by Kurds, the Sunni province of Baghdad, and the Shi'ite southern province of Basra. The pan-Arab secular Baa'th Party separated politics from religion and ethnicity only on the surface. In contrast to the pronouncements of its ideology⁷⁹ it was a representation of the Sunni Arab minority, with the Takrit clientele at its core. Shi'is and Kurds were practically excluded. In Iraq not only the ruling elites under Saddam, but also the Shi'is and Kurdish counter-elites were based on political communities formed on the grounds of religion and ethnicity. This is the obstacle faced by efforts at nation-building and democratisation in Iraq after the toppling of Saddam's rule. In my conclusion to this paper on a general theme I refer to Iraq as a case in point, to show that the issue is not only Islam's predicament, but also a problem with the religio-sectarian ethnic determination of communities as collective entities. This reality contradicts the concept of an Islamic civilisation based on the concept of *umma*, however, coexisting with the ethnic and sectarian subdivisions. These constraints are preventing nation-building and democratisation. This is a general statement independently made from the Iraqi case study.

In order to establish my argument, I referred first to the lack of required cultural underpinning as well as the proper institutions needed for democracy and pluralism. The existing nominal nation-states in most countries of the Islamic civilisation explain the persistence of the ethnic-tribal culture and therefore the lack of good governance. The existing political culture creates great obstacles for the introduction of pluralism, democracy and the related institutions. The Western concept of democratisation has to be adjusted to an appropriate understanding of culturally different conditions and supplemented with the proper institutions for

good governance. Despite my insistence that a change in the prevailing patterns of political culture in the world of Islam towards the acceptance of universal democratic values is among the needed requirements for democratisation, I do think that some consideration must also be given to patterns of collective freedom for the protection of religious and ethnic minorities at the local and regional levels.

*Ethno-politics*⁸⁰ is among the constraints that cannot be overlooked in most countries of the Islamic civilisation. In many cases lip service is being paid to the *umma*, whilst atrocities against Muslims from other ethno-sectarian communities are taking place. Again, Iraq is the best case in point for illustrating and demonstrating this saddening phenomenon. The solution is for ethnic politics as power sharing to become a component of democracy in multi-religious, sectarian and multi-ethnic societies. In most Islamic countries, this power sharing is essential to any ethno-political approach. Muslims need to learn how to view people within their own community as human beings who are free individuals and not as obliged members of collective entities, which in our modern time are virtually a functional equivalent of the old Arab tribes. In going beyond one's own community there is a need for respect towards ethnic and religious minorities living in Islamic societies and for sharing the political power with them. In the end, we as Muslims must stop looking at non-Muslim parts of the world as *dar al-harb* and stop viewing others as *kuffar* (unbelievers). This is also a need for pluralism, which requires new thinking.

My positive judgment of Indonesia is far from flattering. I am aware of the shortcomings of the country and know that although civil Islam exists, it is not everywhere. The Indonesian state is not yet the best model for a civilianised state. Nevertheless, the case of Indonesia, both in state and society, is more appealing to democratically minded Muslims than "the Islamic state" of Iran is; the latter cannot be recommended on any count to others in the world of Islam

in its quest for democratic pluralism and a political culture of good governance. Before leaving Jakarta in October 2003, I explained to my Indonesian graduate students the concept of “Islamic peace”—as presented by Sayyid Qutb—which aims at mapping the entire world into a *Nizām Islāmī* (Islamic system), and contrasted it with the concept of democratic peace based on pluralism and democratic good governance. Before saying goodbye, I asked my Indonesian students: “What is your preference?” The answer of my Islamic students was: “We want democratic world peace”. I left Indonesia with great respect for the civil Islam of the country and with good faith in regards to how it will face the challenges of the future.

Notes

¹ On Islam and democracy see Larry Diamond et al. (eds.), *Islam and Democracy in the Middle East* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), and on Islam and pluralism see Abdulaziz Sachedina, *The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

² On the concept of pluralism see John Kekes, *The Morality of Pluralism* (Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

³ a erif Mardin, “Civil Society in Islam” in John A. Hall (ed.), *Civil Society. Theory, History, Comparison* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 278-279.

⁴ See for example Hasan Sa’b, *Islām al-Hūrriyya, la-Islām al-‘Ubuḍiyya* (Beirut: Dar al-‘Ilm Li al-Malayīn, 1979).

⁵ “The greatest gap in Islamic history is the lack of institutions that guaranties the implementation of Islamic notions.” Hasan Hanafi, in: Center for Arab Unity Studies, ed., *al-Demuqratiyya wa Hūquq al-Inṣān fi al-Waṭan al-‘Arabi* (Beirut: Center für Arab Unity Studies, 1983), p. 211.

⁶ Bassam Tibi, *Der wahre Imam: Der Islam von Mohammed bis zur Gegenwart* (München: Piper, 1996, paperback 1998 and 2001).

⁷ Hichen Djait, *al-Fitna* (Beirut: al-Talia, 1989).

⁸ See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) and in contrast: Bassam Tibi, "International Morality and Cross-Cultural Bridging" in Roman Herzog et. al., *Preventing the Clash of Civilizations: A Peace Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*, edited by Henrik Schmiegelow (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 107-126.

⁹ The literature on this subject is mushrooming, see among others Shireen Hunter, *The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?* (London: Praeger 1998); Fawaz Gerges, *America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser, *A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West* (Boulder/Col.: Westview Press, 1995); and chapter 10 on this subject in: Bassam Tibi, *Islam between Culture and Politics* (New York: Palgrave 2001), pp. 210-230.

¹⁰ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *al-Hūlūʾ al-Mustawrada* (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Risāʾa, 1980).

¹¹ See an authoritative criticism of political Islam by a leading enlightened Muslim, Mohammed Said al-Ashmawi, *al-Islām al-Siyāsī* (Cairo: Dar Sina, 1987); French translation: *L'Islamisme contre L'Islam* (Paris: Editon la Découverte, 1989); see also the reference in note 20 below.

¹² On the first and second wave of Hellenisation in Classical Islam see W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology* (Edinburgh: University Press 1962, 2nd ed. 1995), pp. 37ff, 91ff. The magnitude of intellectual indebtedness of Islamic political philosophy to Hellenism is shown in the contributions published in the book: Charles Butterworth (ed.), *The Political Aspects of Islamic Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Muhsin S. Mahdi*, Harvard Middle Eastern Monographs (Cambridge/MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). Mahdi was the source of intellectual inspiration for me while writing my intellectual history of Islam, *Der Wahre Imam* (referenced note 6), herein Part II on Islamic rationalism and Hellenization (on Mahdi see preface p. 13).

¹³ On al-Farabi in Tjitze J. de Boer, *Geschichte der Philosophie im Islam* (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1901) pp. 98-116; on al-Farabi as

“second master” p. 100. The work of al-Farabi is available in an English translation: Richard Walzer, ed., *al-Farabi on the Perfect State* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).

¹⁴ Bassam Tibi, “Culture and Knowledge: The Politics of Islamization of Knowledge as a Postmodern Project? The Fundamentalist Claim to De-Westernization” in *Theory, Culture, Society*, vol. 12, 1 (1995), pp. 1-24.

¹⁵ Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam. Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

¹⁶ Abu al-A’la al-Mawdudi, *al-Islam wa al-Madaniyya al-Huditha* (reprint Cairo, no date). On these views of Maududi see also Muhammad Dharif, *al-Islam al-Siyasi fi al-Waṭan al-‘Arabi* (Casablanca: Maktaba al-Umma, 1992) pp. 98-99; and Youssef M. Choueiri, *Islamic Fundamentalism* (Boston: Twayne Publ., 1990), p. 93ff.

¹⁷ Bassam Tibi, “Democracy and Democratization in Islam” in Michèle Schmiegelow (ed.), *Democracy in Asia* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), pp. 127-146 and on this subject also chapter 9, in Bassam Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, enlarged and updated edition 2002). This book exists in a Bahasa translation.

¹⁸ Therefore, I strongly disagree with John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Islam and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), see my critical review in: *Journal of Religion*, vol. 78, 4 (1998), pp. 667-669. I believe Esposito’s *The Islamic Threat. Myth or Reality?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) is in many ways misleading as well.

¹⁹ Daniel Philipot, “The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations” in *World Politics*, vol. 55, 1 (October 2002), pp. 66-95.

²⁰ For more details see Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism* (see note 17).

²¹ Martin Marty and Scott Appleby (eds.), *The Fundamentalism Project* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 5 vols., p. 95, see herein: Bassam Tibi, “The Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamentalists” in *Fundamentalisms and the State*, vol. 2 (1993), pp. 73-102; see also parts I and III in vol. 3 on: *Remaking Politics*.

²² The authoritative history of Islamic civilization is Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974), 3 volumes.

²³ See Tibi, “International Morality and Cross-Cultural Bridging” (see note 8 above).

²⁴ On this issue see the proceedings of the Erasmus Ascension Symposium (ed.), *The Limits of Pluralism: Neo-Absolutisms and Relativism* (Amsterdam: Praemium Erasmianum Foundation, 1994), herein Tibi on political Islam, pp. 29-36.

²⁵ Sayyid Qutb, *al-Jihād fi>Sabīl Allah* (reprinted Cairo: Daʿ al-Ismaʿ, 1992) and also the reprint of Qutb, *al-Salam al-ʿAlami wa al-Islam* (Cairo: al-Shuruq, 1992).

²⁶ Masykuri Abdillah, *Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals to the Concept of Democracy* (Hamburg: Abera Verlag, 1997).

²⁷ Bassam Tibi, *Der neue Totalitarismus: Heiliger Krieg und westliche Sicherheit* (Darmstadt: Primus, 2004).

²⁸ Bruce Russett, *Grasping Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 11.

²⁹ Robert Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of Post Cold War* (New York: Random House, 2000).

³⁰ Fred von der Mehden, *Two Worlds of Islam: Interaction between Southeast Asia and the Middle East* (Miami-Jacksonville: The University of Florida Press, 1993), p. 97.

³¹ For a historical record see Merle C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 2nd ed., here Part VI, pp. 237ff. See also Hefner, *Civil Islam*, referenced in note 15 above.

³² On Islam and democracy see the most inspiring contribution of Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), pp. 125-138 and also the references in notes 17 and 18.

³³ Rifaʿa R. al-Tahtawi, *Takhliṣ al-ibriz ila talkiṣ Paris* (Cairo: 1834; reprint Beirut, no date). See the excellent German translation of Tahtawi’s Paris diary, ed. and with an introduction by Karl

Stowasser, *Ein Muslim entdeckt Europa* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1989), p. 223.

³⁴ Leonard Binder, *Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988). In reading Binder, I had a hard time swallowing the chapter on the intellectual father of Islamic fundamentalism Sayyid Qutb (labelled as “religious aesthetic”) being incorporated as a part of deliberations on Islamic liberalism (sic). Political Islam and Islamic liberalism are two different issues.

³⁵ ‘Abbas Mahmud al-’Aqqad, *al-Dimuqratiyya fi>al-Islam* (Democracy in Islam) (Cairo, 1952), many reprints.

³⁶ This is the formula coined by al-Qaradawi (referenced in note 10). For a critique see Ashmawi (referenced note 11) and my work (referenced note 20).

³⁷ See Leslie Lipson, *The Ethical Crises of Civilization. Moral Meltdown or Advance?* (London: Sage, 1993), p. 63. On the cultural influence of Islamic civilization upon the European Renaissance see also Bassam Tibi, *Kreuzzug und Dihad: Der Islam und die christliche Welt* (München: Bertelsmann, 1999), chapter V. On the Renaissance as a basic pillar of cultural modernity see Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987).

³⁸ Lipson, *The Ethical Crises of Civilization*, p. 62.

³⁹ See Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology*, (note 12 above), and the contributions to the *Festschrift* of Muhsin Mahdi (referred to in note 12 above).

⁴⁰ George Makdisi, *The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981), pp. 77-80.

⁴¹ For an elaboration of the two rival traditions in Islamic intellectual history, i.e. *fiqh* and *falsafa* see Bassam Tibi, “Politisches Denken im klassischen und mittelalterlichen Islam zwischen Fiqh und Falsafa” in *Pipers Handbuch der politischen Ideen: Das Mittelalter* (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1993) vol. II, pp. 87-140. See also Part II in Tibi, *Der Wahre Imam* (referred to in note 6).

⁴² For more details see Anke von Kuegelgen, *Averroes und die arabische Moderne: Ansätze zu einer Neugründung des*

Rationalismus im Islam (Leiden: Brill Press, 1994).

⁴³ Murad Wahba, "The Paradoxon of Averroes" in *The Proceedings of the First Conference on Islam and Philosophy* (Cairo: The English Bookshop, 1982).

⁴⁴ See Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).

⁴⁵ Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (note 32 above) pp. 138f.

⁴⁶ See the overview of Adeed Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair* (Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003) and also Bassam Tibi, *Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry* (New York and London: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 3rd enlarged edition 1997).

⁴⁷ See the chapter by Roger Owen in Ellis Goldberg et al. (eds.), *Rules and Rights in the Middle East: Democracy, Law, and Society* (Seattle and London: Verlag, 1993), pp. 17ff.

⁴⁸ On this war see the two chapters of Part II in Bassam Tibi, *Conflict and War in the Middle East: From Interstate War to New Security* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 2nd edition and Chapter 10 in Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism* (see note 46) on: "1967 and After".

⁴⁹ Goldberg et al. (see note 47 above), p. 8.

⁵⁰ See the article Bassam Tibi "Fundamentalism" in Seymour Martin Lipset (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Democracy* (Washington: The Congressional Quarterly, 1985), 4 volumes, here vol. 2, pp. 507-510. See also the most recent chapter on Islamic Fundamentalism by Bassam Tibi in Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Government* (London: Routledge, 2004), 2nd edition, 2 vols., here vol. 1, pp. 184-204.

⁵¹ See Bassam Tibi, "War and Peace in Islam" in Terry Nardin, (ed.), *The Ethics of War and Peace* (Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996, also 1998), pp. 128-145.

⁵² Therefore, I strongly disagree with Raymond W. Baker, *Islam Without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists* (Cambridge/MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).

⁵³ Sayyid Qutb, *Ma 'alim fi al-Tariq* (Cairo: al-Shuruq, 1989) 13th legal printing. See also the Qutb-interpretation by Roxanne Euben,

Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism. A Work of Comparative Political Theory (Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), chapter 3.

⁵⁴ Yusuf al-Qardhawi, *Hatmiyyat al-Hall al-Islami*, 2 volumes; vol. 1 *wa al-Hukm al-Mustaurada* (see note 10), p. 50f. Qardhawi is the leading Islamist, not a liberal as listed in Charles Kurzman (ed.), *Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 196-204, where he is placed just ahead of the truly liberal Muslim M. Arkoun, pp. 205-222.

⁵⁵ On this see chapter 7 in Tibi, *Islam Between Culture and Politics* (see note 9), pp. 148-166. A Bahasa translation of this book is underway.

⁵⁶ Here I argue in line with Ali Abdelraziq, *al-Islam wa Ushuk al-Hukm* (Beirut: al-Hayat, reprint 1966, originally Cairo 1925).

⁵⁷ See Sohail H. Hashmi (ed.), *Islamic Political Ethics. Civil Society, Pluralism and Conflict* (Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), herein Bassam Tibi, *Peace and War in Islam*, pp. 175-193.

⁵⁸ Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (see note 32), p. 131.

⁵⁹ See Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1964).

⁶⁰ Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction*, p. 54.

⁶¹ Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (note 32), p. 131.

⁶² Enayat, *Modern Islamic*, p. 126.

⁶³ On this problem see the classic study by Nadav Safran, *Egypt in Search for Political Community* (Cambridge/MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), in particular pp. 179, 85, 96f. and 120.

⁶⁴ Mohammed Arkoun, *Rethinking Islam. Common Questions, Common Answers* (Boulder/Col: Westview Press, 1994).

⁶⁵ Bassam Tibi, *Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change* (Boulder/Col.: 2nd printing, Westview Press, 1991), also translated into Bahasa.

⁶⁶ Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (note 32), p. 135.

⁶⁷ Enayat, *Modern Islamic*.

⁶⁸ See Bassam Tibi, "Secularization and De-Secularization in Modern Islam" in *Religion-Staat-Gesellschaft*, vol. 1,1 (2000),

pp. 95-117.

⁶⁹ Hefner, *Civil Islam* (see note 15), p. XVIII.

⁷⁰ Hefner, *Civil Islam*, p. 215.

⁷¹ Mardin, *Civil Society in Islam* (see note 3), p. 296.

⁷² In contrast to Mardin see B. Tibi, "The Cultural Underpinning of Civil Society in Islamic Civilization: Bridging Between Civilization" in Elisabet Özdalga and Sune Persson (eds.), *Civil Society, Democracy and the Muslim World*, papers read at a Conference held at the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, 28-30 October, 1996 (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute, 1997), pp. 23-32; there is a Turkish translation of this book.

⁷³ The persistence of such tribal and clan or religious loyalties/identities is one of the major obstacles to democratization in the Middle East. See Bassam Tibi, "The Simultaneity of the Unsimultaneous: Old Tribes and Imposed Nation-States in the Middle East" in Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (eds.), *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1990), pp. 127-152.

⁷⁴ I refer here to Huntington's early concept of a low degree of institutionalisation as an indication of political underdevelopment, see Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). This approach is adapted as a framework for the analysis of the contemporary Arab state, see Bassam Tibi, *Das Arabische Staatensystem. Ein Regionales Subsystem der Weltpolitik* (Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institut Verlag, 1996), chapter 1.

⁷⁵ See Bassam Tibi, "Zwischen islamischem Erbe und kultureller Erneuerung: Die Chancen der Demokratisierung im Nahen Osten nach dem Golfkrieg" in Herfried Münkler (ed.), *Die Chancen der Freiheit: Grundprobleme der Demokratie, Festschrift fuer Professor Iring Fetscher* (Muenchen: Piper Verlag, 1992), pp. 199-223. The original English version of this paper was presented at the Harvard/MIT joint seminar on political development in a paper (not published) in March 1991.

⁷⁶ See Centre for Arab Unity Studies, *Azmat al-Demoqratiyya fi al-Watn al-Arabi* (Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 1984). This author was among the participants. My paper presented there in Arabic on the structural requirements for democratization is

included in this cited volume, pp. 73-87 (text in Arabic).

⁷⁷ See Bassam Tibi, "The Failed Export of the Islamic Revolution into the Arab World" in Frederic Grare (ed.), *Islamism and Security* (Genoa: Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies, 1999), pp. 63-102.

⁷⁸ I have coined this term in my Harvard-MIT-study, published 1990 (see note 75). There is another similar study published simultaneously by Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

⁷⁹ For more details see Amatzia Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba'hist Iraq 1968-1989* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); on Iraqi history see Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq* (Boulder/Col.: Westview Press, 1985). For details on the divisions of the opposition along ethnic/religious lines see chapter 3 in Bassam Tibi, *Die Verschwörung. Das Trauma arabischer Politik* (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1993), pp. 253-272. See the important chapter on ethnopolitics by Gabriel Ben-Dor in Milton Esman and Itamar Rabinovich (eds.), *Ethnicity, Pluralism and the State in the Middle East* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 71

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The Challenge of Democracy in the Muslim World: Traditional Politics and Democratic Political Culture

Azyumardi Azra

Several years before the rise of the “new wave” of democracies in various parts of the world during the 1990s, the renowned political scientist, Samuel P. Huntington, questioned the theoretical optimism for the future of democracy. He argued that “with a few exceptions, the limits of democratic development in the world may have been reached” (Huntington 1984:218). The rise of new democracies in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in particular, however, has rekindled public and scholarly optimism for the future of democracy. Thus, one of the most evident tendencies in the post-cold war period and the new millennium is the rapid growth of democracies, or at least, there is a strong tendency for an increasing number of nation states to become democratic.

This tendency seems not to be taking place in dominant or pre-dominant Muslim states in the Islamic world as a whole. According to a recent report entitled “Freedom in the World 2002: The Democracy Gap”, released by Freedom House New York in late December 2001, there is an apparent “democracy gap” in the Islamic Arab World. Since the early 1970s, when the third major historical wave of democratisation began, the Islamic world, and its Arabic core in particular, have seen little significant evidence of improvement in political openness, respect for human rights and transparency. The democracy gap between the Islamic world and the rest of the world is indeed dramatic. Of the 192 countries in the world today, 121 are electoral democracies, but in countries with an Islamic majority, only 11 of 47 (or 23 per cent) have democratically elected governments. In the non-Islamic world, there are 110 electoral democracies out of 145 states, or over 76 per cent. This means, the report concludes, that a non-Islamic state is more than three times more likely to be democratic than an Islamic state.

The report, however, also mentions the “bright spots” of democracy in the pre-dominant and least Arabicised Muslim countries such as Albania, Bangladesh, Djibouti, Gambia, Indonesia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Turkey, and Iran. Despite its shaky foundation and development, democratic ferment is considerable in these countries. Out of the non-Arabic countries, 11 of 31 are electoral democracies, while none of the 16 majority Arabic countries has democratically elected governments. Among the majority Arabic countries, one (Tunisia) has an authoritarian presidential system; two (Libya and Iraq) are one party dictatorships; four (Algeria, Egypt, Syria and Yemen) are states with a dominant ruling party that faces thwarted and severely circumscribed political opposition; and the nine remaining states are monarchies, eight of them Arabic.

Despite the “democracy gap” in many—if not most—Muslim countries, the Freedom House report maintains that

recent history shows that Islam is not inherently incompatible with democratic values. Indeed if one takes into account the large Muslim populations of such countries as India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey, and the Islamic populations of North America and Western Europe, the majority of the world's Muslims live under democratically constituted governments.

The "bright spots" among Muslim countries raises the hope for democracy in the Muslim world. But one has to admit that the classic question about Islam and democracy—whether or not Islam, for instance, could play a more positive role in the new wave of democracy—remains a subject of heated discussion.

In Indonesia after the fall of Soeharto, for instance, discussion and debate on the relations between Islam and democracy has once again come to the forefront both at the level of discourse and in the reality of Indonesian politics. The fact that there have been a number of conflicting political trends since Indonesia came into the democratic realm, with the interregnum of President B.J. Habibie, has also created further confusion about relations between Islam and democracy.

On the one hand, Muslims played an important role in the fall of Soeharto, bringing an end to the long autocratic rule and, therefore, provided an impetus for the growth of democracy. On the other hand, with the new emergence of democracy in Indonesia, "political Islam" also gains new momentum; this in fact appears to be one of the most visible political developments in post-Soeharto Indonesia. The rise of "political Islam" has worried some, for it could be incompatible with democracy.

The rise of political Islam can be clearly observed in several tendencies. First, the establishment of a great number of "Islamic parties" that mostly adopt Islam as their basis, replacing the Pancasila, which used to be the sole basis of any organisation; second, the increasing demands from

certain groups among Muslims for the official adoption and implementation of *shariʿa*; third, the use and abuse of traditional (classic) political concepts, such as *bughat* (dissension), *jihad* against dissenters, *bayʿa* (oath of loyalty), and other concepts of *fiqh siyasa*; and fourth, the proliferation of Muslim groups considered by many to be radicals, such as the Laskar Jihad (Jihad Troops), the Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Defense Front), the Hizb al-Tahrir (Party of Liberation), the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, the Indonesian Council of Jihad Fighters), and the Jamaʿah al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin Indonesia.

All of these developments—by no means exhaustive—appear, to many Muslims and non-Muslims, to represent the return of the idea of an Islamic state in Indonesia, and this could supposedly bring the future of democracy and pluralism in Indonesia into question. I would argue, however, that despite these recent tendencies among Indonesian Muslims of seemingly clinging to political and formal Islam, it remains difficult to imagine that Indonesia would and could be transformed into an Islamic state. These tendencies could be very alarming for those who are concerned with the future of democracy in this country, but one should not overestimate them since there are also a number of factors that are working in Indonesian society that mean that the realisation of an Islamic state in Indonesia remains only a remote possibility.

Modern Nation-State, *Dawla Islamiya*, and *Khilafa*

Islamic revival in the last two decades has reintroduced the old debates about relations between Islam and politics, and Islam and democracy. Both at the theoretical and the practical levels Muslim intellectuals, scholars, *ulama*, and leaders once again confront such issues as the compatibility or incompatibility of Islam and contemporary ideas and practices of democracy, civil society and human rights.

It is important to make it clear that any discussion about Muslim politics, or more precisely about relations between

Islam and democracy, should avoid sweeping generalisations. In fact there is no single Muslim politics; Islam as a political reality and Muslims are not a monolithic phenomenon. Robert W. Hefner has persuasively argued that there is no single civilisation-wide pattern of Muslim politics, but a variety of competing organisations and ideals. He argues that the modern era's nation making and market globalisation have, if anything, increased pluralism and political contestation in the Muslim world. As a result, the most significant "clash of cultures" today and in the new millennium is not between distinct civilisations, but between rival political traditions within the same Islamic country.¹

The contest and rivalry between a variety of Islamic political traditions becomes increasingly complex with the contemporary Islamic revival. At almost the same time as the rising waves of democracy, the so-called revival of religion—including Islam—has swept many parts of the globe. The increased attachment to Islam has led some Muslims to practice Islam in what they believe to be a comprehensive and holistic manner (*kaffa*). In the political field, the understanding of *Islam kaffa* means the unity of religion (*al-din*) and state (*al-dawla*) as proposed by some Muslim jurists and political thinkers in the classic period of Islam. In short, this is one of the signs of the return of traditional Islamic political concepts and ideas, which actually have little, if any, relevance to the realities of contemporary politics.

This tendency of some Muslims to return to traditional politics contributes to renewed tension between Islam and democracy. It also contributes further complexities to the possible form of the state where Muslims constitute the dominant or pre-dominant population. There are at least three forms of state, each of which has certain conceptual and practical frameworks concerning relations between religion and state, as well as the place of democracy in the respective state.

The first form is the modern republic nation-state. The majority of Muslims have accepted—albeit tacitly—this

modern form of nation-state based mostly on Western concepts and practices. However, while most of the Western nation-states adopt secularism, Muslim modern nation-states place Islam in a different position. A limited number of Muslim countries, like Turkey, also adopt secularism or quasi-secularism, but most of them position Islam as the official religion while in practice adopt certain secular ideologies. As a result there is a great deal of difference between Muslim modern nation-states, for instance, in terms of the kind and level of democracy that is implemented.

It is clear that even though most Muslim countries adopt the modern form of nation-states, more precisely republic states, with secular or quasi-secular ideologies, many of them—as can be seen from the Freedom House report—are not yet democratic; most of them are autocratic and repressive, if not dictatorial. In addition, these secular nation-states in the Muslim world seemed to have failed to deliver their promises of modernity and better welfare for their people. This failure has not only eroded the credibility of secular regimes in the eyes of the ever-growing number of Muslims, but has also created strong skepticism towards the viability of modern nation-states.

A loss of credibility is also faced by the so-called “Islamic-states” (*dawla Islamiyya*) in the form of traditional monarchies such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. Not unlike Muslim secular states, these monarchies are autocratic, suppressive and dictatorial. Modern Muslim thinkers criticise these monarchies mainly for their obvious incompatibility with democracy, since all of them disregard basic democratic values such as equality, plurality, and respect for human rights. The Islamists—as discussed briefly below—on the other hand severely criticise the monarchies because monarchy is not compatible with Islam. The kingships run contrary not only to the Islamic emphasis on the equality of all believers before God but also with the principle of *shura* (deliberation) exhorted by the Qur’an.

The declining credibility of secular nation-states and Islamic monarchies, combined with the renewed attachment to Islam, has led certain groups of Muslims, regarded by many as radicals, such as the Hizb al-Tahrir, Gama'ah Tafsir wa al-Hijrah and other splinter groups of the Jama'ah Ikhwan al-Muslimin, to carry out serious attempts to replace secular nation-states and monarchies with the classic model of an "Islamic political entity", better known as the caliphate (*al-khilafa*), or in contemporary discourse among these movements, the "universal caliphate". The proponents of the universal caliphate believe that this kind of Islamic political entity, led by a single caliph, is the answer and the only solution to Muslim disunity and powerlessness vis-à-vis Western powers² (Abu-Rabi` 1996; Lawrence 1998).

The contemporary revival of the idea of a single and universal caliphate is, undoubtedly, problematic. I would argue that the idea is mostly based on historical and religious romanticism as well as misconceptions about not only the very meaning and nature of the caliphate, but also of the historical development of the caliphate itself in the post-Prophet Muhammad period. Supporters of the caliphate have failed to distinguish between the original and genuine caliphate under the Rightly Guided Caliph (*al-khulafa' al-rashidun*) and the despotic monarchies of the Umayyads, Abbasids and Ottomans. While at least the first two caliphs i.e. Abu Bakr and Umar ibn al-Khattab were elected on merit, the subsequent "caliphs" in the post-*al-khulafa' al-rashidun* period were essentially kings (*muluk*) with uncontested rights and privileges over all other Muslims. Therefore, modern thinkers concerned with the caliphate, such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, `Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, Rashid Rida, Sayyid Qutb, and Abu al-A`la al-Mawdudi, have all refused to recognize the credibility and legitimacy of those Muslim kings as "caliphs".³

One should be aware, however, that these thinkers have proposed different, if not conflicting ideas, concerning some

main themes of the caliphate. Al-Kawakibi and Rida, for instance, insist that the caliph should be an Arab from the Quraysh tribe. Al-Mawdudi on the other hand strongly rejects this idea; to him the caliph should be democratically elected from all Muslims, according to merit, by a special electing body called “*ahl al-hālli wa al-‘aqd*”, or *Majlis al-Shura*. According to al-Mawdudi the distinguished position of caliph must not be reserved only for Arabs, since they have no special privileges over other non-Arab Muslims.

Despite all the conceptual and practical problems surrounding the feasibility and viability of the caliphate, the idea seems to have continually attracted certain Muslim groups throughout the world. In Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia, the idea of the caliphate has been put into circulation by organisations such as Hizb al-Tahrir and Jamaah Tarbiyah since at least the 1970s. It is important to note that during the Soeharto New Order, these movements were very careful not to invite firm action by the regime against their activities. As a result, they survived Soeharto’s harsh measures and have made themselves more prominent in the post-Soeharto period.

The Hizb al-Tahrir, initially established in Jordan in 1952 by Shaykh Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani and spread in Indonesia since the early 1970s, is, no doubt, more pronounced since the fall of Soeharto. Openly calling for the establishment of the universal caliphate, the movement held a *khilāfa* conference in Jakarta in early 2000. The conference was reportedly attended by a limited audience. Despite its increased visibility, it is doubtful that the Hizb al-Tahrir’s appeal for the establishment of *khilāfa* wins significant support from mainstream Indonesian Muslims. The majority of Indonesian Muslims, represented by large organisations such as NU (Nahdhatul Ulama) and Muhammadiyah and most Muslim political parties, almost ignore the issue. In short, discussions about *khilāfa* are conspicuously absent from public discourse, and this clearly indicates that mainstream

Muslims are simply not interested in the *khilāfa*, and certainly do not support its establishment.

Enhancing Democratic Culture

There has been intense discussion about certain factors that have contributed to the weakness of democracy in large parts of the Muslim world. The first factor is the weaknesses of infrastructure or prerequisites that are instrumental in the development of democracy. Most Muslim countries are less developed in terms of education and economic prosperity. Not only that, most Muslim countries can be classified as Weberian “soft states”, in which patrimonialism, corruption, cronyism, and nepotism are rampant, which inhibits economic improvement and distorts socio-cultural development.

A second factor is the tendency of Muslims to believe in the unity of religion and politics. This perception of course has its origins in the classical political theory that religion and state are not separate or separable institutions. Even though in practice most Muslim countries have made distinctions between the two, there are Muslim groups that insist on merging religion and state.

A third factor is the failure of Muslim states to implement democracy largely because of the regimes that, in very contradictory ways, practice undemocratic politics. Many Muslim states use violent approaches—rather than peaceful means—against those who oppose the regimes, creating an endless and unbroken circle of violence. Worse still, many of these autocratic regimes have been supported by the US and other Western countries for their own interests, thus alienating potentially democratic citizens from a democracy. As a result, many people have been losing their faith in democracy and have been looking for an Islamic alternative.

The relative absence of democratic culture is an important factor that inhibits the growth of democracy in many Muslim countries. To take Indonesia as an example, the dominant culture among Muslims, particularly among the

so-called traditionalists, is uncontested loyalty to the traditional *ulama*, known in Indonesia as *kiyai*, or other charismatic leaders. These traditional leaders not only exert a requirement of almost blind loyalty by the masses, but also use and abuse traditional Islamic political concepts such as *bughat* (dissension), *jihad*, and *bay'a* in order to support the undemocratic attitudes and policies of the ruling elite.

A fifth factor is the weakness or disfunctionality of “civil society” groups or organisations. A number of recent studies have shown that civil society has existed among Middle Eastern Muslims in various forms during the course of their history. In Indonesia, a great number of Islamic civil society institutions, in the form of voluntary organisations and groups, has existed since colonial times. Despite its existence, it must be admitted that in most Muslim countries Islamic civil society has not been able to play its crucial role in the development and empowerment of democracy. In fact, Islamic civil society has become dependent on the state, or has been co-opted by the regime.

Looking at all five inhibiting factors, it is clear that the enhancement or empowerment of democracy is no easy challenge in most Muslim countries. But again, democracy is not without hope in many Muslim countries, at least for the time being in the “bright spots” mentioned above.

The fact that the democratic ferment is considerable in these bright spot begs the empowerment of the democratisation process. Many of the bright spots are now in the process of transition to a more authentic and genuine democracy. Sometimes the process, like in the case of Indonesia, is painful and costly, but the ferment of democracy in the form of free press, discourse on human rights and plurality, and free associations and civil society should be kept alive and, in turn, enhanced.

Enhancement of these important prerequisites for democracy will undoubtedly contribute greatly to the efforts for the establishment of good governance. The construction

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of democratic, credible and accountable governance will restore the faith in democracy of most—if not all—Muslims and, thus, will cause them to accept the realities of modern politics rather than contemplate romantic ideals, which are unworkable in contemporary times.

Finally, it is also imperative to reconcile the Islamicity of many Muslims with regard to the supposed unity between *din* and *dawla*, through some kind of “substantification” in contemporary politics of politics with the universal values of Islam. The “substantification” of politics simply means the adoption of the universal values of Islam such as *al-musawa* (equality), *al-‘adala* (justice), *shura* (deliberation), *tasamuh* (tolerance) as well as of Islamic ethics—as emphasised by classic Muslim political thinkers—into contemporary political concepts and systems. With this kind of “substantification”, the opposition of Muslims who consider democracy as a kind of secularism could be reduced.

Notes

¹ Robert W. Hefner, “Islam and Nation in the Post-Soeharto Era”. in Adam Schwarz and Jonathan Paris (eds.), *The Politics of Post-Soeharto Indonesia* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), p. 41.

² R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World* (NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995), second edition.

³ cf. Azyumardi Azra, *Pergolakan Politik Islam: Dari Fundamentalisme, Modernisme hingga Post-Modernisme* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1996), p. 153.

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ASEAN and Multilateral Security Arrangement in Southeast Asia

Dina Afrianty

Introduction

The end of the Cold War has brought changes to the nature of conflict at the global, regional as well as at the state level. The number of inter-state conflicts, which previously appeared to be the most likely to threaten the international security order have to certain extent been reduced. As Reilly observes,¹ of the 110 major armed conflicts in the period between 1989 and 1999, only seven were major inter-state conflicts. The tendency in the post Cold War has been the increase in number of violent conflicts that take place within states. They took the form of secessionist and independence movements, civil wars and communal violence. The Rwandan genocide, the ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia, the independence movement of East Timor and ethno-religious conflicts in Indonesia are some of the forms of armed conflicts that took place within state territories and caused the devastating loss of human

life. Even though they take place within the state territories, these intra-state conflict are a serious threat to the security of other states or the region as a whole. The international security order has also been challenged by the emergence of non-traditional security threats, such as migrating people and organised crimes.

Southeast Asia is one of the regions in the world that has been affected by the above phenomena. It has to face the fact that many of the countries in the region confront various forms of intra-state conflicts and the non-traditional security threats. The independence movement in Aceh, the secessionist movement in the Southern Philippines, the ethno-religious conflicts in Papua, Kalimantan and Poso, the disputes between minority groups in Myanmar and the continuing tension in Southern Thailand are some of major predicaments in Southeast Asia that have endangered the security structure in the region. On top of this, the region has also been rocked by the fact that it harbors alleged terrorists networks.

This paper attempts to look at how ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) as the only regional inter-governmental organisation, play a role in maintaining a peaceful security order in the region given the variety of potential threats to its regional security structure. It will seek to understand on how ASEAN's policy of non-interference and non-use of force have effectively reduced the potential disruption caused by the emerging conflicts in many parts of the region. This paper argues that ASEAN as the regional organisation has worked to promote peace and order in the region, including its insistence on not interfering in the sovereignty of its member states. As the only intergovernmental organisation in the region, ASEAN has proved itself able to stop and avoid any unilateral action from any one country in the region. This article will argue that given the differences in the nature of threats that Southeast Asian countries face, ASEAN, should somehow reconsider its political

and security policy.

In order to engage in this problems, this article will try to identify the security identity of ASEAN and it will elaborate the nature of the conflicts and potential threats that may endanger and disrupt the current security structure of the region. Finally, this paper will attempt to uncover ASEAN's commitments to pursuing a peaceful security order since the organisation established in 1967.

The Nature of Threats to Southeast Asia's Security

Southeast Asia is a regions that was once colonised and occupied by more that one colonial power. The richness of this region, with its abundance natural resources, attracted foreign imperialist powers, from as early as in the 16th century. The Portuguese, Spaniards, the Dutch Indies, the French and the United States of America were among the major colonial powers who colonised and ruled countries in Southeast Asia.

After gaining their independence, countries in this region, except Thailand had to work very hard to develop their economic, social and political affairs. These countries found it difficult to develop their economies at the same time as being confronted by complicated domestic political development. On the other side of the coin, they also had to deal with problems of nation-state building. As a post-colonial state, they had to face the fact that the boundaries which separate one country from another were delineated by colonial powers who disregarded the ethnic, religious and cultural attachments of the population. Not only did the colonial powers define the Southeast Asian states' borders, they also changed the ethnic composition of most of the region.² This has led to the emergence of various insurgencies, separatist movements and other revolutionary groups who seek power.

To illustrate, Lande clearly describes how the historical legacies of colonial powers have created problems to the

post-colonial Southeast Asian States.³ In Thailand, the government instigated a military action to confront Malay uprisings in Southern Thailand in 1922. The Malay, who form the majority of the population in Southern Thailand are culturally, religiously and ethnically different from the rest of the Thai population. They are a Malay-speaking Muslim community living in a Buddhist society and government. To some extent, the population in Southern Thailand felt they should be part of the Malay community in Malaysia rather than citizens of Thailand.

In a similar vein, the minority Muslim community in the Southern Philippines had to fight the Philippines government as their ancestral lands were increasingly threatened by arrival of the Catholics. The Philippines government has structurally attempted to discriminate against and marginalise the Muslim minority in Mindanao. They have not only been discriminated against in the field of economics but also in other socio-cultural contexts. In fact, this kind of discrimination can be traced back to the way the Spanish colonial power treated the minority population in the Southern Philippines. Afraid of the spread of Islam, the Spanish Colonial power, which was later followed by the American imperialists, tried to limit and localise the Muslim population. The Muslims were given very limited freedom to express their religious obligations. Eventually all of this simmering anguish drove the Muslims in Mindanao to fight against the government. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was the first organisation representing the Muslim minority to fight against the government. Armed conflicts between the two have increasingly destabilised the Philippine government. The worsening situation has prompted the Philippines government to initiate a series of negotiations with the MNLF. Tripoli Agreement, which was signed by the two conflicting parties, was the first negotiation that was initiated by the Philippine Government as part of its effort to end the violent conflict. This negotiation resulted in grant-

ing autonomy to Muslim Mindanao. However, as the autonomy that had been agreed upon was never really implemented, further destruction and clashes still continue to take place. It has claimed the lives of thousands of innocent civilians.

Indonesia is another country in the region that has faced many serious domestic challenges in its political development. During its early period of independence, the Indonesian government had to deal with several insurgencies, such as the Aceh revolution. In the following years, it has also had to deal with the issues over West Papua and East Timor. These three Indonesian provinces have a similar demand that is to be separated from the Indonesian Republic. In the case of the conflict in Aceh, which turns to be the longest dispute that has ever taken place in post-colonial Indonesia, the Indonesian government's ignorance to the demand of most of the Acehnese to implement Shariah or Islamic law in their province in the very early period of Indonesia's independence has prompted the Acehnese to fight against the Indonesian government. In the later period, the central government's massive exploitation towards the Acehnese economic resources has furthered the Acehnese hatred towards the Indonesian government. The revenue that the Indonesian government received from the exploitation of Aceh's natural resources has not been returned to the people of Aceh. Although it is one of the richest provinces in Indonesia, the development that takes place in Aceh is very limited. Finally, all of these socio-economic and political grievances have created the feeling of alienation from the whole nation-state building project. It is thus clear that the armed conflict between the Acehnese and the Indonesian military is going to continue until the central government initiate series of reform on its socio-economic and political and military policy in Aceh. Yet, the Indonesian government can no more see the conflict in Aceh mainly as a movement derive from religious sentiments.

The case in Aceh is somewhat different from what is happening in West Papua and East Timor. In regards to the West Papuans' struggle for independence, Lande⁴ notes that the fact that West Papuans racially, culturally and linguistically differ from the rest of the Indonesian population has forced them to fight for separation. This is quite similar to what happened in East Timor. The Cold War situation in the 1970s had led the Indonesian government to take control of East Timor. Various efforts including that of international diplomacy as well as military actions have been carried out by Indonesia in order to convince the East Timorese that they are part of the Indonesian nation. However, all of these processes failed and eventually the people of East Timor fought against the Indonesian military to fight for freedom and independence. With the support of the International community, East Timor finally became a separate nation in 1999.

The armed conflicts between the people and the government, has become one of the largest threats not only to the local government but also to its neighbours. The ethno-religious conflicts taking place in countries in Southeast Asia also to a certain extent, endanger the security order in the region. The ethnic riots between the Bumiputera and the Chinese population in Malaysia, the ethno-religious conflict in places like Ambon, Poso and Kalimantan in Indonesia and the fights between Karen and Shan in Burma have come to the attention of ASEAN countries. Searle (2002)⁵ points out that the rise and decline of ethno-religious conflicts in Southeast Asia relates to the character of the state and its role in ameliorating or exacerbating conflicts, the role of local factors (ethnicity, religions and the distribution of resources) and the external challenge emanating from Islamic religious revivalism in the persistent conflict.

The development following the September 11 terrorist attack to the Twin Towers in New York City have also transformed the security order in Southeast Asia. Suddenly, the

world's attention has turned to the lives of Muslims in Southeast Asia. This is hardly surprising, given that the majority of the population in Southeast Asia is Muslims. Previously, Southeast Asian Islam was perceived by the West as being a more tolerant kind of Islam and therefore different from Middle Eastern Islam. Now the West tends to link Al-Qaeda with the struggles of Muslims in Mindanao and in the Southern Philippines. They have also accused Indonesia of being a site of military training. Given all these assumptions, the US government warned the Indonesian government that the country has become a terrorists area. It was not until the Bali Bombing in October 2002 that the Indonesian government finally took a firm action towards the so-called radicals Muslims. At the beginning the Indonesian government denied the accusation that its large Muslims population had been infiltrated by the radicals.

Similar accusations have been directed towards the Malaysian government by the United States. The *Kumpulan Militan Malaysia* (KMM) was alleged to have been one of the Al-Qaeda cells in Southeast Asia. *Jamaah Islamiah* (JI), a name that has suddenly appeared in much of the literature on terrorism, is accused by the U.S and its Western allies of attempting to establish an Islamic state in Southeast Asia that includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Southern Philippines and Southern Thailand. Despite this accusation, majority of Southeast Asian Muslims still think that *Jamaah Islamiah* (JI) is non-existent.

However, this Islamist movement that has appeared for example in Malaysia and Indonesia can not be underestimated. In Indonesia for example, the growth of this Islamist movement cannot be separated from the country's political development. The economic crises and the political subjugation of Indonesian Muslims during the New Order period have given birth to this movement.

ASEAN and Its Security Objective

On August 8, 1967 five countries in Southeast Asia Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore, declared their intention to cooperate under the umbrella of one intergovernmental regional organisation. This organisation, which later became known as ASEAN has the general objective of promoting peace, stability and prosperity through collaboration and assistance among the member states in the fields of economics and socio-cultural affairs.

There has been many analysis on the history behind the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Cold War situation, the domestic circumstances of the newly independent countries and the political development in Indochina were among the major driving forces that prompted the Southeast Asian States to build a regional cooperation.

During the Cold War period, Southeast Asia's regional security order was largely determined by the influence of the United States, the Soviet Union along with China and Japan who acted as junior partners of the United States and the Soviet Union in the fight against communism.⁶ By establishing a regional cooperation, the five signatory countries believed that they would be able to determine the security order without any involvement or interference from the competing external powers. By and large, it would be the member states' responsibility to maintain their own security, which would eventually result in regional peace.

The establishment of ASEAN was also heavily influenced by the domestic circumstances of the member states. Domestic political development in the member states often affected their foreign policy in the region. For example, Indonesia's foreign policy under Soekarno, which was anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist and anti western capitalist, perceived Malaysia as an outpost of colonialism that endangered the integrity of Indonesia's national unity.⁷ This sort of hard line foreign policy resulted in a conflict between



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Indonesia and Malaysia which jeopardised the region's security. At the same time, Malaysia was also in conflict with the Philippines and Thailand. They were in dispute over the borders that demarcated these countries. These border problems were the result of the European colonial Powers delineation of the present frontiers, ignoring the historical realities of the countries.

These problems encountered by countries in Southeast Asia eventually, as Wanandi notes led to an agreement between the five countries to establish ASEAN.⁸ It is believed that its establishment resulted in the end of confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia in 1966 made possible by increasing awareness of the need to create a regional cooperation. Not unimportant was the acknowledgement that they were facing similar threats from the Communist power in Indochina and the isolationist retreat of Burma.⁹ This, finally, strengthened the Southeast Asian countries' commitment to creating ASEAN.

Although a clear statement about the organisation's objective of promoting political and security cooperation did not appear in the ASEAN Declaration of 1967, a more general declaration expressed the desire of the organisation to establish a firm foundation for common action to promote peace in the Southeast Asia region.¹⁰ Under the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) signed in 1976, the five member states declared that ASEAN's political and security dialogue and cooperation aims to promote regional peace and stability by enhancing regional resilience, which should be achieved through cooperation in all fields and based on the principles of self-confidence, self-resilience, mutual respect, cooperation and the solidarity of nations in Southeast Asia. Despite many criticisms of the "ASEAN way" of diplomacy, which is characterized by having no formal agenda but instead employing a protracted negotiation procedure based on consultation in order to reach consensus on security issues, ASEAN has successfully broken up inter-state con-

flict and forged closer relations and a sense of regional identity between the nations. The member states of ASEAN have managed to build confidence, familiarity and an understanding of each other's positions on different issues through a system of informal and formal meetings between the leaders, ministers and senior officials.¹¹

ASEAN has proved itself to be one of the most effective organisations in the Third World countries. Sharpe classifies ASEAN as a rare example of an influential,¹² indigenous Third World organisation. It has successfully played an influential role in promoting peace not only at the regional level but also at the global level. The role that ASEAN played in mediating between the Philippines Government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) resulted in the reduction of tension. It also played an important role in settling the Cambodian conflict. The success of ASEAN is manifested by the fact that ASEAN membership has grown from only five countries in 1967 to all ten Southeast Asian countries in 1997. The inclusion of new members, mostly countries in Indo China, has ended the animosity and mutual suspicion that had previously characterised ASEAN's relations with the Indochinese countries.¹³ ASEAN has also extended the range of its cooperation, based on its initial objective of accelerating economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region, and the enhancement of all military and political cooperation between the member states.

In relation to the political and security problems, ASEAN has often proclaimed itself to be the principle operator in regional efforts to prevent conflict.¹⁴ The ASEAN approach towards conflict management is through a negotiation and decision making processes, as well as through mechanisms and provisions by the member states focusing on the need to manage inter-state dispute through peaceful means. ASEAN believes that any regional security tensions are predominantly caused by the member states' internal instabil-

ity. It is for this reason that ASEAN places a strong emphasis on the need for each member state to strive for the elimination of internal threats. The ability of the member states to get rid of any potential internal disputes would prevent further breakdowns that could cause serious danger to regional stability.

In terms of its principles of conflict management, ASEAN places a very high priority on non-interference, peaceful settlements of dispute and cooperation when dealing with such conflicts. In 1971, ASEAN member states established ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) both as a philosophy and a vision that meant that countries in Southeast Asia should seek to be in charge of their own destiny and should refrain from doing anything which could lead to external intervention. ZOPFAN was a refusal of SEAN states of the possibility of strategic division caused by outside powers.¹⁵ The creation of ZOPFAN was the result of a new security environment in the Cold War period, which saw ASEAN become a player in the new balance of power. For example, ASEAN states were concerned about the Soviet military support in Vietnam and therefore it allowed the development of US naval and air base in the Philippines. Sheldon¹⁶ argues that the presence of US naval and air bases in the Philippines contributed a lot to regional security light of Soviet military build-up across the South China Sea at Cam Ranh Bay. Sheldon¹⁷ further adds that the ZOPFAN proposal has proven an effective diplomatic device that projects a regional image of neutrality whilst maintaining relations with external powers.

In 1994 ASEAN member states agreed to form a new coalition, with the objective of providing a mechanism to maintain and preserve security and political order in the region following the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. This new form of coalition was called the ASEAN Regional Forum, a forum of ASEAN countries plus New Zealand, Australia, China, Russia, India, Canada, the United States,

Papua New Guinea, Japan and Mongolia. The ARF's key purpose is to develop an institution with the task of researching the possibility of implementing the practices of preventive diplomacy and confidence-building in the participating countries.¹⁸

ASEAN commits itself to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of its member states. However, there has been strong criticism of the so-called "ASEAN way of diplomacy". For example, Evans¹⁹ asserts that the non-interference principle of ASEAN is outdated and ineffective in the era of globalisation and interdependence. The lack of consensus on issues regarding the reformation of ASEAN's institutional capabilities in conflict management suggests that for many of the member states, the unobtrusive style of regional diplomacy remains sacrosanct and not subject to alteration. ASEAN's style of quiet and behind the scenes diplomacy therefore contradicts the transparent and open nature of conflict management that is advocated by a truly multilateral approach.²⁰

How Should ASEAN Deal with these Security Threats?

Weatherbee²¹ identified four levels of threats that have the potential to disrupt Southeast Asia regional order. First, the internal threat from each of the member states. Second, intra-state conflict, mainly arising from persistent political and juridical disputes such as, is the case with Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah, dispute over the Spratly islands in the South China Sea involving several countries in Southeast Asia. Third, threats from non-ASEAN regional sources. Fourth, the threats of intervention of great powers. Given the explanation of the potential threat towards the security structure of Southeast Asia, there are some recommendations on to how ASEAN should act as the only inter-governmental organisation in the region. Although at the very beginning, there seemed to be a reluctance to mention

that the organisation was initially established to promote political and security order, in its later development ASEAN has proven that it plays a significant role in maintaining regional peace and order.

ASEAN's rejection of the use of force and policy of non-interference in political diplomacy have received criticism, as it is no longer effective in dealing with the emergence of various kind of conflicts. As Tivayanond²² argues, for example, the insistence of ASEAN on maintaining the principle of non-interference during the East Timor crises has degraded its effectiveness as a security organisation. ASEAN argues that East Timor was an internal problem for the Government of Indonesia, and therefore it should be left to the Indonesian government. Furthermore, Tivayanond²³ also notes that the reluctance of ASEAN countries to change this non-interference principle has been caused by the increasing number of internal problems for its member states. It is argued that interference by any external sources would undermine the regime's survival.

However, this paper argues that given the challenges from the intra-states conflicts, which increasingly threaten neighbouring country, ASEAN should begin to engage more directly in the disputes in its member states. For example, ASEAN should effectively promote negotiation between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro. It is not only heightened political tension between the conflicting parties could further harm ASEAN's security arrangement. A similar case also has to be presented to the government of Indonesia in its settling of disputes with the separatists in various regions. As ASEAN countries are also moving towards implementing a more democratic approach the ASEAN government should no longer only be concerned with their regime's stability.

Notes

¹ Benjamin Reilly, "Internal Conflict and Regional Security in Asia and the Pacific", in *Pacifica Review*. 14 (1) 2002, p.8.

² Carle H. Lande, "Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Accomodation, and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia", *Studies in Comparative International Development*. 33 (4), 1999, p. 94.

³ Carle H. Lande, "Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Accomodation", pp. 90-93.

⁴ Carle H. Lande, "Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Accomodation", pp. 97.

⁵ Peter Searle, "Ethno-Religious Conflicts: Rise or Decline? Recent Developments in Southeast Asia", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*. 24 (1) 2002.

⁶ Daljit Singh, "Indonesia's Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 24 (1) 2002, p. 118.

⁷ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore, ISEAS, 1994), p.26.

⁸ Jusuf Wanandi, "ASEAN's Past and the Challenges Ahead: Aspects of Politics", 2001, p. 25.

⁹ Daljit Singh, "ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia", in Chia Siow Yue and Pacini (eds), *ASEAN in the New Asia, Issues and Trends* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), p. 122.

¹⁰ Ramses Amer, "Conflict Management and Constructive Engagement in ASEAN's Expansion", *Third World Quarterly*. 20 (5): 1999, p. 1032.

¹¹ Ramses Amer, "Conflict Management and Constructive", p. 1036.

¹² Samuel Sharpe, "An ASEAN way to security cooperation in Southeast Asia?", *The Pacific Review*, 16 (2): 2003, p. 231.

¹³ Ramses Amer, "Conflict Management and Constructive", p. 1037.

¹⁴ J. Michael Tivayanond, "Re-evaluating Preventive Diplomacy in Southeast Asia", *Center for East and South-East Asian Studies* (Sweden: Lund University, 2003), p. 15.

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- ¹⁵ Sheldon W. Simon, "ASEAN's Strategic situation in the 1980s", *Pacific Affairs*, 60 (1): 1987, p. 89.
- ¹⁶ Sheldon W. Simon, "ASEAN's Strategic", p. 89.
- ¹⁷ Sheldon W. Simon, "ASEAN's Strategic", p. 76.
- ¹⁸ J. Michael Tivayanond, "Re-evaluating Preventive Diplomacy", p. 17.
- ¹⁹ Paul M. Evans, "Cooperative Security and Its Discontents in Asia Pacific: The ASEAN Connection", *American Asian Review*, 19 (2): 2001, p. 106.
- ²⁰ J. Michael Tivayanond, "Re-evaluating Preventive Diplomacy", p. 22.
- ²¹ Sheldon W. Simon, "ASEAN's Strategic", p. 73.
- ²² J. Michael Tivayanond, "Re-evaluating Preventive Diplomacy", p. 24.
- ²³ J. Michael Tivayanond, "Re-evaluating Preventive Diplomacy", p. 24.

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