What is Political Islam? An Examination of its Theoretical Mapping in Modern Indonesia

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Introduction

I am not sure if remapping contemporary Indonesian Islam is any more urgent now than in the past –let us say twenty or thirty years ago. This is especially true if the reference point of the remapping is the general characterization of Indonesian Islam in modern times. The mid-forties or early fifties was a time when the archipelago was struggling to transform itself into a new state and because of that the general outlook of Indonesian Islam —other than the fact that it was a product of a relatively peaceful proselytization, signified by the will-

ingness of its bearers (i.e. saint, merchant-*da'i*, etc.) to accommodate local culture — has always been associated with the country's socio-cultural, economic, and political development.

In that context, socio-religiously or theologically speaking, we have been accustomed to see Indonesian Islam in the light of tradition-alism versus modernism, syncreticism versus puritanism, and perhaps even orthodoxy versus heterodoxy. Politically speaking, the map of Indonesian Islam has shared a comparable complexity. The process of transforming Indonesia into a new state in the early until the mid-twentieth century resulted in many students of Indonesian Islam see-ing it in the light of nationalist versus religious group or *santri* versus *abangan*, outsider versus insider, secular versus Islamic, or structural versus cultural.

Moving into the seventies and eighties it all came down to the deconfessionalized, domesticated, marginalized nature of Islam. De-feated ideologically, politically, bureaucratically, and electorally, but somehow one cannot say anything with certainty regarding the state of Indonesian Islam. The political impasse of Islam during this period was also matched by the ability to exert influence religiously as well as socio-culturally.[1] This was precisely what led Don Emmerson to say that who's co-opting whom with respect to the relationship be-tween Islam and the state was not entirely clear.[2]

Thus, charting the map of Indonesian Islam is more difficult to lay out than we often thought and should have been an urgency of those times. In fact, it should have been the order of the earlier period – let's say in the 1920s or 1950s– if one cares to particularly dwell on the complexity of the theological realm of Islam itself, especially if one dares to ask what constitutes Islam? Or what are the defining factors for becoming a Muslim?

These are not provocative questions. They are part of the un-settled issues within the Islamic community since the classical period when Muslims were theologically categorized into Asy'ariate, Mu'tazilate, Murji'ate and so forth. Weighing all the merits of these categorizations, one cannot actually be sure whose Islam is likely to be accepted in the eyes of Allah. If I were to refer this issue to my traditional belief, which may not be a consensus for all Muslims, than I would begin by including those who share the basic teachings of

Prophet Muhammad and regard the Qur'an and Sunnah as the two most important sources of Islam as Muslims. Those who perform ritual practices embodied in the so-called five Pillars of Islam (*Rukn al-Islām*), where Muslims are obliged to (1) declare their faith —to bear witness and to testify that there is no god but God (Allah) and Muhammad is the messenger of God; (2) perform five daily prayers; (3) give alms; (4) fast during Ramadhan; and (5) do the pilgrimage at least once in their life time, are Muslims. Other than that, those who stand by the six Pillars of Faith (*Rukn al-Imān*) where they (1) believe in one God (2) the messengers of God; (3) the angels, (4) the holy books, (5) the day of judgment, and (6) the divine destiny (*qadhā' and qadr*), are Muslims.[3]

The reality, however, indicates that the expressions or material-izations of these fundamental beliefs are different, some even contra-dictory to each other. This is why, in the history of Islam, to cite a few examples, we had a Muslim sufi like Al-Hallaj who is often consid-ered as a "unionist," a Muslim political scientist such as Ali Ibn Abd Raziq who was perceived as "secular," a Muslim statesman like Soekarno who was believed to be an "abangan" —a non-devout or syncretic Muslim. And we can go on and on with numerous and per-haps even more startling and bizarre examples.

Destined by the will of Allah or otherwise, this is precisely what has been happening in the Muslim world, and will continue to happen in the future, where Muslims —having the luxury to interpret their religious doctrines— will never have one voice. It may be publicly insane or likely to create an outcry to put forward questions like what is Islam? Who are the Muslims? Intellectually, however, issues such as these go into the heart of our endeavor to chart a map or remap Islam in general, and Indonesian Islam in particular. So again the question is, why bother to do the remapping now, and not twenty or forty years ago?

But, putting aside the above question for now, it is fair to say that the map of Indonesian Islam has always been changing and quite rap-idly too. So I take it that our feeling of urgency to remap is shaped and influenced particularly by the events of May 1998 when Indonesia decided to take a different course in terms of its system of govern-ment, from authoritarianism to democratization. Of course, one can-

not say that as such it will always be accompanied by a complete break from the past. On the contrary, a large part of the past is still with us. Thus, the remapping of Indonesian Islam is something not entirely novel. While it is true that the map of Indonesian Islam is becoming more complex, a continuity with the past is still very much with us. The recurrent discourse on Islam as the basis of politics, on the implementation of *sharī'a*, on the urgency on the part of some Muslims to wage the Islamic flag –Islamic formalism to put it differently– are cases in point. And, as we may all know, the transition process to democracy provides an opportunity for that kind of formalism to develop — at least to be heard and sold in the market.

In spite of what has been suggested, this paper attempts not to do the remapping of Indonesian Islam, but to chart out several important categories resulting from the theoretical exercises conducted by prominent students of Indonesian Islam. More especially, I will examine a number of approaches often used to describe and explain the archipelago's political Islam. In so doing, it is hoped that the road to remapping becomes even clearer.

Approaches to Indonesian Political Islam

The relationship between Islam and politics in Indonesia has a very long tradition. Its genealogical roots reach back to the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century —an age in which Islam, as suggested by many, was introduced and spread through the archipelago. It was in the subsequent historical discourse, defining a meaningful dialogue with local socio-cultural and political realities, that Islam became involved in politics. In fact, throughout its development in Indonesia, it may be said that Islam — not necessarily suggesting that it is inherently a political religion, as many have claimed[4] — has become an integral part of the country's political history.[5]

Despite the fact that the relationship between Islam and politics in Indonesia has a very long history, it is rather unfortunate that theoretical discourse about it has only developed in the last four decades. Such belated development has meant that its theoretical enterprise has lacked the richness and diversity found in other parts of the Muslim world, i.e. the Middle East. This is particularly true with regard to the

general themes developed in the theories discussed in this chapter. It is a fact that virtually all theoretical efforts to understand Indonesian political Islam have been based upon the story of the formal political defeats of Islam.

Another striking point which characterizes Indonesian political theorizing on Islam, as will be more obvious in the following examination, is that it evolved to be less normative than its counterparts in the Islamic heartland, both during its classical as well as its modern period. For reasons which are still largely unexplored, the theory of Indonesian political Islam has been substantially built on the empirical grounds where the encounters of Islam with politics in the archipelago took place.

In spite of its recent beginning, during those forty years of theoretical efforts it is noticeable that there are at least five dominant theoretical approaches whose influences, to a certain extent, are still pervasive. These paradigms include: (1) the 'deconfessionalization' of Islamic theory, (2) the domestication of Islamic theory, (3) the schismatic and *aliran* (current, way of life) cluster theory, (4) the trichotomy perspective, and (5) the cultural Islamic in the mid-forties or early fifties theory.

1. 'Deconfessionalization' of Islam

This theory is advanced by C. A. O. Van Nieuwenhuijze. Writing in two different articles, in the late 1950s and the mid-1960s, he tried to explain the political relationship between Islam and Indonesia's modern national state — particularly to assess the role of Islam in the national revolution and state building — in the light of the 'deconfessionalization' theory.[6]

Being a Dutch-Indonesianist, despite an effort to see Indonesian Islam "from the native's point of view,"[7] his conceptual tools are very much influenced — not necessarily in a pejorative sense, but simply to locate its roots — by his own socio-intellectual traditions. In fact, as categorically stated, the 'deconfessionalization' theory was borrowed from the accommodationist tendency of the Netherlands' socio-cultural and political groups.[8] It has been widely understood that one of the most conspicuous characteristics of Dutch socio-religious life is the existence of "a certain degree of unavoidable difficulty in the

interrelationships between the numerous denominational groups."[9] Explaining the socio-religious origins of this concept, he says:

> The term ['deconfessionalization'] was originally used in the Netherlands to indicate that for the purpose of a certain conference, representatives of different creeds would meet on (improvised) common ground, namely upon the agreement that the specific implications of their several creeds would be avoided as a topic of dispute.[10]

How can a topic of discussion, which is religiously disputable, be avoided? Or how can such a conference be meaningfully 'deconfessionalized'? The tradition of the Dutch accommodationist practice provides a basis for an argument that such a goal can only be achieved when participants from different religious backgrounds agree to interact based on a common platform —that is by using terminologies and vocabularies that are understandable and acceptable to both groups.

Realizing the wide range of religious and class cleavages (*zuilen*) in the Netherlands, it is obvious that such a theory represents a device to soften the sharp edges of socio-religious exclusivity. This, undoubtedly, is to dodge the presumably unbridgeable differences in the course of their "inter-denominational exchange of views".[11]

In spite of the fact that members of different socio-religious groups allow themselves to interact in a 'deconfessionalized' manner, they remain loyal to their religions. Ideas, Van Nieuwenhuijze argues, do not necessarily change with terminology. This is simply because of the fact that a "man does not slough his skin when for a while he borrows a set of concepts that have been made to fit a relatively exceptional occasion." Thus, "a Roman Catholic delivering a 'deconfessionalized' talk is [still] a Roman Catholic after all".[12]

The Indonesian socio-religious situation offers a comparable case study to test the applicability of 'deconfessionalization' theory across cultural and national boundaries. Post-colonial Indonesia is seen as comprising many powerful actors with different socio-religious backgrounds (e.g. Muslim, Christian, nationalist, secularist, modernist, orthodox). In fact, even those who belong to the same religious tradition often adhere to different religious precepts. "Together," he writes, "these people are facing the challenge of how to realize a national

Indonesian state in the modern sense".[13] It is in the effort to realize this goal, according to Van Nieuwenhuijze, that different actors who have come to play an important role in the process need to establish an understandable and acceptable common platform.

Islam, according to Van Nieuwenhuijze, is a dominant factor in the national revolution. And yet, he sees that the circumstances in which Islam has come to play a role in the process of nation building resembles the kind of deconfessionalization which developed in the Netherlands. Muslims, in their interaction with other actors, are prepared to disentangle "their formal, [and] strictly dogmatic" orientations. This is, his argument runs further, "to give them a more general appeal and, at the same time, to guarantee that Muslims will still recognize them for what they are."[14] In this case, deconfessionalization is a concept utilized to enhance the general acceptability of Muslim concepts to all parties involved "on the basis of common humane consideration."[15]

Van Nieuwenhuijze uses two cases to illustrate his theory. The first is the adoption of Pancasila as the state ideology. In his view — recognizing the bitter debates between "Muslim nationalists," on the one hand, and "religiously neutral" and Christian nationalists, on the other — the adoption of Pancasila, rather than Islam, did not necessarily represent a political defeat for the Muslims. Drawing upon a lengthy textual analysis of the contents of Pancasila, he believes that "[w]hat is relevant here is that each of these terms has connections with Islamic thought."[16] Their connections, though not necessarily formal ones, may be found in the principles of belief in One God, democracy, social justice, and humanism.[17] Thus, in his view, Pancasila contains a religious perspective —an important element which functions as a socio-political common ground for the Muslims to express their self-relation as they desire *vis-à-vis* the others.

Van Nieuwenhuijze's second case is the establishment of the Department of Religion. The idea is to provide an institutional assurance, particularly for the Indonesian Muslims, that the state would take religious interests seriously.[18] Within the context of Indonesia's modern national state, it turned out that such an institutional assurance has not been exclusively Islamic. This means that the political consequences of the creation of the Department of Religion have not

been directed at the implementation of Islamic ideals in their narrow or scripturalistic sense. And yet, it "succeeds in giving the Muslims the feelings of security they were most in need of".[19]

Perhaps, the underlying message of Van Nieuwenhuijze's theoretical approach to modern Indonesian political Islam is the need to present itself in its objective — as opposed to subjective, and thus less "scripturalistic" — form. In this context, the "deconfessionalization" theory should be seen as, in his own words, a "creative interpretation of Islamic principles, in such a way as to reestablish their relevance for twentieth-century life in Indonesia. ... It is, after all, a twentieth-century world, and, more important, a contemporary Indonesia, in which the Muslims live and want to live".[20]

2. Domestication of Islam

This theory has been very much associated with the works of Harry J. Benda on Islam in Indonesia.[21] It was built on an historical analysis of Islam in Java in the sixteenth through the eighteenth century, especially during the period of power struggles between the more devout Muslim rulers in the coastal principalities, represented by Demak, and the syncretic inland kingdom of Mataram. When the latter embraced Islam,[22] it "managed to subdue its rebellious coastal vassals, in the process destroying the most dynamic parts of the Islamic community in Java."[23]

The ravaging of the orthodox coastal principalities gave shape to the process of the domestication of Islam. And yet, by its very meaning — in the context of the power struggle between the orthodox and syncretic Muslims in Java — the domestication of Javanese Islam not only required the elimination of the coastal principalities, but also the slaughtering of the proselytizing *ulama* (Islamic religious leaders) within Mataram itself.[24]

In this power struggle, the Javanese aristocracy, representing the syncretic Mataramese state, was victorious. With the development of an alliance between Javanese aristocrats and Dutch colonial forces, the process of domestication developed to its fullest extent, signified by the extraction of the "political teeth" of Javanese Islam.

It is in the context of removing the "political teeth" of Islam that

we find the essence of Harry J. Benda's domestication theory. And for Benda, the subsequent development of Islam in post-colonial Indonesia seemed to indicate a considerable degree of continuity with the pre-colonial past. The stiff resistance of the secular, Java-centered intelligentsia to the idea of an Islamic state advocated by Muslims, the suppression of the Darul Islam movement, the dissolution of Masyumi, the solidification of the state ideology, Pancasila, and the return of the Javanese political dominance look like repetitions of the past. In a more elaborated manner, he writes:

> With the suppression of these revolts [the Darul Islam movement and regional PRRI-Permesta rebellions] and the return of Javanese control from 1958 on, the 'colonial deviation' in Indonesian history has apparently come to an end. You may recall that President Soekarno prohibited the *Masyumi* in 1960; you may now speculate whether in so doing he has in a way re-enacted the persecution of the Ulama by Mataram to which I referred to before. If you view Indonesian political developments in recent times from a 'Java-centric' viewpoint, it may to some extent appear to be a repetition of old themes. Java is seeking to reinstate its political, cultural, and ideological supremacy and to prevent any Indonesian *Dār al-Islām* from forming. Islam, or more specifically, *Masyumi's* kind of Islam, must in terms of a Java-centered nationalism thus be seen as an intrinsically alien, non-Javanese — indeed, even 'non-Indonesian' — influence. The official state ideology, the *Pantja Sila*, is Javanese, theistic, barely monotheistic, but certainly not Islamic.[25]

It is clear that one of the essential ingredients of Benda's domestication theory is the development of a power struggle between Islam and non-Islamic elements within Indonesian society. The latter had been exclusively identified by Benda as the Javanese element. Like that of the past, post-colonial Indonesia was characterized as a duplication of a battle field where the power struggle which redeveloped between Muslims and Javanese seemed to be in favor of the latter. This is signified by the latter's ability to conduct another effort to pull out the "political teeth" of Islam. If this is the case, then it may be argued that contemporary Indonesian Islam has been continuously domesticated.

3. Schismatic and Aliran Cluster

If Benda offered an analysis of Indonesian political Islam as a constant power struggle between Islam and Javanism, with the former being continuously domesticated, the schismatic and the *aliran* cluster theory —though indirectly— can be considered as an answer to the question as to why such a power struggle came into existence in the first place. Unquestionably, this theory has been the most influential instrument in explaining post-revolution Indonesian politics.[26] It originated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) anthropological research team that conducted ethnographic work in the early to mid-fifties in a small East Javanese town, given a pseudonymous name of Mojokuto.[27] Most specifically, however, this theory has been identified with the writings of Robert R. Jay[28] and Clifford Geertz.[29] The former emphasized the schismatic nature between Islam and Javanism, which subsequently went beyond the arena of religious confrontation into the realms of politics, culture, and social life. The latter developed the socio-religious schism into the socio-cultural and political cleavages of the *aliran*, a term meaning stream or current. It is important to note, however, that both tried to look at Indonesia from the microcosm of Mojokuto in a period in which the inter-party conflicts were particularly sharp.

The central concern of Robert Jay's studies was the issue of religious-leads-to-political schism which developed between *santri* (devout Muslim or Islamist) and *abangan* (less devout Muslim or Javanist) in rural Central Java. In an effort to explain the origins of such a religious schism, its subsequent extension beyond the religious arena, and the extent to which it had caused political confrontation within the Javanese community, he starts out by describing the nature of the process of Islamization in Indonesia in general, and in Java in particular. By way of historical research as well as extensive anthropological analysis and interpretation, he notices that at least two different patterns accompanied the process of Islamization in Java. Sharing the argument that the penetration of Islam in the island was marked by a great diversity, he argues that proselytization in the areas where the influence of Hindu-Buddhist religious values was minimum, if not entirely absent, has a tendency to convert the Javanese community

into orthodox Muslims (*santri*).[30] In these areas, as many have argued, the process of Islamization took the form of *penetration pacifique*.[31]

The second pattern of Islamization took a rather different nature. In the areas where the impact of Hindu-Buddhist civilization was profound,[32] the process of religious conversion was, for the most part, characterized by a contest of two great religious traditions. In this case, Islam —furnished with an exclusively monotheistic philosophy, i.e. the concept of *al-Tawḥīd* (Oneness of God)— encountered the complex beliefs of the Javanese community which were not easily reconcilable to Islamic teachings. As a result, instead of a complete conversion, what actually developed was some sort of religious effort to conquer and neutralize each other.[33] In the process of proselytization, the penetrative nature of Islam may have been able to eliminate "the more formal religious elements of the traditional position, including the major ritual forms of worship to the old Hindu-Javanese gods." In spite of this, however, "the ideological integrity of the traditional Javanese way was maintained."[34] The result was a transformation of the Javanese religious community into the fold of *abangan* or syncretic Muslims.

It has been widely noticed that the schismatic tendency of the two different values subsequently went beyond the religious sphere. Its extension reached the realms of politics, social structure and culture. In the realm of politics, it contributed to the development of political hostility between the northeastern coastal states under Demak and the inland syncretic state of Mataram. In fact, as Robert Jay points out, the political confrontation between these two Javanese states from the sixteenth century on was to a large extent caused by the widening schismatic religious tradition which evolved along the continuum of orthodoxy (*santri*) and syncretism (*abangan*). Throughout the entire process of confrontation, which eventually also created socio-cultural cleavages, symbols of orthodoxy remained to be used as "standards of battle against the traditional-oriented rulers of Central Java and the latter reacted with intermittent persecution of orthodoxy."[35] Describing, rather dramatically, the historical saga of a bitter political confrontation, which was finally won by syncretic Mataram, Robert Jay

records:

> This religious syncretism shocked the more faithful among the Is-
> lamic leaders and learned men. The coastal rulers in their struggle
> with Mataram invoked a religiously pure Islam as a rallying stan-
> dard, especially against Sultan Agung (1613-1646) and his succes-
> sors. Religious teachers travelled through villages in central Java
> preaching against the Sultan. The Mataram rulers in their turn in-
> voked the glory of Madjapahit and at various times persecuted, even
> slew wholesale, numbers of local orthodox Moslem teachers. The
> fight was long and bitter and reportedly reduced large areas of east
> Java to near depopulation.[36]

With such a schismatic theory in mind, Jay tried to explain the
course of political Islam in the context of modern Indonesian political
history. Like Benda, he argues that the development of modern politi-
cal movements was marked by two familiar cleavages. Organization-
ally and ideologically, the movements were very much centered around
the issues of orthodoxy versus syncretism. The confrontational pat-
tern which developed in the heyday of the archipelago's nationalist
movement (the split between orthodox and syncretic leaders in Sarekat
Islam (Islamic Association) or SI, the first mass-based nationalist or-
ganization, in the 1920s-1930s) and in the post-colonial period (the
ideological and constitutional debates which led to Muslim-secular
nationalist cleavages in the 1940s and again in the 1950s), to cite only
two cases, "showed remarkable endurance and stability." Furthermore,
such a "polarization of power between the secularists (and syncretists,
for the two orientations draw support from much the same social ele-
ments) and orthodox Moslems" was substantiated, among other things,
by the results of the 1955 general election. In this election, despite the
claim that the majority of the Indonesians are Muslims, four Islamic
political parties won only 43.5% of the votes.[37]

It is the constant polarization of power between orthodoxy and
syncretism, which led to the enduring nature of the socio-cultural and
political cleavages of the Javanese community, that inspired Clifford
Geertz to develop the concept of *aliran*. In "The Javanese Village,"
his first presentation of the concept of *aliran*, Geertz describes an
aliran, which literally means stream or current, as consisting "of a
political party surrounded by a set of voluntary social organizations

formally or informally linked to it. ... [it] is a cluster of nationally based organizations ... sharing a similar ideological direction or standpoint." In spite of the emphasis on the political party as the core element in the concept, it is important to note that "[a]n *aliran* is more than a mere political party, certainly more than a mere ideology; it is a comprehensive pattern of social integration," and yet it is intensified with more or less "opposition to one another."[38]

From such a conceptual description, it is safe to say that at least there are two major elements inherent in the concept of *aliran*. First, the importance of religio-cultural divisions within the tradition of Javanese community. Second, the way in which such divisions transform themselves rather nicely into a pattern of socio-political groupings.

Geertz's categorization of the Javanese community is slightly different from that of Jay who only sees it in a dichotomous perspective between *santri* and *abangan*. In his endeavor to "institute a search for order in a [religious and] sociological jumble," Geertz sorts out the Javanese community, extrapolated from its microcosm in Mojokuto, into three famous religio-cultural variants: *abangan*, *santri*, and *priyayi*. That is, "a syncretistic, an Islamic, and an Indic ethos and world view."[39] Elaborating the general differences between these three variants elsewhere he writes:

> *Abangan*, representing a stress on the animistic aspects of the overall Javanese syncretism and broadly related to the peasant element in the population; *santri*, representing a stress on the Islamic aspects of the syncretism and generally related to the trading element (and to certain elements in the peasantry as well); and *prijaji*, stressing the Hinduist aspects and related to the bureaucratic element...[40]

Many students of modern Indonesia disagree with the way in which the three variants were formulated. Putting aside the controversy around the more substantive elements of the conceptualization,[41] a number of criticisms have been directed against such religio-cultural divisions. While the *abangan-santri* is widely considered "a valid dichotomy based upon religious differentiation," it has not been the same with the *priyayi*.[42] The latter has been very much perceived as a status rather than religious category. Thus, a *priyayi* may either be a *santri* or an *abangan*.

The criticisms described above are well taken, as Geertz himself in discussing the transformation of such religious divisions into ideo-logical-political groupings stresses more heavily the division between *santri* and *abangan*. This quite obviously is carried out at the expense of the *priyayi* religion. The elimination of the *priyayi* variant in this regard is perhaps due to the fact that within these three variants clear cut religio-cultural distinctions are only to be found in the *santri* and *abangan* religious traditions. It develops rather markedly between those, as he describes elsewhere, "who take as their main pattern of way of life orientation, a set of beliefs, values and expressive symbols based primarily on Islamic doctrine" and those "who take the more Hinduistic (that is, Indian) element in Javanese tradition (along with pre-Islamic, pre-Hindu animistic elements), a pattern sometimes called 'Javanism' (*kedjawen*) because of its emphasis on supposedly indig-enous, pre-Islamic traditions."[43] And quite similarly, the basic ideo-logical-political division within those three variants occurs only be-tween the *abangan* and *santri* political orientations.

In this case, however, Geertz explains, "the process of political maneuver the *aliran* system set in motion soon aligned the *abangan* and the *priyayi* orientations into a unit as opposed to the *santri*." The process of political alignment between these two variants, for one thing, was encouraged by "the institution of mass politics and universal suf-frage [which] drove the *priyayi*s and the *abangan*s into one another's arms." It was also due to the perceived fact that both were "hostile to *santri* exclusivism."[44]

In the microcosmic world of Mojokuto, as Geertz describes, ac-cording to the *aliran* concept, the *santris* were inclined to direct their political orientations toward Islamic political parties, e.g. the Masyumi or the Nahdlatul Ulama, the two largest Islamic parties of the 1950s. On the other hand, the *abangan* and the *priyayi* were more apt to express their political associations with the "nationalist" (PNI, Indo-nesian Nationalist Party) or the communist (PKI, Indonesian Com-munist Party).

The significance of Geertz's *aliran* cluster theory is that it tries to sort out one of the most important sources of socio-political cleav-ages which developed in Indonesia's political realities. Seen from the context of the main theme examined in this study, that is the relation-

ship between Islam and politics, it is safe to say that the *aliran* theory seems to join the school that views Indonesian politics as an arena of political struggle between orthodoxy and syncretism.[45] It sorts out the pieces which composed the Javanese political community into "two logically distinct religio-ideological classes: Javanist (*priyayi-abangan*) and Islamic."[46]

4. Trichotomy Perspective

If the preceding paradigms seem to have been formulated on the interaction between Islam and the country's political realities, the "trichotomy perspective" was conceptualized primarily on the basis of how political Muslims responded to the challenges posed to them by the ruling elite.

Like the earlier theorists, proponents of this approach recognized the obsession of the Muslim political community with the idea of an Islamic state. They also realized the political antagonism between *santri* and *abangan*. In spite of this, they did not automatically assume that all political Muslims displayed a similar intensity with regard to their Islamic state agenda. Likewise, they did not accept the idea that the *santri* and *abangan* political variants held no room for compromises. In their view, the expression of political Islam was anything but homogeneous. Focusing on the diversity and complexity of Islamic politics, they found three different approaches — the fundamentalist, reformist, and accommodationist — to politics within the Muslim political community.

This theoretical stance is prevalent in the writings of Allan Samson[47] and others[48] who argued that Islamic parties suffered from internal political and ideological divisions. Analyzing the discourse of two major "modern" Indonesian Islamic political parties, Masyumi and its widely-claimed-successor Parmusi and the "traditionalist" Nahdlatul Ulama, particularly the way they have reacted to the hegemonic state under Soekarno's and Soeharto's leadership, Samson found no unified conception of politics, power, and ideology. In addition, they also had no common viewpoint concerning generally accepted political behavior and the strategy to carry out the politics of *perjuangan umat Islam* (the struggle of Islamic community).

According to Samson, the conceptualization of "the appropriate role of a religious party, the importance of ideology, and the mode of interaction between Islamic and non-Islamic groups" were central to the development of such internal religio-political divisions.[49] In this regard, he noticed the emergence of fundamentalist, reformist, and accommodationist orientations of the Muslim parties.[50] Describing the principal characterizations of the supporters of these three different approaches, he wrote:

> Fundamentalists affirm a strict, *puristic* interpretation of Islam, oppose secular thought and Western influence as well as the syncretism of traditionalist belief, and insist on the primacy of religion over politics. Reformists also theoretically stress the primacy of religion over politics, but they are far more willing than fundamentalists to cooperate with secular groups on a sustained basis. They are also concerned with making the faith relevant to the modern age. Accommodationists value the framework of unity provided by Islam, but maintain that social and economic interests should be given priority by Islamic organizations. They further stress the necessity of acknowledging the legitimate interests of secular groups and cooperating with them on a sustained basis.[51]

The traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama, though suffering severe internal personality differences among leaders, was generally determined to establish itself in the mainstream of political accommodation. Many of its political leaders were portrayed as "often easily accommodative to secular authority in exchange for noncritical political positions and control of the religious bureaucracy of the Ministry of Religion"[52] — a state institution which provided a source of political as well as financial patronage to many of its members. Because of this, Nahdlatul Ulama has often been accused of engaging in a politics of opportunism, furthered by its extreme eagerness to join any cabinet.[53]

With such a description in mind, it is safe to say that Samson's perspective seems to offer an empirically well-grounded interpretation of what constitutes Indonesian political Islam. The widely accepted depiction of Islamic politics as unequivocally hostile to the "religiously neutral" politics is undermined by this approach. Thus, while it may be true that fundamentalists construe legitimate political power as religiously sanctioned, the reformists and accommodationists

are unlikely to adhere to such a narrow notion of legitimacy. For them, so long as a secular power is not hostile to Islam, it will be recognized as legitimate.

Perceptions of other elements such as the conception of *perjuangan umat Islam* and ideology, which make up the body of Islamic politics, seem to fall in order. In line with the above conception of power, the ultimate goal of the fundamentalist political concept of the *perjuangan umat Islam* is undoubtedly the creation of an Islamic state. While for the reformists, the ultimate objective is to achieve a formal electoral victory for Islamic parties. With it, a window of opportunity to establish an Islamic society — and not necessarily an Islamic state — would be realized. Only the accommodationist faction was recognized as willing to tone down its ideological-political fervor in exchange for administrative and political guarantees.

According to Samson, the diversity of Islamic political responses also indicates the development of a bi-dimensional perception of ideology. In his view, there was a tendency within the Muslim political community to view ideology either as a unifying symbol or an imperative demand. For fundamentalists, concomitant to their conception of power and *perjuangan umat Islam*, the quest for an Islamic ideology was an imperative demand. Conversely, both reformists and accommodationists were willing to accept ideological compromise in exchange for political concessions. The political leadership of these factions was clearly more pragmatic: association with secular authorities was permissible so long as it benefitted groups they represented.

By advancing the concept of diversity among activists of political Islam, Samson suggests that attempts to adjust *santri* political aspirations to the country's political realities are real. Such political adjustment was only partially successful, however, because failure to reach political compromises and bargains only resulted in the swing of the political pendulum from flexibility to rigidity.

This was particularly the case with the reformist faction. On a number of occasions, their formal political agenda had been substantially obstructed and ignored. Unable to free themselves from the attacks of what Samson calls "external obstruction and internal frustration," they retreated to ideological postures, and became ideologically less flexible. The result was, among other things, an ideological alli-

ance between the fundamentalists and the reformists.

The significance of this tripartite thesis remains uncertain. The partial adjustment which had been encouraged by both the reformist and accommodationist factions will continue to be tested, particularly, by their ability to "face political problems in political terms." With it, so the argument goes, "political goals could then be brought more into line with realistic chances for their attainment, and Islam could provide broad moral guidance through the formulation of ethical principles which legitimize public policy."[54]

5. Cultural Islam Perspective

A final theory is the cultural Islamic perspective, which has been presented most vigorously by Donald K. Emmerson.[55] His analysis attempts to question the validity of a thesis that "Islam out of power must be incomplete," or that "Muslims who do not continually struggle to realize an Islamic state are untrue to Islam." In other words, his theory is an endeavor to reexamine the formal doctrinal linkages between Islam and politics and Islam and the state. Militant Muslims may adhere to the notion of inseparability between Islam and politics, believing in the incompleteness of Islam without power. "But," as Emmerson asks rhetorically, "should a scholar?"[56]

Put in its Indonesian historical and empirical perspectives, the formulation of this theory seems to be based upon the attempts of Muslims — after years of political defeat in at least five areas: constitutionally, physically, electorally, bureaucratically, and symbolically[57] — to "refocus their energies on living the nonpolitical side of their religion."[58] The reorientation of Muslim political energies to non-political activities, as this theory assumes, may represent a conscious scenario to "turn inward, away from political rivalry with outsiders and with each other, in order to raise the religious and social consciousness of their followers."[59] It is expected that Indonesian Islam, despite its political disappointment, may flourish culturally and spiritually.

Inherent in this approach is an assumption that by retreating to the cultural strength of Islam, by solidifying the religious piety of its followers in the broadest sense, and by reconsidering the role of Islam in the modern world, a more sympathetic and religiously substantive

Islam can be presented. In turn, it is expected to serve as an aid in overcoming the tumultuous years of political suspicion between Islam and the state. A future reentrance to politics, thus, may perhaps be "unburdened by obsolete beliefs and unrealistic expectations."[60]

Emmerson is inclined to see the discourse of Indonesian Islam throughout the eighties as asserting its cultural, if not entirely non-political, dimensions. The result of this cultural reassertion is "that cultural Islam in Indonesia is vigorously alive and well."[61] In his view, "[t]he regime has nothing against piety." In fact, "[r]eligious faith is, on the contrary, essential to the maintenance of the New Order's anti-communist self-definition." Considering this perspective, the preponderant weight of cultural Islam influences the regime to offer concessions to the Muslims.

In fact, the socio-political mixture between the state's determination to suppress the political wing of Islam, to 'Indonesianize' Islam, and its unwillingness to challenge Islam on spiritual grounds on the one hand, and the socio-psychologically penetrative nature of cultural Islam on the other, has brought about significant changes. It certainly has had an impact — though its precise degree is not yet clear — on the state, bringing about a reexamination of its general perception towards Islam. More importantly, it also has encouraged the state — perhaps out of political necessity — to respond more sympathetically to the political aspirations of the Muslim community.[62] Accordingly, closing his final argument, Emmerson asserts that "the more vigorous and influential cultural Islam becomes, the more seriously observers of Indonesia may wish to consider the question: Who *is* co-opting whom?"[63]

The Urgency of Theoretical Remapping: Bringing Political Islam Back In

Appraising the significance of the theoretical perspectives described above, two basic questions must be asked and answered. First, how useful are they to understanding the nature of the political relationship between Islam and the state? Second, recognizing the primary focus of this study, how useful are they in explaining contemporary Muslim intellectuals' religious and political orientation? In so doing, their validity and reliability across time, under considerably

different socio-economic and political circumstances, can be meaningfully assessed.

Each of five dominant approaches has its own theoretical underpinnings. It is clear from the beginning that the 'deconfessionalization' perspective offered a constructive explanation of the antagonistic political relationship between Islam and the state. Benda's work analyzed the implications of political antagonism (i.e. the domestication of Islam), and both Jay and Geertz a advanced theoretical framework to relate the religio-cultural roots of antagonism to the patterns of cleavage in Indonesian politics. Samson tried to elaborate conceptually the diversity of political behavior of the Muslims, both from the modernist and traditionalist camps, which developed in the seventies. And Emmerson attempted to offer a novel theoretical explanation of Indonesian Islam's cultural strength.

Despite these differences it is rather astonishing to see that virtually all approaches, perhaps with the exception of the cultural Islam perspective, tend to operate under the assumption that the relationship between Islam and politics is organic or inseparable. This is a concept which tends to equate the former with the latter. Their relationship is structurally bound by Islam's formal religious system.[64]

Perhaps, this assumption evolved because of two historical factors. First, the outlook of Indonesian political Muslims themselves, who often displayed their ideological fervor, seem to confirm the inseparability of Islam and politics. Second, the intellectual antecedents in understanding the relationship between Islam and politics as conceptualized by most theorists in the field of Islamic political thought stresses the same inseparable link between Islam and politics.[65] The combination of these two factors certainly strengthened their organic view concerning the relationship between Islam and politics.

Under this assumption Islam and politics are perceived as formally linked to one another. This perceived inextricable relationship between Islam and politics is to be understood not so much in its ethical or moral sense, but more in its scripturalistic meaning. Because of this, Islamic political symbolism (i.e. Islamic ideology, Islamic political parties, and other formal elements which make up the body of political Islam) become important. And other political characteristics, which have no formal bearing on Islam, come to be con-

strued as non-Islamic. Similarly, different forms of political expression, even if principally of the same substance, will be understood as non-Islamic (or at best "religiously neutral") political aspirations. Accordingly, should political differences or conflicts between these two broad parties occur, a clear dichotomy seems to emerge (i.e. the *santri* versus *abangan* politics along with their socio-cultural, religious, and political ramifications).

Nieuwenhuijze's 'deconfessionalization,' Benda's domestication, Jay and Geertz's *santri-abangan* dichotomy are conceptual consequences which derive exclusively from the inclination to perceive Islam as organically linked to politics. Their most basic assumptions have led them to see Indonesian Islamic political realities in static and dichotomous frameworks rather than as dynamic and evolving.

This conceptual framework limits their ability to explain contemporary developments in Indonesian political Islam. It may be the case that at one time they functioned as powerful theoretical devices to understand the nature of the subject, especially during the first twenty years of post-colonial Indonesia where political conflicts among the existing political parties were particularly sharp. But they tend to freeze political Islam and are unable to accommodate changes in the nature of Islam-state relations.

The map of today's Indonesian political Islam is significantly different from that of several decades ago.[66] While it may be true that certain remnants of the earlier political characterization have not entirely faded away, it appears rather vividly however that the very bases — socially, culturally, economically, and politically — of its players as well as supporters are significantly different.[67] The changing nature of the bases of support for contemporary Indonesian Islam has served as one of the primary causes of the emergence of a novel perception in which political Islam no longer has to be conceived in a formalistic/legalistic and scripturalistic way. Many of its actors have come to envision politics more as a mundane, secular affair, rather than as an extension of the sacred religion. It operates not necessarily on the basis of a dry, fixed pattern of religious scriptures, but on moral and ethical standards such as justice, equality, and freedom, which are essential to Islamic precepts.

Another striking point which characterizes the above theories is

that political Islam is perceived more as a body politic, rather than a set of values. It is envisaged especially in organizational and institutional terms. In this case, political Islam is simply identified with Islamic political organizations. More precisely it is equated with the structures, activities, and goals of the country's Islamic political parties, beginning with the four Islamic parties of the 1950s: Masyumi, Nahdlatul Ulama, Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, Persatuan Tarbiyah Islam.

While it is true that one of the most conspicuous elements of political Islam is found in its political parties, it is nonetheless an error to single them out as its unique expression or identification. If the meaning of political Islam is confined to the parties, how can the persistent campaign of Nurcholish Madjid's *Islam Yes, Partai Islam No*, the political significance of the Muhammadiyah organization's commitment to maintain its socio-religious and educational function, the bandwagon effect of the Muslim politicians in joining Golkar, and the growing belief among the Muslim community in Golkar's viability to aggregate and articulate Islamic political aspirations be explained? Are these non-Islamic political discourse?

Aside from such complex problems, the identification of political Islam with Islamic political parties, by implication, has caused further theoretical confusion. It exacerbates the dichotomous view of Indonesian political community. Time and time again it is identified as the Islamic versus the non-Islamic or "religiously neutral" political community. More commonly, the former is known as the *umat Islam* (Islamic community), whereas the latter is outside Islam. And it is an irony that advocating the notion of community of believers is based not on religious faith, but merely on political affiliation.

In this case, the concept of *umat Islam* has been actually distorted. Originally, the concept of *umat Islam* is a religious one. In this instance, religious affiliation is the only determinant variable. Being highly politicized, however — as the consequence of identifying political Islam with Islamic political parties — political affiliation serves as the sole criteria to determine whether or not someone belongs to the fold of the *umat Islam*. Therefore, it was then common to regard those who associated with Islamic socio-political organizations as members of the *umat Islam*, whereas the larger group of Muslim bureaucrats,

ministers, and other state functionaries, because of their affiliation with non-Islamic parties were seen as non-*umat*. The Indonesian Muslim community, based on different political affiliations, was divided into "them" (non-*umat* or "religiously neutral") and "us" (members of the *umat*).[68]

It was only during the last ten years that — thanks to the changing nature of the social bases of the contemporary players and supporters of political Islam — the concept of *umat Islam* began to recover its original religious boundaries. It covers virtually all parties concerned simply by virtue of their adherence to Islam. With the changing nature of the concept of *umat Islam*, which is no longer exclusively based on political affiliation, it is safe to say that not only is such an identification religiously incorrect, but it is also inimical to understanding contemporary Indonesian Islam.

The propensity to identify political Islam with Islamic socio-political organizations has led to further deception. For example, it is very likely that these propensities were used incorrectly to explain the New Order's earlier political maneuvering in creating a strong and stable (but undoubtedly hegemonic) state, committed to economic development. These maneuvers, widely known as depoliticization, were carried out both at the institutional-organizational and individual levels. In the late 1960s, soon after its ascendancy to power, the New Order leadership began to emasculate the political parties. Supported by a number of intellectuals,[69] it led to forced party restructuring in the early 1970s —a period in which the New Order government enjoyed its very first electoral victory in 1971. Four existing Islamic political parties were forced to merge into a new Unity Development Party (PPP) —an Islamic party which was compelled to eliminate its Islamic ideology and symbols in the mid 1980s.

A similar fate was also encountered by two Christian and three "nationalist" political parties which were merged into a new Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). In the mid 1980s, the process of depoliticization reached its peak with the passing of a government bill requiring all socio-political organizations to accept the state ideology as their sole basis (*asas tunggal*) —a bitter pill for many Muslims and Christians to accept.[70] These were among the many political projects — often executed quite blatantly in a coercive or co-optative

atmosphere — to ensure the process of depoliticization.[71]

Undoubtedly, such maneuvers affected the Islamic political parties. Because of the perceived identification of Islamic political parties as representing political Islam, government projects were regarded as evidence that the state is committed to depoliticize Islam.[72] It would be more precise to interpret these government actions as dethroning Islamic political parties or departyzation of Islam. Thus, it does not necessarily mean depoliticizing Islam. In fact, "politicized" Islam, in its new version and appropriate parameters, began to emerge aiming at influencing policy decision making from the inside and outside the bureaucracy, and changing the religio-political outlook of the state apparatus. As in Harold Lasswell's classical work, politics is a matter not just of parties but more broadly of "who gets what, when, how."[73]

In line with this perspective, Emmerson's cultural Islam perspective also misses the political substance of Islam in Indonesia.[74] While it may capture quite correctly the cultural approach of contemporary Indonesian Islam, it fails to explain the political nuances of its actors who aspire to more substantive articulations of Islamic political idealism and activism. In such a context the shift to cultural Islam is a matter of tactics. The underlying fabric of the approach remains essentially political, but its tactics call for an introduction of Islamic values through current political and bureaucratic structures rather than a replacement of those structures with visibly Islamic ones.

Contemporary Indonesian Islam must be seen from a different perspective. In essence, while not necessarily representing a totally novel approach, but a hybrid or symbiotic one, the perspective must combine some elements of "deconfessionalization," cultural perspective, and the diversity of what constitutes political Islam. At the same time, however, the underlying assumption of the organic character of the Islam-politics (or state) relationship as well as the association of political Islam with Islamic political parties must be rejected. Within such a perspective the notion of political community is not defined on a religious basis but a political one. Thus, at a certain stage in the life of Islamic political parties, the differences between the "traditionalist" Nahdlatul Ulama and the "modernist" Masyumi were based on political factors rather than religious ones. This was particularly true with regard to the former's ability to compromise as opposed to the

latter's. Only by so doing can a theory explain Indonesian Islamic political phenomena in political terms.

How then is contemporary Indonesian political Islam, especially with respect to its relationship with the state, to be explained? Contemporary Indonesian political Islam is attempting, though still in its infancy, to reassert itself more substantively in the discourse of national politics, which is the difficult task that the new generation of Muslim thinkers and activists are now undertaking.[75] In this case, Islam does not necessarily have to divest itself of its political outlook, or replace it with a cultural approach. While there are tremendous efforts to reemphasize the cultural dimension of Islam, by implication this ultimate goal reaffirms its political dimension. The political reentrance of Islam is rendered with new vision and substance, as well as with different tactics and strategy. These new approaches will basically include the changing concept of what constitutes political Islam (what are its appropriate parameters in the Indonesian context) and its position vis-a-vis Islamic political parties on the one hand, and the state on the other. It is through such an approach that the place of political Islam within the country's national politics can be best understood.

The Nahdlatul Ulama's withdrawal from the PPP in the late 1980s is one of the most interesting cases to be examined in terms of this new understanding.[76] Its decision to return to its original platform (*khittah*) of 1926, the year when the organization was formed in Surabaya, in a sense is a political withdrawal. But this is only true in a partisan politics sense (i.e. from PPP). It is not intended to abandon its political outlook and replace it with a cultural one. Thus, measured against its swift move during the last ten years or so to become one of the most significant components of civil society, its maneuver remains essentially political.

Essentially, it is the format of political Islam (which constitutes the theological underpinning, goals, and approaches of political Islam) which is actually being transformed. Therefore, any theoretical viewpoints which try to interpret the changing nature of Indonesian Islam from political to essentially cultural, or those which attempt to place it within the schismatic theory of *santri* versus *abangan* are incapable of explaining contemporary Indonesian political Islam which

is currently shaped by a new generation of Muslim thinkers and activists.

In short, the political Islam which is now asserting itself in contemporary Indonesian politics is changing its format (from legalist/formalist to substantialist), which will make it more acceptable in the country's national politics. One of the most appropriate ways is to present political Islam not in what Nieuwenhuijze has called "deconfessionalized" manner, but more in an objective, substantive fashion. That is the kind of political Islam which is capable of transcending its formalistic, legalistic, and exclusive interests for the more substantive, integrative, and inclusive ones. To the extent that politics — democratic and bureaucratic — allow for the articulation of individual and group values, the new political Islam has focused on the substance of its own values, in policies and practice, and while not outwardly rejecting more legalist forms has come to see them as much less significant.

The birth of 42 Islamic political parties following the resignation of President Soeharto in 1998 seemed to indicate the continuity of political Islam with the past —its formalist and legalist character. But, the electoral defeats of Islamic political parties in the 1999 and 2004 general elections only strengthened the thought that political Islam has substantially changed. The phenomenal success of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Justice and Prosperous Party) in increasing the number of their seats in parliament, from 7 (1999-2004) to 45 (2004-2009), which was largely attributable to their objective articulations of politics, also suggested the changing market of political Islam. And the ascension of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to the presidency in 2004 —through the country's first direct and democratic presidential election— only sealed the fate of the traditional expression of political Islam.

Notes

[1] See, Don K. Emmerson, "Islam in Modern Indonesia: Political Impasse, Cultural Opportunity," in Philip H. Stoddard, David C. Cuthell, and Mar-

garet W. Sullivan (eds.), *Change in the Muslim World*, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981).

[2]See his "Islam and Regime in Indonesia: Who's Coopting Whom?, paper delivered at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, 31 August 1989 in Atlanta, Georgia, USA.

[3]These general attributes are reiterated once again by, among others, John L. Esposito in his *What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 17-21.

[4] See, among others, Donald Eugene Smith, *Religion and Political Modernization*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974; Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

[5] For the earliest encounters of Islam with politics, see Theodore G. Th. Pigeaud, *Islamic States in Java 1500-1700* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976); Robert Jay, "Santri and Abangan: Religious Schism in Rural Central Java," Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1957. For discussion of Islam and politics during the Dutch colonial period and the Japanese interregnum, see Harry J. Benda's *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945*, The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1958; Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942*, (Oxford, New York and Jakarta: Oxford University Press, 1978); Alfian, *Muhammadiyah: The Political Behavior of A Muslim Modernist Organization Under Dutch Colonialism*, (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1989); H.A. Suminto, *Politik Islam Hindia Belanda* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982). For contemporary discussion, see Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional 1945-1965* (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1987); B.J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971); Muhammad Kamal Hassan, *Muslim Intellectual Responses to "New Order" Modernization in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia, 1982); Allan A. Samson, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1972; Ahmad Syafii Maarif, "Islam as the Basis of State: A Study of the Islamic Political Ideas as Reflected in the Constituent Assembly Debates," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1982.

[6] See, "The Indonesian State and 'Deconfessionalized' Muslim Concepts," C.A.O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia*, The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1958, pp. 180-243; and "Islam and National Self-Realization in Indonesia," C.A.O. Van

Nieuwenhuijze, *Cross-Cultural Studies*, The Hague: Monton and Co., 1963, pp. 136-156.

[7] The terminology is taken from Clifford Geertz's "From the Native's Point of View: On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding," *Bulletin of the Academy of Arts and Sciences*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1974, pp. 26-45.

[8] Being a nation which is divided into a number of religious and class cleavages (*zuilen*), the Netherlands has developed a viable concept of political accommodationism as the basis of its consociational democratic tradition. A fuller account on this issue is found in Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968). See also his *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977).

[9] C.A.O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, "The Indonesian State and 'Deconfessionalized' Muslim Concepts," p. 180.

[10] C.A.O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, "Islam and National Self-Realization in Indonesia," p. 152.

[11] C.A.O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, "The Indonesian State and 'Deconfessionalized' Muslim Concepts," p. 180.

[12] C.A.O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, "The Indonesian State and 'Deconfessionalized' Muslim State," p. 181.

[13] C.A.O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, "The Indonesian State and 'Deconfessionalized' Muslim Concepts," p. 182.

[14] C.A.O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, "Islam and National Self-Realization in Indonesia," p. 152.

[15] C.A.O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, "Islam and National Self-Realization in Indonesia," p. 152.

[16] C.A.O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, "Islam and National Self-Realization in Indonesia," p. 153.

[17] C.A.O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, "The Indonesian State and 'Deconfessionalized' Muslim Concepts," pp. 185-217.

[18] Being an independent national state where the majority of its populations are Muslims, it would have put the government in a very odd position not to form one. Especially after recognizing the fact that both the Dutch and Japanese colonial administrations, for the purpose of keeping in touch with the Islamic community, established the so-called Indigenous Affairs Office and Office for Religion to administer their affairs. The issue is dis-

cussed at length in Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun*.

[19] Nieuwenhuijze, "Islam and National Self-Realization in Indonesia," p. 155.

[20] Nieuwenhuijze, "Islam and National Self-Realization in Indonesia," p. 155.

[21] His *magnum opus* is *The Crescent and the Rising Sun*, an excellent work on Islam in Indonesia during the Dutch colonial period and the Japanese interregnum. The domestication theory is discussed in his "Continuity and Change in Indonesian Islam," *Asian and African Studies: Annual of the Israel Oriental Society*, Vol. 1, 1965, pp. 123-138.

[22] A number of scholars, including Benda, have observed that "Mataramese Islam was an Islam with a difference; it constituted a syncretic absorption of certain aspects of Islam into the Hindu-Javanese 'establishment'." See Harry J. Benda's "Continuity and Change in Indonesian Islam," p. 130. In a similar vein Robert R. Jay writes: The "accommodation to Islam was reduced to certain formal observances, and although the state remained formally Islamic and no reinstatement of Hindu or Buddhist religious offices occurred, ... [t]he early rulers of Mataram seem deliberately to have set about restoring numerous religious and political elements from the [Hinduized] Madjapahit period." See his "History and Personal Experience: Religious and Political Conflict in Java," Robert F. Spencer (ed.), *Religion and Change in Contemporary Asia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), p. 147.

[23] Harry J. Benda, "Continuity and Change in Indonesian Islam," p. 130.

[24] Harry J. Benda, "Continuity and Change in Indonesian Islam," p. 130.

[25] Harry J. Benda, "Continuity and Change in Indonesian Islam," p. 133.

[26] Many works on post-independent Indonesia have been influenced by this theory. These include James L. Peacock, *Rites of Modernization: Symbolic and Social Aspects of Indonesian Proletarian Drama*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968; R. William Liddle's *Ethnicity, Party, and National Integration: An Indonesian Case Study* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970); Donald K. Emmerson's *Indonesia's Elite: Political Culture and Cultural Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976); Rex Mortimer's *Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974).

[27] Other fellow members of the team include: Alice Dewey, Donald Fagg, Rufus Hendon, Jane Hendon, Hildred Geertz, Edward Ryan, Anola Ryan, and Anne Jay. Compiled from Clifford Geertz, *Religion of Java* (Chicago

and London: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. ix; See also Robert R. Jay's *Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java*.

[28] See Robert Jay, "Santri and Abangan: Religious Schism in Rural Central Java," Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1957; *Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java* (New Haven: Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1963); and "History and Personal Experience: Religious and Political Conflict in Java," Robert F. Spencer (ed.), *Religion and Change in Contemporary Asia*, pp. 143-164.

[29] The first discussion of the *aliran* concept appeared in his "The Javanese Village," G. William Skinner (ed.), *Local, Ethnic, and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, Cornell University, 1959), pp. 34-41. Further utilization of the concept is prevalent in his *The Social History of an Indonesian Town* (Cambridge: MIT, 1965).

[30] These include the areas of north Javanese coastal towns of Ngampel (Surabaya), Bonang, Gresik, Demak, Tuban, Jepara, and Cirebon. See Robert Jay's *Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java*, p. 6. In the western part of Java, it includes the area of Banten. See Harry J. Benda's *The Crescent and the Rising Sun*, p. 12.

[31] See T.W. Arnold's "The Spread of Islam in the Malay Archipelago," T.W. Arnold (ed.), *The Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Faith* (New York: AMS Press, 1974).

[32] Included in these areas were the surrounding localities of the kingdom of Majapahit (e.g. Kediri, Malang) and Mataram (near the present-day city of Yogyakarta). Robert Jay, *Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java*, pp. 6-10.

[33] Robert Jay, *Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java*, p. 101.

[34] Robert Jay, *Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java*, p. 101.

[35] Robert Jay, *Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java*, p. 102.

[36] Robert Jay, *Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java*, p. 10.

[37] Reports on the 1955 elections are in Herbert Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955* (Ithaca: Modern Indonesian Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1957).

[38] Clifford Geertz, "The Javanese Village," p. 37.

[39] Clifford Geertz, *The Social History of an Indonesian Town*, p. 125.

[40] Clifford Geertz, *Religion of Java* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 6.

[41] The more substantive debates with regard to the way Geertz conceptual-

izes the *santri* and *abangan* variants, see Mitsuo Nakamura, *The Crescent Arises Over the Banyan Tree: A Study of the Muhammadiyah Movement in a Central Javanese Town* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1983); Robert W. Hefner, "Islamizing Java? Religion and Politics in Rural East Java," *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 3, August 1987, pp. 533-554; Zamakhsyari Dhofier, "Santri-Abangan dalam Kehidupan Orang Jawa: Teropong dari Pesantren," *Prisma*, 7, No. 5, 1978, pp. 48-63; Mark R. Woodward, *Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta*, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1989.

[42] See Harsya W. Bachtiar, "The Religion of Java: A Commentary," *Madjalah Ilmu-Ilmu Sastra Indonesia*, Vol. 5, 1973, pp. 85-115; Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942* (Oxford, New York, Jakarta: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 19, n. 33. In my view, if the *priyayi* religion does exist, what Geertz needs is to find a proper term which denotes the meaning of what he has described as emphasizing "the Hinduist aspects" or the "Indic ethos and world view."

[43] Clifford Geertz, "The Social Context of Economic Change: An Indonesian Case Study," a mimeo (Cambridge: Center for International Studies, MIT, 1956), p. 140. Cited from R. William Liddle, *Cultural and Class Politics in New Order Indonesia*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1977, p. 2.

[44] Clifford Geertz, *The Social History of an Indonesian Town*, p. 128.

[45] This should not be construed as irreconcilable. In fact, Geertz assumed reconcilability. However, under what kind of political arrangement such a reconcilability between these two different *aliran* may develop is less certain. Geertz's emphasis on the "benevolent guidance" of President Soekarno, with his conception of National Council "within which all interests would be reconciled, or his image of a stable cabinet" consisting of Nationalist, Communist, and Islamic elements seems to suggest the viability of a "guided" political system. See his "The Javanese Village," pp. 40-41. Others, however, viewed otherwise. "The normative model which it presupposes," as Liddle suggested, "is some form of pluralist democracy in which *aliran* leaders resolve conflict through bargaining and compromise." See his *Cultural and Class Politics in New Order Indonesia*, p. 4.

[46] Clifford Geertz, *The Social History of an Indonesian Town*, p. 129.

[47] See, Allan Samson, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia." See also his "Religious Belief and Political Action In Indonesian Islamic Modernism," R. William Liddle (ed.), *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia* (New

Haven: Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1973), pp. 116-142. For a more direct application of this approach, see his "Conceptions of Politics, Power, and Ideology in Contemporary Indonesian Islam," Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye (eds.), *Political Power and Communication in Indonesia* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 196-226.

[48] They include B.J. Boland's *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, Muhammad Kamal Hassan's *Muslim Intellectual Responses to "New Order" Modernization in Indonesia*, and Howard M. Federspiel's "Sukarno and His Muslim Apologists: A Study of Accommodation Between Traditional Islam and An Ultranationalist Ideology," Donald P. Little (ed.), *Essays on Islamic Civilization: Presented to Niyazi Berkes* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), pp. 89-102. See also his "The Military and Islam in Sukarno's Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs*, 46, No. 3, 1973, pp. 407-420.

[49] Allan Samson, "Conceptions of Politics, Power, and Ideology in Contemporary Indonesian Islam," p. 199.

[50] The fact that Indonesian Muslims have suffered from internal divisions is also stressed by Muhammad Kamal Hassan. In his study of Muslim intellectual responses to Indonesia's New Order modernization programs, he identifies the emergence of four different factions within the Muslim community —ideologist, idealist, accommodationist, and reformist. A closer look at the basic characteristics of these groups will eventually assure us that there are no fundamental differences with that of Samson. Hassan's description of the ideologist-idealist faction basically resembles Samson's fundamentalist. In any case, this categorization strengthens the argument that a unified conceptions of politics, power, ideology, or the appropriate responses to the "secular" challenges was actually absent in the Muslim parties.

[51] Allan Samson, "Conceptions of Politics, Power, and Ideology in Contemporary Indonesian Islam," pp. 199-200.

[52] Allan A. Samson, "Conceptions of Politics, Power, and Ideology in Contemporary Indonesian Islam," p. 200.

[53] More sympathetic, and thus less critical, remarks on the course of the Nahdlatul Ulama's accommodative stance, particularly during the Soekarno period, is Howard Federspiel's "Sukarno and His Muslim Apologists," Donald P. Little (ed.), *Essays on Islamic Civilization*, pp. 89-102.

[54] Allan A. Samson, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia," p. 400.

[55] See his "Islam in Modern Indonesia: Political Impasse, Cultural Oppor-

tunity," Philip H. Stoddard, David C. Cuthell, and Margaret W. Sullivan (eds.), *Change and the Muslim World* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), pp. 159-168. Further elaboration on such approach is in his "Islam and Regime in Indonesia: Who's Coopting Whom?," paper delivered at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, Atlanta, Georgia, USA, 31 August 1989.

[56] Quotations are from his "Islam and Regime in Indonesia," p. 3.

[57] Donald K. Emmerson, "Islam and Regime in Indonesia," pp. 4-15.

[58] Donald K. Emmerson, "Islam and Regime in Indonesia," p. 20.

[59] Donald K. Emmerson, "Islam in Modern Indonesia," p. 160.

[60] Donald K. Emmerson, "Islam in Modern Indonesia," p. 168.

[61] Donald K. Emmerson, "Islam and Regime in Indonesia," p. 16.

[62] A similar observation has been made by, among other, R. William Liddle. See his "Indonesia's Threefold Crisis," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 3, No. 4, October 1992, pp. 61-63.

[63] Donald K. Emmerson, "Islam and Regime in Indonesia," pp. 20.

[64] For a fuller account of the organic theory, see Donald Eugene Smith, "Religion and Political Modernization: Comparative Perspective," *Religion and Political Modernization*, pp. 3-28.

[65] In this case I refer especially to Geertz's and Samson's position. For a further account, see Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968). See also, Allan Samson, "Conceptions of Politics, Power, and Ideology in Contemporary Indonesian Islam."

[66] For a useful account on the changes of the geo-political map of the Indonesian Islam, see a collection of articles in *Prisma*, No. 5, 1988.

[67] On the emergence of new social basis, see M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Basis Sosial Pemikiran Islam di Indonesia Sejak Orde Baru," *Prisma*, No. 3, Tahun XX, Maret, 1991, pp. 3-15.

[68] This problem is also discussed in Ben Anderson's "Religion and Politics in Indonesia Since Independence," *Religion and Social Ethos in Indonesia* (Clayton: Monash University, 1977), pp. 21-32.

[69] The involvement of certain intellectuals in this drive was described by R. William Liddle. See his "Modernizing Indonesian Politics," R. William Liddle (ed.), *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia* (New Haven: Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1973), pp. 177-206.

[70] In fact Christian socio-organizations were the last ones to accept Pancasila as the *Asas Tunggal*.

[71] On the effectiveness of these measures to create a strong and stable state, see R. William Liddle, "Soeharto's Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 1, Spring 1985, pp. 68-90. See also his, "Indonesia in 1987: The New Order at the Height of Its Power," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1988, pp. 180-191.

[72] The notion of depoliticization of Islam is shared by some Indonesian Muslims, such as Deliar Noer. See, for instance, his "Contemporary Political Dimension of Islam," M.B. Hooker (ed.), *Islam in Southeast Asia*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1983, pp. 183-238; "Islam dan Politik: Mayoritas atau Minoritas," *Prisma*, No. 5, Tahun XVII, 1988, pp. 3-21; *Islam, Pancasila, dan Asas Tunggal* (Jakarta: Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1984); *Ideologi, Politik dan Pembangunan* (Jakarta: Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1983).

[73] Harold D. Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936).

[74] This cultural Islam perspective is also shared by some Indonesian analysts. See for instance, Sudirman Tebba's "Islam di Indonesia: Dari Minoritas Politik Menuju Mayoritas Budaya," *Jurnal Ilmu Politik*, No. 4, 1989, pp. 53-65.

[75] For a fuller account of their socio-religious and political idealism and activism, see M. Rusli Karim, *Dinamika Islam di Indonesia: Suatu Tinjauan Sosial Politik* (Yogyakarta: PT. Hanindita); Fachry Ali and Bahtiar Effendy, *Merambah Jalan Baru Islam: Rekonstruksi Pemikiran Islam Masa Order Baru* (Bandung: Mizan, 1986); Howard M. Federspiel, *Muslim Intellectuals and National Development in Indonesia* (New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 1991).

[76] See Bahtiar Effendy, "The 'Nine Stars' and Politics: A Study of the Nahdlatul Ulama's Acceptance of Asas Tunggal and Its Withdrawal From Politics," M.A. Thesis, Ohio University, 1988.

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From *Aliran* to Liberal Islam: Remapping Indonesian Islam

M.Bambang Pranowo

When Clifford Geertz's monumental work, *The Religion of Java,* created the categories of *santri, abangan* and *priyayi* to dissect the social and cultural fabric of the Javanese people –later to be known as the *aliran* approach– unbeknown to Geertz, he had defined a generalist's view. The reality is however, that the Javanese people are very complex, moving with the times. The relationship between those defined as *santri* and those defined as *abangan* has experienced a large degree of variation over time. There was a time when Islam functioned as the one strong force to unite people of different ideologies and became the identity of all the Javanese people. This event is recorded, for example, during the period of the Javanese War under

the leadership of Prince Diponegoro (1825-1830) and during the first movement of Sarekat Islam (SI).

Conversely, the events of 30 September 1965, which are thought to have been orchestrated by the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), the bloodshed that ensued, and the emergence of social politics within the New Order have been explained by observers as the result of the opposition between *santri* and *abangan.*[1]

It is obvious that the immense social changes which occurred throughout each regime change - Old Order to New Order and New Order to the Reform era - heavily influenced the religious lives of the Javanese people. Because of this, the *aliran* approach needs to be reviewed critically, with an ongoing assessment of the dynamic social paradigm of the time. To quote A.H. Johns,[2] the events of G-30-S of 1965 were "a watershed in modern Indonesian history".

Considering Prof. Merle C. Ricklefs' view[3] that the events of 1965 coincided with the "significant turning away from Islam to other religions" and Geertz's comments[4] that "many of the sort of people the Javanese call *abangan...* were unwilling even to be formally re-garded as Muslim..." The statement that the *abangan* used the G-30-S to raise a sense of antipathy towards Islam by the *abangan,* is far from reality.

For example, in the shadow of Mount Merapi and Mount Merbabu in Central Java, lie many villages, which until 1965 were scarce of mosques and a stronghold of *non-santri* parties such as PKI and PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party). These same villages now each have a mosque. The reason why the fundamentals of Islam were not prac-ticed in the past within these villages is more the logical result of a lack of Islamic institutions such as mosques rather than an inherent identification of the villagers with the *abangan* way of life.

In the past, such Islamic institutions were created and maintained only in those villages populated by *santri* who from a political per-spective were supporters of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) or Majlis Syura Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi). Together, these parties held contrast-ing political views to those of PKI and PNI. The fierce political ten-sion between NU and Masyumi on the one hand and PKI and PNI on the other posed a severe obstacle to the development of Islam in these villages.

The *aliran* approach is also not applicable in its portrayal of the conflict between *santri* and *priyayi.* Is not the current King of Yogyakarta, Sultan Hamengku Buwono X, himself a *priyayi,* and also a Haji active in many religious activities? It is in the era of Sultan Hamengku Buwono X that recitation of the Quran *en masse* became a tradition and part of the formal ceremonies in remembrance of the Yogyakarta Palace's anniversary.

The *santri* feature of the Yogyakarta palace even become more complete when Sri Paku Alam VIII - the second most important person in the region - completed the Haji pilgrimage with almost all the members of his family in 1998. In the meantime, the King of Surakarta, Sri Mangkunegoro VIII, has been formally noted as a member of Muhammadiyah, a modernist Islamic organization. This phenomenon is easily understood when we step back and consider that these people are actually Muslims, and not part of a group of people in conflict with *santri,* given these gentlemen are categorized as *priyayi* in Geertz's terminology.

Apparently, the broad brush of the *aliran* approach is still being applied by a select group of a few observers and political party representatives when viewing the phenomenon of today's culture, in particular the lead-up to the 2004 election. This time, the generalization is being applied with the formation of groups: New Order –Reform Order –*santri* parties– *abangan* parties, and even more simplistically; nationalistic forces versus religious forces.

Such a generalization is no longer applicable though, if it ever was. The map has changed. *Santri*-ness is not owned by Islamic political parties only. Likewise, nationalism is not the monopoly of certain parties. The information era brought about by technologies such as the proliferation of the internet have played and continue to play an important role in changing the definition of *santri* and *abangan.* In other words, in the midst of increasing globalisation, the interpretation of Islam in Indonesia needs to be remapped.

As stated by Lester Kurt[5] "The deep and radical changes associated with the globalisation of social life are occurring with increasing rapidity…When social organization changes, so do religious organisations, new ideas and new societies are created through mutual, dedicated interaction, and when culture groups interact, each one

will be transformed". It should also be noted that Islam does not recognize the priesthood system *(lā rahbāniyyata fil Islām),* so it should be realized from the beginning that it is impossible for Muslims to be a monolithic community with a unified understanding of Islam. The existence of various schools of thought from its early history is the manifestation of such a postulate.

The emergence of various religious movements known as modernist and traditionalist, radical or fundamentalist, as well as moderate and liberal movements basically result from differences in understanding and interpreting the teachings of Islam. Such a reality cannot be separated from historical, cultural, and structural factors, which in turn form different responses. There are inward as well as outward looking responses, or the combination of both. The differences in responding to certain challenges result in the forming of a given community constructed by a similarity of understanding on how Islam should be practiced in social life.

When the response is inward looking, the movement that emerges will be oriented towards "self correcting" efforts in the form of justification, dynamism, or in-group empowerment. However, because this orientation is more individual rather than communal, such a movement will not disturb or become a threat to outsiders. This movement tends to accept the world as it is. Suffering, helplessness, and unhappiness tend to be turned to oneself rather than to the social structure.

As for the outward looking responses, the movement that emerges from this, tends to see life as already far from God's teachings and stained by evil deeds, secularism, and materialism. This movement postulates that the urban and industrial life signified by individualism and hedonism should be rejected or even destroyed. They invite people to return to a clean life, simple and full of passion, humanistic and rich with spiritual values. The impact of such a movement however can be negative or destructive when it is expressed in the form of escapism, nihilism, or other extreme forms.

Based on such a framework, it may be understood why in present-day Indonesia there are some movements that move in the opposite direction. On one hand, there are terrorist movements that use God's name like Imam Samudra, climaxing in the Bali, J.W. Marriot, and Kuningan bombings. On the other hand, peaceful Islamic movements

preaching open and friendly Islam are emerging everywhere such as that pioneered by young *kiais,* like Abdullah Gymnastiar, widely known as Aa. Gym and Arifin Ilham.

An 'angry' Islam as demonstrated by Imam Samudra, however does not receive wide support from Indonesian Muslims. On the contrary, 'friendly' Islam as preached by Aa. Gym turns out to be received well not only by Muslims but also by non-Muslims. Aa. Gym and Arifin Ilham's activities are examples of movements that emphasize the importance of peaceful, friendly, and decent Islam. In different ways but encouraged by the same spirit to materialize the nature of *rahmatan lil ʿālamien* (blessing for the universe) of the Islamic teachings, a movement concentrating on Islamic thoughts has emerged, known as Jaringan Islam Liberal (Islamic Liberal Network - JIL).

The use of the term 'liberal' by JIL indicates the principle they fight for, that is Islam which emphasizes individual freedom and the struggle to liberate people from the domination of unhealthy socio-political structures. These principles were elaborated in the form of a new interpretation of Islamic teachings formulated in some main ideas: (1) the gate of *ijtihād* (independent interpretive judgment) is open in all fields of life, (2) the emphasis of religious and ethical spirit rather than the literal meaning of the scripture, (3) relative truth, open and plural, (4) taking the side of the minority and the oppressed, (5) freedom of religion and belief (Pranowo, 2004). Based on such progressive principles, it is not surprising that they do not hesitate to invite a debate on some controversial issues such as "the Implementation of Islamic *sharīa* is Contra-Productive", "The Buddhist and the Hindus are *Ahlul Kitāb* (People of the Books), "Freedom for not embracing certain Religion is a Must", etc. The dissemination of JIL ideas is supported by young educated people who, by and large, have a very wide knowledge on secular as well as Islamic subjects. Their efforts are also supported by the utilization of mass media in the form of newspapers, talk shows on television, advertising, and web sites.

Observing the ideas and the activities of JIL, it may be understood that the presence of JIL has invited pro and contra reactions among the Muslim community. The pros feel that they obtained answers on various religious problems which were previously easier to ask rather than to answer. On the contrary the contradictive feel that

they have evidence that the "enemy" of Islam will never stop their efforts to destroy the Muslim *umma* by utilizing young educated Muslims as their agents. Their anger at JIL may be understood, for unlike more senior liberal thinkers such as Nurcholish Madjid and Djohan Effendi, the generation of JIL, the leader of which is Ulil Abshar Abdalla, has been much firmer in formulating their opponents. In the eyes of JIL, the majority of Indonesian Muslims are either fundamentalist or conservatives. For them the presence of liberal Islam (JIL) is in opposition to the domination of such types of Islam.

Looking at the tendency of the present-day Islamic movements in Indonesia it should be noted that Islam came to Indonesia, mostly though not entirely, through peaceful ways; spread in a friendly manner, and being tolerant of existing socio-cultural traditions. By so doing Islam had spread to almost all corners of Indonesia. Therefore, it could be concluded that 'angry' Islam is not the main stream of Indonesian Islam. The majority of Indonesian Muslims are those who long for the friendly, peaceful, and decent feature of religiosity. Islam which was presented in rude ways, whatever their categorization resulted in a very limited acceptance.

It is true there are those who see globalization as merely a threat to Islam, but the more dominant figures of Indonesian Muslims are those who are ready to accept globalization as an unavoidable process and even as an opportunity to increase the quality of life of the Muslim *umma* – a life signified by openness, tolerance, justice, prosperity, and security. The three peaceful and successful elections of 2004 provided vivid evidence of such a tendency. Borrowing Liddle's words (*The Jakarta Post*, September 9, 2003): "In short Indonesian Islam remains a beacon of moderation".

Based on the above discussion, I, here propose a certain paradigm - a paradigm that 1 hope enables to better recognize the complex and pluralist nature of Indonesian Islam. In this alternative paradigm we must, first, treat Indonesian Muslims as real Muslims regardless of the degree of their piety. Second, we need to view religiosity as a dynamic rather than a static process, a state of "becoming" rather than a state of "being". Third, different manifestations of Muslim religiosity should be analysed within the framework of different emphases and interpretations in Islamic teachings. Fourth, given the absence

of priesthood in Islam, it is necessary to treat Muslims as playing active agents in, rather than being passive recipients of the processes of understanding, interpreting, and articulating Islamic teachings in daily life. Fifth, the role of specific socio-cultural, historic, economic, and political settings, including globalization, must be seen as important factors in the emergence of specific Islamic movements.

Notes

[1] J. Mackie, "Indonesia Since 1945 - Problem of Interpretation" in Benedict R. O'G. Anderson and Audrey Kahin (eds.). *Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate, 1964-1981* (Ithaca-N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 124.

[2] A.H. Johns, "Indonesia, Islam and Cultural Pluralism" in Esposito (Ed.). *Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics, and Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 215.

[3] M.C. Ricklefs, "Six Centuries of Islamization in Java" in Nehemia Levtzion (ed.). *Conversion to Islam* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publisher, Inc, 1979) pp. 100-101.

[4] C. Geertz, "Religious Change and Social Order in Soeharto's Indonesia", in *Asia,* New York, No. 27, Autumn, 1972, p. 127.

[5] Lester Kurt, *Gods in The Global Village* (California: Pine Forge Press, 1995) p.149.

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A New Socio-Cultural Map
for *Santri*s

Abdul Munir Mulkhan

Introduction

In its most recent developments, the socio-political life of Indone
sian Muslims tends to differ from that of before the Reform of 1998.
A number of new Islamic ideas have emerged especially among the
young generation of *santri*s that cannot entirely be traced back to
classic Islamic concepts which formed the main frame of reference for
Islamic social and political movements. Apparently we need a new
map of Islamic socio-political dynamics in the national political arena
even though the epistemological roots have remained unchanged.

Young *santri*s are currently not only actively involved in Islamic-
inspired political parties, but also in cultural-, secular-, and national-
ist-inspired parties. At the same time all kinds of Islamic social orga-

nizations have come forward to challenge Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, and various other Islamic organizations such as Persis, al-Wasliyah, Tarbiah that existed before independence. A number of young actors in Islamic movements are also active in a variety of NGOs.

Broadly speaking, the socio-cultural life of this new generation of *santri*s can be divided into two large maps: conservatives and liberals. New Islamic parties and movements whose actors are mainly from the young generation of *santri*s are at the centre of a convergence of modernist and traditionalist Indonesian Islamic socio-cultural foundations. Therefore, both groups remain rooted in traditional Muhammadiyah or NU communities.

NU or Muhammadiyah culturally rooted young *santri*s are organized in various new conservative and liberal Islamic parties and movements. In general they were raised in NU or Muhammadiyah traditions and some are connected to the Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), or Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah (JIMM). Of late, an Islamic progressive movement was founded whose main agenda is to side with oppressed people, especially those who up till now have been active in NGOs.

Apart from that, a large number of these young *santri*s are active in various movements which of late have been designated as 'fundamentalist'; such as Hizbut Tahrir, KAMMI, Majelis Mujahidin, and a number of Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK-university-based dakwah organization). Many of these young *santri*s originate from *abangan* or *priyayi* families. They started a new Islamic identity that cannot be placed on the classic map; modernist-traditionalist, *santri* or *abangan*. The Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) may be mentioned as an example of the involvement of modernist and traditionalist *santri*s with new *santri*s from *abangan* or *priyayi* backgrounds.

This being so, on a wider plain, the socio-cultural Clifford Geertz' divide *santri – priyayi – abangan* remains relevant to understand the dynamics of religious life, politics, and adherents to Islam in Indonesia. We may say that the socio-cultural, religious, and political dynamics of Indonesian Muslims is still based on Geertzian or Weberian epistemology. The religious practice of the Muslim community has

always had links with the level of education, place of residence, family circumstances and occupation such as farmers, manual laborers, traders, or bureaucrats, apart from the socio-economic status.

Based on the epistemology above we can see the political, sometimes conflicting, propensities of each community that still actively fight for the stipulation of Islam as the foundation of the State. They are often labeled 'fundamentalist-radicalists' up to 'moderates' who are more concerned with the implementation of ethics and morality in social, economic, and political life. The first group is more structurally involved in practical political activities or in developing legislation and laws ultimately resulting in the implementation of the *Sharī‘a*. The second group is more orientated towards cultural activities while upholding the development of personal commitments.

Another interesting phenomenon is the emergence of a number of new Islamic parties and Islamic social movements. These new Islamic parties have no cultural relation to the old parties such as Masyumi or NU who were both in existence just after independence neither do they have structural ties with the NU or the Muhammadiyah. However, these new parties and social movements cannot be seen as totally separated from these two largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia.

NU community based parties such as the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), or Muhammadiyah community based parties such as Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) no longer consider Islam as the foundation and ideology of the party. These large Islamic community based Islamic movements have currently started to formulate new foundations of their political agendas based on socio-political Islamic ethics in different ways while other parties like Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB), Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), and Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR) still continue to consider Islam as their foundation.

The downfall of the New Order in May 1998 and the subsequent reform movement and implementation of democratic practices in the national political system, especially in the direct presidential elections and the elections for the regional leader such as governors, district heads and mayors has changed the socio-political Islamic map in this country. *Santri* presidential candidates could side with non-*santri* based

vice-presidential candidates and vice versa. This can be evidenced from the five presidential-vice presidential candidate duos in the last 2004 presidential elections: Wiranto (Military/Golkar/secular)-Solahuddin Wahid (NU/PKB), Megawati Soekarnoputri (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan -PDIP)-Hasyim Muzadi (NU), Amien Rais (PAN/Muhammadiyah)-Siswono Yudohusodo (nationalist), Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Partai Demokrat-PD/military/secular)-Yusuf Kalla (Golkar/*santri*), Hamzah Haz (PPP)-Agum Gumelar (military/secular). The PKS, which initially supported Amien-Siswono in the first round, supported SBY-Kalla who had from the outset been supported by PBB. NU supported Mega-Hasyim and Wiranto-Solahudidin just like the PKB which tended to be active in the national and democratic coalitions.

All this reflects the socio-political situation of the *santri*s who form the minority of the three Muslim groups: *santri*, *abangan*, and *priyayi*. The *santri*s are known for their Islamic struggle program. Therefore, the social, economic, and political dynamics of Islam in Indonesia form a reflection of the socio-political role of the *santri*s who base themselves on an agenda of Islamic struggle. This map of Indonesian Islam can be read from the way the *santri*s realize this agenda.

During the whole period of Indonesia's independence the *santri*'s agenda of Islamic struggle has undergone quite substantial changes. Some continue to struggle for an Islamic Indonesian State while others strongly oppose the democratic system and wish to see the majority of the Muslim population proportionally represented in the national political constellation. A number of other groups fight for the implementation of the *Sharī'a* in the legal and legislative system.

The socio-political phenomena mentioned above has resulted in a new polarization in the politicization of the *santri*s apart from a new polarization in Islamic thinking ranging from conservative to liberal, and from moderate to revivalist radical-fundamentalist. At the same time appears the repoliticization of *santri*s which evolved from the NU conflict following the Boyolali plenary meeting and the demands of the Angkatan Muda Muhammadiyah (AMM) to found an alternative party. These trends will involve a number of Islamic movements

on the practical political scene starting with the elections of regional leaders in early 2005 up to the presidential elections in 2009. The main question is whether, and how, they will be related to new liberal and progressive tendencies in Islamic thinking.

The Landscape of the Way of Thinking of the Generation of Young *Santris*[1]

The socio-political phenomena of the new generation of young *santris* are based on new ways of thinking about Islam which differ from those developed by the previous generation. Not infrequently these new ways of Islamic thinking or interpretation result in strained relations between various supporting communities. One explanation is that there is a link between the young *santris*' new way of religious life and their participation in the world of modern education in the country or abroad.

Parallel to the extension of modern education accessible to all, was the emergence of young *santris* who enjoyed almost all fields of study from the first grade up to the highest level. They master almost all of the world's languages as a medium for dialogue with all the great national civilizations. Some of them have started to develop a critical way of interpretation against mainstream Islamic traditions which, for more than 1000 years, has dominated the understanding of the Islamic communities in the world. As their predecessors, in the early phase of the history of Islam, these new and critical interpretations frequently arouse suspicion and misunderstanding which are in fact unfounded.

The new empirical map of the young *santris*' way of thinking emerges in almost all Muslim communities in the world ranging from Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, and a number of regions in East Asia. This more critical way of thinking (possibly liberal) compared to the generation of the 1970s has paved the way for the development of a new epistemology. Nowadays, there is a struggle to create a new era of civilization in much the same way as the predecessors of early Islamic history struggled to set the fundamental roots for the development of modern Western civilization.

Nowadays the effects of globalization bring the young *santris*

from the largest Muslim countries, such as Indonesia, in touch with all sorts of major world traditions. They not only read *salafi* works in Arabic, but use other languages to read a wide range of original works in science and technology, philosophy, and the history of the great nations in the world. Their commitment towards the Islamic tradition and their self confirmation as pious Muslims does not diminish their desire to become part of the global civilization that is moving to establish its influence in all aspects of human life.

Young *santri*s are now critically studying the whole of the traditional Islamic structure in the midst of the large stream of world modernism. Some unorthodox ideas forthcoming from this critical thinking is unpalatable for the general elite of the earlier generation, and the Muslim community at large. It is sometimes difficult to differentiate these critical ideas as being 'liberal', 'progressive', 'transformative', or 'prophetic'.

This critical interpretation of Islam forms a historical challenge for the development of its adherents themselves as well as for the global community. Abiding with the teachings of Islam as a guideline to solve many problems requires functional and actual interpretation. Direct or indirect interaction of the Muslim community with a variety of local, regional, and global communities leads to such a demand.

The conviction of the absolute and perfect teachings of Islam as recorded in the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet is constantly challenged. This may not repress the conviction that the large historical map was completed by the Qur'an and the Sunnah; the development of civilization had already reached its climax with the mission of the Prophet Muhammad. Solutions to multiple problems are not totally provided by the *salaf* and *khalaf ulama* way of thinking so it forced educated young *santri*s to develop the new interpretations as mentioned above.

The conviction that man's failure to solve worldly life problems due to neglect of Islamic teachings is confronted by social and historical facts in the lives of the Muslim community. Explanations of social and historical facts in the Muslim community combined with the search for solutions to the many problems they face leads to multiple opinions which can be divided into two large categories:

One: A *verbalis* group that views Islam as a guideline for people's conduct which is complete and ready to be used in accordance with the Prophet's teachings. Failure in solving life's problems is the result of disobeying these guidelines. This group, often called radical and fundamentalist, tends to romantically reject social change and the development of social and hard sciences.

Two: An interpretative group that views that eternal and perfect Islam indeed forms a metaphysical and ethical set of standards. Social change and the development of science and technology is the wish of God in His natural law. Failure in this world is the result of misunderstandings about the intent of the Islamic teachings, and indifference towards history, science and technology. This group is more concerned with universal human values than with symbolic ritual teachings.

Both groups severely criticize the whole Islamic tradition adhered to by *salaf* and *khalaf ulama*. Their critical ideas are often called 'liberal', 'progressive', or 'prophetic' and 'transformative'.[2] Derived from these *santri*s is the Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah (JIMM), Gerakan Islam Transformatif (GIT), Generasi Santri Progresif (GSP), Gerakan Dakwah Islam Profetik (GARDIF), Jaringan Filantropi Islam (JIFI), Gerakan Praksis Kemanusiaan Madani (Gaprikima), and other such institutions.

The agenda for Islamic secularism, inclusivism, and pluralism of the *santri* generation of the 1970s met a new, more critical format. The wave of critically reinterpretating Islam by educated young *santri*s became more formidable as it coincided with the emergence of multiculturalism and the use of hermeneutics as the interpretative method which split the divine hegemonic skies that had ruled for 1000 years.

Multi-culturalism does not only respect 'otherness', 'otherness' is considered the epistemological foundation and is considered more important than 'sameness'. God himself is portrayed as Other-ness, and it is impossible to understand Him as a single entity. Hermeneutics will open the debate in the fields of *kalām*, *fiqh* and *tassawuf* which up to now has been in the hands of the *salaf* and *khalaf ulama*. The authenticity of Islam is no longer a sacral matter but is open to new, explanations that change and develop in accordance with social

changes and technological developments.

The romanticism of applying the *salafi* tradition has during its history been opposed by futuristic functionalism of the liberals, practicism of the progressives, and criticism by the supporters of transformational or prophetic Islam. *Aqīdah-imān* teachings, *akhlāk* and *ibādat* are viewed as sociological truths and they believe that the Qur'an and the Sunnah have never excluded reinterpretation. Even though intelligence and reasoning continually invite debate in an effort to understand the clear ayats, at least a large part of the holy ayats can be understood by intelligent reasoning.

Outside the internal debates among *salaf* and *khalaf*, or liberal and critical interpreters and the role of intellect above, the world is waiting for new Islamic views to deal with concrete issues currently faced by Muslim nations and most modern civilizations all over the world. In the middle of the deterioration of social, economic, and political functions of a number of Islamic movements, especially in Indonesia, the young *santri*s' search for functional meaning and prophetic roles from the whole of the Islamic tradition should be considered. This kind of interpretation forms at least the fulfillment of the *rahmatan lil 'ālamien* function of Islam as a guideline or *hudan* for the whole of mankind in each stage of civilization and history.

The Political Orientation of the *Santri*s[3]

The presidential elections of 2004 more or less forced sacral theological values to directly address the interests of pragmatism and secularism. The socio-political elite have to learn how the iron law of democracy, i.e. *vox populi vox Dei* (the voice of the people as the voice of God) works. From this starting point young *santri*s started reinvestigating a number of doctrines that were up to now accepted as ultimate truths.

The ideological political map changes more rationally and pragmatically but at the same time re-crystallizes the political ideology when the political elite failed to create a new ideology based on the iron law of democracy. This was evident from the blood-thumbprint reaction to the *fatwā* that proclaimed the election of a female leader to be *harām*.

Unlike during the legislative elections, *santri* activist party or Islamic organization leaders openly supported the nationalist and secularist presidential candidate in the 2004 elections. Their pragmatic and dominant consideration was the achievement of universal Islamic aims or the individual interests of the *santri* activist themselves. This demonstrates the new paradigm of the *santri*s who had until then been known to be tied to Islamic ideologies and culture based on sacral values.

In order to obtain majority people's support, pragmatic judgment needed a base in values not easily found among the Islamic ideology and *santri* culture. This conflict in values was manifested in the *fatwā* issued --in NU circles-- that proclaimed the election of a female leader to be *ḥarām*, and in the difficulties faced by Partai Keadilan Sejahtera when was encouraged to vote for Amien Rais or Wiranto.

This ideological confusion of the *santri*s was more or less utilized by presidential candidates Hamzah Haz and Amien Rais when they claimed themselves to be representatives of *santri*s. In the first days of his appointment of vice-presidential candidate, Siswono Yudohusodo was occupied in convincing the *santri* community that Amien Rais and himself were nationalist *santri*s. Siswono was active in preaching and conducting sermon safaris in pockets of *santri* communities. Meanwhile, Wiranto was tying bonds of friendship with old *kiai*s and pesantrens, as did Megawati Soekarnoputri.

The Islamic ideological pragmatism of the *santri*s resulted in the confirmation that universal Islamic ethics were compatible with the ethics of humanity and power. The presidential and vice-presidential candidate duos represented this new ideology, and what was more interesting was the spread of a rational democratic political awareness of the realistic power of the people to decided political fates. The iron law of democracy *vox populi vox Dei* was beginning to function well.

Eighty per cent of the electorate of one hundred fifty million people during the 2004 presidential elections is Muslim. However, this does not guarantee that the person they elected is a *santri*. All candidates were Muslim, but only 25 per cent of the electorate chose a Muslim from *santri* background. Membership of an Islamic organization also

was no guarantee that a *santri* would be voted in. Members of the NU and the Muhammadiyah also acted as supporters for Partai Golkar, Partai Demokrat and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P), apart from other Islamic parties.

People's choice was not only based on criteria such as the piety or the charisma of the presidential, vice-presidential, and legislative candidates. Often the people voted for someone they knew or who was considered to be trustworthy and able to defend their interests.

The political rationality of the common people (also academically called 'proletariat') could evidently be put to use in the 2004 presidential elections. This rationality 'forced' the candidate and the party putting him up for election to adopt a pragmatic attitude, both when the candidate duos were chosen, and also during the polling campaigns conducted from 1 April 2004 onwards.

Therefore, the results of the elections in 2004 can change the political map of the legislative and presidential elections in 2009. Coalitions between parties, which began with cooperation between some parties to nominate candidates for the presidential and vice-presidential elections will crystallize after the elections. Two or three large coalitions may appear in the legislative elections in 2009 to nominate presidential candidates.

The ideology of the two or three coalition parties after the 2004 presidential elections will tend to be more rational and pragmatic when it is based on the considerations of the majority of the voters conduct, sacral/theological values are being reinterpreted based on the practical interests of the people and the proletariat in a program aimed to elevate the economy of the people.

The *fatwā* stating that it is *ḥarām* to vote for a female leader or other *fiqh fatwā*s in the social, economic, and political domain will lose their practical meaning when they have to face the many secular interests of the electorate majority. Piety can only be politically meaningful if it is followed by a commitment to defend the interests of the people who are not NU or Muhammadiyah members. A reconstruction of the teachings in order to solve social, economic, and political issues is viewed as an increasingly urgent necessity.

This trend also points to a grand-scale secularization of the po-

litical theology of the *santri*s which up to now has been represented by the largest Islamic organizations of NU and Muhammadiyah. *Vox populi vox Dei* will start to change the configuration and the national political map when it will be realized that the political destiny of the five presidential candidate duos and the destiny of a party are in the hands of the people. However, a pragmatic orientation without any clear ideological foundation may cause the president-elect to get caught in the pragmatism of power.

The pragmatism of power became manifest when the abstract party platform did not automatically change into the platform of the five duos even though they were nominated by a party or group of parties. If the votes of a party or parties in the legislative elections did not yield a sufficient number of votes for the presidential and vice-presidential candidates to survive the first round of the presidential elections, then the logic follows that the candidates for president and vice-president have a larger potential to manipulate votes than those obtained by the parties in the legislative elections.

This phenomenon causes the party institutions to put forward their presidential and vice-presidential candidates but they fail to formulate the power platform they want to implement when voted in. The ideological transition in the 2004 presidential elections already changed the sacral values into pragmatic orientation, however, it can invite romanticizing about sacral values that may easily be manipulated for the practical purpose of mobilizing the participation of the people as can be glanced from the *fatwā* that it is *ḥarām* to chose a female leader and the claim of some presidential candidates that they were representatives of Islamic and *santri* symbolism.

The ideological transition crystallizes through horizontal, vertical, and diagonal crossings of secular, nationalist, Islamic, *abangan*, *priyayi*, and *santri* cultural ideologies into a new ideological configuration. This phenomenon forms a continued process of the weakening of party ideologies that has been evident since the start of the New Order. Pragmatic secularization evidently forms a large wave of the national politicization after the 2004 presidential elections in the reform era even though its journey has stagnated since the downfall of the New Order in May 1998.

The 2004 presidential elections formed the most realistic lesson in democracy about the rights of each individual to decide how he/she wants to vote, apart from the iron law of democracy *vox populi vox Dei*. On the other hand, when there is no alternative of an ideology of transition without a clear program, the presidential elections – especially in the second round – could become the arena for fierce ideological and theological struggle which could prove to be widespread and last long after the presidential elections. However, democracy is a medium for study that makes many things possible which for a long time were considered impossible.

The transition to democracy will become smoother when we truly realize that 'destiny' decides the politics of the votes of the proletariat. In a later stage school politics will weaken and will realize a new, more rational ideology as a foundation for the formulation of party programs in the practical interest of the electorate.

Repoliticization of the *Santris*[4]

It was not strange for the NU and the Muhammadiyah to be active in politics. Both of these large Islamic organizations have been involved in politics since the early years of independence in the Masyumi party. Some years before the 1955 elections, the NU turned itself into a political party until in 1984 it returned to the Khittah of 1926. In times of early New Order, the Muhammadiyah became involved in the founding of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi) but later claimed itself to have no organizational links to political parties.

Both organizations claimed to be non-partisan social movements for the empowerment of civil society, but at the start of the Reform Era, the NU and the Muhammadiyah elite became involved in practical politics. Concomitant with the political failure of the *santri* elite, the Angkatan Muda Muhammadiyah (AMM) started to entertain ideas of founding a new party. The millions of members of these largest Muslim organizations are their social capital for each national political agenda. However, without a clear agenda this social capital cannot automatically be put in motion for practical political purposes as it may well result in the collapse of civil society.

Therefore, in the NU Muktamar in Boyolali (28 November - 2

December 2004) and in the Muhammadiyah Tanwir in Mataram (2-5 December 2004), the need was felt to formulate a civil political agenda as political arenas for its practical politics talented members. They were urged to enter the practical political domain that was controlled by means of a political contract based in civil society. Meanwhile, actors of social propagation developed a critical attitude towards power in order to protect social sensitivity and empathy among the political actors and those in power.

The division of tasks and political agenda based in civil society needed to be considered in the midst of strong pressure that the NU and the Muhammadiyah stayed commited as pillars of civil society. An absence of a clear division of tasks between civil political actors and social propagation actors could weaken the free, independent, and creative empowerment of society. Apart from that, the social capital and the cultural force of civil society could lose its critical and correctional function towards political and state practices that tended to work for their own interests.

The significance of the division of tasks was connected to Islamic doctrine. Unlike the secular West, the Muslim community views politics as a part of religious practice and Islam is often understood as *din wa al-daula* (religion and power). As a result, attempts to liberate political practice from religious doctrine were pointless and virtually impossible.

The dedication of the NU and the Muhammadiyah as social propagation movements was never completely free from practical politics. The political experience in the presidential elections and during the Reform Era made the *santri* elite leaders of these organizations increasingly aware of the political power they could yield. Some elite in the higher echelon of NU and Muhammadiyah were directly involved in the 2004 presidential elections, as presidential and vice-presidential candidates or in campaign teams for the candidates. This will continue in the elections for governors, district heads, and mayors in the whole country.

The involvement of NU and Muhammadiyah elite in the presidential elections invited internal debate about their relations with practical political activities. The defeat of the NU (PKB) and

Muhammadiyah (PAN) based parties in the legislative elections, and the failure of these organizations in the presidential elections were good political lessons. The politics of normative and theology based *santri*s was corrected by the sociology of more empirical and realistic politics.

The placement of the Muslim community as the majority and the millions of NU and Muhammadiyah members as a real political force became to be understood to be a pseudo-concept. People became aware that religious culture forms social capital that could be moved for political purposes if pragmatic communication was developed in the interests of the majority. This model of political communication brought democratic actors that had no organizational base in Muslim movements to the height of power.

This political awareness forced the *santri* elite to rethink the political role they could play for practical political purposes or for higher politics. The problem was, how to guard the neutrality of the social propagation movements the moment their actors became involved in a party with a different culture and ideology. Here lies the consistency of the social propagation movements that empower an independent civil society, free from partisan politics that tended to be oriented to short term interests, as movements that are worth maintaining.

In this situation the NU and the Muhammadiyah need to concentrate on the empowerment of the people as a basis and social capital in matters pertaining to the state and high politics. However, it is still necessary to create political space for politically talented members to grow and to develop their political skills based on civil values. Through systematic efforts a civil high political practice can be developed so that *santri* political actors are not trapped in the pragmatic goals and hedonism of power politics.

Practical political activities are more attractive because their results can be measured and easily enjoyed. The government and the DPR and DPRD can quickly produced policies at the national or local level (local regulations) that are binding for all members and provide facilities for a better life of them. Social propagation activities are never free from political interests, the results are hard to measure and can only be seen after a relatively long time with immeasurable social capital.

Practical politics themselves will no longer be considered '*ḥarām*' by Muslim movements the moment Islam is understood as *dīn wa al-daula* (religion and power). God is portrayed as All Powerful, teaching the *Sharī'a* in all spheres of life. Ritual practices are fulfilled by the mobilization and participation of the masses such as during ritual communal prayers, Friday prayers, or prayers on festive days which form important political activities. The realization of legal and moral order itself necessitates power and political intervention.

NU and Muhammadiyah supporters are members of the state with their own rights and political obligations. This assumes that political activities are an integral part in the life of the members of both organizations. The issue is how to recognize the rights and political obligations NU and Muhammadiyah members have when the movements themselves strongly state that they are neither movements nor political parties. Their choice to act as social propagation movements places both Islamic movements in the sphere of ethics and morals while at the same time as the fundamental basis for civil society in the political dynamics of the people.

As social propagation movements, each and every NU and Muhammadiyah activity forms a promotion and advocation of the benefits of ethics and morals in each dimension of life: social, economic, political, cultural, scientific, and technological. Although political activities tend to be carried out in order to attain power for ones self, social propagational activities are aimed at meeting the welfare demands for all members of the state. There seems to be no peaceful compromise until the moment when social propagation movements confirm their empirical foundation and political movements their idealistic basis, both for the benefit of civil society. The issue now is how to play both the role of social propagation for civil political ideas and ensure the moral commitment of the public political actors themselves. One impossible solution is to free social propagation movements from practical politics. Aware or unknowingly, politics is the secular face of the propagation movements even though they often hide this by claiming not to be political movements.

Closing Remarks

The future of a political party, whether based on a theological, local traditional, or secular ideological conviction, will ultimately be decided by the way its activists are involved in communication with the electorate. Political reality in developing national politics will see a change of attitude by *santri* politicians in a more fluid and less ideologically biased direction than the political practices of the generation before independence. *Santri* politics will become more institutionalized when, at the same time, new Islamic ways of thinking emerge that are more critical towards the tradition of the new *santri* generation.

The people decide their political choices on tradition and life's necessities and the pattern of relations that has been made over time with a party and its activists. Parties based on religious *santri* values pay less attention to the needs of political communication. A political polarization emerges which by some specialists was turned into the essence of the differentiation into three political communities: *santri*, *priyayi*, and *abangan*. Even though in its development this kind of categorization has begun to change, it can still be used as a model of the cultural and theological polarization.

Therefore, the categorization of *santri*, *priyayi*, and *abangan* is useful at an analytical level but no longer reflects the ideological bases of the three socio-cultural communities in Indonesia. The relevancy of this categorization will continue to show that levels of ritual obedience will emerge that will form the basis of the division of the socio-cultural life of the Indonesian society. This will form the initial data for the prediction of political relations and is useful for the development of political communication in times to come. This kind of categorization is also important in developing socio-political and cultural policies for the development of the role of Islam in the national history itself.

Notes

[1] Abdul Munir Mulkhan, "Geliat Kaum Muda Santri", *Majalah Syir'ah*, 2004, pp. 44-45.

[2] Abdul Munir Mulkhan, *Tafsir-Tafsir Sosial Islam*, Workshop Gerakan Mahasiswa Muslim (23-25 April 2004) with the theme: '*Membangun Sekutu Islam Progresif*' (Creating Progressive Islam Allies) for the topic: 'Membumikan Gagasan Islam Progresif' (Bringing the Idea of Progressive Islam to Earth), organized by the Labda Shalahuddin Yogyakarta, 25 April 2004 in Yogyakarta. See also Shalahuddin Jursyi, *Membumikan Islam Progresif* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2004).

[3] Abdul Munir Mulkhan, 'Kiblat Politik dalam Pilpres 2004'. *KOMPAS,* June 10, 2004, pp. 4-5.

[4] Abdul Munir Mulkhan, 'Repolitisasi Kaum Santri', *KOMPAS*, December 3, 2004, pp. 4-5.

Contemporary Liberal Islam in Indonesia, Pluralism, and the Secular State

Komaruddin Hidayat

Introduction

An issue that is being actively debated in Indonesia nowadays is the topic of 'Liberal Islam'. This is partly due to the responses triggered by the edited volume by Charles Kurzman: *Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook* published by Paramadina and mostly due to a response to the article written by Ulil Abshar Abdallah (coordinator of the Liberal Islamic Network) entitled "*Menyegarkan Kembali Pemahaman Islam*" (Refreshing the Understanding of Islam) printed in *Kompas* daily newspaper, 18 November 2002. Ulil's controversial article gave birth to a polemic and a death fatwa issued against him by KH. Athian Ali, the chairman of the Forum of Ulamas of the Indonesian Muslim Soci-

ety. Even though the term 'Liberal Islam', or terms like this are actually not new[1], its recent resurfacing has given it enough impetus for serious Islamic discourse in this country.

The Historical Roots of Contemporary Liberal Islam

In Islam, the term liberalism first surfaced in intellectual religious discourse on philosophy and subsequently in Sufism. In both areas it resulted in polemics and discord between the different circles of experts in Islamic jurisprudence (*al-fuqahā*); those who adhered to legalistic orthodoxy as opposed to the philosophers who were very much in favour of free intellectual reasoning. In time, discord divided the *fuqahā* and the Sufis, specially the philosophical Sufis such as al-Hallaj, who stressed individual spiritual wandering and internal exercise and were convinced of the possibility of a unity between God and man under certain circumstances.[2]

In the West, intellectual liberalism surfaced at the time of the advent of intellectual freedom of thought where scholars felt ill at ease with *given* or religious inspired truth. In response to this, a kind of 'rebellion' occurred resulting in a breach between intellectualism and religion which in its turn gave birth to secularism and humanism. In other words, liberal thinking surfaced as a rebellion against the shackles of the realm of religious thinking, that is, a revolt in the name of freedom of thought. In the political context the movement of liberal thinking emerged as a protest against the authority of sovereign power that collaborated with religious authority.

The same phenomena occurred in the Islamic world when liberal thinking aspired to free itself from the power and authority of the sultanates which collaborated by means of religious symbols. The contemporary dominant religious understanding at the time was that of a legalistic religious notion which did not allow enough room for exploratory thinking. Liberal Islamic thinking was a legacy of the Jewish world of thinking. This way of thinking consequently influenced the world of Western thought via philosophers such as Ibn Sina and especially Ibn Rusyd. However, liberalism in confrontation with religion in the Islamic world was in general not as confrontational as liberalism in the Western world, as in Islamic teaching ways of thinking were given their proper place and were even admired.

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From among the classical Islamic liberal thinkers, Ibn Rusyd (1126-1197) was the most influential. In his view, Islam held human values in high esteem. Islam accommodated the efforts of rational men to critical thinking. According to Ibn Rusyd, man is endowed with reasoning and is capable of seeking and creating truth, in contrast to the traditional view which held that salvation and truth should be based on religious doctrine. Moreover, his liberal thinking led him to the conclusion that, if divine revelation contrasts reason, people have to exercise analysis to explain divine revelation with a second meaning or an understanding of its substance based on critical reasoning. In an Islamic context this meant giving preference to an intellectually arrived interpretation instead of a literal understanding of the divine revelation.[3]

Even though liberal Islamic expression in religious thought had surfaced from the classical Islamic period (8 - 13 century), in politics liberal expression came later. The most significant indication of liberalism was the onset of an interest and appreciation for the notion of egalitarianism and democracy and the discourse revolving around basic human rights which emerged when Islam came into contact with the West. Consequently, the expression of liberal thinking in politics became to mean a refusal of the classical formula with extreme examples from people such as Ali Abd al-Raziq and Mustafa Kemal Attaturk.

Even though they were very much appreciative of Western civilization, they were still of the opinion that freedom of thought and expression had to be firmly rooted in Islamic values. In other words, liberal thinking stressed human substance over Islamic universalism which was later to fit uncomfortably with the orthodox intellectual legacy which was firmly rooted in its commitment to religious symbols and scripturally characterized. In Indonesia, Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta are perfect examples of this. Therefore, even though the majority of the Indonesian people are Muslims, Islam is not the foundation of the Indonesian nation.

In the field of religion, Islamic liberalism in Indonesia emerged in the form of Islamic modernism; a movement like the Muhammadiyah organisation that responded to contemporaneous demands and developments. Initially, Muhammadiyah was considered to be modern and

liberal as it exercised co-education; boys and girls were treated equal and were allowed to study together. At the time it also received donations from the Dutch so it was considered to emulate Christians.

As in other parts of the Islamic world which gave birth to liberal thinkers such as Mohammad Arkoun, Hassan Hanafi, and Fazlur Rahman, in Indonesia liberal Islamic circles were being led by people such as Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid and, most recently, although not as productive as his seniors, Ulil Abshar Abdalla.

Pluralism and the "Secular Nation State" in View of Liberal Islam in Indonesia

Even though Muhammadiyah, at least at the time, could be categorized as practitioners of Liberal Islam, due to constraints of space I will only consider three Liberal Islamic figures briefly: Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Ulil Abshar Abdallah.

According to Cak Nur (popular name for Nurcholish Madjid), pluralism is the understanding that diversity is a fact, positively viewed and a condition for the well being of human society (see: QS 2:251). This understanding is not only internalized but also externalized with, for example, more positive views of other religions that invite well being (QS. 3:113).[4]

In most of his writings on pluralism, Cak Nur analyses many aspects of religious pluralism. Pointing to the opinions of Ibn Taimiyyah, the word *al-Islām* for him includes the understanding of *al-istislām* (to surrender oneself), *al-inqiyād* (bow in submission), and *al-ikhlāṣ* (sincerity). This attitude forms the most important consequence of *tauḥid* and is the starting point or the core of religion, even though its stipulations are various. For this reason he translates the Quranic verse '*Inna ad-dīna 'inda Allah al-Islām*' (QS. 3:19) not in the usual way as 'In fact religion (which is condoned) at Allah's side is only Islam'.[5] But, pointing to the translation of Muhammad Asad he translates it as 'Behold, the only (true) religion in the sight of God is (man's) self-surrender unto Him'. It is the same with the translation of *al-Islam* in QS. 3:85: 'And whoever follows a religion other than al-Islam (attitude of self-surrender to God), will not be accepted and on the last day will be counted among those who will regret.' Cak Nur – quoting the commentary of Yusuf Ali – concludes: 'All religions are

one (the same), because there is only one truth. It is the religion that is taught by all Prophets'. Cak Nur goes further and views the possibility of non-Muslims 'entering Heaven' QS. 2.62: 'In fact, they are the religious people (Muslims), Jews, Christians, and Shabi'in (worshippers of deities) whoever has his faith in Allah, later, and will do good deeds, need not be afraid and they need not have any concerns'. In line with this, and quoting the view of Rasyid Ridha, Cak Nur also holds the opinion that apart from Jews, Christians, Majusi and Shaba'in, the idol worshippers in India, China, and Japan are also followers of books that contain *tauḥīd*, where the female followers may be wed by Muslims.[6]

Pluralism is evident in the *Mīthāq Madīnah* (Madinah Agreement) in the Prophet's political document. The charter stipulates the avowal that each inhabitant of Madinah, regardless of religion or race, is a member of the community with the same rights and duties: such as the right to religious freedom and the duty to defend the nation.[7]

We can understand that Cak Nur, by using his slogan 'Islam Yes, Islamic Parties, No', rejects the formation of an Islamic State. The issue of the Islamic State, he stresses, is not only obsolete, it is also not Islamic. The reason is that the transcendent and sacral nature of the model for the Islamic State will lead to polytheism which is unreconcilable to the monotheistic nature of true Islam. The concept of Islam in politics is mediatory to two conflicting extreme opinions, Ali Abdurraziq on one side, and Sayyid Qutb and al-Maududi on the other.[8] In his early writings of the late 1960s and early 1970s, Cak Nur stated that the goal for the creation of the state is to implement justice, especially in economics where every person can have his rightful share of the wealth. Cak Nur idealizes a democratic government with the model of the welfare state.[9]

Pluralistic opinions were also aired by the fourth President of the Republic of Indonesia, Abdurrahman Wahid. Wahid wants to turn non-Muslims into members of the State enjoying full rights, even including the right to become leader of the State in an Islamic State. He rejected the Qur'an (QS. 3:38) to be used as a reason to repudiate the right of non-Muslims to become leaders of the State because he claims that Allah says '*auliya'*' in that verse, which means 'friend' or 'defender', and not '*umara'*', which means 'leader'. He compares this

with the Constitution of the United States where each member has the right to become President including a coloured person, even though this has never happened yet.[10]

These views are in line with his concepts about the relation between Islam and the State, that is, Islam as a complementary factor in Indonesian social, cultural, and political life. For Gus Dur (popular name for Abdurrahman Wahid), efforts to embrace Islam as the sole feature (Ideological Islam) will turn Islam into a *divisive* factor because of the heterogeneity of the Nusantara. This does not mean that the Muslim community has no right in the life of the people and the nation, but he means that he invites people to consider local circumstances in understanding Islamic teachings and to bear contextual factors in mind. In this relation, he stresses the substance of political Islam instead of its form and firmly holds the opinion that for Indonesia the Pancasila State is ultimate and final.[11]

The above-mentioned views are echoed by Ulil Abshar Abdalla who understands QS. 3:19 as: 'In fact, the right religious path is a never ending process towards surrender (to the Most Righteous)'. From this he sees that each religion is on its way along the path leading to the Most Righteous. Every religion, in this way, is right, with varying levels and degrees of depth in experiencing this way of religiosity. Each religion is a similar large family that is, a family of people who love the never ending path to the truth and thus, he continues, we compete (QS. 2:148) in experiencing that road of religiosity.

This being so, each value of goodness, wherever it may be, is in fact a value of Islam. Islam, as said by Cak Nur, is a generic value that can be Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, Konghucu, Jewish, or Tao and may even be found in Marxist philosophy. He no longer looks at the form, but at the content. Each religion, he says, forms the clothing, the vehicle, *waṣīla*, the means by which to reach the main goal: self-surrender to the All-Mighty.

Prohibitions for multi-religious marriages, in this case between Muslim women and non-Muslim men become irrelevant. The Qur'an itself never forbade it decisively because the Qur'an holds equal universal views about human values regardless of religious differences. All Islamic legal products that differentiate between the position of Muslims and non-Muslims should be amended based on principles of

universal equality in human ranks.

In addition to this, Ulil also views the importance of the division between political and religious authority. Religion is a private matter whereas the regulation of public life is the result of consensus in society via democratic procedures. Universal religious values should indeed contribute to creating public values, but the doctrine and practice of particular religious practices are the individual matters of each religion. He even concludes that there is no such thing as Divine Law for theft, businesses, governments and such like. There are universal general principles which in classical studies on Islamic Law are called *Maqāṣid al-Sharī'a* (general goal of Islamic Law). Moreover, Islamic law such as *qiṣāṣ* and lapidation reflect Arab culture that should not be followed, even though they were practiced by the Prophet Muhammad in Madinah. The reason given is that Islam as practiced in Madinah is historical, particular, and contextual. Islam in Madinah is the result of a *trade off* between what is universal and what is particular. Therefore, Islam in Madinah is one form of Islam that is to be found on the face of the earth, bearing in mind that the verbal divine revelation is already complete whereas the non-verbal revelation in the form of *ijtihād* is not yet completed. Furthermore, he considers that the *sharī'a* as God's prescription to settle matters regardless of the time period is a form of escapism by using the reason of Divine Law.[12]

Liberal Islamic Views on the Text

Based on the explanations stated above, Liberal Islamic views are closely connected with the scriptures, or the text. In Islam there are no texts that are not *negotiable* or *interpretable* when we confront them with actual needs. Texts function to preserve and guard universal Islamic contents. Thus, what really needs to be done is to guard and preserve their substance or spirit, not the vehicle. The liberalization movement, as is shown above, is constantly aware of the prime considerations of place or vehicle but it is opposed to sacralizing the vehicle.

In this context they emphasize the spirit of the text. To reach the spirit and not to stop at the vehicle is indeed not easy. Experiences of internalization and socialization of religion play a major role. This

ranking is problematic for most Muslims because of their religious experiences which have been taught and dictated and which have not grown out of individual awareness in relation to experiences in life. Their way of religiosity has a forced ring to it: it is not the result of being informed, discussed, or felt. But, religion should be understood as, so to speak, a tree that grows in the garden of the heart so that religion becomes an integral part of us. In light of all this it comes as no surprise that the three figures mentioned above meet with social resistance, even with death threats.

While dealing with religious texts, liberal Islamic groups show their particularities, which methodologically sets them apart from other groups. They view the texts as a living, dynamic, and referential *al-turāth* (legacy). For them, the texts are a source of inspiration, *resources* to be adapted and adjusted. Therefore, cases in which the texts are legalistically regarded as *qaṭ'i*, or 'frozen' in connection with law, should, in their opinion, be reinterpreted, the more so since their number is very small.

It seems that such a methodology is connected with the awareness that as long as we are talking about intellectualism, there are no sacred texts. Intellectualism developed from criticizing the old and giving birth to the new. Sacralizing texts may be needed by the laymen, in order not to confuse them; just as they need leaders. But, when reaching adulthood, people need to know that sacralization in itself can narrow Islam.

In this sense, their intellectual wanderings in fact stop at the 'house of the text'. However, their 'house of the text' has already been renovated and modified so that it is safer to live in; its main role is to provide rest, but there are also other needs because it develops.

Therefore, do not consider that Liberal Islamic interpretations reduce the value of the texts to a point that they turn to a state of nihilism. The liberal movement is continuously aware of the fact that there are basic buildings, that is, teachings of the core and the substance of Islam because it provides a stepping stone to face the pounding of the waves, like the house mentioned just now.

Liberal Islamic Views on Pluralism and the Secular State: A Final Remark

The pluralistic views of Liberal Islam form an explanation for natural and social realities. This is so because at the outset social life is pluralistic just as can be found in the world of the flora and the fauna. It is precisely because of the pluralism that culture can develop dynamically and full of synthesis. It would seem that social Darwinism is right, although not in every aspect, in that dominant ethnic or other kinds of groups will always emerge and will try to crush and dominate other, weaker groups. However, overpowered does not necessarily mean disappeared as it has been proven that the development of a people, religion, or culture experiences periods of growth and regression. Centres of world power and civilization undergo changes measured in centuries. We may see, for instance, how China, Japan, Italy, France, Germany, England, and Arabia have all once felt themselves to be the centre of the world. Going further back in time we may also mention Egypt and Greece. All these countries exhibited their own characteristics and should be appreciated and acknowledged for their contribution to enriching the treasury of world civilization to be dynamic, always pluralistic, and synthetic.

When this pluralism is viewed from the perspective of religion, we may witness an outstanding phenomena of the existence and contributions from large world religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Konghucu, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam as well as from the religious communities outside these *mainstream* ones.

For this reason cultural and religious plurality are 'given realities' which should be enjoyed, maintained, and conditioned in such a way that they form a 'blessing' from God. How quiet and boring the world would be if everything was uniform!

The relationship between state, religion, and society will always change dynamically, especially since we are entering the modern age where political and bureaucratic powers become increasingly strong. In the past the power of religious figures and institutions were very strong and dominated social dynamics and change. But, when institutions of science, economics, politics, and the military exist and compete side by side to influence socio-political change, religious figures

and institutions are hauled from their place and are reduced to additional forces ultimately resulting in the Secular State. For this author, the term 'secular state' is not an ultimate and final concept; bearing in mind that relations between religion and state are never completely severed. For example, in the Unites States, a country known as the champion of democracy and the secular state, has of late shown that the spirit and nuances of its Christianity are very much in force in George W. Bush's administration so that when the US says that religion and state should be separated, this needs to be explained.

Culturally we may say that the structure of the state is secondary while the socio-cultural base is primary. This means that socio-religious conditions in society will significantly influence state policies regardless of the political theory adhered to, such as Christianity in the West, Hinduism in India, and Islam in Indonesia. Each religion 'colours' the implementation of democracy in the states where they flourish. However, we should bear in mind that there are times when the state is so powerful in relation to society that in its turn it creates civil protests or even social revolution.

The success of the recent elections in Indonesia has in fact revealed many things in connection to religion, society, and the state which evidently has found better, safer, and more promising relations for the future of democracy in Indonesia. If this *trend* is true, it is due to the strength of moderate and liberal Islamic groups who desire to put religion in the social domain as a moral and critical force. Islamic political aspirations are channeled through political parties while the moral role of Islam is fought via religious mass organizations such as the NU and the Muhammadiyah, and independent NGOs.

Looking ahead, relations between religion and the state will remain dynamic while they continue to support and criticize each other. The state and the government need moral support and legitimization from the religious community while the religious community in turn needs the state via party political channels. Relations between both will be healthy when religious power can maintain its integrity while the state succeeds in creating a clean and efficient government.

In order to create healthy relations between the state, society, and religion the democratic agenda should succeed and be maintained; bearing in mind that sound democracy is unattainable without healthy

political parties. Unfortunately, up to this day political parties are still viewed with cynicism and skepticism. This is not conducive to the future of the democracy since political parties are the place where a cadre of political figures of high quality is created and where the political aspirations of the people are channeled. Since political parties are still viewed as pernicious, often ill-organised groups, many political and intellectual figures, including the *ulama*, enter the domain of the state via NGOs and religious mass organizations such as the NU.

This phenomena forms the social reality we have to accept, but should be avoided in the future thereby allowing the political process to become more rational and allowing religion to attain moral authority and be free of the scatheful politics practiced by its figures. The two largest Islamic mass organizations in Indonesia, the NU and Muhammadiyah can in fact play a strategic role as civil forces in society that are capable of taking a distance of practical politics while abstaining from the temptation of cooptation by the state. Furthermore, their political aspirations should be channeled via political parties which quite likely will be very susceptible to a variety of political upheavals and changes. In that way, religiously based political parties can be a bridge between the interests of the state and those of society. This model might form a middle road between two extremes: understanding secularism on the one side and theocracy on the other, also between structural and cultural approaches.

The old concept of confrontation between the Western secular democratic model and the concept of the age-old theocratic model is hard to maintain in Indonesia. Once more, relations between religion and the state in Indonesia from its independence on 17 August 1945 up to the present day have increasingly affirmed the seed of democracy as it is known in the West when it was sown in Indonesia on the land of 'cultural' Islam. This is because the culture of Islam has resulted in a tree of democracy that is synthetic and quite likely will become a model or at least an inspiration for the Muslim world.

Notes

[1] Leonard Binder, *Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Biologies* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1988).

2 HA. Rivay Siregar, *Tasawwuf, Dari Sufisme Klasik ke Neo-Sufisme* (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 1999), pp. 55-56.

[2] See Harun Nasution, *Falsafat dan Mistisisme dalam Islam,* Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1985. MM. Syarif, "The Philosopher" in *History of Muslim Philosophy* (Weisbaden: Otto Horrassowitz, 1963).

[3] Nurcholish Madjid, *Asas-Asas Pluralisme dan Toleransi dalam Masyarakat Madani,* Paper presented at the Seminar "Masyarakat Madani dalam Perspektif Agama dan Politik", Jakarta, 22 February 1999.

[4] See Ministry of Religious Affairs, *Alqur'an dan Terjemahnya*, Jakarta: Depag dan Kerjaan Saudi.

[5] Nurcholish Madjid, *Islam Doktrin dan Peradaban,* Jakarta: Paramadina, 1992, pp. 177-196.

[6] Agus Edi Santoso (Ed), *Tidak Ada Negara Islam: Surat-Surat Politik Nurcholish Madjid-Mohamad Roem* (Jakarta: Penerbit Djambatan, 1997), p. 28.

[7] Viktor Tanja, *HMI, Sejarah dan Kedudukannya di Tengah Gerakan Muslim Pembaharu di Indonesia,* Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1991, pp. 122-126 and Agus Edi Santoso (Ed), *op. cit.*, pp. 22-26.

[8] Nurcholish Madjid, "Nilai Identitas Kader atau Nilai Dasar Perjuangan ", in B*uku Panduan LK I HMI Cabang Ciputat Periode 1993-1994, 1994-1995, and 1995-1996* (Ciputat: HMI Cabang Ciputat, 1993-1996).

[9] Masykuri Abdillah, *Demokrasi di Persimpangan Makna, Respon Intlektual Muslim Indonesia terhadap Konsep Demokrasi (1966-1993)* (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 1999), pp. 122, 127-128.

[10] Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam dan Negara; Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktek Politik Islam di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Paramadina 1998), pp. 147-149, 220-222.

[11] Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, "Menyegarkan Kembali Pemahaman Islam", *Harian Kompas,* 18 November 2002 and see also Ulil Abshar Abdallah, *Islam Liberal dan Fundamental* (Yogyakarta: eLSAQ Press, 2003), Second edition, pp. 1-9.

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Fundamentalism and the Implementation of *Sharī'a* in Indonesia

Jamhari

A ccording to a current national survey conducted by the Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (PPIM) in collaboration with the Freedom Institute and Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) in November 2004, Indonesian Muslims would like to see the *sharī'a* implemented in Indonesia. A similar survey conducted by the PPIM in 2002 and 2003 showed that this was supported by 61% (2002) and 71% of the respondents (2004). The survey also shows the increase in the support for the implementation of certain *sharī'a* laws such as amputation of the hand, compulsory wearing of the veil for women and stoning to death for adulterer.

Furthermore, the survey also highlights certain areas in Indone-

sia that have vehemently demanded the implementation of *sharī'a* along with the demand for regional autonomy. After the collapse and the failure of a centralistic government under the New Order, some areas in Indonesia have demanded the right to implement *sharī'a* . The establishment of Nangro Aceh Darussalam (NAD) based on foundations of Islamic *sharī'a* is an example of this. The Indonesian government has permitted NAD to implement *sharī'a* in Aceh.

What does this survey tell us about the future of Indonesian Muslims; are the results of this survey an indication of increased support for fundamentalism in Indonesia?; will Indonesian Muslims support the implementation of the shari'a in Indonesia; will the growing demand for regional autonomy provide a political channel for the implementation of the *sharī'a* in certain regional areas?

Islamism and the Implementation of *Shari'a*

When speaking about Islamic fundamentalism and the implementation of the *sharī'a* in Indonesia, people have different understandings of it. Some believe that Islamic fundamentalism and the demand for the implementation of the *sharī'a* is a political movement which responds to current political discussions. This movement is called Islamic political culture. When discussing democracy in the context of the Muslim community, Islamic political culture is considered by experts to be an important factor that cannot be ignored. They believe that Islamic political culture is an obstacle for the development of democratic political culture, and this in turn obstructs the consolidation of democracy. However, there are other academics who believe that Islamic political orientation does not have a significant negative impact on democratic values. At least, these negative impacts are not as great as thought up until now. As a result, Islamic political culture is an important issue to be empirically researched and proven so that the true version of the two competing views can be revealed. Others however, argue that it is a religious movement resulting from a certain religious outlook, namely radical Salafism.

Islamic religiosity and Islamic political culture is seen to impede the growth and strength of civic culture in the community, and in turn it can obstruct the formation of a good government administration. This may occur if the Muslim community has its own opinion of what

constitutes a good government, one that is different from a democratic government. There is a conviction amongst observers of political Islam that as a result of tradition the Islamic communities have their own political language, which supposes that good politics or government is based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah, or on Islamic law. In the context of the Islamic community, it is therefore important to pay attention to how strong and widespread support for this "Islamic politics" is, and the extent to which this "Islamic politics" contrasts with a culture of democratic politics or civic culture. There are several possibilities for the relationship between Islamic political culture and democratic political culture in the Muslim community: they are different and contradictory, and as a result the presence of both can give rise to a "clash of political culture", which can consequently hinder the growth of good governance as understood in the framework of democracy. Another possibility is "vagueness" in the beliefs of the Islamic community about these two political cultures, where emphasis on the importance of Islamic political culture - a government administration based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah - is substantively construed as being the same as supporting political democracy. Therefore, Islamic political culture and democratic political culture do not always clash, and could potentially be a positive relationship. A Muslim who is proud of his Islamic identity, as indicated by his conviction in the importance of the Qur'an and the Sunnah for a good government, can at the same time strongly support a democratic system of govern nent. This can only take place because The Qur'an never definitively or explicitly demands that the Islamic community practice a particular system of government.

Linked to this Islamic political culture is the problem of discrimination towards women and non-Muslims. These two socio-political categories are coijwtter§d to be second class citizens, after men and Muslims. Therefore, this study pays particular attention to this issue, as it is related to equal nghts-afui inclusiveness in political participation and recruitment in the context of good governance.

In the context of this struggle between a culture of democratic politics and a culture of Islamic politics, an analytical explanation can be found not only in socio-economic status, but also from socialisation within the community and from the religious variations amongst mem-

bers of the society. This socialisation refers to the extent to which religious life is important in a person's family, whether he or she was raised in a strongly religious tradition, the extent to which he or she was active in social associations that can be differentiated in terms of being "religious" and "non-religious", and whether he or she received an Islamic education (in a *madrasah* or IAIN for example) or a public education. In this relationship there are several possibilities: a person who has received a strong religious education, guidance and family experiences will likely be obedient in carrying out religious rituals, will conform to religious education, and be active in religious social organisations, which in turn creates a positive and strong attitude towards Islamic political culture. However, this pattern can also be established through a process of socialisation, and can be taken from the characteristics of social associations where they socialise. This must all be empirically proven, based on the religious attitudes and understandings within the community, and not just based on theoretical assumptions.

In this context, Islamic political culture or an orientation towards Islamic values can be seen from a number of indicators, and there are generally two dimensions to an orientation towards Islamic politics: an orientation towards symbolical Islamic political values, and an orientation towards Islamic politics as legal specific guidance. This survey indicated the first tendency, that the majority of the Islamic community supports Islamic political values, whilst the second tendency is less supported. This is explored in more detail in the following descriptive statistical data.

The majority of Indonesian Muslims (58% in 2001 and 67% in 2002) have a positive attitude towards the idea that the best form of government is an Islamic one, which means a government based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah, under the leadership of leaders who are experts in Islamic teachings. A larger proportion (61% in 2001 and 71% in 2002) responded positively to the view that the country should make the practice of Islamic *shari'a* law compulsory. However, this attitude is in fact quite ambiguous because the meaning of *shari'a*, Qur'an and Sunnah is not clear in a political context. It is realistic, to say that the majority of Islamic communities respect the Qur'an, the Sunnah and the *shari'a*, but these three terms are understood in very

different ways by different Muslims, and vary between Muslim groups.

At least two interpretations and understandings emerge: teachings from the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and also an understanding of the shari'ah, can mean laws, or specific practices for its implementation, but they can also have other meaning. For example, these can refer to moral values that can not be carried out in a binding and specific manner in a particular context. This can be seen in the community's attitude towards Islamic political values in a specific and more concrete manner. For example, a positive attitude towards the importance of supporting the enforcement of the *shari'a*, as demonstrated by groups such as Front Pembela Islam (FPI - Islamic Defenders Front), Laskar Jihad, Darul Islam etc. Less than half of the respondents (2001: 46%) responded positively to these ideas, though this proportion increased significantly in 2002, to 53%.

Other indicators show similar results: a general election to choose a candidate who is an expert in Islamic teachings (46% in 2001 and 2002), and a smaller proportion in response to an election to select an Islamic part}[7] (2001: 23%; 2002: 21%). Less than 50% of respondents responded positively to the opinion that the law of stoning to death should be upheld (42% in 2001, not asked in 2002), that thieves should have their hands cut off (29% in 2001 and 33.5% in 2002), that interest be eliminated or forbidden in the banking system (26% in 2001, not asked in 2002), the idea that women are not allowed to travel far without being accompanied by an appropriate male (mahram -father/brother/husband) (45% in 2001 and 51% in 2002), not allowed to live with a male adult who is not mahram (41% in 2001, not asked in 2002), the need for policing prayers (10% in 2001 and 30% in 2002), the need for policing fasting during the month of Ramadhan to supervise whether Muslims are carrying out this ritual or not (13% in 2001, not asked in 2002).

If the orientation towards democratic values and values of Islamic political values are contrasted using a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 indicates certainty that power is in the hands of God, and 10 indicates that power is in the hands of the community, an average value of 5.6 is obtained. This means that there is a neutral orientation, or a slight tendency towards an understanding that power is in the community's hands.

The Indonesian community relatively accurately understands the degree of Islamisation of the large political parties in comparison to one another. Using a scale of 1 to *7,* where 1 is the most Islamic, 4 is neutral and 7 is the least Islamic, in 2001 the order of Islamisation of the 5 largest political parties was as follows: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan-PPP (2.01), Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa-PKB (2.16), Partai Amanat Nasional-PAN (2.86), Golongan Karya-Golkar (3.93) and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan-PDI-P (4.11). This means that in the eyes of the Indonesian community, PPP is the most Islamic, followed by PKB and then PAN. Golkar and PDI-P were seen as neutral in this spectrum of most Islamic and least Islamic parties. The community's perception more of less reflects the formal level of Islamization of these parties. The abovee question was not asked in the 2002 survey.

Asked whether the indonesian government should implement the *shari'a*, in 2001 61*%* of Indonesian Muslims confirmed yes. In 2002, the number increase sharply to 71%. However, when the details of the applications of Islamic laws for criminals were expounded, the number of those agreeing decreased (see the table). So, what does 61% and 71% mean? Does this number indicate that Indonesian Muslims want to implement *sharī'a*?

Of course one interpretation is that the demand for the implementation of *sharī'a* is quite high. Some Indonesian people who strongly support the idea then established a political party to fight for the implementation of *sharī'a*. However, the question remains why did these Islamic parties fail to get support from Indonesian Muslims in the 1999 and 2004 general elections? Therefore, there seems no to be relation between the high percentage of Indonesian Muslims' demand on the implementation of *sharī'a* with radicalism or "Islamic politic." It is rather an indication of the depth of Indonesian Muslims' attachment to Islamic identity is.

In line with this argument, the demand for implementing the *sharī'a* in some regional areas is not an indication of the growth of radicalism in Indonesia. It is "a political movement" relating to the demand of putting Islamic values in the government (Islamic substantiate). Further, it is a response to the failure of the ruling government to restore the confidence people to state.

Regional Movements for the Implementation of the *Shariʿa*

There are some regions in Indonesia which are attempting to implement the shari'a such as Aceh, Makassar (notably Bulukumba), Cianjur, Garut and Banter? The Indonesian central government granted Aceh a special autonomy by giving them permission to apply *shariʿa* laws as a way of solving long standing conflicts in Aceh. There had been a serious movement in Aceh to gain independent status from Indonesia, and Aceh people expressed that they wanted to establish an Islamic state in Aceh. Granting the Acehnese permission to apply *shariʿa* law in their province was aimed at compensating the movement for independence. In other words, it was more a political than a religious solution. Similarly, other areas, such as Banten, Cianjur, Garut and Bulukamba reflect the same; the move to implement the shari'a is a political driven activity rather than a religious one.

The *Shariʿa* in Aceh: Taming the Independence Movement?

The Indonesian government approved two laws for Aceh; 1) Government Decree number 44 in 1999 on the implementation of "Special Aceh" (keistimewaan Aceh); and 2) Government Decree number 18 in 2001 on "Special Autonomy for Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD). However, regrets fully the implementation of "Special Autonomy" for Aceh did not improve the situation much. The aspect that can be said to be more edifying is the application of *shariʿa* Islam in Aceh.

The Acehnese welcome the implementation of the *shari'a* in Aceh as an honour for their local identity. Islam in Aceh has been deeply rooted in the life of the people, to the extent that islam has become inseparable with the identity of Aceh people. BJ. Boland found that the Acehnese people identified themselves as Muslims, "being an acehnese is equivalent to being a Muslim." Historically, lslamic kingdom in Aceh used the *shariʿa* as its foundation of laws. The Acehnese always referred to their glorious Islamic kingdom in the past which helped to spread Islam throughout Indonesia. In light of this Aceh people claimed, that "Muslims in Java should remember that without Aceh they would still be heathen (*kāfir*)."

For the Acehnese, the implementation of the s*hariʾa* in Aceh is

one solution to solve the conflicts in Aceh. The establishment of NAD is an acknowledgement of the distinctive historical identity of Aceh.

Sharī'a in Cianjur: The Impotent Central Government

Though people outside Cianjur are still wondering why Cianjur demands the implementation of the *sharī'a*, for people of Cianjur the demand is not a strange one. Cianjur, historically, was part the area under the influence of Darul Islam. The strong influence of Darul Islam in Cianjur was seen from the people's support for Kartosuwiryo.

The implementation of the *sharī'a* in Cianjur, again like in Aceh, was motivated by the history of Islam in Cianjur. People in Cianjur believe that Islam is part of their local identity. The policy of regional autonomy, which attempted to accommodate local identity, became the portal for the movement. The Issue of the implementation of the *sharī'a* became a passionate issue during the campaign for the election of the major. Islamic mass organisations publicly announced that they would back those who actively support the implementation of the *sharī'a* in Cianjur.

If in Aceh the implementation of the *sharī'a* was part of the conflict solution, in Cianjur the implementation of *sharī'a* was part of local politics to justify regional autonomy. In Cianjur, the demand for the implementation of the *sharī'a* has been understood as set values which may influence and contribute development. There has been little discussion on making Islamic laws for the public. Rather the implementation the the *sharī'a* is placed in the framework of law supremacy, good governance and local cultural identity. What we see today in Cianjur is the implementation of *sharī'a* has resulted in more symbolic ways such as type of clothing, using Islamic terms in its development program and giving attention to Islamic education.

Sharī'a in Bulukumba: Blaming Corruption, Criminals, and Qur'anic Illiteracy

Although there have been serious movements in South Sulawesi to implement the *sharī'a*, the movement has not gained any success at the provincial level. A committee for the preparation of the implementation of the *sharī'a* was established in south Sulawesi to negotiate

with the government. The committee was also responsible for a public campaign on the implementation of the *shari'a* in South Sulawesi. One of the successes of the team was in helping Bulukumba, a regional district (kabupaten) about 180 Km from the capital city of South Sulawesi, Makassar, to implement *shari'a* Islam. In March 2002, the regional major decreed four regional laws for the implementation of the shari'a; 1) laws to fight Qur'anic illiteracy; 2) laws on prohibiting alcoholic 3) laws on the obligation for Muslim women to wear the veil (jilbab); and 4) laws on zakat (alms givings).

Like Aceh and Cianjur, people in South Sulawesi also referred back to their past Islamic history. Once Kahar Muzakkar fought for the establishment of an Islamic state in South Sulawesi. The New Order then dismantled the movement and killed Kahar Muzakkar. Although the New Order was successful in fighting the movement, the New Order was not successful in erasing the memories of the people in South Sulawesi. The movement of the implementation of *shari'a* in Makassar was deliberately linked to Kahar Muzakkar.

Like in Aceh and Cianjur also, people in South Sulawesi see Islam as their local identity. Therefore, as part of the regional autonomy movement, people in South Sulawesi are attempting to affirm Islam as their local identity.

But when asked for more details about the arguments in establishing *shari'a* in South Sulawesi, people argued that the movement was actually inspired by the impotent central government in their fight against a corruption, and crime, and to promote religious values in everyday life. "If a democratic government is unable to combat corruption, why don't we think consider Islam as an alternative to democracy," a leader of the movement once said. The implementation of the *shari'a* is a protest againts the impotent of the central government that has failed to restore order and law enforcement againts criminals and corrupters.

Conclusion

Although rauical groups have an agenda to implement the *shari'a* in Indonesia, it seems that the movement to implement *shari'a* in some regions in Indonesia was inspired by the mandate of achieving re-

gional autonomy. Islam is used to get more support from the people and as cultural and political binds. Secondly, the movement is also related to the failure (or impotence) of the central government in solving the issue, like corruption, crimine and drug abuse. Third, the slow process of consolidating democracy in Indonesia is also a factor in contributing to the insistence of implementing the *sharī'a* in Indonesia.

(Un)stated Purposes: Culture and Politics of *Sharī'a* in Indonesia

Hugh Talat Halman

Ikhtilāf ummatī raḥmat (Difference of opinion in my community is a mercy.)
— Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad[1]

This work compares two visions of the "comprehensive applica tion of *sharī'a*" in Indonesia. First, Radical Islamists seek to seize the power and institutions of the state to enforce *shari'a*.[2] Second, Neo-Modernists, wary of any state's potential for corruption, place their hope instead in education and culture as the means to develop an Islamic society.[3] The vibrancy of this dialectic in Indonesia may allow us to peer behind a veil of reified abstractions which apologists and polemicists (both Islamic and non-Islamic) have tended to abuse by broadbrushing portrayals of "Islam" as a monolith. The history of Indonesia's dialogue of two visions of the comprehensive application

of *sharī'a* may allow us to clarify this problem as we proceed. In this discussion we can situate and identify the pivotal role of Muslims, as human agents and advocates of causes who use selected parts of a shared repertoire of Islamic discourse in support of diverse agendas.

One wonders what becomes of *sharī'a* when it becomes the ideology of a nation state. Is *sharī'a* even compatible with a nation state with its political parties and ideology of nationalism? On the other hand is there really any alternative? Are not Islamic courts and active practitioners of *fiqh* necessary for *sharī'a* to be effectively and comprehensively applied? Or can there be an Islamic society without an Islamic state? On the one hand radicals chant, "Islam is the answer" a slogan implying that Islam is the solution to all problems. On the other hand Neo-moderns have been echoing and elaborating the stance of Nurcholish Madjid's famous 1970 declaration, "Islam yes, Islamic party, no", an assertion which distances Islam from politics and differentiates it from the State.

Is it necessary – or even possible – to implement *sharī'a* in the institutions which comprise the contemporary nation state with its unprecedented dynamics of political parties, nationalist ideologies, and a global context? The role of *sharī'a* is also complicated by the fact that it differs significantly from other contemporary political systems in that it involves both piety and politics. Even if we can assume that piety is unchanging, is the application of *sharī'a* to contemporary political contexts –Indonesian or otherwise Indonesian– so simple?

In this paper, we will examine a number of prominent Muslim leaders and organizations which demonstrate alternative visions of the application of *sharī'a*. Further, the degree of engagement by Neo-Modern Liberals in their assertion of a valid Islamic identity provides a valuable model for the potential of developing an Islamic spirituality which addresses, and is situated in, a global context. Their claims are all the more interesting if we compare them to the implicit claim of Radical Islamist political ideologues to offer a comprehensive application of *sharī'a*.[4]

Radical Islamists and their Unprecedented Past

Bruce Lawrence has described fundamentalists (or what I will call here generically "religious radicals" or specifically "Radical Is-

lamists")[5] as: "…secondary male elites who oppose secular state power and attempt to affect social and political policies by authoritarian and highly selective reference to sacred scriptures."[6] Lawrence specifies that fundamentalists (i.e., radicals) represent an exclusively modernist development including people who (1) view themselves as the righteous remnant; (2) oppose their enemies through confrontation; (3) are organized in a hierarchy of male elites; (4) generate their own technical vocabulary; and (5) have historical antecedents but no precursors.[7] Framing the issues and problematics of contemporary Islamist radicals in an historical context, Carl Ernst observes:

> Certain ideologues (those whose theological positions require them to take power) have announced their aim as the establishment of pure Islamic law. They present themselves as returning to the standards established by the Prophet Muhammad 1,400 years ago, ruling society exclusively on the basis of the Qur'an. This audacious claim, which was never made before the twentieth century, reflects the very modern rhetoric of fundamentalism. It flies in the face of Islamic history, since every premodern political regime that we know of combined Islamic law with local custom, pre-Islamic structures and administrative decrees…Saudi Arabia has a monarchy plus a considerable admixture of pre-Islamic tribal custom, and Iran has a modern constitutional government structure combined with clerical rule…[8]

It is in some ways this very idealization of living in the past which is – ironically – unprecedented. And as we shall see, many Muslims argue that the Prophet's *sunnah* is characterized by tolerance and flexibility. In contrast to such tolerance, Robert W. Hefner and Sirozi have detailed how radicals view Islam as a totalizing, comprehensive, and enforced way of life.[9] As Sirozi points out, the radicals reject modernity and propose adopting six and seventh century Islam; they reject democracy and advocate *shari'a*; ignore globalization in favor of Islamization; and reject pluralism, asserting Islam as the only way, the only authentic religion, and the only way.[10] And although Sirozi is correct in observing that radicals inveigh against modernity, Bruce Lawrence has made a very clear case for the ironic stance which radicals take against the values of modernity while also embracing its means for spreading their message and perpetrating acts of violence.[11] In this milieu Indonesians face the question of enforcement since many

radicals propose to revive the Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta), a preamble to the 1945 Constitution which declares that "the carrying out of Syari'ah is an obligation of all Muslims." In an equally critical sense, Indonesians face the problem of enforcement and violence because of acts of terrorism motivated by an unprecedented socio-religious nostalgia which is facilitated by scientific weapons technology.[12]

Radical Islamist Parties and the State of *Shari'a*

The following provides a representative portrait of some of Indonesia's most visible Radical Islamist parties and some of the features of their agendas and intentions related to the question of establishing state of *shari'a*:

Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) Prosperous Justice Party, led by Hidayat Nur Wahid, Annis Matta, and Lutsi Ishak (graduates of Saudi Universities). Although in the 1999 election PKS (at the time PK/ Partai Keadilan) received only one percent of the votes, its status has changed as it has continued to pursue active social work among the poor and to convincingly gain a strong image of incorruptibility among both the poor and the middle class. As a result PKS emerged in the 2004 election with 7.34% of the votes, 45 parliamentary seats, and a ranking as one of the big six contenders — ahead of the National Mandate Party led by Amien Rais (Partai Amanat Nasional/ PAN) with 6.44% and the Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang/ PBB).[13]

PKS began among intellectuals at the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB). In 1974, at the Salman Masjid at ITB, Imaduddin Abdul Rahim started what became a national movement known as Latihan Mujahid Dakwah (LMD/ Training for Religious defenders of the Faith). LMD recruited members who met in small study groups called *usrah*, literally "family," to underscore their commonality of purpose. Their original study materials included books by the Muslim Brotherhood and Imaduddin's *Kuliah Tauhid*, more popularly known as the "Green Book." One of its most famous programs, the *tarbiyah* (Islamic education) movement which emerged in the 1970s established the "Nurul Fikri" learning and guidance centers. This movement also created a publications program, the *Sabili* magazine, and a campaign to en-

courage listening to songs praising the Prophet (*nasyid*) as an alternative to other forms of music. From these activities arose the Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK/Religious Institute Campus) which created a trans-national forum called Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslimin Indonesia (KAMMI/the Indonesian Muslim Students Action Unit). Both KAMMI and PKS believe that democracy can provide a means towards Islamic government with no underlying contradiction between the two. KAMMI became the springboard for PK (Partai Keadilan/Justice Party), later PKS.[14] PKS has emerged as the most moderate voice for Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia. On October 6, 2004, Hidayat Nur Wahid was elected leader of the Majlis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR).

Perhaps here lies a clue to an apparent discrepancy. An often-cited 2002 poll by PPIM (the Center for Research on Islam and Society at UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta) reported that 71% of respondents (2500 persons interviewed in 312 villages or urban wards; 89% Muslim so as to match Indonesian demographics) supported the application of *shari'a* for Muslims and 54% favored supporting militant movements (which do not participate in the electoral process) such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and Laskar Jihad.[15] However the 2004 election results seem to portray a different picture. In between this disparity, PKS's advancement in the last election may represent some of the actual –and noteworthy– expression of those respondents.

Front Pembela Islam (FPI) Islamic Defenders Front led by Habib Rizieq Shihab. In a recent interview Shihab summarized his argument for enforcing *shari'a* with these observations:

> Indonesia's problems are rooted in a moral crisis that has resulted in economic and social crises. Nothing changes if the morals don't improve. To accomplish that I think everybody in the world would agree the right approach is a religious approach…In Indonesia the majority is Islam, so Islam is the right solution for us….Our goal is to make *shari'a* the law for the majority and the minority…whether others like it or not, whether they agree or not – so our morals will stay intact.[16]

The FPI was the most prominent among three vigilante groups (including the Betawi Brotherhood Forum (FBR), and the Tangerang

Defenders Front) which during Ramadhan 1425 AD raided nightclubs and restaurants serving alcohol. The raids culminated in FPI's much-reported 11:30 PM attack on the Star Deli in the tourist neighborhood of Kemang Raya on Friday October 22, 2004). Fortunately the damage was limited to property, specifically doors, windows, furniture and other unspecified items. No injuries to persons were reported.[17] In this same period the FPI continued to blockade a Catholic school which they claimed was a center of conversion. Public debate questioned whether this behavior could be reconciled with Islam. Is Islam more than merely a "religion of peace," within its own community, but a religion of tolerance accepting the rights of pluralistic communities as well, as some would interpret a number of Qur'anic ayat (e.g., Q. 3.64; 5.48; 29.46)?

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a Neo-Salafi movement[18] evolved after over two decades of consensus building, especially around the goal of conducting *jihād* to achieving an Islamic state. JI was formally established around 1994-1995. Its roots extend to a number of predecessors: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood; Darul Islam; Persatuan Islam (PERSIS), a movement with an ideology closely resembling Wahhabism; and Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII), also a Neo-Salafi movement. DDII has been the receiving conduit through which Saudi Arabia's government-sponsored Islamic World League (Rabita al-'Alam al-Islami) has channeled funds for education, *dakwah*, and mosque-building in Indonesia. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the reputed *amir* or leader of JI (at least until 2002 when Thoriquddin/Abu Rusdan may have assumed this title) is perhaps the most internationally famous Indonesian radical Islamist. He continues to stand trial for the October 12, 2002 Bali bombing in which 202 people died, the October 13, 2003 bombing of the JW. Marriot Hotel in Jakarta, church bombings on Christmas Eve 2000, and a plot to assassinate President Megawati. JI has a huge dossier of bombings and robberies as well.[19] 83 members were arrested in 2003. In a CNN interview Ba'asyir disclaimed JI's existence: "Jemaah Islamiya, I am sure, is a manipulation, a fiction that was created to arrest people."[20] Ba'asyir inveighs repeatedly against Americans and Jews as the real terrorists because as he claims they continue to attack Islam.

Laskar Jihad (Jihad Fighters). Ja'far Umar Thalib is a Hadrami Indonesian (5% of Indonesians fall into this category) who studied at the Saudi-funded Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab/ LIPIA) in Jakarta and then in 1986 studied in Saudi Arabia on a DDII scholarship. He fought in Afghanistan as a *mujāhidin* and studied further in Yemen (1990-1993) before he returned to Indonesia in 1994. He founded Laskar Jihad as the paramilitary wing of the Followers of the Sunna and the Community of the Prophet (Forum Kommunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah/ FKASWJ). FKASWJ participated significantly in stoking conflict between Christians and Muslims in Maluku and Poso in 2000 and 2002.

Dewan Dakwah Islamiya Indonesia/ DDII (Indonesian Islamic Preaching Council) promotes literalist interpretation of scripture and mandates specific outward signs such as Islamic dress. DDII is a Neo-Salafi movement through which the Saudi-funded Islamic World League (Rabita al-'Alam al-Islami) has channeled funds for education, *dakwah*, and mosque-building. It has also focused on missionary work, especially in eastern Indonesia as a strategy of countering Christian evangelism there. DDI warns repeatedly of "Christianization," and the threat of a Zionist conspiracy. Similarly they denigrate Nurcholish Madjid and the Islamic Renewal Movement as a "Trojan Horse."

Hizbut Tahrir (Liberation Party) appeared as a network of campus dakwah organizations (Lembaga Dakwah kampus-LDK) in the 1980s. Initially the movement was founded in 1953 by Shaykh Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani, a former Muslim Brotherhood member, who set the goal of reestablishing a universal caliphate. Hizbut Tahrir rejects democracy and envisions instating caliphate as the only means by which Muslims can show their strength. In the late 1980s, the head of AL Ghazali Pesantren in Bogor, KH Abdullah bin Nuh, invited Abdurrahman Albhaghdadi from Australia. It was Albhaghdadi who brought Hizbut Tahrir to Indonesia. Hizbut Tahrir spread to a number of Universities and its leaders proposed a network of campus organizations. At a large gathering (*silaturahmi*) in Bogor in 1988, a new organization emerged, the campus dakwah organizations (LDK) which

took active roles in *tarbiyyah* movements, gained control of student governments, and became important advocates for *Reformasi*. LDK *Tarbiyya* leaders created Nurul Fikri. Many returned to their high schools to offer workshops in Islamic spirituality and values (Kerohanian Islam, or Rohis) which inspired the concept of "Integrated-Islamic Schools" (Sekolah Islam Terpadu). LDK also started publications such as *Saksi* (Witness) and *Tarbawi* (Educational) emphasizing moral and political reform, rather than the *jihād* of *Sabili*. Some of these campus leaders ultimately formed KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia). Using the term *Aksi* (action) they intended to signal that their campaigns were based on commitment to Islamic values rather than on protest (*demonstrasi*). Muhammadiyah leader Amien Rais praised this form of dakwah as *politik adiluhung* ("high" or "moral" politics) in contrast to Radical Islamists' ambitions to take control of the state.[21]

It is these groups which responded to the failure of the Soeharto's New Order by raising the rhetorical banner of the "comprehensive application of Islamic *syari'ah*."[22] But some have implicitly questioned the authenticity of the use of the term "comprehensive" by these groups. Describing the myopia of these groups, Sirozi observes:

> Certainly the radicals were not educated in a 'democratic' or 'pluralistic' education system and do not seem to have 'global intelligence.' They were educated in [a] 'politically inclined' and 'religious and highly gendered' tradition based on [a] *Salafi-Wahhabi* understanding of Islam…The graduates may be able, for example, to think and speak about the issues of *jihād* and *Sharī'a* but may not be able to think and speak about the issues with subtlety and depth, listen to others' view[s] and put them in global perspectives.[23]

One question to consider in this context is whether *shari'a* is supported and sustained when it is politicized and reified as a battle cry and agenda. Taking a lead from Sirozi's observations, a question arises: might a global context mean understanding *jihād* as a cooperative venture based on humanity's shared destiny rather than a battlefield of culture wars? A recent case in point occurred after the tragic tsunami of December 26. The Aceh Free Movement (G.A.M.) ceased fighting the Indonesian Military (T.N.I.), and both groups in turn cooperated in receiving assistance from foreign countries. But some have

asked where have the Islamist groups been in the midst of the aid relief? Sirozi's observation concerning the competence and authenticity of Islamist groups is strongly underscored by comments such as these in a *Bangkok Post* editorial:

> The remarkable lack of unity of Islamist extremists with Muslims hard hit by the December 26 earthquake and tsunami is good news for governments fighting the regional equivalent of al-Qaeda…. Clearly the extremists have only one interest at heart, and that is their own. The lack of help, even of a message of condolence, speaks volumes…The lack of aid and sympathy has exposed the true values of terrorists, extremists and their leaders.[24]

This account reflects omissions in the application of the *shari'a* suggesting a discrepancy between Islamist political rhetoric and the actual practice of *shari'a.* For a different model for the practice and fulfillment of *shari'a* we turn to Indonesia's other major stream.

Neo-Moderns: *Shari'a* as Holistic Human Culture

Neo-moderns, also called Post-Traditionalists, the Liberal Islam Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal/JIL), and the New Intellectual Group constitute a movement which has emerged since the 1970s among educators and civic leaders who have continued to advocate nurturing a comprehensive application of *shari'a* through the development of curriculum and the fostering of culture. Neomodernists also offer a comprehensive approach on a theoretical basis. As Greg Barton explains:

> Neomodernism argues for a holistic approach to *ijtihād* [independent interpretation], informed by both classical scholarship and modern Western critical thought, in order to discern the overarching message of the Qur'an, and its application to modern society…to make society more Islamic through education, rather than through party-political initiatives, such as attempts to introduce legislative recognition of the *Syari'a,* or even the establishment of an Islamic state.[25]

Some of the significant political parties in alignment with this moderate modernist Islamic ethos include: PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa/National Awakening Party), led by Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid (PKB received 10.57% of the 2004 vote); and PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional/ National Mandate Party), led by former

Muhammadiyah chairman Amien Rais (PAN received 6.44% of the 2004 vote).[26]

In what follows I would like to examine this heritage of Islamic inquiry into a "comprehensive application" of *sharī'a* which is, in contrast to the approach of some of the radical ideologues "holistic," rather than exclusivistic. Here I will profile some of the intellectuals whose work contributed to this stream.

Munawir Sjadzali, Minister of Religion from 1983 to1993 was a *pesantran*-trained scholar in both classical Islamic and contemporary scholarship, devoted to the goals of tolerance and inclusiveness. A student of Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid's father Wahid Hasyim, Sjadzali especially supported the neo-modernism of "Gus Dur," Nurcholish Madjid, and the IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Rector, Harun Nasution. He was especially dedicated to promoting the interpretive practice of "contextualized *ijtihād*." His hermeneutic called first for accounting for the unique circumstances during the time of the prophet before proceeding to adjust accordingly when applying Qur'an or hadith to contemporary concerns and contexts.

In a work written as a teaching text for the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN), Sjadzali identifies what he considers comprehensive in Islam:

> In Islam there is no governmental system, but there is a set of ethical values for life in a state…Islam is not totally similar to other religions, Islam contains a set of moral principles and moral values for life within a community as can be found in Al-Qur'an, with flexibility in its implementation and application, taking into consideration the different situation and conditions at different periods as well as among cultures.[27]

Sjadzali saw the relationship between the state and Islam as one in which the state protected people's rights so they could practice Islam. Interpreting Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Farabi, al-Ghazali, and others Sjadzali argued that the just state is the essential desideratum, even more so than the Islamic state: "a just head of state, even if an unbeliever, is better than an unjust head of state, even if he is a Muslim."[28]

Harun Nasution (1919-1998) In his approach to a comprehensive vision of Islam, Nasution advocated the development of an "Is-

lamic state of mind."[29] Nasution worked on his masters on *Masjumi* at McGill and his doctorate on Muhammad Abduh there as well. Thus when asked to serve at IAIN he developed a holistic curriculum called an "Introduction to Islamic Studies." For him the key is education, to "Islamize the power elites" rather than create political parties:

> I am often asked if the Muslim community can develop without an Islamic political party. In my opinion, it should not have a political party. The progress of the Muslim community is often very dependent on the power elite, namely leaders with an Islamic spirit, and it is not very dependent on political parties.[30]

Nasution reaffirmed this position in his autobiography, *Reflexi*:

> Islamic institutions have nothing to do with political parties but are about the spirit and soul of the ruler. If the ruler has an Islamic spirit, the Muslim *umma* will develop…Islam will develop in a country if her leader or power elite is mentally Islamic…therefore be close to the power elite. Bring him or her the spirit of Islam.[31]

Nurcholish Madjid (1939-). In January 1970 Madjid (almost inadvertently) launched a movement of *pembaharuan* (renewal) formally known as Gerakan Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam (Movement for the Renewal of Islamic Thought) when he delivered a speech which challenged and critiqued the typical configuration of Islamic organizations and parties emphasizing themes such as the unity of the *umat*:

> The answer to the above questions [e.g., Why are people not attracted to Islamic organizations?] might be found by putting down the next question: to what extent were they [the Islamic public and especially young Indonesian intellectuals] attracted to Islamic parties and organizations. Their attitude might be formulated thus, more or less: "Islam yes, Islamic party, No!"So if Islamic parties constitute a receptacle of ideas which are going to be fought for on the basis of Islam, then it is obvious that those ideas are now unattractive. In other words, those ideas and Islamic thinking are now becoming fossilized and obsolete, devoid of dynamism. Moreover these Islamic parties have failed to build a positive and sympathetic image; in fact they have an image which is just the opposite. (The reputation of a section of the *umat* with respect to corruption, for example is mounting as time passes.[32]

In 1976, Madjid participated in a nine-month seminar at the Uni-

versity of Chicago with the Pakistani Islamic Modernist, Fazlur Rahman. Rahman discovered that a vision of Islamic "neo-modernism" which he had also been working out matched what Nurcholish Madjid, Aburrahman Wahid and Mukti Ali and others were in the midst of evolving. It was only because Bahasa Indonesian (Indonesian language) left Indonesian writing sadly beyond the horizons of many readers abroad that Rahman had to wait for Nurcholish Madjid's arrival in Chicago to find a neo-modernist colleague. In the 1980s Harun Nasution brought Madjid to the faculty of IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah in Jakarta.

Madjid argues that the Prophet's precedent for governing a pluralistic society and the document upon which that precedent was established, the *ṣahīfa al-madīna* (the Piagam Medina, or Medina Charter) is an exemplar and precedent for pluralism. Madjid's understanding of this is almost teleological: he takes it as one of the "potential Islamic doctrinal resources for the establishment and appreciation of the modern concept of civil society," and in an essay under this title traces and interrelates milestones of humanism across Islamic and non-Islamic cultures.[33] Madjid emphasizes the role of religion as an affirmation of and contribution to the nobility of humanity. In his argument he cites the Qur'an's Surah of the Fig, with its reference to *taqwīm*: "We have created man in the best of moulds (*taqwīm*)" (95.4) and the declaration that human beings have been created by nature upright (*ḥanīf*) with a nature from Allah (*fiṭra Allah*). (30.30) Madjid underscores this fundamental Islamic humanism by quoting the Prophet's closing proposition from his Farewell Speech (*Khutbat al-Wadā'*) in which the Prophet emphasized that "…your Life, your Property, and your Honor are sacred upon all of you." This statement, as Madjid observes appears to be a prototype of the American Declaration of Independence's closing affirmation, "…we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our Sacred Honor." Madjid is not as much interested in illuminating influence in this case as in establishing an inherent Islamic ethos of civil society.

By describing the Prophet's leadership in Medina as a model for civil society (*masyarakat madani*), Madjid argues that civil society is an integral dimension of *sharī'a*. Madjid interprets the Prophet's very change of the name of the city of Yathrib to *Madīnat al-Nabi* as also

signifying this ethos of civil society, as the term *madīnat* means a polity, a community, a place of civility. Madjid's vision of the Prophetic City of Virtue, *al- Madīnat al-Faḍīlah* is characterized by the civil virtues of freedom, tolerance, and pluralism. It is in this light that Madjid has accused radicals of secularizing the profane by requiring an Islamic state.[34] And it is from this perspective that Neo-moderns understand his 1970 declaration, "Islam yes, Islamic party, no."

Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid (September 7, 1940 —) stands in a unique position among the participants in Indonesia's dialogue on *shari'a*, culture, and politics. For fifteen years he was the leader of the world's largest Islamic organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (The Awakening of the Ulama). Many of its over 40 million members consider him to some degree or other a saint. When he became President of Indonesia in 1999 some Western media announced that Indonesia had elected a "Muslim cleric" as President.[35] But Gus Dur[36] is a complex and interesting "Muslim cleric." His father was a *kiai* (as were both his grandfathers) who in addition to running a *pesantren* convened a circle of young Muslim intellectuals which included Munawir Sjadzali. In his youth Gus Dur was strongly attracted to a variety of Javanese-Islamic spiritual expressions. In addition to reading Qur'an and *hadīth*, he was drawn to the Sufi traditions of Java. As a teenager he prayed through the night in graveyards and made long arduous pilgrimages to Sufi saints' tombs.

He also developed a deep appreciation for the spiritual wisdom of the *wayang kulit*, the Javanese shadow puppet theatre thorough which distinctly Indonesian versions of the Hindu epics the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana* are performed. As a traditionalist, Gus Dur's attitude toward extra-Islamic spirituality and culture is one of acceptance of those truths which accord with Qur'an and *sunnah*. In the *wayang kulit*, moral conflict is expressed as a continual process, a polarity not between stark good and evil, but instead between, as Barton aptly phrases it "the spiritually developed and the spirituality undeveloped," and even in an almost non-dualistic sense simply the fostering of "benevolent maturity."[37] Clifford Geertz quotes an informant who observes that in the Indonesian *Mahabharata*

"… the *wayang* is full of wars which are supposed to represent the

inner war which goes on continually in every person's *batin* [interior self] between his base and refined impulses. In every *lakon* [episode] Ardjuna and the other Pendawas are continually fighting the giants and ogres, and oddly, they have to keep killing them over and over again. They kill them once and then a couple of hours later they are killing them all over again. Why is this? It is because the giants and ogres represent the passions…[O]ne has to keep fighting them off with good impulses represented by the Pendawas.[38]

These aspects of the *wayang kulit* contributed to Gus Dur's "appreciation of "the need for ambivalence and tolerance" which he felt represented the values of *pesantren* education.[39] Through these interests and experiences and his synthesis of things Islamic, Javanese, and Western, Gus Dur developed an inclusive perspective he contributed to the Neo-modern movement which emerged in the 1970s.

But at one stage Gus Dur gave Radical Islamism a sincere hearing. In his early twenties he sought comprehensive answers to humanity's social, political, and economic problems in the writings of such "fundamentalists" as Sayyid Qutb, Said Ramadan, Hasan al-Banna, and in al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, the Islamic Brotherhood.[40] After over a year of this quest in Jombong and Cairo he found these approaches superficial and repetitive and concluded that Islamism or fundamentalism is contrary to the true spirit of Islam.

In 1963 his studies brought him to Cairo, Baghdad, and the Netherlands. Having received an Islamic education in Indonesian *pesantrens* and *madrasas* in Egypt (al-Azhar), as well as a secular education in Baghdad (University of Baghdad) and Europe, Abdurrahman became convinced of the "failure of formalizing Islam in the life of a state like Indonesia."[41] He also became convinced that Islam needed to be reinterpreted in line with contemporary scientific knowledge. After serving in a variety of capacities in the *pesantren* network he moved to Jakarta in 1977 where he participated in forums with other progressive Muslim thinkers such as Nurcholish Madjid as well as with non-Muslims.

During the period of dissent in the 1970s and 80s under Soeharto's rule, Aburrahman in 1983 in conjunction with his older mentor-colleague NU leader, Achmad Siddiq, successfully persuaded NU to adopt Pancasila as a framework of civil Islam.[42] Through this act

Abdurrahman wanted to alleviate a potential confrontation with Soeharto's government. Inspired in part by the Islamic liberalism of Egyptian 'Abd al-Raziq, Abdurrahman chartered an accommodationist path based on the separation of religion and state, saying: "there is no need for a nation-state with Islamic law."[43] In his view the contemporary model of nation state is not essential to Islam. "..all social, political, or law reform starts with a curriculum, not with impractical legislation."[44]

Believing that Islamic values dictate tolerance and benevolence toward religious minorities, Gus Dur has strenuously promoted Pancasila as a means of ensuring a social structure of pluralism[45] which would be endangered by a politicized Islam. When in 2004 a crisis between Catholics and Muslims erupted in the neighborhood of the Sang Timur Catholic School, Abdurrahman literally stepped in to mediate. He proclaimed tolerance and dialogue as a priority among all the nation's different groups, and asserted: "And where Muslims are the majority, they should protect the rights of minority groups." [46]

Implicit in Gus Dur's stance is the idea, shared by Nurcholish Madjid, that pluralism is an Islamic value and practice and therefore an essential aspect of the comprehensive application of *sharī'a*.

In light of some Radical Islamist movements' interest in violence, Gus Dur's observations on this question provide an alternative Islamic viewpoint :

> This willingness to use violence [by Islamic movements] will by necessity involve violence in their efforts. One act of violence begets further counterviolence and soon an uncontrollable escalation of violence ensues. To avoid the possibility of such an escalation, with its never-ending specter of a war of annihilation, Islamic movements should dedicate themselves to nonviolence as a way to achieve their objectives.[47]

Abdurrahman has stressed the primacy of the "indigenization of Islam," a vision of Islam which validates itself in part based on its timely and socio-political relevance. Parallel to Munawir's advocacy of "contextualized *ijtihād*" this consideration also contributes to a vision of the "comprehensive application of *sharī'a*."

Comprehending the Comprehensive

The first concern which has been raised by a number of critics is that the political rhetoric of *sharī'a* stresses form over content in a way that leads to questions of authenticity, applicability, and relevance. Underneath the clothing of Islamic political discourse, how deep – or comprehensively – does the practice of *sharī'a* go? For example, recently events in Aceh have become a measure of this concern. One commentator pointed out that Osama bin Laden released an audio tape after the tsunami in which he said nothing about this great human tragedy. This commentator raised the question: Is humanitarian effort not also a jihad?

> Unfortunately, until now we have not witnessed a significant expression of concern from those who often identify themselves as *mujāhid sabīlillah* (the true crusaders for the religion of Allah)….Osama Bin Laden, the self-proclaimed commander of jihad against [the] United States and their allies, has ignored this humanitarian emergency….His silence is even more amazing, considering that the worst hit country is Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim nation. A few days after the earthquake and tsunamis hit south and Southeast Asia, *al-Jazeera* television aired excerpts of Osama's latest statement to the world in which the terrorist leader asserted that jihad in Iraq was a duty….This [silence about reconstructing and rebuilding Aceh and North Sumatra] is probably because the reality is these sort of people do not believe in reconstruction and rebuilding, and that is why the enormous suffering in the wake of the tsunami will reveal them as the political opportunists they are. Indonesia, like other Southeast Asian countries were only worthy of their attention as a recruiting ground for suicide bombers.[48]

Such discourse suggests something like an inversion of the fairy tale of the Emperor's New Clothes:in this case, the clothes are seen (i.e., *sharī'a* rhetoric), but some are wondering if there is anyone actually wearing them (i.e., Muslims practicing compassion and caring). In this light Martin van Bruinessen has described the limits of Islamist rhetoric and its realization in poignant terms:

> In concrete terms, imposition of the *sharī'a* appears to be understood primarily as the suppression of 'vice,' a ban on the sale of alcohol, forced veiling of women, and restrictions on the movements of women unaccompanied by a male protector.[49]

Van Bruinessen's description echoes a point Bruce Lawrence has underscored and which deserves reiteration: one typically finds a strong, but too often unstated, correlation between fundamentalism and patriarchy. In a personal conversation Muhammad Sirozi quoted a neo-modern who analogized the difference between the radicals and neo-moderns as "lipstick" and "salt." Radicals offer lipstick, all show, no substance. In contrast, the Neomodern program is like salt which dissolves naturally. The radicals, he went on to emphasize, have offered no specific program for the nuts and bolts of administration and governance. Their orientation is revolution and destruction.[50]

Many of the Radical Islamist groups have not delineated the contours of *sharī'a* nor have they developed a program for its implementation. Might idealized nostalgia be insufficient and merely signify obsolescence? Have Islamists adopted functioning or viable models? Are these models effective or counterproductive? Are they worth fighting for or resisting and on what bases? Many Indonesian radicals, for example were inspired by the Iranian revolution. This revolution was a clear example of an attempt to comprehensively apply *sharī'a* by state control. How well has it worked to empower Iran in a global context? Giles Kepel and Elizabeth Collins have both argued that the appeal of political Islam has waned after Islamist regimes in Iran (1979), Sudan (1989), and Afghanistan (1996) have failed to bring justice.[51] Now perhaps as a part of such an inquiry some will consider the degree of radicalist's contributions to the post-tsunami efforts.

Another interesting observation is that of Robert W. Hefner who suggests that the risk of an Islamic state is that Islam might become subordinated to the state.[52] Is *sharī'a* the task of political parties, nationalism, and globalization? A relevant hadith from Bukhari which would seem to underscore the irony or inappropriateness of asserting one's public persona to make *sharī'a* a politically recognized reality reads:

> The Messenger of God, God's prayers and peace be upon him, said to his companion Abd al-Rahman b. Samura: 'Oh, Abd al-Rahman, do not seek command. For if you are given it because you asked, you will bear the full responsibility. But if you are given it without asking, God will assist you in it."[53]

Might a myopic pursuit of political power and ideological certi-

tude in fact limit "comprehensiveness?" And might the political system also be compromised? Further, real world issues such as globalization and poverty cannot be ignored. The decisive sounding but simplistic formula "Islam is the answer," rests in a space of Derridian undecidability. One might equally say,"Islam is [not] the answer," as the hadith of the dates might suggest. In the canonical hadith of the dates recorded in *Saḥīḥ Muslim*, the Prophet once advised the date-growers of Medina on date growing, but when the resulting yield was disappointing, he then expressly differentiated his prophetic authority from the expertise of date-growers.[54]

The circumference of concern requires an ever-expanding comprehensiveness. How comprehensive can an application of *sharī'a* be if it overlooks human rights, women's rights, and ecology? As Amina Wadud comments: "…gender inclusiveness is essential in the movement of Islam into a world-wide thought system…"[55] The apologetic trend to ascribe the origins of these ideals to "Islam," cannot absolve Muslims who claim certainty concerning a "comprehensive application of *sharī'a*" from the duty to address questions of how to fulfill these ideals in practice. Further, how can a "comprehensive" view (which is really "exclusivist") be comprehensive if it renders its citizens afraid of and in enmity toward the "other?" And where does environmentalism find its place in the rhetoric and intentions of Islamist groups. The Qur'an is very clear on the meaning and value of the natural environment and the natural beauty of the communities of species (6.38). Nature is described as "muslim." (3.83; 16.49; 30.26; 55.6)

A dynamic perspective on the *sharī'a* would re-envision the Prophetic Sunna as starting with the advances in such areas as human rights, women's rights, globalization, interfaith dialogue (which in some ways the Prophet helped to herald) and then continuing in those directions rather than opposing these global values. A "comprehensive" vision has to include co-existence of difference. But the Islamist radicals preclude the co-existence of difference.

The Prophet himself lived in his own time and addressed contemporary issues in contemporary ways (not merely limited to the ways of earlier Prophets). Islamists who envision hurdling back across centuries to retrieve an idealized "pure" form of Islam are simulta-

neously ignoring the needs of the present while also failing to recreate the dreams of the past. With this unprecedented combination they are truly offering Muslims everywhere *bid'a* – an innovation.

Nurcholish Madjid's affinity for the *ṣaḥīfa al Madīna* as a precursor to civil society is emblematic of Indonesia's potential for a Pancasila *syarī'a*. Perhaps like few other Muslim countries in the world, Indonesia resembles the Muslim community in Medina in its potential for flexibility, fluidity, and inclusiveness, as well as an unbound and creatively unpredictable range of great possibilities.

Notes

[1] This "*hadith* of Layth," was transmitted by Layth ibn Sa'd from Imam Malik.

[2] In this paper I will use the cross-culturally familiar spelling "*shari'a*," except in cases or in quotes where the Indonesian conventional spelling "*syarī'ah*" is more accurate or appropriate. Denotatively, both words are the same.

[3] The broad scope of *shari'a* classifies all actions in one of five ways: (1) Required (*wājib*); (2) Recommended but not required (*mandub*); (3) Accepted or permitted (*mubāḥ*); (4) Disliked but not prohibited (*makrūh*); and (5) Prohibited (*ḥarām*). The sources (*uṣūl*) for interpreting *shari'a* consist of four elements of Islamic tradition: (1) the Qur'an; (2) the Sunnah or precedent of the Prophet Muhammad; (3) *Ijmā'* the consensus of opinion of Islamic scholars; (4) *Qiyās* (analogical reasoning derived from the Qur'an and Sunnah.) Finally, four fields of knowledge (*'ilm/'ulūm*) contribute to the development of *shari'a:* Qur'anic exegesis (*tafsīr*); Hadith (*hadith*); Theology (*kalām*); and Law (*fiqh*). Even if any or some of these thirteen components can be considered stable or consistent, the possible varieties of 21st century political contexts vary.

[4] This paper was written as a contribution to a panel entitled: "Fundamentalism and the Comprehensive Application of Shari'a in Special Areas." (See seminar title and date in footnote 1). "Comprehensive application of *shari'a* " is a staple of post-New Order (i.e., after Soeharto's fall on May

21, 1998) Islamist discourse.

[5] A number of good reasons for using the term "Radical Islamist" rather than "Fundamentalist" will guide us in this choice. Essentially there is no useful reason to invoke the limited (and often erroneous and ambiguous) comparison between "Islamism" and Christian – or even Jewish – Fundamentalism. As Francois Burgat has observed the meaning, particularly the demographic disparity between power-privileged American and Israeli fundamentalists and "Islamic fundamentalists" turns the comparative label into a "distorting lens." We are better off then to use, I propose, a term such as Islamist and perhaps as is done in the Republic of Iran, speak of an *idiolozhi*. (cf. Burgat in Esposito and Burgat 2003: 24) Bjorn Olav Utvik argues that Islamist fundamentalism bears too little resemblance to its Christian and Jewish contemporary counterparts and, further, that the category of fundamentalism is tautologically defined, begging the question of the authority of scripture. He proposes a more salient comparison with the Protestant, especially the Calvinist Reformation (Utvik in Esposito and Burgat 2003) As for the descriptor "Radical," this may provide a helpful clarification, because, as Tazim R. Kassam has pointed out, the *Oxford English Dictionary* still carries among its definitions of "Islamist" an "orthodox Muslim," or "an expert on Islam." (cf. Tazim R. Kassam, "On Being a Scholar of Islam: Risks and Responsibilities," in Omid Safi (ed.), *Progressive Muslims*, (Oxford: One World, 2003), pp. 121-141, ftn. 1).

[6] Bruce Lawrence, *Defenders of God* (Charleston: University of South Carolina Press, 1996) quoted in Carl Ernst, *Following Muhammad* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), p. 26.

[7] Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, pp. 99-101. Although these traits appear among non-fundamentalist and even non-religious groups, this definition illuminates some of the otherwise hidden ironies of fundamentalism: modernist traditionalists; believers innovating in their practice of traditionalism; and alleged traditionalists exploiting high technology to name a few.

[8] Ernst, *Following Muhammad, pp.* 30-31

[9] Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 12; Sirozi, "Countering Islamic Radicalism in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," Unpublished Conference Paper presented at "The Idea(l) of the Indonesian Islamic University," Yogyakarta, December 9-11, 2004, p. 3.

[10] Sirozi, "Countering Islamic Radicalism", p. 3. Two prototypes for all later so-called fundamentalist movements are frequently cited as Hasan al-

Banna's Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1920s and 1930s and Abu al-'Ala Maudoodi's *Jama'at-i Islami* in India, established in 1941. Both claimed to return to an original pristine Islam and discredited rivals as corrupt deviators. Neither of these movements' founder-leaders had received traditional Islamic education. Both were decidedly modern and anticolonialist. (cf. Ernst, *Following Muhammad,* p. 133).

[11] Bruce Lawrence, *Defenders of God*.

[12] For the case that no use of modern weapons technology can be legitimated by reference to *sunna* or *sharī'a*, see Chaiwat Satha Anand, "The Nonviolent Crescent: Eight Theses on Muslim Nonviolent Actions," p. 23. Accessed at www.globalnonviolence.org October 5, 2004. Also see, Hugh Talat Halman, "Four Voices of Islamic Non-Violence in South and Southeast Asia," forthcoming in Kuriokose, ed. *Nonviolence in the World's Religious Traditions.*

[13] Sofian M. Asgart, "No Vote for Corruption," *TEMPO* English Edition January 25-31, pp32-33; Syafa'atun, "1001 Reasons to Vote for PKS," *TEMPO*, English Edition, January 25-31, pp. 36-37.

[14] Syafa'atun, "1001 Reasons to Vote for PKS" , pp. 36-37. Elizabeth Fuller Collins, "Islam is the Solution" *KULTUR,* vol. 3, no. 1, 2003, (Jakarta: Pusat Bahasa dan Budaya UIN Jakarta), p. 157.

[15] Collins, "Islam is the Solution", p. 173. Martin van Bruinessen, "Post-Suharto Muslim Engagements with Civil Society and Democratisation." Accessed December 12 at http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/

[16] Habib Rizieq Shihab, quoted as interviewed by Tracey Dahlby, *Allah's Torch: A Report from Behind the Scenes on Asia's War on Terror* (New York: William Morrow, 2005), p. 191.

[17] "Police Yet to Interrogate FPI Attackers, *The Jakarta Post* Tuesday October 26, 2004; "Police Claim to Have Four Raid Suspects but No Arrests So Far," *The Jakarta Post*. Accessed on January 5, 2005 at www.thejakartapost.com.

[18] The term Neo-Salafi reflects the combination of the conservatism of traditional Salafi and Wahhabi dakwah with the revolutionary Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood.

[19] Much of this information and other facts and perspectives appear in Sidney Jones, " Jemaah Islamiya: A Short Description," *KULTUR,* vol. 3, no. 1, 2003, (Jakarta: Pusat Bahasa dan Budaya UIN Jakarta), pp. 105-114.

[20] Quoted in Tracy Dahlby, *Allah's Torch: A Report from Behind the Scenes in Asia's War on Terror* (New York: William Morrow, 2005), p. 129, ftn. 1.

[21] Collins, "Islam is the Solution", p. 165.

[22] "Project Description," for the International Seminar, "A Portrait of Contemporary Indonesia."

[23] Sirozi, "Countering Islamic Radicalism", p. 14.

[24] "Extremists Show Their Nature," *Bangkok Post* editorial reprinted in *The Jakarta Post*, January 26, 2005, p. 6.

[25] Greg Barton, *Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid* (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2002), p. 13.

[26] Sofian M. Asgart, "No Vote for Corruption," *TEMPO*, English Edition, January 25-31, p. 32.

[27] M. Sjadzali, 1991, *Islam and Government System: Teachings, History, and Reflections* quoted in Malcolm Cone, "Neo-Modern in Suharto's Indonesia," *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 4, 2, December 2002, p. 59.

[28] Sjadzali, *Islam and Government System*.

[29] M.B. Hooker, *Indonesian Islam: Social Change through Contemporary Fatawa.* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003), p. 36.

[30] Hooker, *Indonesian Islam,* p. 62.

[31] Hooker, *Indonesian Islam,* p. 66.

[32] Nurcholish Madjid, "The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and the Problem of the Integration of the Ummat," in Kemal Hassan, *Muslim Intellectual Responses to 'New Order' Modernization in Indonesia*. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1982, pp. 187-197. I have quoted this passage as it appears in Greg Barton, *Gus Dur*, p. 124-125.

[33] Nurcholish Madjid, "Potential Islamic Doctrinal Resources for the Establishment and Appreciation of the Modern Concept of Civil Society," in *Islam and Civil Society in Southeast Asia*, ed. Nakamura Mitsuo, et. al. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 2001, pp. 149-163.

[34] Hefner, *Civil Islam*, p. 116-117

[35] Barton, *Gus Dur*, p. 62.

[36] This popular nickname means loosely, "honored older brother." Dahlby, *Allah's Torch,* p. 151.

[37] Barton, *Gus Dur*, p. 121.

[38] Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1965), p. 271.

[39] Barton, *Gus Dur*, p. 121.

[40] Barton, *Gus Dur*, p. 60.

[41] Abdurrahman Wahid, quoted in John Esposito and John O. Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam.* (Oxford, 2001) p. 200.

[42] Hefner, *Civil Islam,* p. 160.

[43] Abdurrahman Wahid, quoted in Esposito and Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, p. 205.

[44] Hooker, *Indonesian Islam*, p. 41.

[45] Pancasila, the five principles of Indonesia's constitution are symbolically depicted on the breast of the national symbol of the avataric eagle of Wisnu (Vishnu), Garuda: (1) *bintang*, a star represents belief in One God Almighty (citizens must identify themselves as Muslim, Hindu, Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist, or Confucian; (2) *rantai,* a chain symbolizes a just and civilized humanity; (3) *pohon beringin*, a banyan tree represents unity among Indonesia's diverse ethnic groups in a spirit of nationalism; (4) *kerbau*, a buffalo, represents democratic consultation and deliberation for the sake of building mutual consensus; and (5) *padi*, rice or a rice field represents social justice for all Indonesians.

[46] "School's Wall Falls, Tensions Still High," *The Jakarta Post*, Tuesday October 26, 2004, p. 2. "All the nations groups" refers to the six recognized religious communities under Indonesia's constitution: Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, Hindu, Buddhist, and Confucian. A commentary on both sets of events by Muhammad Ali, a lecturer at UIN Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University with a similar appeal for peaceful coexistence appeared in *The Jakarta Post* Friday October 29, 2004. For the 12-year historical background leading up to this crisis (centering on the use of the school building for conducting mass since August 15, 1992) see Setiyardi, Y. Tomi Aryanto and Ayu Cipta, "God's Bitter Gate Keepers," *Tempo* (English edition) November 22, 2004, pp. 12-13.

[47] Abdurrahman Wahid, "Islam, Nonviolence and National Transformation," in Paige, Glenn D., Chaiwat Satha Anand, and Sarah Gilliat, eds., *Islam and Non-Violence.* Hawaii: Center for Global Non-Violence, Inc., 1999. Accessed October 4, 2004 at www.globalnonviolence.org.

[48] Zakiyuddin Baidhawy, "Tsunami Calls for True 'Jihad,' " op. ed. piece, *Jakarta Post* Thursday January 27, 2005, p. 6.

[49] Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-

Suharto Indonesia." July 2002, p. 17. Accessed December 2004 at http://www.let.uu.nl/~martinvanbruinessen/personal/publications/genealogies_islamic_radicalism.htm.

[50] Personal conversation, Yogyakarta, December 10, 2004

[51] Collins, "Islam is the Solution", p. 173.

[52] Hefner, *Civil Islam*, 220.

[53] al-Bukhari, *Saḥīh,* vol. 7-9 (Beirut: Dar al-Qibla, 1987), p. 703; Hamza al-Sahmi, *Ta'rīkh Jurjān* (Hydrerabad, 1967). The quoted hadith and these attributions all appear in Richard W. Bulliet, *Islam: The View from the Edge.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 1.

[54] Chapter 35, Book 30, no. 5830-32 provide three tellings of this one hadith making up the entire chapter.

[55] Amina Wadud, "Abstract," in Conference Manual, "Idea(l) of an Indonesian Islamic University," Yogyakarta, December 9-11, 2004, p. 9.

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Questioning Political and Economic Rights for Non-Muslims in Contemporary Indonesia

Iik Arifin Mansurnoor

"Inna al-ma`rakata bayn al-mu'minīn wa khusūmihim hiya fī samīmiha ma`raka `aqīda wa laysat shay'an ākharan `alā al-itlāq…. Innahā laysat ma`raka siyāsa wa la ma`araka iqtisādiyya wa la ma`araka `unsūriyya. Wa law kānat shay'an min hādha lā sahula waqfuhā, wa sahula ḥall ishkālihā"[1]

"*But whoever (or whatever) [will succeed Suharto], they will still be faced with gatherization of peoples imperfectly balanced…. [Pluralism seems to be the most pervasive and enduring], …neither Islam as overlay nor Islam as immanence will in the end really do*"[2]

"*[These] studies show that although it is possible to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the various actors and institutions [in today's Indonesia], it is extremely difficult to foresee the final equilibrium of all these forces — since Indonesia's possibilities range from reinvigorated stability to chaos and national disintegration*".[3]

Introduction

Catching a glance at the percentage of the Muslim population in Indonesia, Muslims could be expected to be predominant in political and economic spheres. Until quite recently *santri* Muslims belonged to a political minority, at least in term of access to real power. Despite the presence of wealthy Muslim individuals, economically most *santri* Muslims were again players in the peripheries of the capitalist economy of 20th century Indonesia. What has gone seriously wrong with them? Who is to blame for their misery? Is it the fault of Muslims, the colonial government, the Old/New Order governments or the dominant world powers? As a historian I would like to share some historical perspective on the phenomenon.

Prior to the reformation and genuinely democratic elections following the downfall of the New Order regime, no one ever expected santri-Muslims to assume responsibility in addressing the economic and political rights of non-Muslims. A government where santri-Muslims played an insignificant role was ever-present and omnipotent. This is quite normal in modern nation-states; however, for us the problem was oligarchic monopoly. Shares in political and economic power were anathema since an access to them was highly personal and authoritarian. In reflection of the above, indeed, this Seminar has initiated a seminal forum to address crucial issues on the future of the political strength of santri-Muslims and potentially also its ramification for their economic muscle. At present, however, all these can simply be considered as wishful thinking and perhaps at most optimism and confidence.

The time of a seemingly never ending global war on terror sponsored by the most powerful democratic nation on earth is also an opportunity for the largest Muslim country in the world to shine in implementing human rights and humanitarian laws. It is a fact that since the start of the campaigns against terrorism after 9/11 the rule of humanitarian law has rather eroded instead of having been enforced. "Human rights have been undermined at the time they most need to be upheld".[4]

In the past few years, almost suddenly Muslims, *santri* and others, have become socio-religiously less distinguishable, and politically significant, or even prominent, enjoying the "fallen *durian*" of amaz-

ing political strength. Although their leaders or, perhaps more appropriate, parties have not been very successful in dominating power, they have shown their strategic niche in the country's political structure. Indeed, optimism for brighter prospects concerning the community and nation has run deep and high.

The mapping of present Muslim locus and future potential in Indonesia perhaps, in my own perspective, can also be reflected through past model and experience. Growing out of a mercantile world, Islam in Southeast Asia has been very positive and optimistic in the far away land of Svarnadvipa. It soon found niches in different politics of the region. In the period after the Pacific War, Muslims, like many others in Southeast Asia, Indonesia included, showed enthusiasm for the new era of an independent nation-state, even an "imagined" one, to use Anderson's famous sardonic term.[5] The few enlightened Muslim leaders were determined to establish a state, *dār al-Islām* where Islam prevails, whatever that meant at the time. Defeated in the elections and the parliament in the 1950s, many initiated diverse desperate attempts or, some may call, ingenious alternatives to salvage Muslim interests in political power.[6] Then in the mid-1960s Muslims unexpectedly found themselves in a buoyant mood when the army looked for partners in reaping the legitimacy to rule. Geertz's seminal taxonomy of Indonesian,[7] or actually Javanese, society at the time seems not to have won any note among the newly emerging Muslim leaders. Soon political euphoria gave in to the increasingly dominant slogan "politics no more". Will opportunities be missed again now, in the beginning of the 21st century? Let's return to this issue and reflect upon it later in this essay.

Why has urban violence in post-1966 Indonesia been closely linked to Islam and Christianity? Aside from socio-economic, racial, and regional conflicts involving Chinese and "separatist movements," major violence has erupted in areas where Christianity and Islam meet head-to-head. Why? This is a complex phenomenon which cannot be easily generalized. However, I venture to suggest some glaring factors: 1) Both Islam and Christianity are missionary religions aiming at bringing the world into its respective fold; 2) Globalization has also reinforced religious response among the faithful. In the context of violence, media coverage of violence involving co-religionists worldwide

can easily ignite comparable violent response against the local opponents; 3) Massive dislocation of local interests can also lead to violence.

Yet the same globalization also makes various noble ideas, including human rights as outlined in the numerous declarations and conventions, spread among a wider audience. We have two immediate issues which need to be addressed. Will Muslims happily endorse the U.N.-sanctioned human rights? What aspects of these rights are relevant for addressing the political and economic rights of non-Muslims in Indonesia?

In arguing that a neutral, non-religious authority should stand to administer religious freedom, one must bear in mind that only democratically elected governments may be expected to function in this way. Authoritarian governments by nature of their origin of power, generally less people-oriented, always face legitimacy challenges and thus are continuously under threat of political dissent. Any group including religious ones and minorities can be the immediate object of victimization, arrest and harassment or at other times trusted, but controlled, agents to undertake particular missions and protect vested interests.

Persecution of minorities, for more details see below, can also be contemplated in order to silence co-religionist critics and the emotionally charged masses. In many parts of Indonesia, for example, pogroms and intimidation of Christians or Chinese at times were arguably sponsored by the hidden hands of the country's leaders for no other reason than keeping their political dominance, particularly when minorities have been conveniently used as a vital, though vulnerable, vehicle for control and monopoly of administrative and economic power.

Despite the serious and continuing violation of human rights in this country, which must be immediately tackled, reports on human rights issues concerning minorities have been routine and relatively less alarming.

Will non-Muslims in Indonesia be victimized in the process or the aftermath of Muslim political and economic ascendancy? Clearly religio-political radicalization among Muslims has born some negative repercussions for non-Muslims and minorities. Injustice and suf-

ferings in the past could be simply blamed on non-Muslims who were suspected as beneficiaries and recipients of certain policies of the ousted political elite. For example, a few wealthy Chinese tycoons, owners of giant conglomerates, who facilitated the business activities of the ruling class led to the formation of a public opinion and generalization that all Chinese were simply cronies and exploiters. Are these phenomena transient and temporary and thus side-effects of Islamist struggles for more space in the public domain? I cannot give a satisfactory, let alone conclusive, answer without having better knowledge shared by those colleagues who have dealt with political dynamism and pitfalls of Muslim politics in contemporary Indonesia.

Here, I argue that despite economically and, until quite recently politically peripheral, Muslims, through the arduous process of democratization, have shouldered the obligation to design a more elegant, open, fair and democratic map for their future handling of minorities. Historical models provided by texts and events remain crucial but they are not normative. The general principle of inclusiveness, fairness and justice for all as advocated by the Scripture should be maintained and referred to continuously, and not the literal words and reports, culled from the historic Prophet. An understanding of the historical context of contemporary Indonesia's religious, political, and economic phenomena remains indispensable in our analysis of Muslims and their future vis-à-vis the minorities.

Islamic Background: Normative References, Imperative Models and Historical Realities

Does Islamic polity provide non-Muslims and others with "rights"? The Qur'an refers to non-Muslims in many verses and for many different contexts. Ideologically and religiously Muslims are exhorted to submit to Allah concerning their arguments and exchanges with non-Muslims (22:17). Yet, in worldly affairs Muslims have to deal with them realistically and matter-of-factly (2:212; 3:64, 149-50; 22:11). For me the handling of most temporal issues, including relations with non-Muslims and minorities, belongs to the profane. Islamic values and principles and various other conventions and traditions clearly can make any policy concerning minorities more meaningful, legitimate, and virtuous. Otherwise, Muslims fail to appreci-

ate their own religious treasures. Now let's examine relevant major historical features and experiences in this regard.

One of the earliest relations the Prophet Muhammad and his companions established with non-Muslims took place when Muslims were welcomed to settle in Habasha (Eritrea), long before the migration to Medina. Tabari cites a comment by the Muslim migrants: "We arrived in the land of Habasha, establishing excellent neighborly relations, upholding our faith, worshipping God, living harmoniously and hearing no words we disliked".[8]

When the Prophet endorsed the historical "Charter of Medina," shortly after he settled in the city, the agenda of pluralism had been set up clearly and fairly. Non-Muslims were given fundamental rights in return of loyalty to the state in the person of Muhammad. Although toward the end of his life, Medina had emerged as an Islamic capital with a monolithic population, and later scholars referred to this historical fact as an evidence of the prophetic wish and model, it is clear that principles of pluralism were proposed and implemented by the Prophet. The two controversial episodes during the time of the second caliph, `Umar, can elucidate a better picture of such principles.

The Najran and Khaybar affairs during the life of the Prophet show that some form of rights for non-Muslims and others was clearly specified. Ibn Ishaq and Ibn Hisham provide us with interesting accounts on the relations between the Christians of Najran and the Prophet Muhammad after his migration to Medina. Following debates, exchanges and visits, the Najranis declared their acceptance of Muhammad's leadership, and loyalty to Medina without becoming Muslims. In response to their request, Muhammad sent Abu 'Ubayda ibn al-Jarrah as his representative to Najran.[9]

Tabari came up with an interesting account from Sayf ibn 'Umar, listed under events in 13H, concerning the Christians of Najran. Like what Caliph 'Umar did against the Jews of Khaybar, the Caliph expelled them from Najran to other locations. His argument was derived from the claimed report that the Prophet warned his companions not to let any second religion prevail in the Arabian Peninsula *Allā yutrak bi-jazīrat al-'Arab dīnāni* (Do not let two religions co-exist in the Arabian Peninsula).[10]

Concerning the Jews of Khaybar we have this account. After

having been defeated by the Medinan regime, the Jews were allowed by the Prophet Muhammad to stay and run their businesses in return for tasks and obligations to Medina. Relations had developed smoothly, until the middle part of 'Umar's caliphate, when he decided to expel the Jews from Khaybar. His verbal argument was based on the report, which seems to have just reached him, saying that the Prophet on his deathbed declared "*Lā yajtami'anna bi-jazīrat al-'Arab dīnāni*" (Two religions will never co-exist in the Arabian Peninsula).[11]

Seen in these fragmented, but closely relevant historical episodes, I believe that 'Umar's decision to expel non-Muslims from Najran and Khaybar was historical, not normative. It belongs, in the *fiqhi* term, to the realm of personal opinion, in the position of caliph thought. This can also be compared to the similar events, when the Prophet declared three tribes of Medinan Jews non-citizens. Indeed, according to the Prophet's standard, they failed to fulfill their earlier pledge of loyalty in return for cooperation and security. They continued to pose threats politically through their conspiracy and to some extent economically for monopoly.

Mutual trust and benefit indeed characterize intensive relations between Islamic state and various non-Muslim communities. During the Umayyad and 'Abbasid rules, the need for professionals, officials, medical practitioners, teachers, and skilled workers led to the appointments and hiring of non-Muslims into the Muslim courts. For example, joint-research at the Bayt al-Hikma of Baghdad under the direct patronage of the great 'Abbasi caliphs and the Red Sea-Mediterranean trade under the Fatimi and Mamluk dynasties of Egypt and the Ottomans can also be cited as historical practices of Islamic inclusiveness and all-embracing approach to state and society.

The classical dictum of Islamic world order remains relevant today; however, its historical interpretation of Muslim superiority in universal polity must be critically assessed, particularly its confrontational –black-and-white– division of the world into *dār al-Islām* and *dār al-ḥarb*. Indeed, it has become irrelevant, and *de facto* ignored despite continuing memorization and reminiscence.

The concept of *umma* paved the way for, or rather created, the contagion of inclusiveness and synthesis ignoring ethno-cultural frontiers. The solidarity as augmented in the *umma* did not end cultural

diversity among Muslim communities. As can be clearly observed in the material culture, dress, and language, to mention a few, found among Muslims, the *umma* was a pointer or guide of solidarity, not a dogma for singularity.

In the 15ᵗʰ century, the Ottomans innovated the *millet* system which proved relatively successful in managing diversity through autonomy. Being newcomers to the Mediterranean the Ottomans learned very fast to govern the non-Muslim majority in the Balkans. Indeed, under the Ottomans non-Muslims enjoyed wide autonomy, except in political and military matters.

Despite the jurists' propagation and the spread of the dualistic approach to the political world in the forms of *dār al-Islām* and *dār al-ḥarb*, Islamic history has been more often characterized by mixing and bridging. This necessitated the jurists-cum-political theorists to suggest such terms as *dār al-ṣulḥ*,[12] *dār al-aman,* and *dār al-'ahd,* were *ad hoc* and increasingly unavoidable designs in support of the pluralistic reality and accommodating Islamic society.

Early Experience of Social Formation in a Plural Society

The coming of Islam to Southeast Asia traversed a totally different path from that in the Middle East. This led to the emergence of diverse new phenomena related to the formation of a Muslim community in the region. Unlike the political centralization that resulted from the Muslim conquests of West Asia and North Africa, in Southeast Asia, Muslim sultans who emerged from the late 13ᵗʰ century inherited the prevailing polities, undoubtedly containing the bulwark of non-Muslim population. Islamization took the form of mass conversion much later. Let's now have a closer look at these Muslim polities.

Petty Muslim Polities and the Scholarly World of Southeast Asia

One crucial and even revolutionary impact of Islam on the early Southeast Asian polity is manifests in its wide opening to the local autonomy as can be seen in the mushrooming of sultanates in the Malay World, and Nusantara, from Patani in the west to Ternate in the east. Yet they continued to maintain contact, affiliation, and cooperation developing eventually the integrated Indo-Malay culture, language, and governance. The state, as epitomized by its proprietor–

ruler, formally endorsed Islam as symbol and identity, whereas the society was left almost alone in its own diversity and layered segments, including diverse religions. Abdullah Munshi's observation of Malaya's east coast in the early-19th century can be cited not so much as what Abdullah argues, but as an illustration of inclusive communities of Malay states, where diverse ethnic and racial communities live together. In the case of Mataram, Ricklefs has documented, among other things, the diversity of Mataram society.[13] Certainly it was not fixed and ossified at one time or other but rather historically moved in a version of pendulum swing. In other words, not only did Southeast Asian Islam offer more room for local political autonomy, it also provided diverse segments to enrich the character of each individual state and society. Under the patronage of these polities, Muslim scholars wrote religious treatises which have some relevance to and perhaps also impact on the Muslim discourse on non-Muslims. Let's have some closer examination of their contents.

Emphasis of the Teachings of Southeast Asian Scholars as Reflected in Their Works

Despite the fact that Islam reached the region by peaceful means, including trade, the concept of building a community follows the Medinan model. The Meccan model has been ignored by Muslim scholars. In reality the pioneers must have adopted the Meccan approach consisting of three principles: belief in the unicity of God, socio-economic improvement and justice and the concept of social equality. Nevertheless the emphasis on establishing a community based on the Medinan model could not be pursued equally in all parts of the region. The preoccupation of imposing a universal system could be hampered by the inability of certain Muslim concentrations to gain influence and also the opposition of non-Muslim majority.

It must be pointed out that a Patani scholar, Muhammad Nur,[14] has categorically argued about the peaceful propagation of religion. For example, before his migration to Medina, the Prophet Muhammad never contemplated any idea of war. Patience and perseverance are key concepts during this period, as Muhammad Nur shows. Although he never pursues this aspect further, generally Southeast Asian scholars who write and comment on *Kitāb al-Jihād* put aside this point and

go on to discuss the obligation of *jihād*. The mind set of religious scholars has been stuck to the political and administrative developments as shown with the emergence of Medinan regimes and the caliphate system or any other later political concepts. The Meccan period is considered an abrogated model. In my opinion, such scholars as Muhammad Nur sense the relevance of the Meccan model for many newly developed Muslim communities in the peripheries; however, due to his preoccupation with school-oriented thinking his doubt never wins his own conviction.

Moreover, it is also important to note that the vigor among the inspired scholars and leaders toward renewal and reform was after all an internal pulse and first inward-looking orientation and thus much energy was spent on internal or domestic matters. The Kharijis (since 657), Ibn Taymiya (d.1329), Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (d.1797) and, in Southeast Asia, al-Raniri (d.1657) all launched attacks and purged their Muslim brethren who were considered clumsy and improper. They justify their attacks and purges are generally on the argument that all those Muslims went beyond the limit as to be legitimately labelled *kuffār* or at least apostates.

The dissemination of Islamic teachings in Southeast Asia has followed particular approaches and patterns. Generally it is acknowledged that before the introduction of the reformist and modernist ideas toward the end of the 19th century, the teaching of Islam revolved around three disciplines: Islamic jurisprudence, scholastic theology and Sufism and morality. All these disciplines were taught using particular acceptable texts, known as *kitab Jawi* or *kitab kuning*.

The model of religious life among early Southeast Asian Muslims mainly came from al-Ghazzali's teachings, as can be seen in the dominance of *fiqh*, scholastic theology and sufism and morality as propagated by the Hijaz-based scholars.[15] Muslim scholars insist on the importance of giving priority to individual rights over protection of one's life, mind, property, sense of honor or prestige and family.[16]

In commenting on the works of 'Uthman ibn 'Aqil of Betawi, Snouck Hurgronje insists that a religious teacher like 'Uthman belongs to a group of responsible scholars who attempted to implement the Islamic norms "in a smooth and moderate manner." Of course Snouck expresses his approval his subordinate, as a colonial govern-

ment officer, who tries to accommodate the government's interests within the perimeters of the religious norms.[17]

The editor of *Kitab Perukunan* maintains that a Muslim has the obligation to uphold and implement the pillars of the faith (*arkān al-īmān*) and those of Islam (*arkān al-Islām*). At the same time, he elaborates virtues and conditions that a Muslim must keep at all time, as follows:

· Patient to the reality of God's law
· Content with the divine decree and fate
· Sincere in submitting to God
· Obedient to the commands of God and His Messenger and staying away from the prohibitions
· Being a low-profile person
· Avoiding lies
· Free from envy and jealousy
· Preventing his stomach from unlawful foods and drink.

All these qualities were vehemently blusted and refuted as destroying Islam by the reformist leaders, such as al-Imam group in early 20th century Singapore, in the region from the beginning of the 20th century.

By studying relevant topics of the Islamic-Malay works, especially those on jurisprudence, we may delineate the pattern of social formation of and interaction in society. Particular attention is given to areas where Muslim scholars in Southeast Asia address the issue of social interaction with other communities. Four major topics have been chosen to shed some light on this phenomenon.

The discussion will focus on four issues which are more relevant to social and political ties between the Muslim community and the others in Southeast Asian contexts. This section will examine such issues as the concept of obligatory religious alms and tax (*zakā*), dietary rules, marriage and tolerance and religious wars. All these four clearly have relevance to measure how far interaction and exchange may develop between Muslims and non-Muslims.

The Distribution of Religious Taxes

Muslims have obligations to pay diverse religious taxes, including *zakā, zakāt al-fiṭr* and *ṣadaqa* under certain conditions. These

taxes may be paid directly or through institutions. Yet, Islam has specified certain recipients of all these taxes. All eight segments as recipients come from among the Muslims themselves. My immediate question is how can such funds be used as a means to attract non-Muslims, or at least to show a positive attitude to other communities? This is especially important since in Southeast Asia, Islam won support not by conquest but by other means, including social and economic benevolence.

Based on scriptural evidence and Shafiʻi school arguments, religious scholars specify eight categories of people as recipients of obligatory religious alms and tax (*zakā*). Al-Raniri, for example, provides some detail on these eight categories in his book *al-Ṣirāṭ al-Mustaqīm*. Among them is a category known as "new converts," (*al-muʼallafāt qulūbuhum*) and fighters in the name of Islam, *fī sabīl Allāh* (in the path of God).[18] As can be seen below, some scholars provide further detail on the category of *al-muallafāt qulūbuhum* (those whose hearts are to be reconciled [to Islam]).

Zakā is also parceled out to those voluntary fighters in the way of Allah; but not those members of the regular paid armies. *Zakā* and *zakāt al-fiṭr* cannot be given to: The wealthy, slaves, Banu Hashim and Banu ʻAbd al-Muttalib (whether they enjoy khums al-khums or not), non-Muslim (*kāfir*), and those who have a right to receive a daily allowance from the *zakā* givers.

According to Muḥammad Arshad al-Banjari,[19] it is lawful to extend alms (*sadaqa*) to poor non-Muslims, even *kāfir ḥarbi*. Interestingly, it is preferable to extend alms to enemies than to one's family members since their hearts may be won by gifts.

Zakā should be given to eight segments of recipients, including the *muʼallaf*. The category of *muʼallaf* who deserves to receive *zakā*: "individuals whose sympathy and conviction are sought for their recent conversion or for other reasons." They may be divided into five categories:[20]

· Those who have not been firmly convinced with Islam are given *zakā* hoping to develop firmer faith
· Those who are firmly convinced with Islam, however, by virtue of their influential position in their own community they are given

zakā hoping that their followers will be interested in Islam
· All Muslims who are assigned to defend Islamic territories from any attack and rebellion are given *zakā* hoping that they dedicate their effort to protect the Muslims from outside military threats
· Those who wage war and threaten any one refusing to pay *zakā* until he/she voluntarily submit it to the ruler
· Those who collect *zakā* from faraway community, even though the latter never refused to pay it.

The determination to give *zakā* to any of these should be based on fair and sound judgment. *Mu'allaf* is not necessarily male. Curiously Muḥammad Arshad adds that the distribution of sacrificial meat to Non-Muslim is unlawful.

Scholars also identify items or properties which must be taxed in *zakā* terms. For instance, Muḥammad ibn Isma'il al-Fatani included such items as cattle, gold/silver, mining and business, and agriculture in those to be taxed.[21] In addition, Muslims are obliged to pay individual tax (*zakāt al-fiṭr*) once a year before the end of the fasting month (Ramadan). They are also encouraged to extend donations, contributions and help for the needy. *Zakāt al-fiṭr* is obliged on individual basis and financial capability.

The importance of *zakā* in society became more apparent after the decline of Islamic polities. Snouck has argued that the financial support for the resistant efforts in Aceh significantly came from the efficient mobilization of *zakā*.[22]

Marriage arrangements

The importance and sanctity of marriage receive particular attention among Southeast Asian scholars. Many of them, besides inserting a chapter on marriage, write exclusive treatises on the subject. Even though such treatises are simple and thus primarily intend to serve the need of the public, they clearly shows how serious Muslim scholars view marriage in the context of Islamic law. In the context of this paper, I am interested in examining how Muslim scholars provide a social solution concerning marriage for Muslims who live in non-Islamic environment. In general no particular room is provided for

them except in a few cases. Interestingly these few cases come from religious opinions (*fatwā*s) issued by Muslim jurisconsults (*mufti*s), including those from Patani.

Muḥammad ibn Ismaʻil al-Fatani, in his *Matlaʻ al-Badrayn*, provides some details concerning marriage in an Islamic perspective. He argues that preference is given to certain qualities in women, for example, virgin, pious (not *fāsiqa*), beautiful, fertile, of respectable family background (aristocarat, *'ulamā'* or *ṣāliḥ*), distant relative or unrelated.

He continues that it is not lawful for a Muslim to marry non-Muslima (*kāfira*), except the *kitābiya*, either *dhimmiya* or *ḥarbiya*. The *kitābiya* include the Jewish and Christians; however, they should belong to families which had endorsed the respective religion before the coming of the prophets who abrogated the previous *sharīʻa*. (This does not concern the originality of the teachings of those religion). The *kitābiya* should also perform the proper Islamic bath after marital relations etc. (even without Islamic *nīya*), take care of cleanliness and avoid eating pork, garlic/onion and drinking intoxicants. The renegades of the two religions are not lawful; for example the Samiriya among the Jews and the Sābi'iya among the Christians.[23]

Muḥammad Arshad al-Banjari refers to Bab al-Nikaḥ in his *Sabīl al-Muhtadīn*; however, he does not provide specific discussion on marriage in the book.[24] For him, the people of the book whose ancestry cannot be ascertained (Jews from Banu Isra'il), or if it dubious whether or not their fathers and ancestors endorsed Judaism before Jesus or the Prophet Muhammad, indeed, their slaughter is not lawful.

Muḥammad Nawawi al-Bantani writes a specific chapter on marriage (*Kitab Aḥkām al-Nikāḥ*). He does not specifically discuss the prohibition from marrying non-Muslims, however, when discussing lawfulness of the slaughtering of non-Muslims, Nawawi specifies those *ahl al-kitāb* whom may be married.[25]

Moreover, when discussing the marriage of those who have no guardian, Da'ud al-Fatani in his *Furū' al-Masā'il* specifies that some slaves be married by the order of a ruler when they accept Islam. Conditions which make marriage unlawful include Zoroastrian, Wathani or Zindiqi and *kitābi* other than Jewish of the period before

the coming of the next prophets abrogating the Torah.[26]

In his *al-Fatāwā al-Fatānīya*, Aḥmad bin Muḥammad Zayn al-Fatānī argues that a Thai Buddhist may be married or made a concubine (*ama*) after conversion.[27] He adds, in a reply to a question concerning the law on the purchase of non-Muslim women (Thai, Cambodian etc.), that it is unlawful to buy any woman if a Muslim comes in to those countries under protection. It is, however, lawful, if he comes in without protection. Such a woman (*ama*) can be lawfully asked to have sex only when she accepts Islam (she had been categorized as a *wathani* not *kitābi*). Again, a new female convert (Thai, Khmer, Chinese, or Kuci) may be married without being declared free (if it is known that she is free). If she is a slave then a marriage can be valid if she is freed first (*istibrā'*). A Wathani slave should convert and be freed for marriage.[28]

Dietary: Physical and Socio-religious Precepts

As a part of physical cleanliness, the dietary system forms an important component of religious piety. Islam is no exception to this. More particularly special requirements in dietary obviously concoct particular orientation toward identity and solidarity among co-religionists. In the context of Muslims in Southeast Asia, the strict implementation of a dietary system has not been without challenge and difficulties, especially in view of the cultural and social construct of the community. By looking at the way Muslim scholars present a formula in this direction will be beneficial to a better understanding of the link between social identification and dietary system among Muslims.

Muḥammad ibn Isma'il al-Fatani, goes into details describing the kinds of animal and fish which are edible and religiously lawful for consumption.[29] Moreover, like other Shafi'i scholars, Muhammad lists some conditions for the lawfulness of any slaughtered animal. For example, an animal must be slaughtered by a mature Muslim man, a Jew or a Christian (*kitābī*), and the slaughtering must be professionally done (method, tool, manner). According to Nur al-Din al-Raniri, the slaughtering by the people of the book is lawful but that by the Majusis, the pagans (*wathani*s), apostates, the Wujudiya without a book is unlawfull.[30] However, during an emergency (fearing one's

death for starvation and no food) such foods are lawful. "...*wajib ia membunuh akan murtadd dan kafir ḥarbi dan zānī yang muḥsan orang yang hendaklah membunuh dia akan tārik al-ṣalā; tetapi tiada harus membunuh akan kāfir dhimmi. Harus membunuh akan kanak-kanak kāfir ḥarbi dan perempuan dan orang yang gila daripadanya dan khunthanya dan hambanya karena dimakan dan jikalau oleh orang kelaparan yang menyampaikan kepada maut makanan yang gālib empunya dia maka wajiblah ia memakan daripada makanan itu dan jadi berhutanglah ia.*" (...[I]t is obligatory to kill an apostate, non-Muslim enemy, adulterer, Muslim who refuses to pray; however, it is not permitted to kill a protected non-Muslim. It is permitted to kill non-Muslim children, women, insane, bisexuals, and slaves for consumption; and if a man is commissioned to deliver foods but he is starved to death then it is obligatory for him if capable [of retaining it] to consume it but he must repay later.)

Muḥammad Arshad al-Banjari, like other Shafi'i scholars, insists that one of the requirements in the slaughtering of lawful animal is that it is done by a Muslim or non-Muslim whose women can be lawfully married by a Muslim, even if those women maintain their own religion such as Judaism and Christianity. The slaughter of the Zoroastrians (Majusi), Ṣābi'is, and Sāmiris as well as the pagans and Christian Arabs is not lawful. He adds that the meat of sacrifice is unlawful to be distributed to non-Muslim (*kāfir*).[31]

In prescribing an Islamic dietary, Da'ud al-Fatani says that it is obligatory (*fard*) to know whether the food and drink one has is lawful or unlawful. A Muslim should ensure that conditions for a slaughterer are fulfilled, either Muslim (male or female), or *kitābī* whom may be married by a Muslim. *Kāfir Majūsī*'s slaughtering is unlawful.[32]

In his *fiqh* book, Nawawi al-Bantani confirms earlier opinions of his Southeast Asian teachers and colleagues on the ruling of a non-Muslim's slaughtering. The slaughtering of the *kitābi*s, Jews and Christians, is lawful. However, the slaughtering of those who belong to a religion without scripture such as Majusiya (Zoroastrianism) and paganism is unlawful.[33]

Tolerance

In this section, I am interested in examining how the Muslim scholars pursue the idea of tolerance among themselves and beyond. The scholars of the region fundamentally uphold the orthodox concept of dividing our world into the abode of peace and the abode of war. Although in practice Muslim rulers were able to develop some *de facto modus vivendi* internally and externally, Muslim scholars do not address the concept of truce, let alone peace treaty, as suggested by their earlier counterparts. As I have shown elsewhere, the scholars of the region seem to have been rigid and less elaborate in defining jihad, its implementation and its consequences. Unlike their great teachers, they do not address what should be done when Muslims are conquered. After winning a battle, they come with details on how booties and PoWs, for example, are handled; however, they fail to come up with some long term coexistence, except the maintenance of the state of war.[34] Truce is temporary and ad hoc.

If Raniri[35] comes up with a precedence concerning critical and radical approaches to irregularities and religious accretions, other scholars maintain tolerance toward their coreligionists on similar issues. For example, Da'ud ibn 'Abd Allah al-Fatani encourages moderation in evaluating and criticizing other Muslims. He cites the issue of condemning Yazid ibn Mu'awiya a *kāfir* as an example. Some care is taken to discourage such an act by quoting some opinions of the well known scholars.[36] Although 'Abd al-Ra'uf follows Raniri's style in writing *fiqh*, he does not endorse Raniri's radicalism in countering his rivals. In a statement, he deplores the method of excommunication declared by his predecessor. Indeed, 'Abd al-Ra'uf's *Mir'at* does not list any specific chapter on *jihād* or *perang sabil* as done by scholars after the late 18th century.[37]

Zayn al-'Abidin ibn Muhammad al-Fatani adds more valuable information on the issue. According to him, the propagation of *al-amr* and *al-nahy* is *farḍ kifāya*. The argument is taken from the Qur'an:[38] *Waltakun minkum umma*… and the tradition:[39] *Man ra'ā minkum munkar fal-yughayyir biyadih*….

The conditions for the obligatoriness of the propagation of *al-amr wal-nahy*:

1) those who command must be a knowledgeable person on the subject *of al-amr wal-nahy;*
2) safe and not causing more dangerous things; for example, forbidding a person from drinking intoxicants; however, the person later commits suicide;
3) optimistic about the result of the propagation.

As far as I am concerned this simple, straightforward conceptualization of social and economic issues by early Southeast Asian Muslims bring home an important message; religious norms can inspire innovations not ossify the human mind and endeavors, including the handling of and diplomacy with non-Muslims.

Colonial Experience

Peripheralization of political Islam and the decline of Muslim entrepreneurship. First the Iberian powers conquered or at least humbled Muslim powers in the region and followed by the imposition of commercial monopoly by the Dutch and later the British. By the 19th century, the last two implemented colonial rule under different scales of interference. As Reid argues the period of rapid and sudden commercialization and Islamization in the 16th and 17th centuries was followed by serious economic downturns.[40] Muslim merchants were pushed aside and outmaneuvered by the Europeans. In many developing countries, the colonial period has become a convenient scapegoat and a negative comparison. It is contrasted to the independence period. In the context of our neighboring Malaysia, especially during its honeymoon with PM Mahathir's "Vision 2020" the 21st century is the golden opportunity for progress and rapid change. Interestingly, the future hinges on science and technology, the globally oriented commercial and economic system, as well as dynamic social formation. Yet, the 21st century progress should not end the religious and socio-cultural tradition. In a sense, Malaysia's determination is an attempt to transform the long decline into a new brighter era.

Islamic Awakening: The Beginning of Assertion

How did the Muslim reformists and others in the early 20th century perceive their conditions and share their vision of the future of

the Dutch colony? What were their major concerns? Why were economic issues shelved?

Most Muslim organizations that emerged around the dawn of the last century were occupied with social and religious reforms. The Governor General of the Dutch East Indies allowed very little movement, championing political and economic causes, even Sarekat Islam had to declare loyalty to the colonial system, and Cokroaminoto accepted an appointed seat in the Volksraad.

By the beginning of the 20th century, cash crop economy and industrialization had made a strong impact on Indonesia's economy. Traditional subsistence cultivation experienced major erosion in the face of mass cultivation and agribusiness.[41] Yet, the majority of Muslims continued to live in rural areas with all their subsistence economic activities. The thrust of the liberal, read colonial, economic policy and market forces created a slump in petty businesses where a few active Muslim entrepreneurs found it hard to survive. Thus, emerged a movement under different names calling for religious solidarity to maintain economic survival. The best representative of this movement can be seen in Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI). If SDI in the early 20th century wanted to share the market through more competitive production with fair access to commodities,[42] what have Muslim entrepreneurs achieved now a century later? None of the new "waves," industry, finance, or ICT, as Alvin Toffler prognosticates, has ever come under their mastery, let alone control. Should Muslims then be required to take care of others while they themselves are economic pariahs and their retailers survive at the mercy of non-Muslim business magnates? Despite all these disturbing facts, Indonesia is, at least seen in the prospect of my grandchildren, fortunate enough, except for the losses of unredeemable forest (timber) and oil, that the nation still has control over the major resources, the many islands, mountains, water and other natural wealth. Given the realization of the promising democratic and clean governance and disciplined citizens who are mostly Muslims, then the future Indonesia where Muslims predominate in most spheres has the duty to treat all its citizens fairly and justly. Such a dream is not impossible; however, it is necessary that we persist in paving the way for an Islamically inspired system of

society and state where all share the *raison d'etat* and thus live peacefully and harmoniously.

Independent Indonesia: The Cycle of Replays or Promising Rebirth?

When Indonesia assumed full sovereignty in the second-half of the 1940s, Muslims were confident to implement Islamic concepts in the newly independent country, if not to declare the country an Islamic state. Infrastructure, human resources, economy and state apparatus broke down or were poorly maintained. Nationalization of major economic corporations in the late 1950s neither structurally changed the economy nor did it alleviate the poverty and sufferings of the population. By the time Major-General Soeharto took over national leadership in 1966, Indonesia's economy had almost collapsed and the price of rice was claimed to have risen at an annual rate of 900 per cent.

Neither the general elections in 1955 nor the 1959 Presidential Decree gave Muslims any political advantage. In the government Muslims had only a few men of their own. Bureaucracy continued to be dominated by the status quo, the revamped *priyayi*. Only a few Muslim figures were in charge of top positions as provincial governors or regency *bupati*. Their fare in power sharing was not much different from that of the minorities, including Chinese.

Interestingly under the Old Order government of President Soekarno, Muslim entrepreneurs enjoyed some state patronage through various cooperative networks. Thus access to a small economic cake was shared by many, including minorities which continued to enjoy the lucrative intermediary position in business and trade.

Optimism and new hopes ran high among Muslims who fully supported the fight against communist diehards and supporters alike during the second half of the 1960s. At least they could expect to be rewarded for their performance in the purge of the communists and their sympathizers. Unlike the Japanese during the Pacific War, the New Order government never entertained mass mobilization for political support. Thus Muslims soon found themselves mere spectators of change engineered and enforced in the country.

Now let's have a look at the political and economic facts of religious minorities in the provinces.

Table 1

Indonesia's Provinces with Significant Numbers of Religious Minorities

Provinces	% of Non-Muslims (mainly Christians) in 2000	% of votes for Christian parties (Parkindo and Partai Katolik) in 1955 Elections
N. Sumatra	31.40%	14.8%
Riau	13.58% (Bud & Conf)	(As part of Central Sumatra)
Bangka-Belitung	7.23% (Bud)	(As part of South Sumatra)
DKI Jakarta	10.04% (Prot &Cath)	3% (Greater Jakarta)
East Nusa Tenggara	87.67%	58.74%
W. Kalimantan	34.01% (Prot & Cath) 12.99% (Bud and Conf)	0.5%
Central Kalimantan	17.32%	Over 1.41% (As part of South Kalimantan)
E. Kalimantan	13.83%	3.91%
N. Sulawesi	69.27%	21.36%
Central Sulawesi	17.20%	Over 11.41% (As part of South Sulawesi)
Maluku	50.19%	38.42%
N.Maluku	14.58%	(As part of Maluku)
Irian Jaya/Papua	75.51%	(Still under the Dutch)
Bali	87.44% Hindus	

Source: Feith 1957; Suryadinata *et al.* 2003; Recapitulation 2004.

As can be seen in Table 1, Hindu Balinese comprise the majority (more than 87%) in their own domain, Bali. Bali has enjoyed a cash income of dollars through its tourist industry and tourism-related services and production. Agriculture has reached what Geertz suggests an involuted stage.[43] But it has given Bali more than enough foods. In a sense Bali is economically self-sufficient, and even provides other islanders to share its lucrative market.

Catholics in NTT form about 87% of the total population. Unlike Bali, NTT has arid land and very meager economic resources. In the past it offered horses and sandalwood to the regional and international markets. For the future, the province will require certain care and appropriate policy from the center, a major challenge for Muslims.

Table 2

General Elections 1955-2004: Percentage of Votes for Religious or
Closely Affiliated Religious Parties

Religion/ Year	1955	1971	1977	1982	1987	1992
Muslim	Over 43% (Masjumi, NU, PSII)	Below 35% (NU, Parmusi, Perti)	PPP	PPP	PPP	PPP
Christian	Over 4.6% (Parkindo, Partai Katolik)	Over 2.44% (Parkindo, Partai Katolik)	PDI	PDI	PDI	PDI
Hindu						
Others						

Source: Feith 1957; Nishihara 1972; Ward 1974; Recapitulation 2004.

An effective way of assessing Indonesia's record in coping with
non-Muslims' rights can be through comparing it with how other
ASEAN members have dealt with their religious minorities. I am a
believer in the regional prospect, shaky though it is, that a stronger
ASEAN indirectly improves its members' approaches to their minori-
ties. If the Philippines has its Moro issues and Myanmar its Karen,
then Indonesia should have offered a better example in its handling of,
say, the Protestants in the Toraja land.

Regional and International Dimension of Economic Plan

Muslim or Muslim-dominated governments in Southeast Asia,
or anywhere for that matter, cannot avoid being linked to regional and
international-global systems. Not only is ASEAN determined to es-
tablish an ASEAN economic community by 2020, to mention just the
more immediate economic regionalism, but many other economic en-
closures and institutional perimeters are looming large to globalize or
at least regionalize. Muslims clearly cannot avoid taking advantage of
the openings rather than finding themselves inward-looking and iso-
lated.

The rapid economic growth during the New Order rule widened
the gap between ordinary Muslims and the capital owners and corpo-
rate groups. The economic crisis since the late 1990s has made Mus-
lim small and medium entrepreneurs even lower down on the eco-
nomic scale. Yet more and more highly educated and skilled Muslims

with stronger commitments to Islam have also entered modern professions and joined the bureaucracy. Consequently some political scientists argue that the emergence of a new middle class dominated by the newly emerging educated and enterprising Muslims led first to the empowerment of civil society and next increasingly put more pressure for democratization vis-à-vis the well-entrenched New Order regime. All are history now.

Internally Muslims continued to experience intensification of "legitimate representation" amid the blurred boundaries of dominant access to truth and authority. Thus contestation of who can properly represent Islam in the face of the globalized world among other things magnified the opening of debate and emerging opinions and the intensification of layered Muslims. The final trajectory of the interactions between Islamist movement and the state is far from clear, let alone over.[44] Yet it is undeniable as can be seen in the first direct presidential elections in this country, that Muslims have taken responsibility for the development of a new Indonesia.

Despite political upsurge and the increasing importance of Muslim-based political parties in recent years, as can be seen in Table 2 above, no major breakthrough was made by any of them. They failed to send their own cadres into the helm of power or to control the seats in the two houses. This is not to deny that in the new government of President SBY many Muslim leaders and politicians have won listening ears and welcoming hands. So far so smooth and cordial, but how long will such a honeymoon and mutual cooperation last?

Can popular and symbolic policies, *gincu, gebrakan* or whatever, satisfy the constituents, including Muslims, and at the same time not alienate the "real power" brokers in economic and political spheres? Will increasing dissatisfaction deteriorate into power dysfunction or inaction? Despite the apparent working commitment, the outcome of the tough bargaining process remains to be seen.

Muslims and Minorities Today

Despite many similarities and even cases of identical wording among modern constitutions on freedom stipulated for religious minorities, a major difference emerges concerning the propagation and

dissemination of religious teaching and belief. Among Islamic countries the silence on this matter is very typical. In my view the singular most immediate reason is defense against aggressive Christian missionaries in some Muslim countries. Why do Muslims choose this approach? Is it not self-contradictory to their own religious missionary vocation? For many Muslims, the imbalance of wealth and facilities between their own religious institutions and those of the aggressive missionaries or evangelists do not permit a level playing field.[45]

Persecution of minorities can also be contemplated in order to silence co-religionist critics and the emotional masses. In many parts of Indonesia, for example, pogroms and intimidation of Christians or Chinese at times were arguably sponsored by the hidden hands of the country's leaders for no other reason than safeguarding their own interests and political dominance.

The future of religious minorities and their better treatment hinges not so much on the inherent value and spirit of the Scripture as on the implementation of those relevant ideas under the atmosphere of a democratic system. As argued by several scholars, a democratic system is the best way to give minorities their rights and fulfill their dreams.[46]

The creation of an atmosphere of sharing and equal justice is crucial for participation and harmony in national life. A tendency to superiority proclivity or inferiority complex, through whatever causes, do not lead to any conducive coexistence among the major world religions. In the past Muslims succeeded in establishing and pursuing a more open system for minorities, in no insignificant part due to their optimism, and not their assumed superiority. Likewise in many advanced democratic countries, the provision of more opportunities and more equal treatment, at least relative to many other developing countries, cannot be separated from their optimism about their own achievement and modern vision. Whatever one argues as regards the long hostility of Islam and the West, it is a fact that the presence of Muslims in Western Europe and North America is a living proof for earnest exchange amid all these fires of hostility.

Human Rights Issues in Indonesia: Religious Minorities
Some controversies as seen by minorities and non-Muslims:[47]
(1)Some objection has been raised against the government's su-

pervision and control over foreign aid to religious institutions. The Government requires official religions to comply with Ministry of Religious Affairs and other ministerial directives, including the Guidelines on Overseas Aid to Religious Institutions in Indonesia (Ministerial Decision No. 20/1978), and Proselytizing Guidelines (No. 77/1978). According to the Guidelines, foreign religious entities must obtain permission from the Ministry of Religious Affairs to provide any type of assistance to Indonesian religious groups. Although these guidelines are not always enforced, some Christian groups allege that when they are, they usually are applied to restrict the religious activities of minority groups, including Christians, and rarely are applied to Muslim groups, unless they are non-mainstream Islamic groups.[48]

(2)The demographic change in favor of the Muslim population in some parts of the country, such as Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, Maluku, Papua and Irian Jaya has been seen by non-Muslims as deliberate attempts to assimilate and even undermine the local, mostly non-Muslim, population. Internal migration has altered the demographic makeup of the country over the past three decades. It has increased the percentage of Muslims in predominantly Christian eastern parts of the country. For example, by the early 1990s, Christians became a minority for the first time in some areas of the Moluccas. Curiously, the IRF Report 2001 maintains "no evidence suggests that the Government intended to create a Muslim majority in Christian areas, and most Muslim migration seemed spontaneous." The fact remains, however, that government-sponsored transmigration from heavily populated Java and Madura to less populated areas contributed to the increase in the Muslim population in the resettlement areas. Regardless of its intent, the economic and political consequences of the transmigration policy contributed to religious conflicts in Kalimantan, Maluku, and Central Sulawesi, and to a lesser extent in Papua. In Papua Muslims constitute a religious minority except in the districts of Sorong and Fakfak, where they account for roughly half the population. Most ethnic Papuans practice Christianity, animism, or both. In recent years, migration has changed Papua's ethnic and religious composition. The arrival of Muslim migrants occasionally led to tensions between indigenous Papuans and new arrivals. However, these tensions had less to do with religion than with economics.

Economic tensions between local or native peoples (predominantly non-Muslim) and more-recently arrived migrants (predominantly Muslim) were a significant factor in incidents of inter-religious and inter-ethnic violence in Maluku, Central Sulawesi, Papua, and Kalimantan.

Interestingly, according to the IRF Report 2003, inter-religious relations were generally good in all ridden conflict areas, including Papua, Kalimantan, Maluku, and Central Sulawesi. Many Muslims and Christians in the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi worked together to repair mosques and churches damaged in the past. In Bali, where some feared that the 2002 bombings would strain relations between the island's Hindu majority and Muslim minority, no such confrontations have been reported. On the first anniversary of that attack, Muslim, Hindu, and Christian leaders participated in a memorial service.

(3) Non-Muslims were less enthusiastic in founding religious parties, except Christians who formed the Prosperous Peace Party (PDS). Of the 24 parties that participated in the 2004 legislative elections, only the PDS openly declared Christian identity and orientation. No party representing a religion other than Islam or Christianity competed in the 2004 legislative election. In this election, Islamic parties received about 21 percent of the vote, secular parties associated with Islamic social organizations earned 18 percent, and the Christian PDS received less than 2 percent of the vote.

(4) Procedures on entry and activities of foreign missionaries in the country have emerged as a source of complaint and irritation among churchmen. Since 1985, foreign missionaries must obtain work permit visas, and laws and decrees from the 1970's and 1980's limit the duration of the visas. These visas are difficult to obtain, as are visa extensions, although some extensions have been granted for remote areas like Irian Jaya/Papua. The Ministerial Decision No. 49/1980 on Recommendations for Employment Applications of Foreign Religious Workers stipulates that all foreign religious workers must receive a recommendation from the Ministry of Religious Affairs (written by the Ministry's Legal and Human Resources Department and signed by the Ministry's Secretary General). To obtain ministry permission, the applicant must obtain and submit: a letter from his/her sponsor; a letter from the Indonesian Embassy in the applicant's country allow-

ing the applicant to obtain a temporary stay visa (VBS); a curriculum vitae; evidence demonstrating that the applicant has skills that an Indonesian citizen cannot offer; a letter of approval from the Ministry of Religion's provincial director; a letter of support from the Director General of the Ministry of Religion who handles matters concerning the applicant's religion; a letter from the receiving religious institution in the country confirming that the applicant will work no more than 2 years in the country before he/she will be replaced by a citizen, if one can be found; statistical information on the number of followers of the religion in the community; permission from regional security authorities; and approval from district and local Ministry of Religious Affairs authorities. Foreign missionaries who obtain visas are able to work relatively unimpeded, although there have been restrictions imposed in conflict areas such as Irian Jaya/Papua and the Moluccas. Foreign missionary work is subject to the funding stipulations of the Social Organizations Law.[49]

(5)Non-Muslims have complained against the difficulties to occupy top positions in the country. The law does not discriminate against any religious group in employment, education, housing, and health; however, some minority groups allege that there is "*de facto* discrimination that limits minority faith access to top government jobs and slots at public universities." Some minority groups also contend that promotion opportunities for non-Muslims in the military and the police are becoming increasingly difficult to obtain. There is also pressure by Muslim groups to accord the best positions to Muslims, the majority group. Vocal segments of the Muslim community have called for a form of affirmative action for "Islamic" civil servants and businessmen to correct the discrimination against them during the Soeharto regime, when a very small minority of Sino-Indonesians were given preferential economic treatment, and many politically active Muslims (or Islamicists) were discriminated against in access to civil service employment and business opportunities. Ethno-religious representation in the general officer corps generally is proportional to the religious affiliation of the population at large; Javanese Muslims (the largest single ethnic group) dominate, but Christians are well represented in the general officer ranks (perhaps reflecting generally higher educational standards among the Christian communities). However,

promotion to the most senior ranks for Christians and other minorities is limited by a "glass ceiling." Many Christian officers complain openly about this glass ceiling.

(6) A source of resentment among Christian minorities comes from restriction on founding houses of worship. The Ministry of Religious Affairs through a joint Ministerial Decree issued in 1969 restricts the building and expansion of houses of worship and prohibits the use of private dwellings for worship unless a license is obtained from the regional office of the Ministry and the community approves. This decree has been used to prohibit the construction and expansion of churches and to justify the closure of churches in predominantly Muslim areas. Although these regulations apply to all recognized religions, minority—especially Protestant—groups claim that the law is enforced only on minority groups, and that minority groups have difficulty obtaining the proper licenses and permits to build houses of worship. Christians claim that the law is not enforced on Muslim communities, which often do not apply for the permits before constructing a mosque. Even when the proper permits are obtained, some Christian groups encounter difficulties in constructing or reconstructing churches. For example, according to the IRF Report 2001, a Muslim mob attacked and destroyed a Pentecostal church that was under construction in North Jakarta, even though the church had all the required permits. The local authorities did nothing to redress the situation or resolve the problem, except to suggest that the church be relocated elsewhere. In November 2000, the director of the local government on Lombok Island ordered the closure of eight churches in Mataram on the grounds that the churches had not obtained the proper permits, and the activities of the churches disturbed the peace in what were predominantly Muslim neighborhoods. Another church in West Jakarta was closed and ordered to move under the written instruction of the local authorities, who claimed that the presence of the church had disturbed Muslim neighbors, and that a youth group from a nearby mosque opposed the idea of having the church so close to the mosque. In some cases, even when the building or expansion permits were obtained, Muslim mobs attacked the church grounds, forcing the Christian worshippers to close their building project.

These are sensitive issues which Muslim leaders must face and

address, taking into account the religious requirements of the minorities and the just claims of aggressive missionary activities of the evangelical groups.

(7)Concern over the recent introduction of the *shari'a* into positive legislation law has been expressed by non-Muslims. In 1999 the government supported the implementation of Shari'a (Islamic law) in Aceh Province. Law 44/1999 on Special Autonomy for Aceh gives Aceh authority to apply Shari'a law in the province in religion, education, culture, civil law, and policy-making spheres. A more comprehensive legislation (Special Autonomy for Aceh Nanggroe Darussalam) was later approved by the People's Representative Assembly (DPR). The bill allows Aceh to establish a court system based on *Shari'a* law. Individuals sentenced under the new Acehnese Shari'a law would not have the right of appeal to the Supreme Court. The new law also would allow the Acehnese to restrict the freedom to choose one's religion; for example, Muslims would be forbidden to convert. Extreme sanctions, such as the amputation of limbs, are not mentioned in the draft, and the government has assured the public that these types of sanctions would not be practiced. However, some Muslim scholars argue that there is nothing in the draft legislation that would forbid the application of *Shari'a* punishments (*ḥudūd*) to any crimes. The Government also has assured the public that *Shari'a* law would not apply to non-Muslims in Aceh.

In light of the Government's decision to allow Aceh to apply aspects of *Shari'a* law and the implementation of national legislation granting greater regional autonomy (Law 22/1999 on Regional Autonomy and Presidential Decree 25/2000), a number of provincial parliaments were deliberating whether to impose *Shari'a* law in their provinces. In October 2000, Muslim leaders in South Sulawesi issued a statement that Muslims in the province were ready to accept *Shari'a* law, and they formed a committee (the KPPSI) to prepare for its implementation. On April 24, 2001, the KPPSI issued the "Makassar Declaration" announcing the enactment of *Shari'a* law in South Sulawesi and forwarded the document to the DPR for parliamentary consideration and approval. Provincial legislatures in Banten, Gorontolo, Maluku, North Maluku, Riau, and South Kalimantan provinces also were considering implementation of *Shari'a*. A number of Christians

and Muslim moderates have expressed serious concern that these efforts to implement *Sharī'a* foreshadow a growing Islamic fundamentalism.

(8) Protests against forcing non-Muslims in the conflict areas, particularly Maluku, to declare acceptance of Islam were launched by churches. Witnesses testified to human rights groups of incidents when active duty and retired military personnel participated in or stood by during the torture or executions of Christians who refused to convert to Islam in Maluku. These incidents reportedly occurred during the period covered by IRF Report 2003 in Ambon, Keswui, Buru, Seram and other parts of Maluku Province, as well as in February 2000 in Lata Lata, North Maluku Province. Witnesses and victims also testified to human rights organizations that active duty military and police officials stood by while members of one religious group raped or mutilated members of another faith. Mass forced conversions and circumcisions of Christians in the Moluccas occurred during the period covered by this report, and witnesses and victims alleged that active duty military and police personnel were present, but did nothing, during some of these incidents. In some areas of the Moluccas where Islamic militia groups (Laskar Jihad) are in control, freedom of religion is restricted. Laskar Jihad militants have forced Christians in some areas of Maluku either to convert to Islam, leave the area, or be executed.

(9) Muslims have been criticized for outlawing conversion to other religions. In the light of aggressive missionary activities among the population in the country, taking advantage of the UDHR, this stand and criticism is well-understood. For Muslims, the conduct of the evangelical missions which have enjoyed strong financial and logistic support on the one hand and the current weak social and economic conditions on the other has done in service to the community. After all, for them, why should so much money be spent to persuade others to the mission if the majority of those who already accepted the faith remain backward and poor? Indeed, the recent implementation of *Sharī'a* law in Aceh has been discredited for restricting the freedom to choose one's religion; for example, Muslims would be forbidden to convert.

(10) Failure to end violence between Christians and Muslims in

some parts of the country has been vehemently criticized. Religious violence and the lack of an effective government response to punish perpetrators and prevent further attacks continued to lead to allegations that officials were complicit in some of the violence or, at a minimum, allowed it to occur with impunity. Although the President and other officials repeatedly have criticized instances of inter-religious violence, the Government's efforts to end or reduce such violence was generally ineffective. The Government at times has tolerated the abuse of freedom of religion, claiming that it does not have the capacity or authority to deal with the "emotions" of private individuals or groups who target others because of their beliefs. According to credible reports, individual members of the security forces in the Maluku, especially on the centrally located island of Ambon, were responsible for some of the shooting deaths that occurred during widespread riots and communal clashes throughout the period covered by IRF Report 2003.

(11) Muslims have been criticized for discriminating the Chinese. The Chinese dilemma involves diverse aspects, including religious, ethnic, economic, and social ones.[50] The fact that the Chinese rarely accept Islam, despite their long stay in the country and acquaintance with Islamic community, forms an important emotion gap. This is in contrast, for example, to what happens in Thailand where the Chinese accept the country's religion, Theravada Buddhism. However, their success in economic fields has made them distinct and in a sense proud of their work ethos. In this light, not surprisingly the Chinese tend to keep distance and maintain "an exclusive identification," resulting in the rise of Chinese enclaves geographically, economically, and socially. On the other hand, the strong reaction by the indigenous and the unfair policies by various governments resulted in the sidelining of Chinese from formal political processes and the government, except during the brief period under President Soekarno in the early 1960s. Surprisingly, the Chinese have almost always since the colonial period emerged as indispensable partners in economic life for the regimes. This close association with the regimes, especially those that had lacked political legitimacy, always risked threats. Thus the Chinese in times of crisis conveniently became scapegoats, as can be seen in the anti-Chinese harassment and attacks during the mid-

1960s and May 1998 riots.

Uncertainty, or perhaps insecurity, led minorities, particularly the Chinese, to seek other alternatives and reserved business arrangements. The amassment of large capital and business success made it easier for Chinese entrepreneurs to run international business activities, beyond Indonesia. These complex business networks by several Chinese tycoons paved the way in time of crisis in the country for capital and business transfer in almost unlimited magnitude.[51] Now, how can the Chinese become truly national economic actors and feel comfortable at home? Indeed, this question forms a major challenge for any government and not least the Muslim majority from now on.

Summary

Interfaith dialogue has brought positive results among the intellectuals and the participants. However, the recurrent outbreaks of religious violence have taken place with support of the men on the street, instigated by some leaders though; these people have been generally left out of the academic niceties and intellectual nuances of the dialogue. Is there any way to instill better understanding of other faiths among the commoners? As the case of the latest US elections shows, one of "the towering democratic systems" did take advantage of the popular religious vigor among the ordinary citizens during the elections campaigns. Grass-root approaches through evangelical groups and churches proved successful in delivering the much needed support for President Bush, who took to religious issues considered dear by many American church goers. In Indonesia, we also witness the continuing appeal of religious symbols, slogans, and figures in political campaigns and even in public displays.

The rapidly changing political environment has paved the way for an increasing, if not predominant, role of "Islamist proponents" of different shades in governance and democratic institutions, especially the legislative bodies. The shift from being a political minority and pariah to the center stage of power potentially carries revenge and punishment. Based on Islamic pristine principles and international conventions, Muslims have the honor to create an open, fair and truly just and democratic system within state and society. Not only does

discrimination lead to misery for the weak but it also reduces the strength of the nation as a whole.

Genuine and just democratization remains the best way to run the state for all citizens in the country. Since Muslims have the majority votes, the present "privileges" of non-Muslims (colonial legacy and recent political and economic patronage) will slowly erode. It is the responsibility of Muslims (leaders, parties, organizations) to ensure that non-Muslims, minorities and the weak, are not handicapped in the exercise of their rights due to democratization and the political dominance of Muslims (a far cry though at this time). As Benedict Anderson argues despite the long established system of democracy in our neighboring countries, the Philippines and Thailand, for example, the system has come under the control of oligarchies which "found through the electoral processes ways to maintain an iron grip over" the countries' economy and political system. "[T]here is no reason to believe that the present form of democracy is going to do much for the vast bulk of ordinary people. And that is one reason why they sell their votes"[52] Clearly Anderson is not campaigning against democracy *per se*, however, a democratic system, any system, can be manipulated when the powerful misuse the trust, the opportunity, and the leadership they acquire. Democracy and promises or pledges do not work without the support and cooperation of all parties and citizens.

On the economic side: What should be done to reduce, if not eradicate, poverty and disparity and encourage growth? I have no expertise to enter into this complex issue; however, as a historian I see that injustice and extreme inequality in access to "modes of production" as manifested in monopoly must be immediately and comprehensively tackled and given priority for solution. Interestingly, the democratic system by default constantly puts pressure on any government to immediately and efficiently address the lots of many, the hungry, the poor, and the unschooled. On the other hand, Indonesia's economy cannot be insulated, nor can it reject globalization, which makes it necessary to open for investment and the market convention. Here the task of any government and the challenge to Muslims are crucial: How to welcome the industrious and skilled Chinese? None among reformed Indonesians wants to repeat the power play of the 1955 elections when the democratic process was prematurely and

harshly ended. As Lex Rieffel warns, based of Feith's earlier note, the long terms factors, particularly the tensions among different social and ethnic groups across Indonesia, "still exist and represent the principal challenge for the Reformasi system".[53] Perhaps the more immediate threat to the democratic system will be the chaos and anarchy created by the manipulation of the urban poor and the unemployed at the expense of true economic and social reform within the much-valued achievements of political reforms.

What is Indonesia's consensus on the future economy? Is it oriented to rapid and sustained growth or high consumption and thus heavy debt? Can the public be passionate enough to allow the traditional players like the Chinese to return to their commercial niche, even less dominant but fairer position? Questions like these will need to be openly addressed by Muslim leaders and parties reflecting the attitudes and opinions of their respective constituents.

After all, attempts at remedying injustice and stopping violation of human rights against the weak, minorities, and even Muslims themselves will not easily achieve the expected results. They are difficult and complex since they necessitate the reform of "often entrenched institutional arrangements and patterns of privilege" taken for granted for so long by so many of the powerful and the wealthy.[54] Any government in Indonesia, even the mandated president, can do very little if the corrupt system and practice in the administration of justice and execution of various policies aimed at alleviating poverty and backwardness and ending injustice fail to represent the law and people's will.

Our handling of our own citizens, Muslim and non-Muslims or minorities, cannot avoid the global eye watch as can be seen in the 1993 U.N.-sponsored Vienna Conference on Human Rights which, *inter alia*, declared that "the promotion and protection of all human rights is a legitimate concern of the international community." Rights advocates have claimed this as an end to "sovereign defense" which had been customarily used by modern nation states to reject interference in state sovereignty. Clearly the weak have to yield, whereas the more powerful may buy time for their own convenience.

Models of locating minorities in modern nation-states can give us clues that may serve and suit this country. Europe has provided us

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with mixed results on this issue. North America, which grew out of frontier settlements full of new opportunities, has developed into an amazing melting pot for many. Yet such a model, secular in principle, has also shown some weaknesses in its "guarantee of religious freedom." Religious freedom is conditioned by the absence of any compromise to the secular principles; collectivist tendencies should give way to individual religious freedoms.

Thailand has an interesting feature of dealing with minorities. It has been praised for its successful integration of its Chinese citizens better than any other modern states in ASEAN. Did it pay some high cost for such a name? Is there any erosion and loss on the part of Thais of the land? At the same time it is also experiencing mounting pressures to accommodate the inspiration of its Muslim citizens in the south. Does Indonesia belong to the same Thai coin but of different sides? Should the two exchange and learn from each other to round their handling of their diverse minorities?

Malaysia is perhaps closer to and shares many features with Muslims in Indonesia. However, the relative "variant" orientation, to use Taufik's terms,[55] and "exoticing" tendency of Malaysian Muslims serve little to the open, inclusive and culturally melting pot tradition of Indonesian Muslims. Put differently, Muslims' moral responsibility and political potential are open both to misuse and at the same time to noble acts.

Notes

[1] Sayyid Qutb. *Ma'ālim fī al-Tarīq*. (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1987), the 11th Edition, p. 201.

[2] Clifford Geertz, *After the Fact: Two Countries, Four Decades, One Anthropologist*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 39.

[3] Lucien W. Pye, "Review." *Foreign Affairs* 78/6 (November/December 1999).

[4] Reed Brody, "Right Side Up: Reflections on the Last Twenty-Five Years of the Human Rights Movement." Human Right and Armed Conflict, Hu-

man Rights Watch: World Report 2004 (http://us.oneworld.net/external/; accessed on November 13, 2004).

[5] Benedict Anderson, *Imagine Communities: Reflections of the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983)

[6] Merle C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia c. 1300 to the Present* (London: The MacMillan Press, 1981), pp. 215-216, 248-254; Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s* (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1994); Douglas E. Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance* (London: Routledge, 1995).

[7] Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Glencoe, III.: Free Press, 1960)

[8] Abu Ja'far Muhammad Tabari, *Tarīkh al-Rusul wal-Muluk*, ed. Muhammad Abu al-Fadl Ibrahim (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1977), vol. 2, p. 329.

[9] Ibn Hisham. *Al-Sīra al-Nabawiyya*, ed. 'Umar 'Abd al-Salam Tadmuri. (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabi, 1987). pp. 225-226.

[10] Tabari, *Tarīkh al-Rusul wal-Muluk,* p. 446.

[11] Ibn Hisham, *Al-Sīra al-Nabawiyya,* pp. 304-305.

[12] Ann K. S. Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam: AN Introduction to the Study of Islamic Political Theory: The Jurist (Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 210.

[13] Merle C. Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi, 1749-1792: A History of the Division of Java.* London and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974.

[14] "Before his migration to Medina, [the Prophet Muḥammad] was prevented from declaring any war, indeed, he was commanded to call the people [peacefully] to accept Islam and deter them [from evils] patiently facing the difficulties and pains posed by the [Meccan] idolators." *Adapun dahulu daripada berpindahnya kepada Madinah maka tertegah ia [Rusūlullāh] daripada perang hanya yang disuruhnya itu menyampaikan seruan masuk kepada agama Islam dan menakutkan mereka itu dan sabar atas segala kesusahan dan segala kesakitan yang diperbuatkan oleh musyrikin atasnya,* Muḥammad Nūr ibn Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il al-Fatānī, *Kifāyat al-Muhtadī pada Menerangkan Cahaya Sullam al-Mubtadī.* Pattani: Muhammad al-Nahdi, 1351/1932, p. 320.

[15] Virginia Matheson and M.B. Hooker, "Jawi Literature in Patani: The Maintenance of An Islamic Tradition." *JMBRAS* 61/1 (1988), pp.14-15.

[16] Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Zayn al-Fatānī. , *Farīḍat al-Farā'iḍ fī 'Ilm al-'Aqā'id*. Edited and annotated by Wan Mohd. Shaghir Abdullah. Kuala

Lumpur: Khazanah Fathaniyah, 1990, pp. 95-97.

[17] Snouck Hurgronje, C. *Kumpulan Karangan Snouck Hurgronje*, tr. in 14 vols. (Jakarta and Leiden: INIS, 1993), p. 36.

[18] For Raniri, alms, not *zakā*, may be extended to out-side groups (*seteru*). (Raniri 1044/1634:2/76, 82-3, 85-88).

[19] Muḥammad Arshad ibn 'Abd Allah al-Banjari. *Sabīl al-Muhtadīn li al-Tafaqquh fi Amr al-Dīn*. Cairo: Dar Ihya' al-Kutub al-'Arabiya, [originally completed in 1195/1781] n.d. (Aswadie's edition) p.256.

[20] Cf. Muhammad ibn Isma'il al-Fatani, *Matla' al-Badrayn*, p.59; Nawawi al-Bantani, *Qut al-Ḥabib*, p.108. *Zakā* and *ṣadaqa* are distributed to the eight segments, including *al-mu'allafāt qulūbuhum*. *Al-Mu'allafāt qulūbuhum* are classified into four:
· New converts with weak determination
· Non-Muslim who may be expected to accept Islam
· New converts enjoying strong influence on their own community with strong determination to bring in his family and his followers
· New converts with strong determination who protect the evils of those unbelievers and those refuse to pay *zakā*.
  It is expected that *zakā* may bring them closer to and more convinced with Islam.

[21] Muḥammad al-Fatānī, *Matla' al-Badrayn,* p. 59.

[22] C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Aceh; Rakyat dan Adat Istiadatnya*, tr. (Jakarta and Leiden: INIS, 1996).

[23] Muḥammad al-Fatānī, *Matla' al-Badrayn, p.* 143, 151.

[24] Muḥammad Arshad, *Sabīl al-Muhtadīn*, p. 241.

[25] Muḥammad Nawawi al-Bantani (al-Jawi), *Qūt al-Ḥabīb al-Gharīb*, (Cairo: Matba'at Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi, 1938), p. 267.

[26] Da'ud ibn 'Abdullah al-Fatānī. *Furū' al-Masā'il wa-Uṣūl al-Wasā'il*, (Cairo: Dar Ihya' al-Kutub al-'Arabiya), (originally written in 1254/1838) n.d. pp. 179, 185.

[27] Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Zayn al-Fatānī, *Al-Fatāwā al-Fatānīya*, 3 vols., edited and annotated by Wan Mohd. Shaghir Abdullah, Kuala Lumpur: Khazanah Fathaniyah, 1996-1999, pp. 40-47.

[28] Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Zayn al-Fatānī, *Al-Fatāwā,* pp.38-46 (*fatwa* No.45); see also No.94 and 95.

[29] Muḥammad al-Fatānī, *Matla' al-Badrayn,* p. 87.

[30] Nur al-Din al-Raniri, *al-Ṣirāṭ al-Mustaqīm* (Cairo: Dar Ihya' al-Kutub

al-'Arabiya), [originally completed in 1044/1634] n.d.pp. 249-250, 265.

[31] Muḥammad Arshad al-Banjari. *Sabīl al-Muhtadin,* pp. 451, 471-472.

[32] Da'ud al-Fatanī, *Furū' al-Masā'il,* pp. 267, 272.

[33] Muḥammad Nawawi, *Qūt al-Ḥabīb al-Gharīb,* p. 265-267. (*Aḥkām al-dhabā'iḥ wal-aṭ'ima*) *Wa taḥill zakat kull Kitābi Yahūdi aw Naṣrāni bi-shart ḥill munākaḥātinā li-ahl millatih wa-huwa fima idha 'ulima dukhūl awwāl al-āba' fi dhalika al-dīn qabl naskhih.*

The meat of *udḥiya mutatawwa' bihā* (sacrifice) is divided into three (one version of interpretations among the Shafi'is):

One-third for self-consumption, if needed

One-third for wealthy Muslims

One-third for the poor (Nawawi puts a condition of being Muslim for the recipients).

[34] While generalizing, I should quickly add that Da'ud al-Fatani, as outlined earlier, has come up with more detail, even if less comprehensive, on these issues.

[35] See al-Raniri, *al-Tibyān fi Ma'rifat al-Adyān*, Hyderabad: Da'irat al-Ma'arif al-'Uthmaniya, n.d.. This is the first Malay work on comparative religions developed from Islamic perspective. The book is based on the model of Shahrastani's *al-Milal wal-Niḥal*, as adapted by Abu Shahur al-Salimi in his *al-Tamhīd*. After discussing the non-scriptural religions, Raniri discusses Christianity and Judaism. In the second part, he focuses on Islam, addressing the 72 heretical groups except one the ahl al-sunna wal-jama`a. Ḥamzah Fansuri and Shams al-Din are included in the membership of the 72 heretics.

[36] Da'ud al-Fatānī, *Furū' al-Masā'il,* p.10.

[37] 'Abd al-Ra'ūf al-Sinkilī, *Mir'āt al-Tullāb fi Tashīl Ma'rifat al-Aḥkām al-Shar'īya lil-Malik al-Wahhāb*. Mecca: al-Matba'a al-Miriya, 1309/1891.

[38] *The Qur'an* 3: 104.

[39] *Ṣaḥīh Muslim*, Bab al-Iman, edited by Muhammad dhihni (Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rifa, 1909), vol. 1, p. 50.

[40] Anthony Reid,Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2000), pp. 217-234.

[41] Robert E. Elson, *The End of the Peasantry in SEA: A Social and Economic History of Peasant Livehood, 1800-1990s*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

[42] The aim and objectives of SDI in 1905 1) to promote socio-economic enterprise; 2) to coordinate batik producers; 3) to uplift the position of the indigenous; 4) to upgrade the study of Islam and Islamic schools. The formation of SDI was mainly stimulated by fierce competition in batik production from the Chinese and the latter's highhandedness *vis-à-vis* the local a result of the successful Chinese Revolution in 1911.

[43] Clifford Geertz, *Agricultural Involution: The Processes of Ecological Change in Indonesia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963).

[44] Suzaina Kadir, "Mapping Muslim Politics in Southeast Asia after September 11." Briefing Paper 02/05, The European Institute for Asian Studies December 2002), p.4.

[45] A missionary group complains that without direct participation in distributing and implementing aid to non-Christians may end up in wrong hands, including government agents. "Foreign donors, tired of seeing aid wasted by the Bangladesh government, are delighted to channel aid to NGOs." *The Times of India*, July 19, 1998.

[46] See Henry J. Steiner, "Do Human Rights Require a Particular Form of Democracy?" In Adel Omar Sherif and Eugene Cotran, eds. *Democracy, the Rule of Law and Islam* (The Hague and Cambridge, MA: Kluwer Law International, 1999), pp.193-210; Allan D. Swanson, "Good Governance and Human Rights in Development and Democracy." In Adel Omar Sherif and Eugene Cotran, eds. *Democracy, the Rule of Law and Islam* (The Hague and Cambridge, MA: Kluwer Law International, 1999), pp.331-341. Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, "Islamic Foundations of Religious Human Rights." In John Witte *et al.*, eds., *Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Religious Perspective* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff Publishers, 1996), pp. 337-359; Anne E. Mayer, *Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).

[47] Most contents of this sub-section are taken from *International Religious Freedom (IRF) Report* 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004. Relevant topics issued by Amnesty International, HRW and International Crisis Group are referred to and consulted.

[48] International Religious Freedom (IRF) Report 2001.

[49] International Religious Freedom (IRF) Report 2001.

[50] Ironically as reported in *Detik Online* (November 29, 2004), 26 syndicates in the US run by WNI (Chinese Indonesians) were found by Judge Paul McNulty guilty of falsifying reasons to get asylum status for more than 1000 Chinese Indonesians. Among the reasons: being of Chinese de-

scent; discrimination against Christian Chinese in Indonesia; torture and violence suffered during the riot of May 1998; and victims of sexual and physical harassment or robbery .

[51] Scott Waldron, "Indonesian Chinese Investment in China: Magnitude, Motivations and Meaning." Australia-Asia Papers No.73. CSAAR, Griffith University, Queensland, 1995, pp. 7-39.

[52] Benedict Anderson, "Democratic Fatalism in South East Asia Today." The Alfred Deakin Lecture, May 11, 2001, Radio National, Australia (http://www.abc.net.au/rn/deakin/stories/s309714.htm; accessed on October 14, 2003). pp. 3-4.

[53] Rieffel, Lex. "Indonesia's Quiet Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* 83/5 (September/October 2004).

[54] Human Rights Watch, "Safeguard Rights in Indonesia, November 10, 2004;" "World Report 2003: Asia: Indonesia." (http://hew.org/wr2k3/asia7.html; accessed on November 18, 2004)

[55] Taufik Abdullah, "Islam dalam Sejarah Nasional: Sekedar Penjelajahan Masalah." In Taufik Abdullah, *Islam dalam Masyarakat: Pantulan Sejarah Indonesia* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1987), p. 241.

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Some Preliminary Notes on the Problem of Defining Santri Politics and the Expectations Put on the Nahdlatul Ulama

Andrée Feillard

An Indonesian intellectual living in Europe wrote October 28, 2004, on the wahana mailing list his solution to problem solving concerning Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and politics: "*Seharusnya NU melalui diskusi matang secara down-top memutuskan untuk menjalankan dwifungsi, yaitu menjadi parpol dan sekaligus sebagai organisasi religius, budaya, pendidikan. Ini demi negeri, bangsa dan negera kita*." [The NU should discuss in a down-top way how to implement dual functions; that is how to be a political party at the same time as functioning as an organization for religion, culture, and education. This must

be achieved for the good of our state, country, and nation] (BDG Kusumo, Ceko, 28 oct 04). This is an interesting idea, which reflects the high expectations from the NU today. This kind of thinking often comes from people with a limited knowledge about the details of NU's functioning, but it is a frequent view in intellectual circles, even after the Wahid presidency. Another piece of writing by an Indonesian intellectual living in Indonesia reflects the same desire to see the NU fight for Indonesian culture, tradition, heritage : Mohamad Sobari wrote in Kompas, 24 October 2004 (ASAL USUL) : "*Apa makna NU baru tadi kalau ternyata begini kompleks penjelasannya? Jelas bukan Nahdlatul Ulama, bukan 'Nunut Urip', bukan 'Nadah Udan', dan bukan pula 'Nahdlatul Umah', melainkan 'Nasib Umat'*." (What is the meaning of the new NU, it's not Nahdlatul Ulama, not 'Nunut Urip' not 'Nadah Udan', and not 'Nahdlatul Umah' but the 'Fate of the People').

These very general statements reflect the hopes and expectations put on the NU since the early 1990s, when Gus Dur took over the Forum Demokrasi and led the young NU generation to reflect freely on religious issues, together with other Muslim intellectuals. Now, Reformasi is already more than five years old, and the time is rife to ask what has happened with santri politics, in which so much hope had been placed.

When we talk about santri politics, whether in the Reformasi period or before: we need to ask how do santri politics differ from non-santri politics ? The very fact that this subject is raised seems to indicate it does exist, at least in the mind of observers. It would be too easy here to give an account of my perception of NU politics during the Reformasi period. I have done it elsewhere already.[1] So, I would prefer to pose new questions arising out of the Reformasi experience.

Who is a Santri Politician?

We should start asking simple questions like : what makes a santri politician different from a non-santri politician, what are the conditions that would make a santri politician act differently from a non-santri politician.

The first and most evident answer would be his link with some

pesantren (NU) or Islamic school (Muhammadiyah, PUI). Hence, one could expect a santri politician to protect these schools and the teachers they produce. The role of the Ministry of Religious Affairs would thus be essential for him, as it regulates budget, subsidies, and student grants. Examples of conflict in the past seem to confirm the importance of the ministry. In 1952, the NU left the Masyumi partly over rivalries with the Modernists concerning the ministry. In 2001, when Abdurrahman Wahid was ousted, the ministry was left in the hands of NU, a minimum condition for the NU to accept the very painful moment.

Secondly, a santri politician will also have to protect his aliran understanding of Islam, which will impact the rivalry between traditionalists and modernists to hold the ministry. Producing religious school books is seen as an important in expounding schools of thought. This rivalry seems to have ended today with an unexpected turn : Muhammadiyah is now in charge of the Education department, and is no longer a rival for NU in the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Indeed, Muhammadiyah has been in charge for three times in a row the Education Ministry since 1999.

Thirdly, one can expect that a santri politician will be supported by an Islamic organization (*ormas Islam*). Thus arises the question of what power the said *ormas Islam* has on the politician, or what power *he* has on the organization after having been elected for example as a MP. The question also arises of his autonomy from his organization, and whether he enjoys the same autonomy as he would as a non-santri politician from a non-religious political party. If we were to try to formulate an answer now, we could say that the answer lies in the personality of the santri politician, and that there is no rule as such. Thus, Gus Dur acted without the kiais' support in October 1999, but he asked the kiais to support what he thought was the right way to do politics. In his period, the *kiai Khos* concept emerged. The 31st NU congress in Boyolali seemed to show that the kiais tried to withhold the power taken by politicians, based on the apparent perception that politics had gone too far. This kind of giving in and withdrawing again of political power by Religious organizations is not new. In 1997, the same friction arose. But this time, it seemed that the Syuriah itself was touched by the debate, with Abdurrahman making a bid for the

top NU post. Thus, after the NU Boyolali 2004 congress, one can say that the santri politician now has an impact in the highest spheres of this religious organization.

This is not only the case for the NU. Muhammadiyah also has been influenced by strong political personalities recently. Amien Rais is a "santri politician" if we understand the term santri not as pesantren-linked but representing a major Muslim organization. His supporters also used the Muhammadiyah as a vehicle during his bid for the presidency and for legislative elections, and his defeat and the moderate showing of PAN had undoubtedly had some impact on Muhammadiyah's image nationwide.

The impact of santri politicians on religious organizations is indeed hard to deny. But the influence of the reverse more difficult to assess. In particular emerges the question of their autonomy towards the *sharī'a*. It was during Gus Dur's mandate that Aceh introduced the *sharī'a* as an anti-separatist tool, despite Abdurrahman's reputation as a liberal Muslim intellectual. The kiais supporting Abdurrahman in the 31st NU congress were among the most conservative: one of them called for a clear rejection of Jaringan Islam Liberal. Similar contradictions were witnessed elsewhere. Thus at the same congress, one could hear anti-Hasyim activists argue that they were against Hasyim because of his willingness to be political partner to a woman, and thus to place himself as vice president below a woman. Others on the contrary voted against Hasyim because of his supposed conservatism on issues gender. The resulting impression is that of a blurring of ideological lines, and of principles being subject to political motives.

This blurring of santri political principles is not to be found merely in NU circles, but also in other organizations. Under the PPP and the *Poros tengah*, the same phenomenon occurred and attracted the public's eye when Hamzah Haz rejected Megawati's bid for the presidency first and then accepted to become her vice-president.

The Voters: Are Traditionalist *Santri*s and *Abangan* that Similar?

Earlier, in a session on the necessity to "remap" Indonesian Islam, Bambang Pranowo tried to explain Islamic radicalism by introducing a new category of "angry Muslims", while Bahtiar Effendy

argued that new categorization was unnecessary in the current political context of post-2004 elections. These two answers reflect the difficulty of making new categories, and the eternal fear that making new categories will end up dividing the *ummah*.

But for an outside observer, it is evident that Indonesian society in the 21st century is no longer what it was in the 1970s. And research by the PPIM of UIN in Jakarta exposed this change clearly. Indeed, a person born after 1960, of "abangan" origins, who learned religion in the 1970s in an Indonesian public school, might be different from a person born after 1960 who was raised in a *santri* NU or Muhammadiyah environment. Both will be practicing Muslims but they might be different, at least in their consciousness of differences within Indonesian Islam. Thus, is a NU-linked student, for example, more prepared for a degree of pluralism, while an *abangan* Muslim who learned about Islam at public school more likely to be attracted to a rigid understanding of Islam? The question has to be asked.

As I have often observed misconceptions about who is who in Indonesian Islam, I would suggest that polls organized on santri politics take more into account the subtle differences between *santri* and *abangan*, or post-*abangan*, or neo-*santri* Indonesians.

Thus, if we look at earlier surveys on *santri* profiles[2], we can see that we should try to define their specifications more properly. The questions asked to determine the *abangan-santri* divide was : "do you strongly agree, agree, doubt, disagree, or strongly disagree"? to these statements regarding *abangan* rituals :

- We need to go to a spiritual adviser (*dukun*) to ask for guidance to achieve our goals.
- We need to go to sacred graves (*makam kramat*) to achieve our goals.
- For our safety, protection and health, we need to give offerings (*sesajen*) to spirits (*roh*).
- We need to wear sacred articles (*benda pusaka*).

Answers could thus measure the degree of survival of *abangan* rituals in the new *santri* Javanese society. I would argue that this kind of terminology is problematic.

If the term *abangan* does have a negative connotation today, then the terms associated to *abangan* rituals, such as *dukun*, *sesajen*, *makam*

kramat, *benda pusaka*, *roh*, might well carry the same negative con-
notation. It could be assumed that the terminology specific to the
abangan tradition would meet the same reaction from respondents not
wanting to "admit" to performing these rituals.

But more problematic is the fact that there is no effort here to
differentiate the rituals of traditionalist Muslim and the *abangan* Mus-
lim, except for the performance of prayers and fasting. In fact, the
same rituals may carry different names in *abangan* and in Tradition-
alist Muslim circles, a way for the latter to escape Reformist criticism
of these rituals. Thus, my observation of Nahdlatul Ulama activists
brings me to the following comments on the terminology". [3]

- An *abangan* may go to a *dukun* to seek advice or to seek a medi-
  cal cure, but a traditionalist *santri* will say he goes to a *kiai* known
  to have special supranatural powers : he will be given blessed
  water to drink or to rub on his face, or zamzam water from Mecca.
  The Traditionalist Muslim will first try to pray more often and
  ask God for guidance, but in a case of a long term disease, he will
  visit a "kiai". A kiai is described as a "specialist of jinns" (*ahli
  jin*), and he is a "real kiai" (*benar-benar kiai*), because he is known
  in the village to master the "kitab kuning". Only to such a holy
  man with religious knowledge will the traditionalist NU family
  go, not to a "*dukun*". The dukun is illegitimate and traditionalists
  say they do not believe in dukuns at all despite the fact that many
  in the community, especially the *abangan*, believe in their power.
  In the case related to me by a NU activist, the kiai gave prayers to
  recite and water was used to rub onto the face of the sick woman
  and for her to drink, a therapy which was described as successful.
- An *abangan* will easily admit to going to a *kramat,* but a tradi-
  tionalist Muslim will often use the term "*ziarah*", or "*ziarah
  kubur*". The Traditionalists say that Muhamadiyah people also do
  it more often now because they need to prove that "they do not
  forget their dead". The difference between an *abangan* and a Tra-
  ditionalist Muslim, according to the latter, is that the *abangan*
  will prefer to go on the eve of a Jumat Kliwon, while a Tradition-
  alist will not pay attention to the Javanese calender (Friday and
  Friday *Kliwon* is the same for him). For a Traditionalist, *ziarah
  kubur* is a kind of "*wasilah*", an intermediary to pray through

somebody "higher", normally a "wali", and is recommended by a Tradition (Hadith). A Muhammadiyah person might also go "ziarah" but for other reasons, "not to forget", because, according to Traditionalists, "they are ignorant and do not know the meaning of the term wasilah". Ziarah kubur is not considered something wrong or pre-Islamic by the Traditionalist, it is justified by a Tradition (hadith), and there is an opinion that the *abangan* have imitated the Muslims in this, so that it has now also "become a tradition in *abangan* circles" as well. An *abangan* will probably bring flowers as offerings (*sesajen*) more often to the tomb (*kramat*) than a traditionalist *santri*. The most important thing for the Traditionalist is "to pray", although there is a "recommendation" (*anjuran*) to bring flowers because their perfume pleases the dead. In fact, whether or not flowers will be brought might depend on the money available, or the wali visited.

- Questions to distinguish *abangan* from Traditionalists might rather be asked about the motives of the offerings. A Traditionalist might not say offerings are "necessary", for him they are rather "optional". Moreover, a Traditionalist Muslim will use the term "roh" as meaning the "soul" of the dead whose tomb is being visited, where the meaning of *roh* as "spirits" is absent in these circles, and spirits are called "*jin*".

- An *abangan* will be proud of his *benda pusaka*, but these are not often to be found in every single *abangan* family. It rather belongs to a priyayi or a kiai. Furthermore, people will not "wear" an ancient kris, but will store it at home. Some *santri* "wear" a "jimat", smaller items, usually, semi precious stones. They are more often found in *abangan* circles, but also in some Traditionalist Muslim circles. But the unease about this in Traditionalist Islam is stronger than in *abangan* circles. A kiai will be more confident possessing such a *benda pusaka*, but here also, it can be problematic. In July 2001, a few days before the fall of President Abdurrahman Wahid, a kris carried in a green cloth was given to the President during the confidential meeting he had with old kiais in Kediri, and put carefully in the back of his Mercedes. When I asked him about this kris, he minimized the meaning of the gift.

Given this difference of terminology, and the meaning or accept-

ability for the same rituals, one can assume that the Traditionalists and the *abangan* did not answer the survey questions in the same way. It might have been hasty to assume that "a traditionalist *santri*" would say "yes" to all the questions, the same as an *abangan* Javanese.

Furthermore, generally speaking, and this concerns *abangan* and Traditionalists alike, the expression "we need to" might have sounded too imperative in a Javanese context. The answers might have been different to the expression "May we?". The supernatural is very much present in Traditionalist *santri* Javanese circles but not so much in the form of articles (*benda*), which would make them more vulnerable to accusations of "shirk" (associationism) by the Reformists. The supernatural expresses itself rather in fantastic stories of constant intervention of dead ancestors, famous dead kiais, or walis, in the socio-religious-political life of major kiais. Besides this "divine intervention" at high hierarchy levels, among the NU population, the belief in invulnerability (immunity) is openly accepted. It is very significant that Gus Dur loyalists who were ready to fight for the political survival of the President in July 2001 strongly believed in the invulnerability of a few trained militia. This criteria might be an important indicator for Traditionalist *santri*s.

Abangan and *santri* Muslims are indeed different people although their differences have developed into new forms of religiosity over the course of the years. Research has to be made about their respective voting trends. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani have started very interesting surveys which should be continued. If there is one major difference between a *santri* and an "abangan" politician, if we may say so, it is the need felt by the latter for religious legitimacy in santri political partners: most presidential or vice-presidential candidate had relations with NU especially Megawati who choose Hasyim Muzadi and Wiranto who choose Solahuddin Wahid. At the same time, Amien Rais's VP partner was a politician known for his "secular" nationalism. This search for political "partners" in the religious sphere means that most probably that santri politics is not "finished", but on the contrary, that it has entered a new era, even though many are conscious of its limits and its potentially negative impact on religious organizations.

One question is still unanswered: how will the masses react to NU's increased involvement in politics: will the kiai's aura and reputation be lessened? And if so, who will replace the central role of the kiais? As for those who put so much hope in NU's "dwifungsi", the question is: do they know NU's working mechanisms : For example, that NU's *Bahtsul Masāil* acts independently from politicians or thinkers like Gus Dur? To understand the complexity of Indonesia's new politics, it might be useful for "abangan" politicians to study the evolving "santri world".

Notes

[1] Andrée Feillard, "Indonesian Traditionalist Islam's Troubled Experience with Democracy (1999-2001)", in *Archipel* 64, Paris, 2002, pp. 117-144.

[2] Ohio State University and Universitas Indonesia conducted a survey of Indonesian voters in 1999, just after the June general elections, the first democratic election in forty-four years. Voters had just elected 483 national members of Parliament chosen among 48 eligible parties that met the minimum size required in the national election law.

[3] Interview with a Nahdlatul Ulama activist and religious teacher in Kendal, Central Java, 19 July 2001.

Some Notes on *Politik Santri* in Indonesia

Fachry Ali

I

The term *politik santri* or santri politics is a problematic one. Even though it has been frequently used in public discourse, the term itself possesses no common understanding. When, for instance, on an occasion I proposed this term to replace *politik* Islam or Islamic politics, Mrs. Aisyah Amini, a long serving politician from an Islamic political party, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), flatly rejected its reasoning that the term would narrow the real meaning of Islamic politics and reduce its magnitude to a political force from the *pesantren* only. "Islamic politics," she continued, "is in fact much broader than santri politics. This is because it embraces all the elements of the Islamic movements which have existed and have operated since the beginning of the twentieth century. Calling it "santri politics" thus re-

duced Islamic politics to the level of Islamic political movements which are generally confined at the rural level."

This statement demonstrates how differently the term "santri politics" can be perceived and how opinions on it are largely related to cultural differences and background experience. Mrs. Amini's opinion provides us with a striking example. Tracing back her historical political consciousness, we find that it was not rooted under *pesantren* tutelage. But, it was gained from a well established, organized Islamic movement in an urbanized environment. In her early days (1950's) in Minangkabau, West Sumatra, Mrs Amini's consciousness had already been influenced by modern Islamic intellectual movements whose development peaked in the early part of the last century. In politics, the striking legacy of these movements was fully accommodated by Masyumi, a modernized Islamic political party, which at the time had gained strong political leverage within West Sumatran society. As a modernized party, it was clear that the majority of Masyumi members were from the urban population and their professions were not tied to the fields of the rural areas. Later, as a student in Jakarta in the 1960s, Mrs. Amini continued to be involved in an urban movement environment by becoming a member of Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI, the Association of Islamic University Students), the largest student organization in Indonesia whose religious and socio-political ideas progressed far beyond the average Muslim contemporary. After university in 1970, Mrs. Amini was deeply involved in Islamic politics through her role in Parmusi, a modernized Islamic party whose ideas of origin could be traced back to Masyumi. Through her involvement in Parmusi she became a politician of Partai Pesatuan Pembangunan (PPP, United Development Party – a new party comprising of former Islamic political parties that in the early 1970s were forcibly amalgamated by the New Order State). Even though this new party was a combination of various backgrounds of religious thought, Mrs. Amini firmly identified herself as a representative of its modernized wing.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the specific roots of the ideas, and the cultural and intellectual environment helps to shape a distinctive political perception on the origin of a person's mainstream. This is the reason, I think, why Mrs. Amini perceives that Islamic politics is indeed more significant to be used as a real categorization

to mark the general political activities of the Indonesian Muslim - than the term "santri politics". To make a rather general proposition, it could be said that an Islamic politician or a Muslim political group whose cultural background derived from the urbanized environment would like to consider themselves beyond the *santri* boundary.

II

This reluctance to be a member within the confines of santri politics is closely related to the nature of the concept of *santri* itself. The term *santri* is commonly linked with people whose intellectual background and political tutelage is closely linked with the *pesantren*. As commonly recognized, *pesantren* –many of which have been established and developed several hundred years ago– is a place as well as a system of Islamic education that is generally located in rural areas. Although by no means static in nature, and in fact *pesantren*s continuously develop both physically and conceptually, there are, at least, three main elements that basically characterize a *pesantren* as an Islamic educational system: the *kiai*, the mosque, and the pupils. The *kiai*, or *ulama* who technically serves as a teacher is conventionally the leader of the system whose authority –theoretically and not infrequently practically– commands almost total obedience from his pupils. The mosque, on the other hand, serves as the center of activities from where religious knowledge is disseminated from the *kiai* to the pupils and then amongst the pupils themselves. Finally, the pupils function as the receivers of the religious knowledge disseminated by the *kiai*. This continuing process of interaction among these three elements of a *pesantren* has automatically shaped a distinct model of social relations within the *pesantren* wherein the *kiai* plays his role at the apex of the social structure of the *pesantren* and his pupils act as religiously –emotionally– loyal followers.

These pupils of the *pesantren* are called *santri*. Coming from diverse and often distant areas, under the spirit of pursuing religious knowledge, the *santri* were and are chained together in a concentrated spot of an Islamic educational system: the *pesantren* -often thousands in number within one single *pesantren*. Under the tutelage of a *kiai* or a group of *kiai*s these *santri* not only receive general religious teach-

ings that can be understood rationally, but also a particular system of values, tradition, and religious thought which, since a long time, has been developing and prevailing in the *pesantren* as a specific guide for their conduct. Thus, in time these *santri*s, directly or indirectly, function as the transmitters of typical religious thoughts throughout the region. These thousands of *santri*s immediately transform themselves to be *kiai* or ulama in almost every village they come from, by establishing their own *pesantren*s. Over time, through this process, *pesantren*s not only continue to grow in increasingly inter-connecting areas, but also gradually enlarge the already long-established networking systems among themselves. Through this network the *pesantren*s intensify their religious-based emotional and cultural connections respectively. Naturally, this *pesantren* network continuously forges the solidification of a distinctive Islamic tradition, system of thoughts, and a web of values among the *pesantren* constituents.

As this *pesantren* social system juxtaposes with the outside world, it becomes clear that this system demonstrates a typical cultural system in regulating behaviour. Former President Abdurrahman Wahid once stated that the social system of *pesantren* has become a subculture, helping to enrich the national culture. In other words, all the *pesantren* elements and the ever–intensifying interaction between them have been functioning as the source of raw material from which the term or even the concept of *budaya santri* (*santri* culture) originates.

It is, I think, from this specific development that the concept or the term "santri politics" finds its origin. To make it simple, santri politics refers to the political activities led and organized by elements of *santri* culture supporters in an attempt to build a certain power house. In other words, the very concept is a politically organized-movement of the *santri* to systematically influence public policies by using power struggle pursued within the official regulations in the prevailing Indonesian state political system.

Empirically, the concept or the term became increasingly public by the 1950s when the national stage formally accommodated various ideological-based political competitions. In an attempt to achieve independence, since the early 1900s various groups of Indonesians chose particular ideologies as a means to create and solidify their respective characteristic membership and to base their specific objective

movements on how their dreams of Indonesia's future should be formulated. At this time there were three major ideologies that dominated the pre-independence Indonesian political scene: Communism, Nationalism, and Islamism. These ideologies survived and thus were able to take a decisive part in the post-independence political struggle.

However, even though this post-independent power struggle reflected ideological nuances, in fact –especially in the case of Java– such bouts were essentially manifestations of cultural games that were pronounced through political forms. To quote anthropologist Clifford Geertz, such contestations in essence were a "struggle for the real", in which all supporters of a cultural axis wrestled fiercely to grasp a political position to ensure that their system of values could control how the whole society should be structured. The political movements at that time, therefore, were more heavily dictated by cultural polarizations than by material based drives. Those whose cultural roots were much less influenced by Islamic values, for example, tended to identify themselves as *abangan* (someone who does not adhere strictly to the precepts of a nominal religion), whose socio-economic class was theoretically divided in peasants, and the *priyayi*. The people who belonged to this cultural group were more subject to the leverage of either Nationalism or Communism. Meanwhile, people who were deeply influenced by Islamic teachings would automatically identify themselves as *santri*–again, both could possibly come from the peasant strata or the *priyayi*. Surely, because of their cultural affiliation, the political aspirations of these people were subject to the influence of Islamism. Based on this fact–though not without confusion whether *abangan* or *priyayi* refers to a cultural or a class category–as reformulated by Geertz, the term or the concept of santri politics has become a general term for usage in the public discourse. Analyzing 1950s Indonesian politics through a cultural perspective, therefore, one cannot avoid to see it essentially as a cultural struggle between "secular-*abangan* politics" forces (Nationalism and Communism) against "religious-santri politics" forces (Islamism) in controlling the power house in Indonesia.

There is no doubt that this term lingers in our public mind even until today. Kiai Hasyim Muzadi–Chairman of the *pesantren*-based Islamic organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)'s Executive Board

(Tanfidziah) which was established in 1926- suggestively publicly restated this term. Recently when he was chosen to run for the post of vice president for PDI-P's candidate president Megawati Soekarnopoetri in the 2004 presidential general elections. No one doubts that Megawati and her party's followers are derived from the nationalist-based "secular-*abangan* politics" forces. But it was precisely because of that and by reminiscing on his past experiences, Muzadi publicly declared that such a union is historical in nature, because it symbolically reflected a reunification of two major forces that once dominated the Indonesian political stage: *santri* and *abangan*!

III

More explanation is required to further clarify this concept. However, basically by considering the cultural and historical contexts explored above, it is much safer to state here that Islamic politics and santri politics share the same features. All Islamic based political activities or major political movements organized and led by elements of Islamic groups can generally be categorized as santri politics forces. In this sense I see no fundamental difference between Mrs. Amini's opinion and the common usage of the term "santri politics". This becomes more reasonable considering developments in Islamic politics where the limits between rural and urban politics –which once divided the Indonesian Muslims culturally and intellectually– are increasingly becoming blurred.

Even though the majority of *santri* still originate from rural areas, the *santri* of various *pesantren*s have been experiencing a vertical mobilization thanks to increased educational capabilities or simply by being consistently active in their political carrier. Some of the best sons of the *pesantren* world are now prominent public figures at the national level as a result of being appointed as members of executive boards of the NU, the *pesantren*-based Muslim organization. To add another interesting example, young people of the same background, have stepped even further in their religious intellectual wanderings, by breaking through long prevailing *pesantren* religious thoughts with new ideas–such as launched by Ulil Abshar Abdallah and his contemporaries of the "Islam Liberal" group- that has resulted in a series of

radical progressive concepts of religious thoughts which could not even be recognized by their own fellow *santri*s anymore.

To sum up, the barriers for "traditionalist-*santri*" to enter an urbanized Islamic political environment have broken down. As a consequence, many paths have now been opened to allow every talented *santri* to be recruited unexceptionally into –to quote Mrs. Amini's statement once more– all embracing modern Islamic political movements. It could even be said that structurally santri politics has transformed itself into urbanized politics, in a sense that they now have more ability both to organize their supporters by means of modern management to achieve specific political goals and by using modern means, including public opinion as well as international support, to win their domestic political games. Hence, both actors of the early 1900s urbanized background of Islamic socio-political movements; those pointed out by Mrs. Amini above, and the newly emerged *pesantren*-based *santri*, stand equally on a balanced position of development.

This has especially been the case with the *nahdliyin* communities, the NU's constituents, whose progressive developments in modern socio-political consciousness was forged by Abdurrahman Wahid since leading this organization in 1984. Claiming themselves to control almost forty million followers, it is evident that the NU possesses huge political potential in the Indonesian power game. Being long marginalized under the repressive New Order State, their time of realizing this potential only arrived recently when the former regime tumbled in 1998. Now free to establish their own political party, again, under the inspiring as well as confusing leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid, the *nahdliyin* organized themselves politically by creating their own political party: Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, the National Awakening Party), a year after President Soeharto was forced to end his rule. It is through this vehicle that the impressive and unprecedented development of santri political forces emerged, perhaps beyond their own dreams and more than has ever before been witnessed in Indonesian political history. The PKB, in this dramatic event, does not only provide massive vertical mobilization for the upper layer of santri politicians–by becoming members of parliament or even cabinet members–but also ushered in Abdurrahman Wahid as the first presi-

dent of the Republic of Indonesia with a santri politics background in the post-1999 general elections.

Certainly the PKB is not the single representative of santri politics in Indonesia. Long before the birth of that party, santri politics had channeled its political aspirations through a New Order State-sponsored political party: PPP which garnered many votes and support from the *nahdliyin* communities. Even though less dramatic in its development, this party received a lucrative windfall of political gain when it "unintentionally" placed one of its *santri*-background politicians Hamzah Haz as Vice-President in 2001, immediately after the fall of Abdurrahman Wahid's government. Unfortunately, Hamzah Haz could not make use of his strategic political position, not even for strengthening his own party's position in the recent general elections, let alone for santri politics as a whole. Being alienated from its former *nahdliyin* supporters and less attractive in the eyes of the educated urbanized Muslims, the PPP is now facing a gloomy future on the Indonesian national political stage.

In addition to the political parties mentioned above, there are at least three other political clusters whose major actors are derived from the non-*pesantren* background wing within santri politics: Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, the Crescent Star Party), Partai Amanat National (PAN, the National Mandate Party), and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Justice and Welfare Party). If we just refer back to the standards set forth by Mrs. Amini mentioned earlier, these parties –with their respective characters– are essentially the direct legacy of the urbanized Islamic political movements, in which Masyumi's past performance has largely become their model.

Even though these parties generally share intellectual and religious visions, they respectively perform different power and leverage achievements. Basically, the PBB has been unable to enlarge its public leverage beyond the people around the Persis (Persatuan Islam, Islamic Union –an organization that formerly served as one of Masyumi's chapter members) frontiers. This is, to some extent, because the party which was led by Yusril Ihza Mahendra, relied heavily on the assumption that the former supporters of Masyumi would automatically transfer their support to them without the PBB having to reorganize them energetically, creatively, and imaginatively. It is not

surprising then that this party failed to increase its numbers by more than a handful of votes during the last two general elections. The best move for this party is to affiliate itself to one of the promising individuals or political groups who have greater potential to win the power games. Through these kinds of maneuvers this tiny party has managed to send two of its best members to serve as cabinet members in the recent government.

PAN, on the other hands, thanks to much more organized support from the Muhammadiyah, enjoys a stronger political position. Combined with its charismatic leadership of Amien Rais, the forerunner of the *reformation* movement that caused President Soeharto's power to plummet in 1998, PAN received many more votes than the PBB. Still, despite being well managed, its urbanized and modernist character in religious thought has culturally alienated the PAN from the majority of Indonesian Muslims, especially those within the *nahdliyin* communities. In addition to the fact that the *nahdliyin* already have their own political party, differences in religious thoughts and traditions play a significant role in restraining them from placing their political aspirations in the Muhammadiyah figure led–political party.

Finally there is the PKS, which surprised many people with its rapid rise in popularity. Led by young people and being mostly unknown to the general political public, the party presented a good impression to the people. Even though its first appearance gained a less significant number of votes in the 1999 general elections, its religiously-pious, industrious as well as public-devoted-oriented cadres created an extraordinary impressive performance in the 2004 general elections. Many Indonesian groups are indeed asking whether this newly established political party possesses a clear vision on Indonesia's multi-facet crisis due to its sudden emergence, and its unknown and above all, politically inexperienced leaders. However, in the situation where the people are experiencing a loss of confidence in almost all state apparatus as well as the political elite, the strictly-religiously-based morality that the PKS offers has attracted public attention. This was clearly demonstrated when in the recent general elections they were able to amass more votes than PAN. The emergence of PKS, therefore, serves as a striking example that Indonesian voting behaviour is

not only influenced by materialistic, earthly, and secular motives of power, but is also inclined towards attitudes of religious morality.

IV

Recent developments in Indonesian santri politics have not yet reached a conclusive point. Progress in these *santri*–based parties may take a constructive or destructive form. However dramatic the development of santri politics on the current Indonesian political scene, it cannot be denied that secular-based political parties–specifically Golkar and PDI-P–have demonstrated that they still remain attractive to many people. While each of the *santri*-based political parties, as symptomatically seen during the last two general elections, theoretically and practically demonstrate themselves to be in a state of fluctuation, the future of these santri political parties thus remains to be seen.

Indonesia's Role in the Muslim World and International Affairs

Azyumardi Azra

The visit of Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to Cairo on the eve of 'Id al-Fitr in November 2004 to offer condolences to the deceased Palestinian President, Yasser Arafat, seems to have certain symbolic meaning. In the first instance, it shows that Indonesia remains committed to supporting the struggle of the Palestinian people. Indonesia since the time of independence (17 August, 1945) has declared to take sides with the Palestinian people in their struggle to gain their rights and independence.

Implicitly, the visit also indicates that Indonesia is still a good friend of the Muslim Middle East as a whole; this is particularly true since President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was accompanied on his

visit by prominent Muslim leaders, like Hidayat Nurwahid (Speaker of the MPR), Din Syamsuddin (Council of Indonesian Ulama/MUI), Hasyim Muzadi (national leader of NU), and Amin Abdullah (leader of Muhammadiyah). The three organizations are rightly often considered as representatives of Indonesian Islam.

With this kind of delegation, the President sent a wrong message; as if the struggle of the Palestinians is the struggle of Islam. Despite the rise of HAMAS and the *intifada* in the last decade, the Palestinian struggle is clearly not identical with the struggle of Islam. The fact is that the struggle is basically secular nationalist in nature without particular reference to Islam or any other religion. He should have included leaders of other religions, particularly Roman Catholics and Protestants among his delegates. This is particularly important, since the Palestinian people also comprise of a significant element of Christians who joined forces with Muslims to fight for their holy sites in Palestine that have been occupied or controlled by Israel (cf. Azra 2000:7).

New Orientation?

But what is more important for the purpose of this paper is whether the visit is a gesture that Indonesian foreign policy would orient itself to the Islamic world; whether Indonesia would take a greater role in Middle Eastern affairs, particularly in the Palestinian question and Iraqi problem, as has been mandated by the preamble of the 1945 Indonesian constitution. Accordingly, Indonesia should play an active role in the creation of a just and peaceful international order. Indonesia, for that reason, should oppose any kind of colonialism, imperialism, and aggression.

Another equally important question is whether the visit of President Yudhoyono and his subsequent participations in the APEC Summit Meeting in Santiago, Chile, and ASEAN Summit Meeting in Vientiane, Laos, are signs of Indonesia's more assertive role in international diplomacy. There has been of course a great deal of hope among Indonesians that Indonesia could play a greater and more assertive role in international affairs. So that Indonesia can regain respect from the international community.

There is little doubt that the role and position of Indonesia in

international affairs and diplomacy has decreased significantly since the fall of President Soeharto in 1998. Since then, I would suggest that Indonesia is "sleeping giant" Southeast Asia's. This is not because Indonesia has adopted low profile diplomacy at the international level, but mostly because it has lost it élan. This is of course mainly due to the internal crises Indonesia has been facing since the sudden fall of President Soeharto. Following the monetary and economic crises, for instance, the number of staff at many Indonesian embassies was reduced quite significantly. This arguably might have affected the effectiveness of the embassies to perform their diplomatic duties.

More importantly, however, domestic political uncertainty and instability have been mainly responsible for the decreased role in international diplomacy. The three presidents –B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri– who ruled Indonesia after the fall of Soeharto had apparently no clear foreign policies, or else they were too occupied with serious domestic problems that had to be urgently resolved.

Furthermore, for many Indonesians, President Habibie –during his interregnum– was held responsible for the fiasco of Indonesian international posture, when he allowed East Timor to conduct a referendum that led to internal violence; this then became an official and formal *raison d'être* for international institutions, like the UN, and foreign countries, especially Australia, to intervene. In the end Indonesia had to allow East Timor to declare its independence under the protection of the UN.

When Abdurrahman Wahid was elected President by the Peoples' Consultative Assembly (MPR) in 1999, it appeared that he intended to revive Indonesia's role in international diplomacy. For this purpose he traveled to many foreign countries; but rather than producing clear results of his visits abroad, he used these visits to issue controversial domestic policies. Therefore, it is debatable whether his frequent visits were taken at all seriously by the foreign countries he visited.

At the same time he also created public controversy when he announced an intention to open trade and economic relations with Israel. As one might expect, he was opposed bitterly by many Muslim groups who forced him to abandon the plan. But the damage had been

done, and he was considered insensitive to Muslims' feelings in his foreign as well as domestic policies.

Foreign policy was even unclear during the period of President Megawati Soekarnoputri who replaced President Wahid after his impeachment by the MPR for mismanagement, controversial policies, and erratic behaviour. Known for her indecisive attitude, President Megawati chose to be passive rather than active not only in foreign affairs, but even in domestic ones.

The September 11, 2001, events in the US, however, put President Megawati Soekarnoputri in a very awkward position. Only a few days after the fateful events, President Megawati met President Bush to offer her condolences; the move and her further attitude to the US were regarded by Muslim hardliner groups in Indonesia as an act of surrender to US pressures.

The election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono on September 20, 2004 through direct presidential elections raised hopes from Indonesian people and many foreign leaders that Indonesia would soon regain political stability. Many Indonesians were tired of the decline of their country's role in international affairs. Political and economic stability would of course allow Indonesia to play a much more important role in international affairs. A weak and instable Indonesia would be a disadvantage for the world; Indonesia is at least expected by the world to be a mediating and stabilizing force in the ASEAN and Pacific regions.

Conventional Policy

It seems, again, that President Yudhoyono wishes that Indonesia could play a greater role in international affairs. Whether this could happen or not would depend much on domestic political developments. As Djalal and Wanandi argue, domestic affairs greatly influence Indonesia's foreign policy (Djalal 1996; Wanandi 1989). Thus, if President Yudhoyono is able to consolidate his government and has a good working cooperation with Parliament (DPR) –in which his party occupies only a minority position– he would have a good chance to assert a more active role for Indonesia in international diplomacy.

In 2005 Indonesia will commemorate 50 years of the famous Bandung Conference that has been regarded as the corner stone of the

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); preparation is underway to celebrate the Conference. Indonesia under the leadership of President Soeharto was of course the leader of the NAM in the early 1990s. The commemoration of the Bandung Conference as well as the reminiscents of Indonesia's leading role in the NAM could be a momentum for a more assertive Indonesian foreign policy under President Yudhoyono.

But the question now is whether Indonesia would abandon or make some adjustment to the long-held "policy of ambiguity" particularly towards the Muslim world. There are a number of cases in which Indonesia's foreign policy showed a strong tendency towards the policy of ambiguity (cf Azra 2000:12ff). On the one hand, the Indonesian government seems to take careful consideration when handling issues relating to Islam and Muslims appear at the forefront of international events. But, on the other hand, Indonesia seems to consistently play down the Islamic factor in its foreign policy.

Leifer concludes that Indonesian governments, especially from the advent of the New Order inaugurated by General Soeharto, have taken great care not to allow foreign policy to be dictated by Islamic considerations. He admits, however, that Islam is not without influence in Indonesia's foreign policy, but that influence has been expressed much more in the form of constraints than in positive motivation (Leifer 1983:144).

Despite the "policy of ambiguity" towards the Islamic factor, from the late 1970s to the end of the Soeharto period, Indonesia had shown some signs of a more active role in international diplomacy and affairs. Indonesia, for instance, took a greater role in the NAM; played a crucial role in negotiations regarding the Bangsamoro problem in the Philippines; and established stronger relations with certain countries in the Middle East. These changes were a large extent motivated by economic interests. Thus, after a decade of inward oriented policy of national economic development in the late 1960 and 1970s, the Soeharto government became more assertive in its foreign policy, becoming an important actor in international politics.

But as indicated above, the Indonesian posture in international politics declined considerably following the fall of President Soeharto; again, Indonesia was occupied mainly with internal problems from politics, economics, and social to cultural.

Apart from these internal crises and problems, there is little doubt that the Islamic factor becomes more apparent in domestic politics which, in turn, influences Indonesia's foreign policy. The so-called "Islamic revival" that has been taking place since the last decade of the Soeharto period seems to have gained a new momentum in the post-Soeharto reform period (*masa reformasi*). The reappeareance of political Islam, represented by many Islamic parties, has brought about new emphasis on the importance of the Islamic factor in both domestic and foreign policy.

An even stronger pressure is brought by a number of hardline groups that have become more pronounced in the post-Soeharto period. These groups, known for their anti-American sentiment, appeal to the Indonesian government to pay more attention to, and to take a more active role in, Middle Eastern problems, that is, the Palestinian question and American aggression in Iraq. They bitterly criticized President Wahid for contemplating a plan to open trade and economic relations with Israel, and shunned President Megawati Soekarnoputri for having "surrendered" to the pressures of President George W. Bush in his against terrorism. They, by and large, have been idle since the arrests of a number of perpetrators of the Bali, Marriot, and Kuningan bombings; but they could easily reactivate themselves and challenge President Yudhoyono.

Conclusion

Despite some signs shown by President Yudhoyono of a possible more active and assertive foreign policy, it is also clear that he will concentrate mainly on domestic affairs. For that purpose, he appealed to his cabinet ministers not to travel abroad unless absolutely necessary and urgent. He himself has of course broken his promise not to travel abroad by going to Cairo, Santiago, and Vientiane.

Therefore, it is difficult to expect that President Yudhoyono's admininistration will have a strong aspiration to play a greater role in the Muslim world and in other international affairs. Despite some efforts in the past by President Soeharto to get closer to a number of Arab countries, Indonesia has never played a prominent role nor occupied an important position in international Islamic organizations such as the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). This has been

the official position of the Indonesian government and it seems that it is adopted too by President Yudhoyono.

There is a lot of hope among Indonesian Muslims as well as foreign scholars, such as the late Fazlur Rahman, John Esposito and others that Indonesia could be a model for other Muslim countries in its political system and modernization. The hopes in fact find a stronger basis with the success of Indonesia in the consolidation of democracy, as has been shown particularly in the peaceful legislature and presidential elections of 2004. Indonesia, in this perspective, should be more active as a model of the compatibility of Islam and democracy.

But, again, the expectations seem to be very difficult to materialize. This is not only because Indonesia continues to adopt a policy of ambiguity, but also because Arab Muslim countries tend to underestimate the importance of Indonesian Islam and the country's huge Muslim population. Indonesian Islam is considered not 'real Islam' as opposed to Middle Eastern Islam; and Indonesian Muslims are regarded as not 'Islamic' enough. A number or prominent scholars, such Nikki Keddie, Fazlur Rahman, John L. Esposito and others through their comparative studies have shown the fallacies of that kind of perception and bias.

Thus, there is long way for Indonesia to go in order to be able to play a greater role in the Muslim world and international affairs. First steps should be for Indonesia to improve domestic conditions particularly politics and the economy. If that can be done, Indonesia could reorient its foreign policy, playing a more pro-active role in the Muslim world and international affairs.

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The Repositioning of the Indonesian Role in Adapting Islam to the Worldwide Social Agenda

Murni Djamal

- I -

It has become apparent that in almost all levels and arenas of Indo nesian history, Islam has deeply colored the spirit and ideas of the founding fathers, and laymen of the country in achieving and realizing their targets of independence from the control of colonial power. When this religion of peace and tolerance first appeared in the Indonesian archipelago[1] (Indonesia), and with the appearance of the European traders from Portugal to East Indonesia (such as Mollucas, Makassar), and the Dutch to (Java, Sumatra, etc.), in the beginning of the six-teenth century, People of different ethnicities, races, and faiths all lived together in harmony. It was only after those European countries began

to introduce their colonial policies and conduct missionary programs that a number of Muslim leaders declared war against them. Sulthan Babullah in Moluccas, Sulthan Hasanuddin in Makassar, Sulthan Syarif Hidayatullah in Batavia and even much earlier, Sulthan Iskandar Muda in Aceh led the Indonesian Muslims to fight against the Portuguese. Other Muslim leaders also rose in defence of their country in an effort to make it independent from Dutch rule. Pangeran Diponegoro in Java, Tuanku Imam Bonjol in Minangkabau, West Sumatra, Tenku Ci' di Tiro, Tenku Umar, Cut Nyak Din in Aceh, Sulthan Badaruddin in Palembang, South Sumatra, Raja Ali Haji in Riau, Pangeran Antasari in Banjarmasin, Kalimantan, and so many others, all declared war and were prepared to sacrifice their lives for the glory of Islam and the independence of the country.

The colonial army and navy were much stronger than the Muslim armed forces which meant that combined with the lack of national organization the Islamic based struggles were not that successful. The superior Portuguese, Dutch, and later British forces were far more successful in coordinating their battalions in specific areas to achieve victory before moving further a field.

Muslim leaders clearly demonstrated their readiness to defend their country from external forces; no matter how strong their enemy was. They may have lost many battles, but their fighting spirit was not obscured; on the contrary it became a "hidden treasure" which inspired future Indonesians to continuously strive for independence from the hands of the colonialists and build a strong nation.

- II -

After many battles the Dutch finally conquered the Indonesians. The Dutch government appointed strong leaders to maintain colonialist practices in Indonesia which included oppressing Indonesian Muslims by keeping them poor, uneducated, and neglected.

During the long period of Dutch colonization, there was no talk of human rights, or democratic rights; Indonesians were totally at the mercy of the Dutch government so it was not strange to see that most Indonesians belonged to the very low income per capita strata of soci-

ety. At this time, there existed only a very small highly educated society, because the Dutch government offered no equal opportunities to the young Indonesians to enter government schools. Understandably, most of them went to the Pesantrens to study Islamic religious subjects. General subjects like mathematics, biology, chemistry, physics, foreign languages, etc were not included in the curriculum. These two systems of education produced a vast gap between the public school graduates (organized and supervised by the Dutch government) and the graduates of the Pesantren(s). The former produced Dutch or Western oriented graduates, while the latter produced more fanatic, religiously based graduates. In the long run before and after Indonesian Independence in 1945, these two groups formed their own political parties; many of the Dutch or Western based school graduates chose to participate in the Nationalist party, while the Middle East or Pesantren based school system graduates were active in Islamic parties. This fact, of course, does not negate the participation of young Muslim intellectuals in Islamic based parties, but their numbers were not that significant.

- III -

According to Professor Kahin it was the homogenization of 90 percent of Indonesian Muslims that brought the people independence from the Dutch. During this time, differences in religious background or political organizations were put aside. All Indonesians; Muslims, Christians, Buddhists and Hindus strongly united against the colonialists in an effort to win the war of independence.

Finally, after three hundred fifty years of heroic struggle and strong resistance, Indonesians declared their independence in August 1945 through two Muslim nationalists, Soekarno and Hatta, the first president and vice president of the new Republic. In order to run this new nation appropriately and democratically, the ten members of the Indonesian preparatory independence committee (nine of them were Muslims) formulated the 1945 National Constitution and Pancasila; the five pillars of the national philosophy. According to Kahin, it was the homogeneity of the dominant Muslim population across the country

that was responsible for the formation of national integrity.[2]

The declaration of Indonesian independence impacted the future Indonesian attitude. Indonesians were now confident that they could overcome any obstacles provided they were united and exercised mutual trust and mutual cooperation. Of course there were many who did not believe that they could free themselves from the long period of colonization; they were individuals or groups who wanted colonial rule to be prolonged because they had benefited a lot from the colonial rulers kindness for the welfare and prosperity of their families and their groups. The reaction to Indonesian Independence from foreign countries also varied; the Dutch and her allied countries didn't believe that this poor country, with a limited number of educated leaders, and very weak armed forces could win the war and gain her independence, but on the other hand, many Muslim countries in Asia and Africa became inspired to liberate themselves from the long sleep of colonial dominance. Pakistan, Egypt, Algeria, part of Malaya and India were all countries that were inspired to gain their independence following Indonesia's example.

Since then, Indonesia, supported by a strong unity of leaders of both political and social Islamic and other religious organizations, and upheld by a fairly stable political-atmosphere, has moved forward to introduce the spirit of independence to the world's nations in The United Nations Organization (UNO) headquarter in New York. The late President Soekarno in one of his speeches in the UN, quoted Surah Al-Hujurat verse 13 of the Holy Quran and appealed to the organization to encourage more countries to become independent. Indonesia's call for independence was clearly heard in the UN as well as in the third world countries of Africa and Asia as it continued to promote brotherhood and mutual cooperation among people of the Asian and African countries and together with India, Yugoslavia and Egypt, Indonesia became pioneers for the establishment of a non-alignment movement (NOM), which brought together two-thirds of the world's population. The execution of the Asian-African countries conference in 1955 in Bandung, demonstrated to the world that Indonesia now existed as a nation and between 1955 and 1965 it played an important role in adapting her policies to the worldwide social agenda,

that was the establishment of democracy and the protection of human rights.

A few years after the KAA the Indonesian government, played a further role for Indonesian Islam by executing KIAA, (Conference for the Islamic countries of the Asian – African conference) thereby making Indonesia more popular in the international forum and it became viewed as a country that strongly supported a harmonious and tolerant life among people of different faiths. The establishment of OKI (The Organization of Islam Conference) and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Countries) were all facilitated by the Indonesian government in efforts to allow Indonesian Islam to adapt to the worldwide social agenda.

The historical successes of the Indonesian struggle for independence and her efforts in establishing peace, and promoting international cooperation has almost disappeared in Indonesian Islam today.

- IV -

Where does Indonesian Islam and the worldwide social agenda meet? Are there any misunderstandings and misconceptions, or constraints between the two which may create obstacles to world peace and harmony?

We have to admit that in the past there has been a number of misunderstandings and misconceptions between Muslims and the Western people which in turn make it difficult for both parties to work hand in hand in adapting to the worldwide social agenda. Much of the misunderstanding, which finally led to hostilities originated from the history of wars that took place between the Muslims and the West in the Middle Ages; "To the Muslims, for example the 200 years of the Crusade were an episode of great cruelty and terrible plunder of Western infidel soldiers", while to the western people, the Crusades are traditionally regarded as "a series of heroic, exploits in which the kings, knights and princes tried to wrest Jerusalem from the wicked Muslim infidels"[3] The long struggle of Middle Easterners to take back their lands from the occupiers and oppressive rulers, and some other extremist movements using the name of Islam, have imposed the preva-

lent idea in the West that Islam is related to violence, extremism or even terrorism.

"Furthermore, the fall of Granada to Ferdinand and Isabella in 1492, is seen by Muslims as a year of tragedy. It symbolized the end of eight centuries of Muslim civilization in Europe; meanwhile the fall of Constantinople to the hands of Sultan Mehmet in 1453 frightened European rulers. But when Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798 the Muslim Arab world become occupied by Western powers. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, it looked like Europe's triumph over Islam was complete".[4] European countries such as, the Dutch in Indonesia, the British in India-Pakistan, the French in North Africa, etc. ruled most Muslim countries for about one to three and half centuries. The introduction of Western education and the application of Western laws in those Muslim countries have really threatened the Muslim population with a fear that their children will be converted to Christianity. "The fears of religious conversion still prevail in multi-religious societies of today and are often a source of mistrust and tension among these communities in extreme situations".[5] The vast majority of Muslims are moderate, but, unfortunately, the terrible violence of a small minority of "extremists", who either do not understand the real Islamic teaching or really want to violate the Islamic principles to achieve certain political and material interests"[6], have overshadowed the moderate Muslims. The Western media seemed to have generalized the meaning of terrorism as almost similar as identical with the struggle for liberation in Palestine and Kashmir.

- V -

The Holy War (*Jihād*) has been another aspect of Islam which has caused discord between Muslims and Westerners. People in the West still believe that Islam was spread at the point of sword; Jihad violated democracy and violated human rights. On the contrary, war is not an objective of Islam nor is it the normal course of Muslims. It is the absolute last resource and may only be deferred to under the most extraordinary of circumstances. *Jihād* cannot be declared by a certain individual or a certain group. According to Muslim jurists it is

only valid when the following requirements are met:

a. There are aggressive designs against Islam.

b. There are concerted efforts to uproot Muslims from their homes.

c. Military campaigns are being launched to eradicate them.

Only the Imam (head of Islamic State) has the power to declare Jihad.[7] Otherwise what the people call for *Jihād* nowadays cannot be included for the practical reasons above.

Misconceptions and misunderstandings may also occur from distorted media campaigns about "Fundamentalism" and its relationship to terrorism.

Demands by revivalist groups in some parts of the Muslim world for the introduction of Islamic laws have been misused by some Muslim extremists to overthrow well-established government structures using the name of religion, but based on narrow interpretations. Many stories have been distorted by the mass media and presented as an Islamic fundamentalist threat to democratic order and other religions.[8]

One other major misconception is the mistaken view that women and non - Muslims have no rights in Islamic society. In fact the The Holy Quran, for almost fourteen centuries now, has been emphatically promoting the ideas of human rights for all; including non-Muslims, slaves, women, etc. regardless of race, religion, status or gender. Islam has always promoted basic human rights; the improper practices of denying human rights oft practiced by some dictatorial regimes or monarchy system shall not be taken as examples of Quranic laws. "Distinction should be made between a political set up established by the rulers to suit their political interests and real Quranic injunctions."[9]

- VI -

To understand the issue of the status of woman in Islam one must distinguish Islamic principle from the culture and customs in various Islamic countries. The case of Taliban women in Afghanistan who were deprived of their rights to education and freedom of choice cannot be generalized as typical of other Islamic countries, such as Egypt, Syria, Pakistan and Indonesia. Egypt and Syria gave women the vote

as early as Europe. Begum Khalida, Benazir Bhutto, and Megawati Soekarnoputri, became Prime Ministers and the President of their countries; although some Islamic leaders in Indonesia disagreed with the appointment of Megawati the majority of the population seemed to have given approval to her appointment.

It is important here to mention that the Quran's teachings are very much concerned with eliminating the root causes of violence and emphasizing the promotion of world peace and solidarity based on justice, while at the same time addressing the key factors that lead to "harmonious existence rule of equal justice to all human beings, religious tolerance and ultimately world peace".[10]

- VII -

Indonesian Islam should be ready to reposition her role in adapting herself to the worldwide social agenda, and once again repeat the historical successes of the previous generation. In the first step of its program, Indonesia has to work very hard at improving the economic condition, alleviating poverty and creating more employment opportunities for the more than 40 million young job seekers. The educational system at all levels must be improved in terms of the quality of teachers and the quality of school graduates, along with the quality of teacher's infrastructure. The rampant practice of corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN), especially among high-ranking officials in the government, must be ruthlessly eliminated; fair and firm steps should be taken immediately to bring those involved in KKN to trial and to be sentenced appropriately. Human rights, including those of women and children, must be enforced while criminals, drug dealers, violators of human rights and those involved in terrorist activities must be heavily punished.

It is only by achieving political stability and striving for a better economic condition, by encouraging the active participation of all segments of Indonesian community that the above constraints can be overcome. The three phases of the general election in 2004 has shown the world that Indonesia is now becoming a democratic Muslim country that has successfully carried out a general election in peace, security

and tolerance. People of the world are now waiting for more progress from Indonesia, both on the national and international agenda. Indonesia is not yet an independent county but then again Western Countries cannot fully stand alone without assistance from Muslim countries; including Indonesia.

- VIII -

It is now up to the Indonesian government along with activists in organized political parties, mass organizations, NGOS, educational institutions, and professionals, to work hand in hand to promote peace, tolerance, protection of human rights, anti-terrorism and elimination of drug abuse as the next step forward. It is only by hard work, sincere intention, and firm sanctions that Indonesian Muslims can once again earn a respected position in regional and international relations. The worldwide social agenda promoted by all nations of the world, particularly by the Western countries should be directed towards the creating of mutual understandings and minimizing misconstructions derived from the common areas of misconceptions between Islam and the West.

- IX -

In order to finalize this discussion, we appeal to leaders of Western countries to be sincere in dealing with Muslim countries, including Indonesian Islam, by treating these countries in a fair way certainly world peace and international harmony can be achieved. Mutual understanding between Islam and the West must begin with sincere intentions and efforts from both sides including:

1. The Media needs to take a more balanced position and avoid using loaded works which might lead to misjudgment and prejudice.
2. Muslims need to be visible in the Western media, in films, on discussion programs, on the radio and TV so that they have an opportunity to present their point of view and counter any negative images.
3. More conferences and seminars for the general public need to be

organized to explain Islam in the West.

4. Teaching a basic knowledge of Islam in Western schools so that children do not grow in ignorance of it; ignorance breeds fear and prejudice.

5. International action to address the major problems that cause so much anger and distress among Muslims especially those of Muslims in Bosnia, Irak, Middle East, Afghanistan.[11]

On the other hand, Muslims, including those living in Indonesia are also appealed to take the following steps:

1. To convince the world that the media images of them as law-breaking and violent people are not true. They must safeguard that foreign ambassadors, diplomats, travelers and Non-Muslims are safe in their countries.

2. To show the world that Indonesian Islam takes serious steps to fight against injustice, corruption, collusion, and nepotism (KKN), drug abuse, criminal acts.

3. Implement democratic ideas in all levels of peoples' life; such as in politics, economy, education and others.

4. To show the world that Indonesian Islam will keep socializing a peaceful life, and harmonious relations, regardless of a person's faith, ethnicity, race, etc. Islam is a religion of peace and justice, which asks for full protection of human rights without any discrimination, including the protection of Non-Muslim minorities.

5. Rrectify the misconceptions about Islam both at the local and international level. Muslims should endeavor to better the image of Islam from all types of extremist and terrorist activities, either derived from a wrong understanding of Islam by the extremists themselves or by the mass-media. Muslim intellectuals should contribute writings to counter any campaigns of associating Islam with terrorism, violence and violation of human rights so that the misconceptions and misunderstandings about Islam can be corrected.

Both parties, people in the West and Muslims all over the world should try to come closer to one another through mutual trust, mutual understanding and mutual cooperation. Karen Armstrong is right to

say, "If Muslims need to understand our Western traditions and institutions more thoroughly, we in the West need to divest ourselves of some of our old prejudice".[12]

Notes

[1] W. Stöhr and P. Zoetmoelder believed that Islam came to Indonesia in around 1247 based on the report of Marcopolo's travel to Sumatra in 1292 where he found the town called Ferlak (Perlak). The place was frequently visited by Muslim Indian traders. They were also responsible for converting the indigenous to Islam (les réligions d'Indonésie), 1868:1315. Mean while, Sumanto al-Qurtubi believed that Islam came to Indonesia through the Island of Java in the 15th – 16th centuries. The Chinese were mostly traders, tourists, professional teachers, or political asylum seekers (Arus China – Islam – Jawa) (current China-Islam-Java), 2003: p. 213. Thomas W. Arnold stated that Islam came to Indonesia from India or direct from Saudi Arabia in the first or second century of Islamic Era, many of them were traders, teachers, etc.

[2] George Mc Turmen Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca New York : Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 38

[3] Ghulam Farid Malik, "Reports of the Muslim Community to Apply the Quranic Values towards World Peace: A Historical Perspective", in *Islam and Perdamaian Global* (Yogyakarta: The Madyan Press and The Asia Foundation, 2002).

[4] *Ibid,* p. 258

[5] *Ibid,* p. 259

[6] *Ibid,* p. 258

[7] *Ibid,* p. 259

[8] *Ibid,* p. 261

[9] *Ibid,* p. 262

[10] *Ibid,* p. 263

[11] Ibid, p.264-265

[12] Karen Armstrong, *Muhammad, A Bibliography of the Prophet* (Harper: San Francisco, 1993), p. 266.

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Repositioning Indonesia in the International World: Adapting Islam to the Agenda of Human Rights and Democracy

Kusnanto Anggoro

Reconstituting the role that Indonesia can play in world politics, especially those relating to the worldwide social agenda, is a complex endeavour. After the tragedy of the World Trade Center in September 2001, world politics appears to have moved steps backwards to the era of real politics during which military and coercive measures were at the fore. As such, the struggle for a more just, prosperous, and equitable world appears to be on the back burner. Indonesia's distinc-

tive character of Islam, however, could well be instrumental to open the way for a more active Indonesia in world affairs. The successful transition to democracy, as manifested in the fairly democratic elections in 1999 and 2004 may enhance Indonesia's credentials. For sure, a rigorous strategy has to be drawn to bridge the widening political divide between Islam and the West.[1] Arguably, considering past practices and political constraints, people-to-people diplomacy may in future become more prominent; though of course it will never be an alternative to official, state-to-state, diplomacy. The biggest challenge may in fact be at the societal level, where there lies a great task ahead to define appropriate roles in changing circumstances.

Islam in Indonesia's Foreign Policy

There is little doubt that the role and position of Indonesia in international affairs has decreased significantly since the fall of Soeharto in 1998.[2] Economic crises reduced significantly the effectiveness of Indonesia's diplomatic performance, which can be evidenced from the great reduction of staff at many Indonesian embassies. Political transition posed specific challenges to successive governments. With a few exceptions, new governments require a breathing space for regime consolidation, and preoccupied by such concerns may play only a limited role in international politics.

Nevertheless, activism in global affairs is enshrined in the state's constitution; oblige any government to utilize diplomacy as an instrument in the pursuant of national interest. Still, with the unstoppable rise of interdependent relationships among nations, globalization poses serious challenges that cannot be solved by unilateral effort alone. Thus, the question that has to be addressed in discussing "repositioning Indonesia in the global politics and international affairs as a champion of Islam to the worldwide social agenda" is not whether Indonesia will play a role in the global politics and international affairs, but, first, what role Indonesia should and could play in the circumstances; and, secondly, whether Islam could be a significant driving force or influence in a particular dimension of Indonesian foreign policy.

The first question is relatively easy to answer. For sure, in the long run, Indonesia has many reasons to be active in foreign policy

and world politics. As proclaimed in the Constitution, Indonesia should play an active role in the creation of a just and peaceful international order. This could be manifested in many forms, starting from opposing any kind of colonialism, imperialism, and aggression, to a more vigorous effort in the struggle for a more just, prosperous, and democratic world. The emergence of what is called "human security" in world affairs, supplementing the more traditional issue of hard security, may open the way for Indonesia to be more active in the struggle for a world social and political agenda, namely in democracy and human rights.

Indeed, priorities should be laid down towards a proper agenda. World politics has from the very beginning been concerned with the issues of nuclear non-proliferation, conventional arms reduction, and conflict resolution. Such war and peace paradigms appear to be of great relevance in conflict-prone regions such as the Middle East and Northeast Asia. Besides that, it has also seriously concerned itself in creating a more just and fair trading regime, flow of capital, and sustainable development. Needless to say, a worldwide social agenda such as justice, human rights, and democracy, represents the equilibrium point between political and economic drives.

In global and regional fora Indonesia has always expressed her concerns. Through both ASEAN and the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) Indonesia has called for resolution of disputes in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Korean Peninsula. The Non-Aligned Movement has also become a vehicle through which Indonesia registered her vote for a more just world. In such fora, however, Islamic consideration does not seem to be in the diplomatic gestures. Instead, Indonesia behaves as a middle-rank Asian power rather than as one of the most populous Islamic countries.

The second question may be more complicated. There is no doubt that Islamic movements and their leaders will be major players in Indonesia's post-Soeharto politics.[3] The two largest Muslim organizations, the Nahdlatul Ulama and the Muhammadiyah, and their leaders are engaged in Indonesia's post-Soeharto political process and seem to have become more popular. However, it is somewhat difficult to assess whether they would play a strong role and have impact upon

foreign policy. As is known, Indonesian Islam and Islamic groups in Indonesia have differed from similar movements in other Muslim countries and have had their own distinctive features.

Such a trend will be likely to prevail. Much as cultural Islam has been on the rise for more than a decade, Islamic political parties remain relatively weak. No political parties performed better in the popular vote, except the Prosperous and Justice Party (PKS – Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), which is ranked sixth, with 7 percent of the seats. In the elections of June 2004, they gathered around 40 percent of the seats in Parliament, far below the 87 percent of the Muslim population. Even the phenomenal rise of the PKS could well be attributed more to their moderation in the Party's ideology, if not their success in adopting public concerns such as environmental degradation, land confiscation, and, more significantly, corruption. Such tendencies are indicative of the fact that from an ideological point of view, there was only a fairly limited pressure for Yudhoyono's government to depart from the course of the past.[4]

Under Soeharto, the government seems to have trod carefully when issues relating to Islam and Muslims appeared at the forefront of international politics. Indonesia consistently played down the Islamic factor in its foreign policy. Undoubtedly, from Indonesia's role in the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), the settlement of the Moro conflict, the Palestinian issue, Indonesia's relation with Israel, The Gulf War, and the conflict of Bosnia-Herzegovina, can be seen that Islam has been manipulated as a justification of Indonesia's foreign policy. Soon after the 1993 Israeli-PLO peace accord, Soeharto, in his capacity as chairman of the NAM, invited Israels President Chaim Herzog to Jakarta. The significance of this event lies in the fact that in trying to play a leadership role in world affairs, Islam did not feature as a major consideration in Soeharto's foreign policy toward Israel, in spite of the sensitivity of the event in Indonesia.

Indeed, there may be an opportunity for Islamist political parties to ride the wave of the possibility of a continuing tug of war in the executive-legislative tussles. At least from a theoretical point of view, smart ideas and/or, at the same time, controversial issues adopted by Yudhoyono could be highly political. This may include the relation-

ship with the US, terrorism, and the Middle East peace process. Most Indonesians are so alienated by the US Middle East policy, from its stance on the Israel-Palestine conflict to its war in Iraq, that anything the US condemns, in the eyes of these Indonesians, can't be all bad. Even the moderates believe that the US has singled out Muslims for repressive action and treats Indonesia in a high-handed way.

Whether such impulses will eventually materialize at the government diplomatic and political level remains to be seen. It is well-nigh impossible to assert what the conduct of Indonesia's foreign policy will be. The current foreign policy initiatives of Indonesia seem to reflect the government's attempt to emphasize the democratic outlook and willingness to discuss many pressing agendas.

For sure, activism, if any, would best serve the interests of Indonesia. Yet, it is unclear whether serving the interests of the state automatically represents the interests of Islam. More importantly, even if they will, it is hard to discern that such policies are the impact of Islamic parties. Putting such a qualification aside, in fact, there are reasons to believe that in lieu of the post-World Trade Center incident, Indonesia may have a better opportunity to play a constructive role to avoid global catastrophe.

Agenda of the World in a post-World Trade Centre "Terrorist" Attack

The debates in international relations and related intellectual discourses around the events unfolding in our times that have direct relevance to 9 September are phenomenal. Prominent thinkers like Noam Chomsky, Arundhati Roy, Tariq Ali, Mahmood Madani, and journalists like Robert Fisk and others have all reflected on the nature of the political developments currently taking place. The essence of their discussions reveals to us the very grave consequences of what is currently taking place, and why these circumstances need to be reversed. President Bush's slogan of "either you are with us or against us" in the war against terror has polarized the world.

This polarization could well endure for some time; and as far as the relationship between the West and the Muslim world is concerned, there have been a number of explanations why the current phenomena

is unfolding globally. First, is growing antagonism by the Muslim and Arab world towards Western, particularly American military presences in their part of the world. This presence has been a longstanding one in some countries, and in others more recent; brought about by war and occupation. The US is cited as the only country to have a military presence in at least 80 nations, if not more. This is regarded by many across the globe as a continuation of an imperial agenda in a world that has by virtue of consensus condemned the pursuit of colonialism and imperial domination through military occupation. This antagonism has been expressed in many different ways over the last few decades, through various political organizations such as the United Nations, and regional bodies such as the Arab League, to more militant action as evident by the emergence of Hammas. The key point of contention is the Israeli occupation of Palestine, US military bases in Saudi Arabia, as well as other imperial designs imposed on Arab and other developing countries.

The second theory revolves around a significant ideological shift in US foreign policy with the election of George Bush as President of the US in 2000, and the increase in neo-conservative thinking as part of the broader spectrum of political thought in the US. Much of this neo-conservative agenda is arguably related to the launch of a US based think tank in the 1990's called The Project for the New American Century.[5] The occurrence of the 9 September disater was in some ways advantageous to such an agenda, and it could be further argued that it was politically expedient to use it as leverage to further legitimize the invasion by the US into countries that serve its strategic interests.

The third set of explanations allude to ideas similar to those posited by Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington, i.e., that modern civilization is in some ways experiencing inevitable clashes within its midst, and that the fundamental differences between the current trajectory of an essentialist Islam and Western culture cannot be sustained; hence the only way to resolve them is through clashes, primarily in the form of militarized engagement. Many scholars reject such notions and argue that in order to make sense of Muslims one has to understand the many multiplicities of Islam. In other words Islam is not a homogeneous faith, it has many ideological leanings ranging from orthodox

to progressive (like any other faith), and it should be understood within those parameters.[6]

The war against terror that America has imposed in Afghanistan, and democratic militarism that Washington applied to Saddam Hussein's Iraq could bring about two serious consequences. First, is the sidelining of the creation of enduring peace, social justice, prosperity, and the protection of human rights. This could actually worsen the quality of life of people in the developing world; and, thus very likely invoke protracted conflict especially in multinational countries. Secondly, it will for sure heighten the tension between the West and the Muslim world.

It is understood that the consequences of an illegal war and occupation as occurred in Iraq, or the still unfolding effects of the invasion of Afghanistan by the US and its coalition armies will have serious repercussions for generations to come. In the meantime, the most vivid consequence is the widening gap between the US and the Islamic world.[7] The present situation is indeed most alarming. The conflicts and the grim developments in the last few years confirm the need and search for explanatory and visionary paradigms that will replace the abstract, yet asymmetric bipolar structure of international relations after the World Trade Center tragedy. Conservatives in the West and orthodox traditionalists in the Islamic world treat the whole dynamic and complex process of human advancement either as an orderly defined ideological task or as an arena for strategically formulated plans against illusory adversaries. As such, they are all too simplistic, perhaps so much so as to ignore the sophisticated layers of human interaction for the sake of simplicity and at the expense of objectivity. In the atmosphere of subjectivity and determinism, what appears to be missing is a call for dialogue and interaction.

Islam and the West: A Clash of Perception

It has always been problematic to counterpose Islam and the West.[8] Islam is increasingly becoming part of the social and political fabric of Western societies because of the presence of growing numbers of European and American Muslims. This development means that the cultural boundaries between the Western and Islamic worlds are becoming increasingly blurred. More importantly, it was noted that the

Islamic and Western worlds are neither culturally and politically homogeneous nor monolithic, nor are they static; rather, new forces and trends are operating within both worlds, especially in the Muslim world.

Nevertheless, it has become a fact of contemporary history that many people have tried to counterpose the two. Huntington's clash of civilization and other writings in the West in early 1990s, they continued to be important and in some extent have been successful in generating a living fantasy. As illusive as it may be, it could well be relevant in some points, especially because international relations are to a large extent solving the problem of perception management.

Regardless of the causes, it is difficult to deny that the Islamist discourse, especially in radical Muslim circles, has constructed the idea of an Islamic civilization in direct opposition to a caricaturized West. Islamists first define the contemporary realities of the West as imperial, morally decadent, unGodly (secular) and the practice of Western power and values as the cause of all problems muslims face. They then imagine a revived Islamic civilization as just, moral, and God-centred or essentially an anti-thesis of their imagined West. Thus the defeat of the West and rejection of Western values (as depicted by Islamists) is necessary for the revival of Islam.

Especially where there is relative deprivation and marginalization, real or perceived, such forces of Islamic ideology, especially concerning holy war (*Jihad*), serve to create in radical Islamists a sense of Islamic universalism or "globalism" to antagonize a Western-centred counterpart or a globalization based on Western civilization and cultural hegemony. That is to say, Islamic radicals have a 'utopian' vision of unitary worldwide Islam in which the ways of government, morality, and social behaviour of all people are regulated according to Islamic law (*sharī'a*).

The globalization of *jihād* and the exportation of Islam are the practical expressions of this determination where 'martyrdom (*istishhād*)' is conceived of as a divine duty in the fight against those who are believed to be corrupt and infidel (*kāfir*). The radical Islamists, backed up a by a sense of ultra-nationalism and religious radicalism, wish to change the present state of affairs by whatever means, including the practice of popular Islamic revolutions (e.g., Iran), mili-

tary coups e.g., Sudan), political assassinations (e.g., Egypt) or other forms of violence and terrorism (e.g., 'Osamah bin Laden' and his Al Qaeda network).

For both Westerners, the US in particular, and Muslims the most important and interesting chapter in Islamic history, culture and civilization so far is the one that is currently being enacted, re-discovered, re-interpreted and re-imposed on domestic, regional and global levels. The process of re-discovery, re-interpretation and re-imposition of Islam, its radical offshoot in specific, is a product of, again, a violence-and-terrorism-generating crisis environment. In some places, resorting to Islam is as, *first*, a refuge providing emotional comfort, peace and certainty of the absolute and, *second*, as a spearhead of socio-political resistance.

Internally this resistance may be launched against what was earlier considered as the crisis environment of political suppression, economic deprivation, socio-economic disparity, frustration, and alienation etc. Externally it may be directed against foreign economic, political, and cultural domination and 'military aggressiveness and hegemony of the United States of America' and Europe. If this internal and external resistance is taking more radical, violent, and terrorist forms in some Middle Eastern and predominantly Muslim countries e.g., Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya etc., it is partly because Islam represents one of the most deep-rooted and therefore least alien cultural strands in such countries.

At the same time, the West, especially America, is also on the verge of rediscovery, if not redefinition of their role in global affairs. After the demise of the Soviet Union, they focused their attention on exporting democracy – both on the conviction of democratic peace and the expedience of regime control. As it was in the past, of course, the latter appeared to be more prominent. They rely on deliberate intervention in the socio-economic, political, and cultural arenas to bring about a "democratic change" in the societies, states, and governments perceived to be authoritarian. In the eyes of neo-conservatives in the American foreign and security policy making establishment, this democratic change can be drawn by coercive diplomacy, or even military operations.

Such a clash of perception could well become a breeding ground for a more anarchic world. Each side now instinctively fits emerging events into its increasingly rigid perception of interests. From a Muslim's perspective, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein by a Western coalition is therefore not about strategic stability or democracy in Iraq. It's about oppressing a Muslim nation, just as many Muslims believe the Indians are doing the same in Kashmir, the Russians in Chechnya, or the Israelis in Palestine. On the other side of the spectrum, jihadist violence and extreme rhetoric is seen not as a response to specific conditions, but as a fundamental flaw within Islam. As such, most in the West may find it difficult to understand that religious militancy is a response to authoritarianism and/or perceived-external domination.

Multiple Dialogues and the Epistemic Community

The main challenge to world security in the third millennium will be posed not so much by rivalries between great powers or by any accelerated revolution in military technology but by human poverty. More than a quarter of the developing world's population still lives in poverty. There is a clear relationship between domestic and regional conflicts and the spread of poverty. Eradicating poverty worldwide should therefore be seen as a practical political strategy in addition to being a moral imperative. A self-sustaining pro-poor growth strategy should be implemented with strong external support; an increase in public spending on human development and a decrease in military expenditures should be seen as integral to this strategy.

At the political level, democracy would remain a contentious issue in the relationship between the West and the Muslim world. This is not to say that Islam is incompatible to democracy and human rights, which of course depends on what level of discourse one is referring to. The opponents of democracy within the Islamic camp base their opposition on claims that Islam and democracy are antithetical of one another. To prove them wrong, Islamic proponents of democracy seek to show that a lack in understanding either of democracy or of Islam, or perhaps of both, is the reason such opponents of democracy arrive at their erroneous conclusions. An almost identical argument could be

applied to the issue of human rights. For every text adduced by the friends of democracy to show that there is no incompatibility between Islam and human rights, the ulama will produce half a dozen others, showing the contrary.

Unfortunately, the post-Cold War world offered a relatively blank sheet of paper on which to write the outlines of a new world order. Short-lived worldwide social agendas proposed by the United Nations and other multilateral organizations in existence since the early 1990s, when the Cold War officially ended with the crumbling of the Berlin Wall, appeared to have been sidelined by the war against terror. Even forums for non-security issues such as APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperations) or the World Bank have appeared to become American instruments to discuss war against terror.

To make it even worse, the atmosphere of mistrust and grievance is thickening in the relationships between the West and the Muslim world. Huntington's clash of civilization may some day become a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy. Even among European Muslims this sense of common victimization gains traction, something that is likely to feed the perception that there are, in reality, two civilizations in conflict.[9] In the Arab Middle East, the need for a renewal of Muslim piety and willingness to fight for the dignity of Islam, through *jihād* if necessary, has emerged unsurprisingly at the top of the agenda.

Apparently what is lacking is a vehicle for dialogue among civilizations that constitute a process for attaining promotion of inclusion, equity, equality, justice, and tolerance in human interactions (read: democracy) and promotion and protection of fundamental freedoms, common ethical standards and universal human values, and respect for cultural diversity and cultural heritage (read: human rights).[10] Needless to say, the notion of dialogue among civilizations needs to be understood and articulated through substantive programmes to facilitate the exchange of views among policy makers, diplomats, scholars and all individuals, groups, governmental and non-governmental organizations in order to advance and institutionalize the idea.

It may be out of the question as to whether such an agenda should be Islamic or universal.[11] As a religion, Islam consists of two circles, an inner small core called *ad-dīnī* (the religious) and a larger outer

shell called *as-siyāsī* (the political). It is this nature of Islam that made it possible for the Prophet, the Rightly-Guided Caliphs and Muslim scholars and political theorists throughout history to devise *ijtihād* to answer questions, resolve problems, and deal with unprecedented situations. Meanwhile, both democracy and human rights are basically concerned with the political authority of state-society relations. Therefore, it is perhaps a fundamental mistake to look for an Islamic antecedent for both the democracy and human rights principle; not simply because there are no such antecedents, but because to argue in such a way is to play into the hands of the *ulama*, the obscurantist religious class.

It is on this issue that Indonesia shares a common strategic goal with the West and the Muslim world. Undoubtedly, this is going to be a perilous endeavour. What we need is perhaps a systematic dismantling and delegitimization of the discourse coming from rogue Islamists that project the West as an anti-Islam crusader power and Islam as an ideology of hate and violence. Unfortunately, it has always been difficult to talk to the West and at the same time to the Muslim world in the same language as they may have their own agenda, priorities, and notions of particular issues, including those of social agenda, human rights, and democracy. More importantly, to create bridges between these two realities is to risk being criticized by both sides.

Of course, diplomacy is a comprehensive effort for all citizens to achieve national interests. It is some what unfortunate that Indonesian diplomats were not active in cultural diplomacy, especially those that were directly related to the issue of bridging the West-Muslim divide. They did not attend the two-day dialog when the 43rd Plenary of the Fifty-Sixth General Assembly convened to discuss Action Programs in Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations that were held soon after the World Trade Center tragedy.[12] For sure, professional diplomats and politicians are the most authoritative actors, yet they also at the same time bring about a political burden. Nevertheless, it must be understood that diplomacy may take private channels, thus, an epistemic community may play a vital role in dialogue among civilizations. From their vantage point of relative intellectual freedom, academics are able to uncover and examine assumptions, unfold shared

meanings and core values and integrate multiple perspectives.

It is important to emphasize that the Western perception of Islam in Indonesia has always been positive, recognizing the moderate character as the mainstream of Islam and seeing that Islam is not only compatible to, but also could well be a basis for pluralist, democracy.[13] Many in the West argue that radicalism in Indonesia is consequential of the abrupt decline of the central authority rather than for religious spirit,[14] and hope for Indonesia to set an example to the Middle East.[15] Meanwhile, the Arab world – even the radical countries like Iran, Syria, and Libya — praised Indonesia for being able to manage Islamic practice amidst corrupt globalization.

These are all great assets to be utilized to bridge the divided Western - Arab world. Perhaps, a tripartite dialogue could well be advantageous to the party involved. Indonesian Muslim scholars have the potential to convince the West that there is no inherent contradiction between Islam and democracy. Thus, the explanation of why so many Muslim countries are not democratic lies in historical, political, cultural, and economic factors, not religious ones. To their radical counterparts in the Muslim world, they may call for innovative and dynamic religious thought, while showing how religious life can flourish in a democratic society.

Concluding Remark

The current foreign policy initiatives of Indonesia seem to reflect the government's attempt to emphasize the democratic outlook, in a way that has never been done before. The participation of President Yudhoyono in international summits, and his bilateral talk on such occasions explains the governments concern on the issue. The message is one that underlines Indonesia's strong adherence to the democratic principles governing international relations. That is for sure a promising sign that Indonesia may in future play a more significant role in world politics.

Whether such intentions will materialize remains to be seen. World politics appears to have returned to the Cold War era, in which military security issues are prominent. The agenda for dialog among cultures has not been adequately tackled in global political institutions.

We are all racing against time to prevent a worsening situation in which Huntington's fantasy becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Whilst official diplomats appear to be ill placed for both bureaucratic and technical reasons, the epistemic community is to play a vital role in colouring the agenda of foreign policy and the conduct of diplomacy.

It is at this point that networks of Muslim intellectuals could play an even more crucial role to bridge the world of different cultures. Islamic values are as universal as democracy and human rights, and Islam is, of course, compatible to such fundamentals. Nevertheless, there will never be an "Islamic democracy" or "Islamic human rights". The essence of both democracy and human rights is the separation between religious and state power and at the same time seeking common ground between social aspects of religion and political aspects of statecraft. Because diplomacy is all about the inter-relationship between actors of different political entities, thus a minus-malum of political aspects should be the most important principle. For sure, it would be to the interest of others if Muslim intellectuals became more organized and insistent in marginalizing and condemning voices that justify violence, incite hatred, and practice demonization of the other. Needless to say, they should also provide policy alternatives, information, and sensitization to foreign policy establishment.

Notes

[1] It is important to note that the concept of "West" derives from three basic and distinctive sources, i.e. the classical legacy of Greece and Rome, Western Christianity, and the enlightenment of the modern age that manifested, among others, in the republic, separation of power, and liberal democracy. Unlike Islam, God and Caesar, Church and state, spiritual and temporal authority had been a prevailing tendency in the Western world.

[2] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Key Aspects of Indonesia's Foreign Policy", in Anwar and Harold Crouch, "Indonesia: Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics", *Trends in Southeast Asia* No. 9 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003).

[3] See Irman G. Lanti and Leonard C. Sebastian, Report on Panel Dialogue on The Future of Indonesia's Islam: The Quest for Equilibrium", Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, 17 June 2002.

[4] Kusnanto Anggoro, "New administration of Yudhoyono and Indonesia's foreign policy", paper presented to the National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, 6 October 2004.

[5] The Project for the New American Century was arguably initially conceptualized as a latter day American imperialist project that seeks to create a modern day American empire, by controlling world affairs. Its founding members included people like Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz.

[6] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 222–49; Bernard Lewis, "Islam and Liberal Democracy," *The Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 271, no. 2 (February 1993), pp. 87–98; and John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

[7] Polling data in 2003 indicate that the majority of the world sees the United States as brand aggressor to the world and the biggest threat to world peace. More recent polling in Europe suggests that most British, French, Italians, and Germans think that the US is motivated by its own interests in the war on terrorism and ignores the concerns of its allies. Complete figures may be found in *View of Changing World 2003*, the Pew Research Centre, 03 June 2003; and Nancy Snow, "Trust, Diplomacy & Public Perception: From Bombs and Bullets to Hearts and Minds", Paper presented to Conference on Communicating the War on Terror, the Royal Institution of Great Britain, London, 5 June 2003.

[8] See, for example, Basyouni Ibrahim Hamada, "Global Culture or Cultural Clash: An Islamic Intercultural Communication Perspective", *Global Media Journal* Vol. 3 Issue 5 (Fall 2004); and Jeremy Black, "Islam and the West: A Historical Perspective," *Foreign Policy Research Institute Special Report* Volume 4, Number 2, May 2003.

[9] Hafez Kai, "Islam and the West: The Clash of Politicized Perception", in Hafez Kai (ed.), *The Islamic World and the West* (Boston: Kolon Brill, 2000).

[10] Asma Barlas, "Reviving Islamic Universalism: East, West and Coexistence", Conference Paper on Contemporary Islamic Synthesis, Alexandria, 4-5 October 2003.

[11] Sanusi Lambo Sanusi, "Democracy, Human Rights and Islam: Theory, Epistemology, and the Quest for Synthesis", paper presented at an interna-

tional conference on "Shari'ah Penal and Family Law in Nigeria and in the Muslim World: A Rights Based Approach" organized by the International Human Rights Law Group, Abuja (Nigeria), 5-7 August 2003.

[12]Agenda for Dialogue Among Civilizations, Fifty-sixth General Assembly, Plenary 43rd Meeting, *Press Release* GA/9955, 11 September 2001.

[13]See Malcolm Cone, "Neo Modern Islam in Soeharto's Indonesia", *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* Vol. 4 No. 2 (December 2002): pp. 52-67; Joint USINDO-Asia Foundation Conference, Islam in Modern Indonesia, Washington, 7 February 2002; Natalie Hand, "America and the Islamic Revival: Reconstituting US Foreign Policy in the Muslim World", *Senior Capstone* (Washington: American University, 2004), especially pp. 64-83; and Discussion with Zachary Abuza and Marie Hatala on Islam in Southeast Asia, Transcript, Council on Foreign Relations, 8 February 2005. Exception to all these positive assessment is, among other, Daniel Mandel, "Indonesian Democracy vs. Islamist Fundamentalism", *Front Page Magazine*, 10 August 2004.

[14]See for example Angel M. Rabasa, "Moderates against extremists", *The International Herald Tribune*, 31 October 2002; and Ceryl Benard, *Civil Democratic Islam: Partner, Resources and Strategies*, RAND Publication MR 1716 (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2003)

[15]John Hughes, "Indonesia could set example for Arab land", *Desert News*, (Salt Lake City), October 2004.

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